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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains a discussion of the organization, 
ideas and methods of the Indian'nationalists from 1897 to 
1905, the response of the Government to the nationalists, 
and the policies of the Government which were opposed by 
the nationalists. It covers the final two years of Lord 
Elgin1s Viceroyalty and the whole of Lord Curzon!s Vice­
royalty, In 1897 India suffered severe famine and plague.
The famine confirmed the nationalists in their view that 
India’s population was growing poorer as the result of 
high revenue assessments and the drain of wealth to Europe. 
The persistency of claims to this effect led British 
officials to initiate inquiries into both the land revenue 
system and the expenditure of Indian revenue in England.
The measures used to combat plague in Western India were 
deeply resented. In Poona members of a conspiratorial 
organization murdered a British plague official. The 
Government did not find the last of the murderers until 
1899. In the meantime officials decided that without 
tighter control over education and the press, political 
disaffection was likely to spreadt Accordingly, measures 
were adopted providing for stricter supervision of education 
and a summary procedure of action against seditious news­
papers, The plague threatened the commerce of Bengal and
4the Indian Municipal Commissioners of Calcutta, who were 
<Jl held responsible for the insanitary condition of that city, 
were relieved of their control of the municipality in the 
hope of checking the plague.
The Indian National Congress movement was suffering 
from internal divisions, inactivity, and falling popularity. 
But the Japanese victories over Russia and the partition of 
Bengal unexpectedly revived it. In the agitation against 
the partition, new sections of the population became 
involved in politics and new methods were used.
This thesis is based on contemporary newspapers, 
periodicals, and tracts, and on Government records and the 
private papers of several officials, including those of 
lord Elgin (Viceroy 1894-98), Lord Hamilton (Secretary of 
State 1895-1903) and Lord Curzon (Viceroy 1899-1905).
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an attempt to define the ideas and 
tactics of the Indian National Congress and its supporters, 
and to show how the Government in India responded to those 
ideas and tactics. The Congress is the centre of this study 
because it was the only political organization in India 
that made any pretence of being "national" or representative 
of all races and religions#
The Congress as an organization offers an unsatis­
factory object of study because in the years 1897 to 1905 
it was more a general movement, an idea, and an attitude 
of mind than a concrete political party. It met for three 
days each year, it passed a number of resolutions which 
were carefully selected and edited so that minority groups 
within the Congress would not object to them. But there was 
no debate, only speech-making, in the annual sessions5 
there was no standing organization which carried on the 
political work of the Congress in India between the annual 
sessions; and there were no official Congress publications, 
except India which was published in London by the British 
Committee of the Congress and which printed more contribu­
tions from the British friends of the Congress than from 
Indians themselves, Therefore a study of nationalism in 
this period, if it is to be meaningful, must be concerned 
with the individual members of the Congress acting in 
their private capacities or on behalf of their local
8political organizations,
With the spread of education and the growth of the 
press one might expect that there would have been an 
increase in political unrest and activity, Except for en­
larging the size and functions of the Legislative Councils, 
few of the Congress demands were met between 1885, when the 
Congress was founded, and 1905# Meanwhile, the numbers of 
newspapers and of educated Indians were growing rapidly.
In 1885, there were 160 English newspapers and periodicals 
with a circulation of 90,000; in 1905, there were 309 
English newspapers with a circulation of 276,000, In the 
same period, the number of vernacular newspapers and 
periodicals increased from 599 to 1,107 (newspapers only) 
and their circulation from 299,000 to 817,000, In 1886,
4,286 Indian students matriculated and 708 received their 
B.A.s; in 1905 the nuiiibe r s we re 8,211 and 1,570 respectively. 
In 1887, there were 298,000 persons studying English and 
in 1907 there were 505,000.^ Despite this growth, the 
period under review was a time of political decline and 
stagnation for the Congress and the local political 
associations. Without exception, the Indian Association of 
Calcutta, the Rafai-am Association of Lucknow, the Indian
1. G-ovt, of India despatch, 21 March 1907, No,7, I.H.P,, 
Pub,, MSS,Eur, L.573/29.
Association of Lahore, the Sarvajanik Sabha of Poona, the 
Presidency Association of Bombay, and the Mahajana Sabha 
of Madras showed less vitality than in previous years. The 
Pounding of the Congress removed part of the raison d fetre 
of these bodies, and their leaders, who had put most 
of their effort into local political work, divided their 
time after 1885 between provincial and national activity, 
without making the sacrifices necessary for the success of 
either.
There was a growing realization that the Congress 
movement had neither created a national spirit nor 
aroused a political consciousness among the population.
The ideal of an all-Indian political organization seemed 
further from fulfilment than it had in the early years of 
the Congress, and there was a tendency to concentrate on 
the unification of the religious, regional,linguistic, and 
caste units instead. The Congress had tried to attract the 
Muslims but, with a number of individual exceptions, they 
had refused to join, largely because, as a minority group, 
they distrusted Congress demands for representative 
institutions and competitive examinations for government 
service. Some Muslims also feared that any political 
activity by the Muslims would be mistaken by the British 
for disloyalty. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan had been instrumental 
in keeping the arguments against joining the Congress
before the Muslim community but after his death in 1898, 
there was discernably less anti-Congress sentiment. The 
United Indian Patriotic Association and the Muhammadan 
Anglo- Oriental Defense Association, the two organizations 
founded to combat the Congress, had ceased to be effective. 
Furthermore, in the years 1898 to 1903 there was shift 
among the Muslims in some areas from "active resistance" 
to "passive acquiescence" and there was discussion as to 
whether the Muslims ought to join the Congress.*1" The 
Bengalee even told the Muslims that if they did join, the 
demands for representative government and simultaneous and 
competitive examinations for the civil service would be 
dropped. But this suggestion was made by Surendra Nath 
Banerjea who was exceptionally conciliatory, and it would 
probably not have received the assent of most other 
Congress leaders.
Three Congress leaders Lala Lajpat Rai, Pandit Madan 
Mohan Malaviya, and Bal G-angadhar Tilak, who were probably 
the most influential Congress members in their respective 
provinces, pursued lines of action which damaged the 
prospects of a Hindu-Muslim political combination. In the
1. See article by Alfred Nundy in the Bengalee, 5 Dec, 1900, 
Also Kayagtha Samachart Vol.3, No.4 (April 1901) 
p.p.d 93-96. For a comprehensive study of the Muslims 
in this period, see Rafiq Ahmed Zakaria. Muslims in 
India; A Political Analysis (1885-1906;, London Ph.D. 
Thesis, 194^
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Punjab, lajpat Rai wrote in 1901 that the Congress ought 
to abandon f,this attempt at forced union" with the Muslims, 
He thought the Hindus should devote their energies to a 
Congress which would give them "unity and strength as a 
religious unity", "It is futile to attempt a chemical and 
premature union of the varipus religious nationalities," 
Instead each community should have "a free hand to 
strengthen themselves, and to exhaust all means by which 
they can do so at the cost" of the other communities. Among 
the particular steps Lajpat Rai envisaged were the 
reconversion to Hinduism of persons who had embraced Islam 
and Christianity and the substitution of Hindi and the 
Devanagri script for Urdu and the Arabic s c r i p t , T h i s
1, Lala Lajpat Rai "The Coming Indian National Congress - 
Some Suggestions," Kayastha Samachar, Vol.IV, No,5 
(Nov, 1901), pp.377-82, Lala Lajpat Rai was almost 
certainly the author of an article entitled "The 
Shivaji Cult and Its Detractors" [Kayastha Samachar,
Vol.Vi, Nos, 3 & 4 (Sept, Oct. 1902), p.243]
He attacked the Hindus who were trying to replace the 
Shivaji festival with an Akbar festival. Akbar, he said, 
did not play the role "of a national leader battling 
against the foreigner and the oppressor, rousing the 
energies and the enthusiasm of his nation for the 
defense of the fatherland." He condemned "the fawning 
and supplicating attitude which certain Hindu leaders 
assumed in order to win the Mohammedans to the Congress 
fold." In 1897 Lajpat Rai wrote biographies of 
Shivaji, Garibaldi, and Mazzini in Urdu for schoolboys.
12
toughness of mind was by no means general but it was 
spreading.
In the North West Provinces and Oudh, Pandit 
Madan Mohan Malavi'Ja led or helped to lead most of the 
communal agitations for many years, including the campaign 
for the prevention of cow killing which led to serious 
Hindu-Muslim rioting in northern India in 1893-94, and the 
campaign for a Hindu University at Benares* He also was 
instrumental in the agitation for the recognition of 
Hindi as an official language in the North West Provinces 
and Oudh which succeeded in 1900 and was vehemently 
opposed by the Muslims.^
In Bombay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak followed a similar 
course. He championed the cow-protection movement and the 
right of Hindu processions to play music while passing 
mosques, although this caused the Muslim members of the 
Sarvajanik Sabha to resign their membership. He converted 
the Ganapati festival from a primarily domestic occasion 
into a political celebration with public processions which 
the Muslims regarded as an offensive parody of their own 
Muharram festival. In the 1894 Ganapati festival, one of
1. See Hamid Ali Khan, The Vernacular Controversy: An 
Account and Criticism of the !EquaTis~ation of Nagri 
and Urdu, as the Character for the Court of the 
INorth-Y/e st Province s and Oudh...(1900).
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Tilak*s close friends, Tatya Sahib Natu, led one of the 
Ganapati processions past a mosque in which Muslims were 
praying, ignoring police orders to stop playing music# A 
riot ensued in which a number of Muslims lost their lives* 
Tilak probably hoped that by provoking the hostility of 
the Government and the Muslims, a sense of community and 
political awareness would be stimulated among the Hindus# 
Reporting on the cause of the Poona Ganapati riot in 1894, 
the Commissioner of the Central Division, Bombay, wrote that 
he supported "the views entertained by the more respectable 
natives that the agitation by the Deccan Brahmans is 
directed in reality not against the Muhammadans, but 
against the Government* Their pretended earnestness on 
behalf of the Hindu religion ... is only a b l i n d , I n  
1895 Tilak started a second popular festival, the Shivaji 
coronation celebration, which was resented by the Muslims, 
Its purpose was similar to that of Ganapati melas in that 
it was designed to broaden and intensify the nationalist 
movement by reviving memories of Shivaji's heroism and the 
glorious days of Maratha independence. Commenting on the 
early Ganapati and Shivaji festivals, the Sedition Committee
1. J.Down, Inspector General of Police, to Under Sec., Govt, 
of Bombay, Ind. Dept., 15 July 1899, Enclosure to S.W. 
Edgerley, Sec., Govt, of Bombay, to Sec., Govt, of India, 
Home Dept., 25 Aug. 1899, Sept. Prog, No.6, I.H.P., Pub., 
V 01.5640, Por an account of the Ganapati festival, see 
Victor Barnouw, "The Changing Character of a Hindu 
Festival,11 American Anthropologist, Vol.56, No.l,
(Feb. 1954); TTpp:-------- ------- -
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of 1918 cited them as the first "indications of a revolu-, 
tionary movement" in India,"*" Tilak himself admitted in 1919 
that "Swarajya" (self-rule) was "the end of the (Shivaji) 
festival,
The shift in emphasis from national to parochial 
objectives was often only a change in method since the 
ultimate aim of Lajpat Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak was, 
like that of the less resolute leaders, some form of 
self-rule. But the shift was no less important because of 
this. The decline of the Social Conference was another 
indication of the retreat from the hope of immediate 
national union. The Social Conference, when it was started 
in 1887, was closely connected with the Congress and its 
leaders. It held its meetings in the Congress pandal 
immediately after the Congress session adjourned and many 
Congress delegates attended the Social Conference, In 1895 
when the Congress and the Social Conference were due to 
meet in Poona, Tilak and the local orthodox Brahmans 
objected to the use of Congress enclosure by the social 
reformers. Tilak claimed that his objection was based on 
this belief that politics and social reform should be 
separated: to insist on social reform would alienate large
1.Sedition Committee, 1918. Report, p.l.
2. The Legal Proceedings in the~Case of Tilak versus Chirol 
and another before Mr, Justice Larling and a Special
Jury, p.116.
numbers of potential supporters for the more crucial politl 
cal movement. However, much of the opposition to the Social 
Conference arose out of the threat it posed to Brahman 
superiority, Tilak1s campaign against the Maharaja of 
Kolapur for appointing non-Brahman officials revealed 
where Tilak1 s sympathies lay. The "orthodox1 group held a 
public meeting on 22 October 1895 to protest against the 
proposed use of the Congress enclosure by the reformers.
The meeting developed into a fracas between the reformers 
and the orthodox, and the police intervened to restore 
order. But the meeting did adopt a resolution moved by 
Tilak which regretted that "the work of the Indian National 
Congress is drifting into the hands of a small clique", 
and expressed the wish that the work be entrusted to 
people "who are prepared to work for the Congress alone," 
Finally Justice M.G.Ranade, Secretary of the Conference, 
agreed not to stage the Social Conference in the Congress 
pandal, but only after further violence, the intervention 
of Congress leaders of Calcutta and Bombay and the resigna­
tion of Tilak from his position as Secretary of the Poona 
Congress Committee,"*”
1, S,L.Karandikar, Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilaks The
Hercules and Prometheus of Modern India, pp.125-28. 
Also, J.Down to* Under Sec,, Govt, of Bombay, Jud. 
Dept, 15 July 1899, op.cit.
The Social Conference was allowed to hold its meetings 
in the Congress pandal when the Congress met in other 
cities* Nevertheless, it was thought that "a certain 
amount of pronounced antipathy to social reform and 
reformers is becoming a passport to popularity for the 
Congress politician*
Except in Bengal, where the reaction against social 
reform was most complete, the caste conferences were 
usurping the role of the Social Conference as the main 
vehicle for reform. Hargovind Dayal, Chairman of the 
Reception Committee of the 1899 Social Conference, told 
the Conference that "if India is to he regenerated and 
unified, we must begin with the units of which it is com­
posed* It is impossible that they should be reformed on the 
2
same lines." The caste conference movement was supposed 
to promote social reform within each caste. It was hoped 
that by encouraging inter-dining and intermarriage between 
the sub-castes, the fragmentation and decay in Indian 
society would be checked. The caste conferences were also 
a reaction against Western concepts of individualism and 
a movement in favour of India1s supposed traditions of 
collectivism. In an editorial against the individualism
1. K.S.Rau, "Social and Political Reform", East and West, 
Vol.l, No.4 (Peb, 1902), p.425- 
2* Report of the 13th Social Conference, 1899* p#8.
which the Congress was said to he promoting, the Indian 
Mirror of Calcutta commented that "the wonder of the 
situation is that those who thus help to destroy a nation 
by sundering its ties congratulate themselves on being 
nation-builders" because they organise national congresses 
and conferences. "To think that a nation can be built up 
not by a common faith in trial by jury, local self-govern­
ment, technical education, and things of this kind, is the
1
wildest of dreams." The caste conferences, which began
in 1887 with the Kayastha Conference, met at Christmas
time, and detracted somewhat from the Congress sessions on
which they had been modelled. Some Congress leaders
regretted the conferences because they tended to promote
inter-caste rivalry, antagonism, and jealousy. But it was
recognized that they induced people "to take an interest
2
in public matters who cannot otherwise be reached."
In the period covered by this thesis, some national­
ist leaders, who had previously been hostile to or refused 
to discuss caste, discovered new merits in the social 
system. In 1889, for instance, Bepin Chandra Pal, had said 
"the war-cry of modern Indian politics is Representative 
Government, but, he asked, "in the new Democracy of young
1. Article entitled "Japan and India", Indian Ration,
1 Aug. 1904, Enclosure No.15, Gov. Gen. in Council to 
Sec.of State, 2 Feb. 1905, Feb. Prog. No.166. I.H.P., 
Pub., Vol.7046.
2. Alfred Nundy, "Caste as a Factor in Indian Politics”, 
Kayastha Samachar, Vol.5, No.2, (March 1902), p.253*1 - ■ *
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India, where is the Pariah and his like to be?". His ideal 
was the formation of one class with equal duties and equal 
rights, and he condemned "this brainless attempt to prop up 
tumbled-down superstitions, to defend time-worn monstros­
ities" in "this caste-ridden, this priest ridden, this
1authority-ridden country," But in 1904, he said that 
India's social organization showed "genius" in the 
"constitutional freedom" it provided. Similarly, Surendra 
Nath Banerjea, who had previously regarded caste as a 
divisive force, discovered in 1905 that it was "a source of 
National Unity •.,. Henceforth the Indian leader of genius 
will be the one who can use caste, not one who requires to 
fight against it."^
1. Bipinchandra Pal. Writings and Speeches, Vol.l, pp.19-24# 
2# Ibid, p.40.
3* Bengalee, 10 Nov. 1905,
H.H7Eisley ["Race Basis in Indian Politics", Contemporary 
Review, Vol.57 (May 1890), p.755] had written"thait 
the Indian social system, among both Mohomedans and 
Hindus, presents about the most perfect example of 
organized, though as yet unused, political machinery 
that it is possible for the human imagination to 
conceive," Por a discussion of the political function 
of caste, see Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, "The Political 
Role of India's Caste Associations," Pacific Affairs, 
Vol.XXXIII, No.1 (March I960), p.5#
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The Government of India did not have a definite 
policy towards the Congress except that of non-recognition 
and tolerance. The Government tried to avoid acknowledging 
its influence hy refusing to receive its deputations and 
by seldom referring to it in public statements. Equally, 
it avoided giving the impression of persecuting the 
Congress, There were some occasions on which the Congress 
was recognized by the Government, Starting in 1901 the 
Congress organized an annual industrial conference in 
conjunction with the Congress session itself. Officials 
not only assisted the Congress with the industrial confer­
ences, but even donated money to it. In 1899 Curzon removed 
from his "native Honours1 list all the names" of persons 
connected "with anti-British papers or Societies",'*' However, 
in subsequent years, association with the Congress was 
not in itself a necessary disqualification from honours.
N*G.Chandavarkar and C, Sankara Hair, former Presidents of 
the Congress, were appointed to serve' as High Court 
Justices, and Pherozeshah Mehta was knighted. The
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 7 June 1899, MSS.Eur. D.510/2,
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main reason for the absence of a comprehensive policy
towards the Congress was that the nationalist movement
was not regarded as an immediate danger to British rule
outside of the Bombay Deccan* The Congress was seldom
discussed in the private correspondence of Lord Elgin ^
and Lord Curzon* Curzon, in particular, seemed unconcerned
with the nationalist movement* When he did write about it,
he usually said that the Congress was declining as the
result of his administrative and economic reforms* He seemed
'the.
to have no awareness of W  psychology of nationalism and 
this led him to ignore the Congress and the educated 
classes when he carried out his policies, In his correspond­
ence he often wrote of the wisdom of consulting and con­
ciliating public opinion* But the times he emphasised the 
importance of public opinion seemed to be the occasions on 
which he most clearly ignored Indian feeling, as in 1901 
when he decided upon sweeping educational reforms and in 
1905 when he partitioned Bengal* Curzon*s willingness to 
flout nationalist opinion, was an indication of the 
Congress's weakness* But more importantly, it stemmed from
his assumption that the people of India were extraordinar-
2ily inferior to Englishmen in "character" and "capacity".
1, The year 1897 was an exception. See Chapters I and II,
2. Curzon to A.J.Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury,
No,211, C*P,E*A., 1899-1901, Curzon Papers*
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Curzon possessed an unusual understanding and insight into 
Indian administrative problems and he respected, at least 
in the abstract, the fact that India had an ancient history 
and civilization* But his correspondence contains so few 
references to Indians other than the rulers of Indian 
states, that it is possible he had neither curiosity nor 
knowledge about the remainder of Indian society. He did not 
foresee a time when the British Government of India might 
be forced to make concessions to rising aspirations* In 
fact, he asked Indians to give up privileges which he 
thought were incompatible with efficient government* The 
main danger to British rule, in his opinion, came from the 
exacerbation of racial feeling in India* But he attributed 
the growing racial antagonism almost entirely to the failure 
of European officials and juries to punish Europeans who 
killed Indians in shooting accidents and "affrays*
1* In 1903, Curzon wrote to Hamilton on twelve different 
occasions about European outrages on Indians and mis­
carriages of justice, but he barely mentioned national­
ism in that year*
Curzon*s efforts to secure equal justice for all races 
in ce&mses'of this type were among the most admirable and 
courageous policies he adopted* He sacrificed much 
popularity with the European community but he believed 
that unless the number of violent collisions was 
checked, racial feeling might "boil over in mutiny and 
rebellion." Between March 1898 and March 1900, there 
' were 129 affrays between European soldiers* shooting 
parties and Indians, but because of Curzon*s new rules 
for shooting expeditions, only 45 such cases were 
reported in the next five years.
Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon of Kedieston 
in the Home Department, p.14.
Although the Government did not have a comprehensive 
policy towards Indian nationalism, it did take measures 
to impede the social changes taking place in India and to 
q assist the classes which were falling behind in the 
competition for government service, education, and land* 
The possibility, or probatility, that a limited number 
of castes - the Brahmans, Kayasthas, Vaidyas, Khatris, 
Banias - would utilize the institutions of an open 
society in order to place themselves in a position from 
which they could dominate the rest of society had been 
recognized before 1895# But it was during the Yiceroyal *• 
ties of Elgin and Curzon that a decisive departure was 
taken from the policy of liberalism and towards a policy 
of paternalism and state interference* The significance 
of this departure for a study of nationalism is that its 
effect might well have been to strengthen the potential 
allies of the British and to remove the grounds for dis­
content among the classes who were still beyond the 
influence of nationalist feeling. As far as the Congress 
supporters themselves were concerned, the shift in policy 
threatened the vital economic interests of the middle 
class from which they came.
23
The official summary of Lord Curzon1s administration
contains an account of how the land was appropriated by the
middle classes.^ The views expressed in this account were
shared by officials who helped prepare legislation between
1895 and 1899 to restrict the expropriation of land by the
middle classes. It suggested that before British rule began,
agriculturists had to surrender all their produce, except
what was needed for subsistence, to the State and the
revenue collectors.
"As the State gradually moderated its demands 
the landholder found himself blessed with a 
larger and larger surplus. His land, which 
in former days no one would accept as a gift, 
became now valuable property. The landholder 
therefore began gradually to borrow on the 
security of his land, the moneylender began 
to find the security good. The more reckless 
the landholder became the more usurious 
became the moneylender; and by degrees the 
land through large tracts of country passed 
on mortgage or sale from the old agricult­
ural families to an entirely new class of 
man. To the English rulers of the country 
this at first seemed well and good. To them - 
brought up as they were on the ideas of 
Bentham and Mill - the agriculturist and the 
moneylender were mere units in the process 
of production and the free transfer of land 
was a feature of progress which could 
bring no one any thing but benefit. By open 
courts, and free competition the land went to 
the economically strong who best deserved it, 
and if the economically weak were thus 
ground out of existence, this was an 
inevitable result of the forces which work 
for progress,"
1, Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon of Kedleston 
in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, pp,22-23
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In the latter part of the nineteenth century officials and
landholders hegan to protest. The Government tried
"to find remedies by interfering with the 
strict laws of contract, by altering the 
strict rules of evidence, by insolvency 
proceedings, by conciliation, by reducing 
the revenue. But it was found to be all in 
vain. The land continued to pass - in some 
areas steadily, in others with appalling 
rapidity - from its old owners to the
moneylender, the townsman, tha suqcessf^l, ^ 1  f i t
lawyer, the prosperous merchant“c iancf*^o' '• *
them was a commercial asset and a tenant ■
a rival to be rack-rented. The^were always
of a different class from the agriculturist;
often of a different caste of nationality;
and in many cases of a different religion.
They were inferior in physique and inferior 
in moral calibre to the men whom they 
supplanted. Their accession to property 
in land entailed in all cases impoverishment, 
and in many cases social and political 
discontent, among the dispossessed peasantry."
The measures adopted during Lord Curzon1s administration
to check the alienation of land in Bombay and the Punjab
were intended to meet this problem."^
During the period covered by this thesis, there was
a conscious effort to strengthen the aristocratic and
conservative classes. For Hamilton, at least, it was a
means of combatting the influence of nationalism. He wrote
"if we could break the educated Hindu party into two
sections holding widely different views we should, by such
1. Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon of
Kedleston in the Revenue and Agriculture Department,
pp.22-23.
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a division, strengthen our position against the subtle and
continuous attack which the spread of education must make
upon our present system of Government. " The laws to keep
the landed estates from passing out of the hands of old 
1
families, the decision in 1902 to grant army commissions 
to sons of aristocratic families, and Lord Curzonfs insis­
tence upon a higher conception of public service and 
responsibility among the rulers of native states are 
examples of official efforts to preserve the aristocracy 
from decay and profligacy.
The other measure adopted for the purpose of prevent­
ing a "class rule" was the abolition of the competitive 
examination for the provincial civil service. In 1900 the
1. Apart from the Punjab Land Alienation Act and the
Bombay Land Revenue Code Amendment Act, these laws were 
not of major importance. They included an act to 
enlarge the powers of the Court Wards in the North West
Provinces and Oudh in 1899; an act to check the sub­
division of revenue-free assignments (jagirs) in the 
Punjab in 1900; an act to enlarge the powers of the 
Court of Wards in Madras in 1902; and act to restrict 
the alienation of land in Chota Nagpur in 1903; acts 
providing a special insolvency procedures for encumbered 
estates and restricting the alienation of land in 
Bundelkund in 1903; an act to preserve ancient 
zamindari estates in Madras in 1904; an act to establish 
a Court of Wards in Bombay Presidency; and an act to
• prevent the transfer of ancestral land outside the 
agnatic family in the Punjab in 1905.
Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon of
Kedleston in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, 
pp.123-25.
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the Secretary of State asked the Government of India if 
"the system of public instruction in India provided a 
suitable and loyal class of Government servants" and if 
unsuccessful candidates for Government service might not 
"become a political danger*" The Government of India 
decided "that the principle of competition for appointments 
was of recent and foreign origin and of uncertain and 
unsatisfactory operation*" Accordingly, in March 1904 in the 
United Provinces, Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, the provincial 
civil service examinations were abolished* In the United 
Provinces it was decided to specify that deputy collectors 
should be chosen from "the landlord class;" and the 
"European schools.
There still were occasions when officials could 
intervene in politics in order to prop up the older families* 
In Lucknow, for instance, the Talukdar Association, the 
main landholders* organization in Oudh, had fallen into the 
hands of a number of pro-Congress lawyers* Sir Anthony 
MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North West 
Provinces and Oudh, was visited by several of the talukdars 
who complained that the Maharaja of Ayodhya, the 
President, had allowed the lawyers to gain control by his 
ineptitude* They "said they did not know how to correct
1. Summary of Administration of Lord Curzon of Kedleston 
in the Home Department, pp.179-80,
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matters; and begged of me to help, I managed to argue 
Ayodhya over; and now a regular procedure has been pre­
scribed which will clip the wings of the vakils who were,
1
for their own ends, pulling the strings*" In another case, 
the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Sir John Woodburn, had to 
intervene to settle a rancorous dispute among the Bengal 
zamindars over election procedure in the British Indian
p
Association. But generally speaking, the allies of the 
British Government were losing their former position of 
strength.
Although the landed families of Bengal and other 
provinces were falling behind in the competition with the 
professional middle class at the turn of the century, 
persons like the Gaikwar of Baroda and the Maharaja of 
Darbhanga still possessed more influence and prestige than 
the Bal Gangadhar Tilaksand the Surendra Nath Banerjeas,
This fact was realized by the Congress leaders who seldom 
deliberately antagonized an important zamindar* A contest 
for the seat on the Bengal Legislative Council in 1904 
revealed both the power of the titled zamindar and the
1. A.P.MacDonnell to Curzon, 29 April 1899, No,IX, C.W.P.I, 
1899, Curzon Papers.
Bengalee, 30 Aug. 1901. The dispute was between the 
Calcutta zamindars and the mofussil zamindars. The latter’ 
formed the Bengal Landholders* Association in August 
1901 and immediately raised Rs,1,35,000 in subscriptions. 
This was more than twice as much as the Indian National 
Congress could raise in most years.
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precarious political position of the lesser zamindar, 
who did not join the Congress, Sitanath Roy, one of 
Dacca1s wealthiest zamindars and merchants, was competing 
with Amblea Charan Mazumdar, a lawyer and a Congress leader, 
for the seat to be chosen by the Local Boards of the Dacca 
Division, According to Sitanath Roy, he had been promised 
the six votes of the Mymensingh District Board*s delegate 
and therefore was assured of victory. But then Surendra 
Nath Banerjea and other Congress people persuaded the 
Maharaja of Mymensingh that it would be a serious blow 
to the influence of the Congress if one of its prominent 
members was defeated. In consequence, the Maharaja told 
the delegate from Mymensingh to cast his vote in favour 
of A,C.Mazumdar although it had been the Maharaja who had 
promised the Mymensingh votes to Sitanath Roy in the first 
place* The result was that A. C.Mazumdar won and Sitanath 
Roy, who had helped the Congress leaders in the early 
agitation against the partition of Bengal, told the Lieuten-;
I
ant-Governor of Bengal "that all his services were at the 
disposal of the Government.
Most of the major clashes between the nationalists
1. A,H,L.Fraser to Curzon, 31 Aug, 1904, and its enclosurey 
Note of an interview with Rai Sitanath Roy Bahadur and 
his brother, No. 125, Correspondence during Lord Curzon^ 
Absence from India, 1904, Curzon Papers.
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and the Government during this period were not the result 
of Government policy towards the Congress. Their origin 
lay elsewhere. The most important differences grew out of 
plague administration, land revenue policy, Curzon's drive £ 
for efficiency, and the financial relations "between India 
and England. The outbreak of violent nationalism after 
1905 cannot be attributed to the Government's policy 
towards nationalism, but rather to the policies which were 
adopted in spite of the nationalists, and to the failure 
of the moderates in the Congress to provide adequate 
leadership.
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CHAPTER I.
THE UNREST OF 1897
Between September 1896 and September 1897, British 
India experienced a series of misfortunes of greater magni­
tude than in any previous year since the Government of India 
was transferred to the Crown. It was a year of plague and 
famine, of riots, political unrest, and sedition. There were 
costly and dangerous tribal risings along the North-West 
Frontier, and Assam was devastated by an earthquake. It was 
a year which gave The Times the "painful" impression "that 
India continues under British rule, very much as it was 
under Mughal rule, the arena of disruptive forces on a vast 
scale."'1' For many politically conscious Indians, it was a 
year in which they witnessed "the inauguration of a repress­
ive regime unparalleled in the annals of India" since the 
Mutiny.2
The start of the famine coincided with the first out­
break of plague late in the summer of 1896. By the end of 
the year extensive famine relief was being given in Bombay, 
the Central Provinces, Madras, Bengal, and the North-West 
Provinces and Oudh. By the end of 1897, India had experienced 
"intense and severe distress" over a larger area than in any 
previously recorded famine.-^ An area covering 225,000
The Times, 19 July 1897.
2. Bengale~ 31 July 1897.
3. Be port of the Indian Famine Commission, 1898, p.234.
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square miles was affected and an average of 2,220,000
1
persons received relief daily for one year. Although few 
deaths were officially attributed to starvation, many 
thousands succumbed to cholera and other diseases which, in 
ordinary times, they would have withstood. In the Central 
Provinces the mortality rate rose from its annual average 
of 33*76 (1891-95) to 69.34 per mille in 1897;2 in Bombay, 
where the normal rate was less than 30 per mille, it reached 
45 in 1896-97.3
The resistance to the payment of the land revenue 
demand in Bombay was the most notable political feature of 
the 1896-97 famine. The Bombay Government, which had been
frequently criticized for its failure to suspend sufficient
/ 4^ amounts of the demand in years of scarcity, issued a notice
to its revenue officials early in December 1896 affirming
the principle that no cultivator should be forced to borrow
in order to pay the assessment. Several days later, however,
the Government learned that "persons not immediately
connected with the land" were fostering "a determination to
pay no revenue," Because of this the Commissioner of the
Central Division, Bombay Presidency, felt it necessary to
1* Ibid, p.196.
2. Ibid, p.173.
3. Ibid, p.182.
v 4. See especially "Report of the Commission appointed to 
inquire into the working of the Deccan Agriculturists* 
Relief Act, 1891-92," paras. 65-66. Also, E.C.Buck,
Sec., Rev, and Agric. Dept. Govt, of India, to H. Babing- 
ton Smith, Pri. Sec. to Elgin, 29 April 1894, Reg, No, 
267B, MSS. Eur. P,84.
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reverse the earlier instructions and he ordered the Assist­
ant Collectors in all the affected districts as well as in 
Thana, Kolaba, and Ratnagiri to issue "notices preliminary 
to the forfeiture of occupancy" to all persons who had 
failed to pay an instalment of the revenue within 10 days of 
the date on which it was due. The only persons to he 
excepted from this order were those persons who were "not 
well-to-do" in the opinion of the mamlatdar and whose "crops 
have not reached four annas" (i.e., 25% of a theoretically 
normal crop). Both conditions were necessary in order to 
qualify for a suspension.^
This policy was carried out with vigour. In the whole 
Bombay Presidency only Rs. 9.6 lakhs were suspended and a 
half lakh remitted.^ Of the total demand 94% was recovered. 
In Bijapur District, where "the crops wholly failed11, the 
Collector remitted none of the assessment and suspended a 
mere one-fifth.*^ The Famine Commission of 1898 thought that 
this "questionable" policy probably forced "the majority of 
the smaller landholders" to borrow in order to pay the 
revenue demand.^”
The "persons not immediately connected with land" were 
representative of the Sarvajanik Sabha of Poona. Prom its
1. Resolution and Memorandum by the Commissioner, Central 
Div., 30 Dec. 1896.
2. In the N.W.P. and 0., Rs. 1,44 lakhs were suspended and 
Rs.65 lakhs were remitted. In the Central Provinces, out 
of a total demand of Rs. 90 lakhs, Rs.24 lakhs were sus­
pended, and another Rs.27 remitted. Report of Indian 
Famine Commission, 1898, p.204.
3- Ibid, p.89.
4. Ibid, p.185.
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founding in 1870 the Sarvajanik Sabha had taken an active 
interest in economic conditions in the villages. During the 
1877-78 famine, Mahadev G-ovind Ranade had organized an in­
telligence service among Sabha workers to determine the 
effect of scarcity on villagers and to suggest improvements 
in the Government1 s relief measures. The Sarvajanik Sabha*s 
criticisms were welcomed by the Government of Bombay until 
it was suspected that the Sabha agents had instigated a 
strike among the labourers on the relief works.1 In 1896 
the Sabha again sent its members into the affected areas to
explain,by means of lectures and pamphlets#the provisions
2
of the Famine Code, and to collect information.
In December 1896, one of the Sabha workers, Anantrano 
Eksambekar, was apprehended in Dharwar District while he was 
distributing pamphlets stating that the Government had 
issued orders to the Collectors to grant remissions of land 
revenue "in places where the out-turn of crops is 6 annas 
and to postpone its realization till next year where the 
crop is 12 annas." In theory a normal crop equalled 16 
annas. In fact no such orders had been issued.*^ Other
James Kellock,
1. Mahadev Govind Ranade; Patriot and Social Servant; p.30.
2. the Times of India (Overland Edition), 9 Jan. 1897* 
and T.V.Parvate, "Bal Gangadhar Tilak: A Narrative and 
Interpretive Review of His Life, Career and Contemporary 
P vents", p.79? together give the names of seven 
Sarvajanik Sabha famine agents. Parvate says there were 
many others as well.
3* Letter from Commissioner, Central Div,, 26 Jan. 1897* 
Famine Prog. No.875* Bombay Rev. Prog., Famine,
Vol. 5326.
3members of the Sarvajanik Sabha were arrested in December 
1896, including Professor Shivram Mahadev Paran;jpe,
Professor Achyut Sitaram Sathe, and G-ovind Vineyak Apte*
Two more persons, Pimpulkar and Karulkar, neither of whom 
were members of the Sabha, were also arrested# All these 
people were charged under Section 117 of the Indian Penal 
Code which made it an offence to abet the commission of an 
offence by a public group. The trial of G.V.Apte and 
Professor A.S.Sathe was held at Pen, Kolaba District, on 
10 January 1897 and attracted considerable publicity. The 
accused were defended by a number of lawyers from Bombay and 
Poona. B.G. Tilak and Professor S.M. Paranjpe attended the 
trial and were greeted by an enthusiastic crowd of several 
thousand people. The case against Professor A.S.Sathe was
dismissed, as were the other cases against Paranjpe,
2
Pimpulkar and Karulkar, but Apte was convicted, fined 
Hs,200, and sentenced to one year's simple imprisonment. Apte 
was alleged to have counselled a crowd of 3,000 villagers 
on 18 December 1896 to withhold payment of the land revenue, 
to take wood and toddy without permission from Government 
forests, and to assault any Government official who tried 
to arrest a fellow villager.*^
The early attempts of the SarVajanik Sabha to persuade 
landholders to refrain from paying the revenue seem to have
1. The Times of India (Overland Edition), 16 Jan. 1897.
2. Bombay Leg., Council Prog., 4 Aug. 1897, p.41.
3. The Times of India (Overland Edition), 16 Jan. 1897.
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"been highly successful. J.P.Orr, Assistant Collector in 
Poona District, reported that in his charge "not a pie of 
the revenue instalment" due on 10 December 1896 had been 
paid,^ In the Dharwar District, where Eksambekar had dis­
tributed leaflets, there were combinations against the pay-
2
ment of revenue even in areas where there was no distress. 
The Collector of Kolaba District complained that his camp 
was besieged by crowds of up to 4,000 people with petitions 
for revenue suspensions and remissions. Many of the 
petitions were on printed forms. ^  Correspondents of The 
Times of India reported that several of the meetings con­
vened by agents of the Sarvajanik Sabha attracted upwards 
of 2,000 villagers.^
When the no-rent campaign began, several of Elgin*s 
colleagues in the Government of India wanted to adopt "very 
drastic measures" to counteract it. But after the Kolaba 
trial the agitation subsided and the Bombay Government 
simply withdrew its recognition of the Sarvajanik Sabha as 
a body with "any claim to address the Government on 
questions of public p o l i c y . B y  the summer of 1897 the
/l. Memorandum from Collector of Poona to Asst. Collectors 
in Poona Dist., 28 Dec. 1896. Enclosure to Memorandum 
from the Commissioners, Central Div., 30 Dec, 1896.
Pamine Prog. No.98; Bombay Rev. Prog., Famine, Vol.5326.
2. Letter from the Commissioner, Southern Div., 26 Jan, 1897* 
Pamine Prog, No.875; Bombay Rev, Prog., Pamine, Vol.5326.
3 . Memorandum from the Commissioner, Central Div., 6 Peb. 
1897, Pamine Prog. No. 559, Bombay Rev. Progs.,
Pamine, Vol. 5326.
4* The Times of India, (Overland Edition), 2 and 9 Jan. 1897«
5. Grovt• of Bombay Resolution, 17 March 1897, Pamine Prog.
No, 875, Bombay Rev. Prog., Pamine, Vol.5326.
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agitation "had completely broken down". *"
Tilak, it seems, had been largely responsible for
2
organizing the no-rent campaign. He realized that the 
peasantry would be a valuable ally for the Congress. He had 
written in the Kesari in January 1896:
"For the last twelve years we have been shouting 
hoarse [sic], desiring that the Government 
should hear us. But our shouting has no more 
affected the Government than the sound of a 
gnat....Let us now try to force our grievance 
into their ears by strong constitutional means.
We must give the best political education 
possible to the ignorant villagers. We must 
meet them on terms of equality, teach them 
their rights and show how to fight constitu­
tionally. Then only will the Government realize 
that to despise the Congress is to despise the 
Indian Nation. Then only will the efforts of 
the Congress leaders be crowned with success.
Such a work will require a large body of able 
and singleminded workers, to whom Politics 
would not mean some holiday recreation but an 
every-day duty to be performed with strictest 
regularity and utmost capacity." 3
Famines were used, in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, as an opportunity for certain middle class Indians
to exhibit their concern for, and to make contact with, the
4poorer classes. In Bengal, Vivekananda,• the Sadharan Brahmo
1. Elgin to Hamilton, 10 Feb. 1898, MSS.Eur. 509/8.
2. See D.V.Athalya, The Life of Lokamanya Tilak, p.86.
Also, J. Down, Inspector General of Police, Poona, to 
Under Sec., Govt, of Bombay, Judic. Dept. 15 July 1899, 
Enclosure No.C-1 to S.W.Edgerley, Sec., Govt, of Bombay, 
to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept., 25 Aug. 1899- Sept. 
Prog. No. 6 . I.H.P., Pub., Vol.5640.
3. Kesari, 12 Jan. 1896, quoted by Theodore Shay, The Legacy 
of tEe Lokamanya: 1 The Political Philosophy of Bal &an- 
gadhar Tilak, p.7§.
4. Sampras ad K. Desai, Life of Swami Vivekananda, p.160.
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Samaj, and the Indian Association opened relief works during 
famines."1* Lala Lajpat Rai has described the work of the 
Arya Samaj with orphans during the 1896-97 and 1899 famines 
in the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and Bombay. The Arya 
Samaj, together with the Hindu Orphan Relief Movement, made 
special efforts to keep orphans out of the hands of 
Christian missionaries. In the 1899 famine the Arya Samaj 
"rescued" 1700 orphans from Bombay, Kathiawar, and the 
Central Provinces. Lajpat Rai thought that the competition 
with the Christian missions for the orphans benefited the 
Hindus because it united the various castes, brought the
educated and the masses into contact, opened opportunities
2
for social service and taught self-reliance. It was only 
in Bombay that middle class famine activities were objected 
to by the Government. But the famine activities in Bombay, 
Bengal, and the Punjab were similar in that they were self- 
conscious attempts to bridge some of the existing divisions 
in Indian society.
1. See Chapter BV below. 
j  2. Lajpat Rai, The Arya Samaj s An Account of its Origin, 
Doctrines and Activrties. with a Biographical Sketch 
of the Pounder, pp. 2lj-l7.
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The first officially recognized outbreak of bubonic 
plague occurred in Bombay City in September 1896, coinci­
ding with the start of the famine. Within several months 
it spread to other areas of the Bombay Presidency, and by 
the end of 1898, isolated areas in every province except 
Burma had been affected. It remained most severe in Western 
India where it reached its height in 1899.^
Although the economic consequences of plague were mild
compared to those of the famine, and although the ordinary
2
death rate was not seriously affected, the impact of the 
plague was immense. The unpopular measures adopted to com­
bat plague caused only slightly less terror than the novel 
and usually fatal attacks of the disease itself. Between 
1896 and 1900, there were ten major riots in India against 
the plague measures and many more disturbances were avoided 
only by the timely withdrawal of the more objectionable 
regulations.^ Plague continued to haunt India throughout 
the period under discussion, but the first few years were 
the most difficult ones as both the people and the 
Government adjusted themselves to living with it. And in 
1896-7 r plague was confined almost entirely to Western India. 
Medical authorities believed that insanitary conditions
1. P.P. Cd.810 of 1902. Indian Plague Commission Report,
1901, Chapt. II,-pp. 7-8 and 48.
?2• Ibid, Chapt. II, p.50.
3* P.P. Od, 748 of 1902. Reports and Papers on Bubonic 
Plague, pp. 216-17.
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favoured the growth of the plague bacillus and that human 
beings were one of the chief conveyors of the disease. 
Therefore it was thought necessary to cleanse thoroughly 
areas infected or in danger of infection, and to isolate 
plague patients and their contacts. The cleansing operations 
often involved destruction of private property and other 
unpopular measures. Houses in infected areas were cleaned 
and lime washed; traps and house connections were overhauled 
and disinfected; roofs, walls, and other obstructions to 
light and air were opened; old clothes and rags were burned; 
sewers were flushed; whole houses were destroyed or altered.^* 
Despite Government efforts to provide compensation, 
people resented the destruction of personal property, 
especially when it was accompanied by a display of force 
such as the breaking down of barricaded doors, the destruc­
tion of furniture and crockery, and the digging up of 
floors. Municipal officials were not always sensitive to 
the feelings of the local population or mindful of the need 
to obtain Indian cooperation. Dor instance, minor panic 
occurred in Bombay when, in the words of the City Health 
Officer, "we treated houses practically as if they were on 
fire, discharging into them from steam engines and flushing 
pumps quantities of water charged with disinfectants."^
1. Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt. II, p. 10.
2. Ibid, Chapt. VI, p,404.
3. Quoted in the "Memorandum of the Army Sanitary Commission 
Report of the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, 1896-97c 
Jan. Prog., I.H.P., Munic., Vol.5646.
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The chance of gaining the public’s cooperation in
sanitary measures was reduced as it became apparent that
cleanliness often was not decisive in preventing the spread
of the disease. In Bombay and other towns, plague was more
prevalent in the well-planned suburban sections than in the
chaotic slums near the town centre,^ and the Plague
Commission was "unable to find anything in the nature of
statistical evidence" to prove that insanitary conditions
2
favoured the spread of the plague.
Forced segregation of plague cases was even more 
obnoxious to the general population than the sanitary 
operations. The history of segregation and compulsory 
removals in Bombay and Poona resembles the pattern of events 
in other places, although in these two cities the opposi­
tion to the Government took more extreme forms. In Bombay 
on 6 October 1896, the Plague Commissioner ordered the evac­
uation of infected houses and the removal of the sick to 
hospitals. This order was followed by great excitement and 
wild rumours about Government intentions. Health Department 
officials were in constant danger as hostile crowds stoned 
the ambulance vans. Tension built up steadily, and on 29 
October shops were closed throughout the city and one 
thousand mill hands attacked the Municipal Hospital. City
1. Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt. VI, p.404.
2. Ibid, Chapt. Ill, p.169.
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officials anticipated severe rioting and they feared that
the municipal sanitary staff, without whom Bombay would be
uninhabitable, might join the mill workers. On the following
day the plague regulations were modified so that patients
could remain at home if a proper degree of isolation and
ventilation were attainable.^
During November and December 1896 plague in Bombay
2
increased and trade began to decline. Several European 
governments and various English trading interests appealed 
to Hamilton, the Secretary of State, for stricter enforce­
ment of the plague regulations. The European G-overnments 
claimed that they wished to prevent the passage of plague 
to Europe, but Hamilton suspected that they would have wel­
comed plague as an excuse to boycott imports from British 
India. ^
Lord Sandhurst, the Governor of Bombay, considered 
that compulsory segregation of plague patients would cause 
terror and that general paralysis of the cityfs life would 
follow. Even without strict segregation more than 400,000 
of the population of 846,000 had fled from the city. 
Nevertheless in March 1897 the Government of Bombay gave in 
-♦» -— - —  ■ - - ■ —    - —  —  _ — _.
1. Ibid, Chapt. VI, p.334.
2. During the fiscal year 1896-7, the aggregate value of 
the Port of Bombay's trade fell off by 10$. The Times 
of India (Overland Edition), 13 Nov. 1897.
3. Hamilton telegrams to Sandhurst, 6 and 8 Jan. 1897. 
Enclosures to Sandhurst to Elgin, 20 Jan. 1897, MSS.Eur.
P.84/70. Also, Hamilton to Elgin, 21 Jan. 1897,
MSS.Eur. 0. 125/2.
to "imperial51 considerations and relieved the municipal 
authorities of their control over plague operations. In 
their place an executive committee of Government officers 
under General Gatacre was established with orders to remove 
all plague patients to public hospitals or the more
i
numerous community and caste hospitals. Search parties
composed of health officers, private citizens, the police,
and the military began to make forcible searches of private
homes. These parties were usually supported by cordons of
soldiers to prevent people from escaping, and they were
2
greeted with "unreasoning fear" almost everywhere.
The policy of forcible evacuation and house to house 
searches lasted for over a year in Bombay. However, it did 
not prove more effective than the relaxed policy pursued 
previously. Not only did it fail to locate all the plague- 
stricken, who were carefully concealed by friends and 
relations, but it also tended to scatter the sick and 
thereby spread the disease. Therefore, in March 1898, the 
Governor of Bombay began to consider plans for the suspen­
sion of the search parties and the substitution of native 
volunteer committees in an attempt to enlist the cooperation 
of local leaders with the plague measures.^
Before these plans were announced the Jhulias of 
Bombay rioted. The Jhulias were a community of Muslims who had
1. Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt. II, p.11.
2. Ibid, Chapt. VI, p.325.
3- Sandhurst telegram to Hamilton, 17 March 1898, P.S.L.I., 
Vol.102.
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recently moved to Bombay and who had played a prominent part 
in the Bombay communal riots of 1893. The riot of March 
1898 started when the health officers attempted to remove 
a young Jhulia girl who was thought (incorrectly, as it 
turned out) to have plague. For two and a half hours the 
rioting raged out of control. The Jhulias were joined, 
unexpectedly, by hundreds of Hindus in attacks and arson 
' attempts on public buildings. Before the military could 
restore order, two European soldiers were killed and 42 
policemen, mostly Europeans, were wounded.1
For the next several days the city was tense. Shops 
remained closed and 10,000 cartmen and a majority of the 
dock labourers struck work in protest against compulsory
p
removals. Mary Europeans, who were nervous because of the 
anti-European nature of the riotings, suspected a premedi­
tated plan between the Jhulias, shop-keepers, cartmen, and 
dock workers. But the Commissioner of Police believed that 
although the strikes and hartals were prearranged, the 
Jhulia outbreak had been spontaneous. After a few days 
Bombay became quiet once more.1
After the Bombay disturbances (and the earlier
1. Letter from Commissioner of Police, 1 April 1898.
Judic. Prog., Ho.949, Bombay Judic. Prog., Vol. 5549.
2. Strikes and hartals were used in many towns to place
pressure on the plague authorities.
3. Letter from Commissioner of Police, 1 April 1898,
op.cit.
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troubles in Poona which are discussed below) coercive 
methods were not generally used to enforce the plague regu­
lations. They were of doubtful utility when not supported by 
Indian leaders, and British prestige suffered each time con­
cessions were made to public demonstrations and disturbances. 
In any case there was no convincing evidence that plague 
could be eradicated immediately even with the full co­
operation of the Indian population.
There were other irritating restrictions that inter­
fered with the ordinary pattern of Indian life, such as the 
inspection of Indian women by Europeans, the practice of 
detaining Indian travellers (but not Europeans) in the 
quarantine camps,^ and the prohibition of the pilgrimage to
p
Mecca. After 1899, home isolation of the sick, disinfec­
tion, and notification of disease were generally preferred 
to quarantine, cordons, and segregation of contacts.
The greatest controversy about the plague measures 
occurred in Poona. It was well known that the large Brahman 
community of Poona was proud of its religious and racial 
traditions. Yet 1100 soldiers, mostly British, were used to 
remove the sick, segregate contacts, and disinfect private
1. In actual fact Europeans were relatively immune to plague. 
Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt.Ill, pp.38-39.
2. The pilgrimage was suspended in 1896-7 in deference to 
the wishes of European Governments who were apprehensive 
lest plague spread to Europe via Arabia. The Government 
of India was reluctant to stop the pilgrimage because of 
the possible reaction of the Muslims but it agreed to the 
suspension after Lord Salisbury and Lord Hamilton insisted 
that otherwise British trade would be seriously hampered 
by the enforcement of strict quarnatine regulations in 
European ports. Hamilton to Elgin,19 Peb. and ^  March 1897* 
MSS.Eur. C. 125/2.
homes."*’ And, if the testimony and reaction of the local 
population are reliable indications, the search parties 
exhibited scant regard for Indian sensibilities and preju­
dices. When the operations began early in 1897 and it was 
learned that all-British search parties would be used, there 
was a mass exodus from Poona. Lord Sandhurst intervened at 
this point and the search parties were altered to include 
Indian soldiers and interpreters to indicate what areas 
British soldiers were forbidden by custom to enter. Gradu­
ally the use of volunteer Indian search parties and caste 
hospitals was extended, and, according to the Poona Plague 
Commissioner, W.C.Rand, relations between the authorities
A
and the citizens of Poona became "on the whole friendly". 
Nevertheless the Poona newspapers, even after the epidemic 
began to subside in mid-April, continued to charge the 
plague workers with ignoring local customs, with corruption,
1. Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt. II, p. 18.
2. Sandhurst to Elgin, 17 March 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/70.
3# It was not only British soldiers who were objected to.
High caste people strongly opposed searches by low caste 
soldiers and plague workers. In Dhawar, a Hindu priest 
aommitted suicide after his- house was disinfected by 
low caste people, Indian Mirror, 11 Sept. 1898, T. and D. 
Selections, P .S.L.I., Vol.107♦ Tbe Kalidas (Dharwar), v 
7 Oct. 1898, expressed the opinion that "the death of 
many a patient in the hospital is accelerated by contact 
with low-caste people." T. and D. Selections, 24 Oct. 
1898, P.S .L.I., Vol.109.
4. Indian Plague Commission Report, Chapt.VI, pp.326-27.
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oppression, and other forms of misbehaviour. Soldiers and
officials engaged in plague work were referred to as
1 2 "butchers" , "barbarous brutes and wild bulls"; and the
bravery shown by Maratha ancestors in overthrowing the
oppressive Mughals was pointedly recalled.^ One newspaper
reported, with no justification, that pure carbolic acid had
been poured on the head of a patient in the Poona General
Plague Hospital, killing the patient.^ Then on 22 June 1897,
after plague had almost disappeared from Poona, W.C.Rand,
the Plague Commissioner, and Lieutenant C.E.Ayerst were
fatally shot while returning home from a celebration of the
Queen Empressfs Jubilee near Poona. The two assailants
escaped.
The same evening an English official was murdered in 
Peshawar. It seemed likely that the murders were deliber- 
ately intended to coincide with the Jubilee, as an express­
ion of disapproval of the non-utilitarian and very expensive
1. Kalpatara, 18 April, quoted in the Bombay Gazette,
‘2 6 J un e 1897 ♦
2. Sudharak, 3 May, quoted in ibid.
3* t)nyan Frakash, 10 May; Kesari, 27 April and 6 May and 
Maharashtra Mitra, 29 April5 all quoted in ibid,
4. t)nyan Prakash, 12 April, The editor apologized and thereby 
escaped prosecution. Letter from District Magistrate, 
Poona, No,42, 19 July 1897, Judic. Prog. No.1871 of 
27 Sept, 1897.
5* Pioneer, 25 June 1897.
60 TT~was~learned subsequently that the murderer was a 
Ghazi and that his motives were unconnected with the 
internal political conditions of India.
Sir Mackworth-Young, Lt. Gov. of the Punjab, to Elgin,
15 July 1897, MSS.Eur, P.84/71.
7. Pioneer, 11 July, 1897.
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festivities during a year of plague and famine,^* It also
appeared that, although Ayerst had not heen connected with
plague work, the motive of the murderers "was not personal
revenge or religious fanaticism, hut an attempt to punish
2
those executing” the plague policy. British opinion in
India and England^was uneasy ahout the apparently political
!
character of the killings. English newspapers and officials 
suggested there might be a connection between the writings 
of the vernacular press of Poona and the murderers, and it
A
was suggested that a new press act was needed.
In Poona itself there was no trace of the murderers, 
who, it was thought, might be part of a widespread political 
conspiracy. A reward of Rs. 20,000 with a full pardon was
1. A manifestation of this opposition to the Jubilee festi­
vities appeared in Lahore in May 1897 when leading 
English and Indian citizens called a meeting in the Town 
Hall to discuss proposals for a statue of Queen Victoria. 
A number of Indian school boys tried to speak at the 
meeting but they were ruled out of order by the chairman. 
They then held up the meeting with catcalls and hissing 
and the chairman, after attemtping for half an hour to 
restore order, left the hall with many other Europeans 
and Indians to the accompaniment of further jeers. Then 
the schoolboys continued the meeting and resolved to send 
money for the relief of orphans in the Central Provinces. 
Bengalee, 5 June 1897.
2. Hamilton to Elgin, 24 June 1897, MSS.Eur. C* 125/2-
3. Hamilton telegram to Elgin, 3 July 1897, MSS.Ein?. F. 84/20.
4. See Hamilton to Elgin, 2 July 1897, MSS.Eur. C. 125/2.
Also The Times, 2 July 1897; Morning Post. 2 July 1897;
Daily News, 2 July 1897 (MSS.Eur.F.84/79) 5 and___
The Times of India (Overland Edition), 2 July 1897.
Elgin to" Sandhurst, 28 June 1897 Register No. 698B
MSS.Eur. F.84. . 9
offered to any person who would provide evidence leading to 
the conviction of the gunmen, and a punitive police force 
consisting of 200 men, was assigned to Poona at the cost of 
the City Municipality.^*
The Rand Murder brought into prominence the charges of 
misconduct which had repeatedly been levelled against 
officials and soldiers in the plague operations. Pour of the 
most serious allegations were given wide publicity, but with 
one exception, they were not substantiated. The first of 
these was made by G.K,Gokhale to a meeting of M.P.’s and to
a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian. Gokhale, in
2England to testify before the Welby Commission, claimed 
that two Poona women had been outraged by British soldiers. 
One was said to have died subsequently?  The•Secretary of 
State for India denied this in the House of Commons ,5 Gokhale 
upon his return to India, found that he had been misinformed 
and he sent letters of apology to the Manchester Guardian 
and The Times of India, completely withdrawing his charges 
against the soldiers. Many nationalists thought Gokhale had 
been too abject in his apology and he had to face their 
hostility and resentment for many months after making the 
apology. So strong was the feeling against Gokhale that at
The Times of India, (Overland Edition) 2 July 1897.
2. A royal Commission to examine the financial relationship 
between India and the United Kingdom.
3. Manchester Guardian, 2 July 1897.
4. Pari, debates, H. of C., 5 Aug. 1897, 4th Series, Vol.LII 
pTJBi:
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the Amraoti Congress in December 1897, he was prevented from
i
addressing the Congress, Soon after the Amraoti session,
Gokhale complained in a letter to the press of the manner in
2
which he was treated.
The second and third allegations were communicated to 
The Daily News by Surendra Nath Banerjea on behalf of the 
Indian Association of Calcutta. Two European officers were 
reported to have attempted to outrage two Hindu girls at a 
plague inspection camp at Khana, Bengal, The Lieutenant- 
Governor of Bengal confirmed this. The third allegation had 
been made by Pandita Ramabai, an Indian Christian who ran an 
orphanage in Poona, She maintained that one of her girls had 
been seduced in the Poona plague camp. However the Governor 
of Bombay said that this was untrue and that the girl had 
been discharged cured^ The final allegation was made in a 
petition from the Deccan Sabha of Poona and brought to 
public notioe by William Wedderburn, It alleged that plague 
workers stripped women in the street, polluted Hindu temples, 
removed people to plague hospitals without giving them
1. V.S.Srinivasa Sastri (Life of Gopal Khrishna Gokhale,p.25) 
said that "it would appear it was the Bengali delegates 
that made themselves specially prominent in this demon­
stration" against Gokhale.
2. See the Pioneer,14 Jan, 1898, and T.V.Parvate, Gopal 
Krishna “Gokhale: A Narrative and Interpret at ive""lfte view of 
His Life, Career and Contemporary Events, pp.71-87.
3. farl. Debates^ H. of C., 26 July 1897, 4th Series, Vol.51, 
pp,1091-92. In June 1898, a British soldier was convicted 
of criminal assault on a girl while he was engaged in 
plague work at Girgaum, Bombay Presidency, India,
15 July 1898.
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proper medical examinations, and used unnecessary violence
in the process. The Government of Bombay emphatically denied
each of these accusations.**" The Collector of Poona conducted
an investigation of 721 out of the 1,699 signatures on the
Deccan Sabha#s petition and he claimed that only 144 of the
signers could he found and that of these, many claimed
2ignorance of the contents of the petition.
The failure of the Governments critics to substantiate 
their allegations was damaging to the Congress cause in 
England and in India since Gokhale, Wedderburn, Banerjea, 
the Indian Association, and the Deccan Sabha were all intim­
ately connected with the Congress, Lord Sandhurst expressed 
a view which was doubtlessly shared by many officials when 
he said that those "gross and malevolent" charges were made 
for the purpose of undermining public respect for the 
Government,^
Shortly after the murders in Poona there were serious 
disturbances among the Muslims of Calcutta over the possess­
ion of a small building which, although not originally 
mosque, had for many years been used as one, A Civil Court 
had ruled that the land upon which the building stood 
belonged to the Tagore Trust Estate and it ordered the
1. Pari. _Debates, H. of C., 5 July 1897, 4th Series, Vol.50,
p.1119.
2. Pari. Debates, H. of C., 5 Aug. 1897, 4th Series, Vol.52,
pp. 381-82.
3* Quoted by Hamilton, Pari. Debates, H. of C., 13 July 
1897, 4th Series, Vol. ^1, p.21.
demolition of the building. When the local Muslims objected, 
Sir Jotendra Mohun Tagore offered to lease them the property. 
But C.C.Stevens, the Officiating Lieutenant Governor of 
Bengal, refused to sanction any compromise, declaring that 
he must "see the law enforced." Accordingly the building was 
demolished."*"
On the night of 29 June, 2,000 Muslims assembled at
the disputed site and rebuilt several feet of the wall before
they were dispersed by the Calcutta Police. On 30 June, the
crowd attacked the Tallah Pumping Station where they had
2
been refused water for the construction work. This attack 
was repulsed but disorders spread to other sections of 
Calcutta and for several days large groups of Muslims roamed 
the streets, rioting and attacking isolated Europeans. Upper- 
class Muslims, including Nur Mahomed and Prince Bakhtyar 
Shah tried to calm the demonstrators by circulating pamphlets 
explaining that the European officials were only carrying 
out the law and that Islamic law forbade the use of the 
property as a mosque site. But their efforts had little 
effect. So Abdul Rahman Khan, son of Nawab Abdul Latif, the
1. C.C.Stevens, Offg. Lt.Gov. of Bengal, to Elgin, 8 July 
1897, Enclosure to Elgin to Hamilton, 14 July 1897,
MSS.Eur.L.509/6.
2. C.W.Bolton, Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bengal to J.P.Hewett, Sec., 
Home Dept., 7 July 1897, enclosure to Elgin to Hamilton, 
14 July 1897, op.cit.
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founder of the Muhammadan Literary Society,^ wrote to
Maulana Amanutullah, a religious leader in Ghazipur with a
large following in Bengal* The Maulana agreed to go to
2
Calcutta to try to pacify the rioters. But Before he 
arrived, the situation worsened when Muslim workers in the 
English-owned mills at Barrackpur, Cossipur, Serampur, and 
Howrah went on strike. On 6 July these workers Began to 
march towards Calcutta to assist the rioters. The military 
Blocked the roads to Calcutta and the strikers returned 
towards the mills where armed European civilians narrowly 
prevented them from looting and Burning the factories. After 
this the mill hands drifted Back to work and Calcutta 
returned to normalcy.
The remarkable features of these disturbances were the 
attacks on Europeans, But not on Hindus, and the panic among
the European community. Many Europeans carried loaded
a 5
revolvers ^  and ventured into the streets only when necessary*
1* During the Wahabi movement the Muhammadan Literary Society 
persuaded certain ulama to issue fatwas declaring that 
India was dar-ul-Islam and therefore' that jihad against 
the British was unnecessary. Wilfred Cantwell Smith,
Modern Islam in Indias A Social Analysis, p.6*
2. Magistrate of Ghazipur to Commissioner or Benares,
9 July 1897, Enclosure to A. MacDonnell, Lt. Gov. of 
N.W.P. and 0, to Elgin, 16 July 1897, Ms. Eng. Hist, c.353.
3. Ibid.
4. There was a run on revolvers in Calcutta arms stores 
during the disturbances. Pioneer, 3 July 1897.
5. Elgin to Hamilton, 14 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 509/6.
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The Anglo-Indian Press stimulated European fears by publish­
ing exaggerated reports of the riots and by suggesting that 
they were connected with the Prontier uprisings, the prohi­
bition of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and a general pan- 
Islamic revival* Officials in Calcutta, however, saw less 
reason to be alarmed* They acknowledged that Indian Muslims 
were excited by the recent Turkish victories over Greece 
but in their view the "mosque", and not wider issues, was 
the main cause of the Calcutta disturbances*^
The Graeco-Turkish War produced am important effect on 
Indian Muslims. With the increasing European interference in 
Ottoman affairs, the Sultan gradually became recognized by 
more and more Indian Muslims as the defender of the Islamic 
faith against Christiandom* The Sultan had encouraged this
concept by means of his pan-Islamic propaganda* He had set up
2
a pan-Islamic Council in Constantinople and he had sent 
emissaries throughout the non-Ottoman Muslim world to arouse 
a pan-Islamic consciousness. The importation into India of 
two Constantinople newspapers, the Sabah and the Mulumaj;. 
was prohibited by the Government of India in August 1897 
after they made offensive remarks about the misery of
1. See C.S.Bayley, Gen. Supt* of Operations for Suppression 
of Thagi and Dakaiti, to H. Babington Smith, Bri.Sec. to 
the Viceroy, 12 July 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
Also C.W.Bolton to J.P.Hewett, 7 July 1897, op*cit.
2. Hamilton to Elgin, 30 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 125/2.
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British India and the maltreatment of women in Poona. Both 
newspapers had been subscribed to and quoted by a number of 
Indian Muslim newspapers. ^
Many British observers suspected a connection between
2
the pan-Islamic movement and the Frontier uprisings which 
had been anticipated by rumours in the bazaars of some Indian 
cities and by writings in the Turkish Press.^ Many observers 
thought that the risings were the inevitable consequence of 
the Government of India’s forward policy. However Lord 
Hamilton, and to some extent the Government of India, sup­
ported the view that the action of the tribes was too sudden 
and extensive to be simply a reaction to the forward policy. 
They thought that the risings were inspired largely by 
religious fanaticism - fanaticism aroused by the Turkish 
victories in the Middle East and by the prospect held out by 
the Mullas that the Amir of Afghanistan would join the 
tribesmen.^ Similar incitements might have stirred Indian
1. Memorandum on the Pan-Islamic Movement, Enclosure to Gov. 
Gen. Despatch to S, of S., 15 June 1899, Foreign Dept. 
Despatch No,110 of 1899, P.S.L.I., Vol.114.
Also, S. of S, telegram to Gov, Gen., 18 Aug. 1897*
Oct, Prog. No. 289, I.H.P., Pub., Vol.5181.
2. The pan-Islamic movement in India attracted considerable 
notice in England in 1897# See Canon MacColl, "The 
Mussulmans of India and the Sultan". The Contemporary 
Review. Vol.LXXI (Feb. 1897)$ Lepel GriTfinT
"ihe Breakdown of the Frontier Policy", The Nineteenth 
Centuryf Vol.XLII (Oct. 1897); and F.Fawcett, "The 
Moplas of Malabar", Asiatic Quarterly Review, Vol.IV, 
(Oct, 1897)#
3. Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur, C. 125/2.
4# P.P. C.8714 of 1898. Papers re British Relations with 
Tribes and British Military "Operations on the North- 
West Frontier of India, 1897-98, No,111. S. of S. 
Despatch to Gov. Gen., 28 Jan, 1898, para.10.
Muslims to action; in fact it was certain "that a
considerable number of men from within the British Indian
frontier took part in the fighting against us."^ Hamilton
feared that a slight reverse in the fighting would lead to
2
disturbances in some of the towns in upper India. But the
decisive defeats inflicted on the tribes in July and August
1897 had a "sedative effect1 on the Indian Muslims,^
The Sultan!s name was being used more frequently in 
4the khutbah in Indian mosques and subscriptions to the 
Sultan from India were increasing. In May and June 1897 
mosques and Muslim homes throughout Northern India were 
illuminated in honour of the Turkish successes against Greece, 
At the same time a holiday was declared and shops were 
closed in Poona and Bombay, while in Calcutta Urdu leaf­
lets were circulated every afternoon giving the latest news
£
of the Graeco-Turkish War. A fund was started to assist
7
distressed Muslims in Crete. Indian Muslim leaders such as
1# Ibid, No,6 , Letter from Govt, of India, For. Dept., to
S. of 3,, 1 Sept. 1897, para.15*
2. Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug, 1897, MSS.Eur, C.125/2.
3# See MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
MacDonnell, who was concerned about the number of Afghans 
in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, ordered officials 
to take census of trans-frontier people in his province, 
MacDonnell to Elgin, 7 Jan. 1898, MSS.Eur. P.84/72.
4. Sermon during Friday prayers.
5. The Times of India (Overland Edition), 4 June 1897.
6 . Bengalee, 8 May 1897.
7. Memorandum on the Pan-Islamic Movement, op.cit,, para,21.
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Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Rafiuddin Ahmed denied that the 
Sultan could claim any temporal or spiritual allegiance from 
Indian Muslims.1 But evidently the idea was gaining ground 
that he was the Caliph for Muslims throughout the world,
A concomitant of the pan-Islamic movement in India was a
2
spate of anti-Gladstone writings in the Muslim newspapers 
which was in contrast to the adulatory opinion of Gladstone 
held by Surendra Nath Banerjea. The Bengalee was unsympathet­
ic to Ottoman claims over the non-Turkish people of the 
Middle East because, it said, "it is the ordering of Divine 
Providence that every nation must be the arbiter of its own 
destinies.
Enthusiasm for the Turkish successes and discontent 
over the prohibition of the pilgrimage and other plague 
measures led some Muslims to abuse British rule. Maulvi 
Hidayat Rasul of Lucknow addressed a public meeting on 13 
July 1897 and, in congratulating the Sultan of Turkey and 
the Amir of Afghanistan for their championship of Islam, 
he made some allegedly seditious remarks. Eor these he was
1. See the review of Sir Sayyid's contribution to the 
Aligarh Institute Gazette in The Times of India
("Overland Edition), 25 Sept. 1897, and Rafiuddin Ahmed, 
"Indias Is the British Ra.i in Danger?", The Nineteenth 
Century, Vol. XLII, (Sept. 1897).
2. See the Pioneer , 4 July 1897, Also, Rafiuddin Ahmed,
"A Moslem’s View of the Pan-Islamic Revival", The 
Nineteenth Century ,Vol.XLII (Sept.1897).
3. 'Bengalee, 20 Beb. 1897.
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1
sentenced to one year's simple imprisonment- A young 
follower of Maulvi Hidayat Rasul wrote an anonymous letter 
to the District Judge, who had sentenced the Maulvi, and 
threatened to murder the Judge and all other Europeans in 
Lucknow. He, too, was convicted and sentenced to one year's 
rigorous imprisonment.^ In the North West Provinces and Oudh 
the editor of the Jami-ul-ulam of Moradahad was convicted of 
attempting to excite disaffection in an article which 
appeared in 14 July 1897.^ In September the Governor 
General in Council ordered that the editor of the Muslim 
Deccan of Bombay who was not a citizen of British India, be 
deported from India for his violent attacks on the Indian 
Government.^ In December 1897 the Calcutta police warned 
the proprietor* of the Hublu-l-matin that his articles were 
seditious. The editor, Mirza Sayyid Jalal-ud-din Husain^ was 
reported to receive an annual stipend of about Rs.6,000 from 
the Sultan, and his newspaper was said to be widely read in
5
Persia.
If the Turkish victories and the Frontier fighting 
stimulated Muslim unity and heightened Indian consciousness
1- The Times of India (Overland Edition), 6 Aug* 1897.
2. Poona Observer and Civil and Military Gazette, 18 Oct.
TB5T
3. Queen-Empress v. Amba Prasad, X X  Allahabad 55, Indian 
Law Reports- Amba Prasad was a Hindu Kayasth but his 
subscribers were predominantly Muslim.
4. The Times of India (Overland Edition), 18 Sept. 1897.
5. Memorandum on the Pan-Islamic Movement, op.cit., para.24.
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of the non-Indian Muslim world, the effect of this new 
awareness varied from area to area. In the Punjab in recent 
years the Muslims had been aroused by the proslytizing 
activities of both the Arya Samaj and the Christian mission­
aries (European and Indian). Anjumans had sprung up all over 
the Punjab and they sent their agents into the bazaars to 
preach, distribute tracts, and to persuade Muslims to purify 
their faith of non-Islamic features. In early 1897, Hindu- 
Muslim antagonism in the Punjab flared up when a Muslim 
murdered a well-known Arya Samaj preacher named Lekh Ram. 
Lekh Ram had recently written a book attacking both Christ­
ianity and Islam, and the murderer was said to have been
2
"deliberately sent to commit the crime". The situation was 
delicate, too, because of the cow protection movement, which 
the Lieutenant-Governor thought caused Hindu-Muslim relat- 
ions to be "like a powder magazine."*'
In other areas of India the quickening of the Islamic 
revival was not accompanied by Hindu-Muslim disturbances. 
This was surprising since as recently as 1893*94 there had 
been many communal riots. Over large areas in 1897 there 
were even signs of a new friendliness between the two com­
munities. In Rohilkhand, in the North West Provinces and 
Oudh, where Hindu-Muslim relations were traditionally 
strained, the District officers reported a widespread
1. A.T.Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, p.285.
2. Elgin to Hamilton, 24 March 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/4.
3. Young to Elgin, 15 July 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
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rapprochement between Hindus and Muslims. Sir Anthony . 
MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor, was uneasy about this; 
he did not know if this unusual phase in Hindu-Muslim rela­
tions was due to Congress pleas for unity, to Muslim 
political ambitions which would require unity as a "necess­
ary antecedent to effective political action against us", 
or to a common determination to resist unpopular measuresT
In the first six months of 1897 there had been general 
unrest over large parts of India. Much of the unrest was 
traceable to the unpopularity of the Governments plague 
measures and to food shortages and high prices. But were 
there signs of a general combination against British rule? 
Observers in both India and England were uneasy about the 
simultaneous occurrence of the Poona murders, the Calcutta
riots, the Frontier uprisings, and the unusual degree of
2
Hindu-Muslim fraternization.
1. MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 July 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
2. The St. Gazette (3 July 1897) and the Morning Post 
(3 July 18^7) suggested that there was a similarity 
between the events of 1897 and the period preceeding the 
1857 Mutiny. MSS.Eur. F.84-/79.
Twenty-four questions about conditions in Poona were 
asked in the House of Commons during the six weeks 
following the Rand murder. Pari. Debates, 4th Series, 
Vols. 50-52.
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CHAPTER II 
SEDITION AND ITS PREVENTION
Lord Elgin doubted whether the Poona murders were 
connected "with any widespread movement" but some of his 
colleagues thought that the situation, at least in the 
Bombay Presidency, was "distinctly dangerous."^
In view of the alarmist opinions held in some quarters, 
Lord Elgin decided to consult the heads of the Local Govern­
ments and other officials about the state of public feeling 
in Northern India*
C.S.Bayley  ^ reported that he could see "no sign of 
disaffection of any kind" in Bengal nor did he think the 
Calcutta riots were important except that they showed 
how excited Indian Muslims became when they believed an 
injury was being done to their religion.^ Judging from the 
relative absence of discussion few people regarded either 
Madras and Bengal as areas where political trouble was likely 
to occur. It was thought that the northern provinces and
the Maratha areas, with their martial and historical
traditions, were potentially more dangerous*
MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North West
Provinces and Oudh, wrote after consulting his district
j 1. Elgin telegram to Sec. of State, 4 July 1897, MSS.Eur.
P. 84/20.
2. General Superintendent of Operations for the Suppression 
of Thagi and Dakaiti*
3. C.S.Bayley to H.Babington Smith, Pri.Sec. to Elgin.
12 July 1897. MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
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officers, that "the entire English-educated section1 were 
"dissatisfied with the existing order of things" and 
although their object was to alter rather than to destroy 
British rule, they would do anything to embarrass the 
British Government. Their influence was slight, he felt, but 
it was . growing.^ MacDonnell thought that the majority of the 
Hindu landlords in the North West Provinces and Oudh were 
loyal. But this situation might change if they continued to 
lose their family lands through inability to pay their debts. 
MacDonnell believed them to be "by far the most powerful 
influence for good or evil." The great mass of the Hindus 
were generally indifferent to the Government except in extra­
ordinary circumstances such as during the cow-protection 
agitation when they were opposed to the Government, or during 
the famine when they were grateful for relief. He expected 
little trouble from the poorer Hindus as long as the Govern­
ment did not interfere with tenant-landlord relations and
2
religious matters,
MacDonnell did not have the same confidence about the 
Muslims in his Provinces. While he did not think there was 
an anti-British conspiracy, the Islamic revival taking place 
there could more easily develop into one than a similar 
revival could "among the more divided Hindu population." 
Although the Muslims represented only one seventh of the
1. A.MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 July 1897, MSS.Eur, P.84/71*
2. A.MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. F.84/71.
\
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population in those provinces, 140 of the 240 tehsildars 
(revenue collectors) were Muslims police officers compared 
to 2,120 Hindus, MacDonnell favouied Hindus in making 
new appointments in order that, eventually, a proportion 
of 5 Hindus to 3 Muslims could he established in the govern­
ment service* He also made certain that there was "a predom­
inance of Hindus in the armed Police in the more important 
Mahomedan districts," MacDonnell did not expect trouble from 
the Muslims but he believed that precautions were necessary 
when "we have to deal with religious effervescence" which 
might take sudden and unexpected forms* Therefore he wanted 
to prepare an emergency plan for guarding the railways and 
to increase the number of British troops in the North West 
Provinces and Oudh.
Sir Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Punjab, reported that although the population of his Province
was generally loyal, there was a growing "opposition to
2
authority" in the larger towns. Unrest was most evident 
among the educated classes, whose numbers were growing too 
rapidly to be absorbed by existing opportunities, and who 
were consequently disappointed by their failure to find jobs.
1* MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 Aug, 1897, MSS.Eur. F.84/71.
2. Between 1891-2 and 1896-7 the annual number of riots in 
the Punjab increased from 653 to 855 ; of murder and 
attempted murder,- from 534 to 736; of grievous hurt, 
from 1,310 to 1,679. The Times of India* (Overland 
Edition), 25 Sept. 18*571
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Young thought that these embittered people, separated from 
their traditional values, used the native press to "vent 
their spleen against constituted authority". The native 
press was no longer "a safety-valve of honestly felt 
dissatisfaction," but an engine of "slander", "disloyalty", 
and "factious misrepresentation" for the dissatisfied 
section of the educated class "whose motives are not honest 
and whose voice is heard more than is necessary". He 
favoured legislation similar to Lytton!s Press Act to check 
the "hitherto unrestrained license of the press." Without 
it the spirit of unrest would increase.^
Sir Mackworth Young regarded the Arya Samaj, whose
agents were preaching in all the principal towns of the
Province, as the most dangerous, "disloyal", and active
organization in the Punjab. He thought the followers of the
Samaj had abandoned their original purpose of reshaping
Hinduism in a form which would withstand modern criticism
when they "found that the subject was above the heads of the
common people." Instead, "they have raised the standard of
opposition to kine-killing in order to get a hearing." The
immediate danger of the Arya Samaj was not so much its
anti-British propaganda, he felt, but rather its provocative
2
attempts to convert Muslims.
In the Central Provinces there were "no signs ... of
1. W. Mackworth Young to Elgin, 15 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P. 84/71.
2. Ibid.
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political movement of any kind'1 except in Nagpur and its 
Maratha vicinity. Even there the Maratha leaders were 
believed to have "had no sympathy1 with the Poona murders. 
The head of the Congress Party in Nagpur, G.M.Chitnavis, 
was "a very loyal man'1, in the opinion of the Chief 
Commissioner.^
The condition of the Indian army, according to the 
leading military officials, was "highly satisfactory, more 
so in fact than it had ever been." Earlier in the year 
they had been apprehensive about the loyalty of the Pathans 
in the campaign against the Muslim tribesmen in the Tochi 
Valley but in the fighting the, Muslim troops were as loyal 
as the Sikhs.^ In 1894 there had been many signs of rest­
lessness in the army (including the passing of chupattis ) 
caused, it was supposed, by the cow-protection agitation 
and low wages. But since that time wages had been increased
and the cow-protection propaganda of the Arya Samaj and
■j
other groups had had little effect.
Lord Hamilton was worried by what he regarded as the 
increasing solidarity of Indian opinion, race, and religion
1. C.J.Iyall to Elgin. 17 July 1897, MSS.Eur. F«84/71.
There were grain riots in Nagpur in September 1896 and 
a police guard had to be sent to protect the house of 
G.M.Chitnavis who was a money-lender and a landlord. 
A.H.L.Fraser, Among Indian Rajahs and Ryots, pp.111-20.
2. Elgin to Hamilton, o July 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6.
3« C.S.Bayley to H.Babington Smith, 12 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
F.84/71.
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in opposition to British rule* He did not know whether he 
preferred Hindu-Muslim unity, which was politically danger­
ous, or Hindu-Muslim collisions, which were an administrat­
ive nuisance. "Of the two the latter is the least rislsy,
though it throws anxiety and responsibility upon those on
2
the spot where the friction exists." Hamilton thought 
that "the development of national feelings or religious 
enthusiasm" was being stimulated by "the process of educa­
tion" and a free press. This tended "to make the onslaught 
against our Government more powerful, while the powers 
behind the authorities do not correspondingly multiply#l,J 
He wondered if the frontier uprisings and the Poona troubles 
did not provide a timely opportunity to exhibit the Govern­
ments strength. "In governing Orientals an assertion of 
strength and fighting power is periodically necessary." 
British prestige, he felt, might be strengthened both 
"internally and externally" by a demonstration of the 
loyalty and fighting ability of the Indian troops and by one 
or two successful prosecutions of the seditious press. 
"Whether we like it or not our rule exists upon the main­
tenance of prestige. Justice may in the Britisher's mind 
be a powerful and ubiquitous influence, but it does not 
appeal in the same way to the masses, and the privileged
1. Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. C.125/2. Also, 
Hamilton to Elgin, 21 Jan. 1898, MSS.Eur. C.125/3.
2. Hamilton to Elgin, 7 May 1897, MSS.Eur. C.125/2.
3. Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. C. 125/2.
6G
classes do not like being treated on all fours with their
1
inferiors*"
Lord Elgin, who usually took a calmer view than his
colleagues of matters concerning Indian nationalism and
unrest, disagreed with Hamilton and was "not persuaded that
any solidarity of interests” existed between the university-
educated classes and other classes, "upwards or downwards",
and he thought "the intense jealousy "which Muslims "feel of
the clever Hindu" prevented any substantial union between
2
those two groups* Elgin admitted that in a country ruled 
by foreigners it was difficult "to concede the same liberty 
of action to educational processes, and that political 
societies and movements which elsewhere might be treated 
with forbearance might have to be put under some restraint." 
Bur nevertheless, even though the Indian National Congress 
"not infrequently trespasses on the borderland of what 
is permissable" no responsible man "would ever propose to 
prohibit the Congress." Elgin aocepted as axiomatic that
-a
British rule in India would "never be free from anxiety.
The general concensus of official opinion was that 
most of the disorders and unrest observable in 1897 were 
directly attributable to the unusual circumstances of plague 
and famine, except in Poona, and were not symptomatic of a
1. Hamilton to Elgin, 9 Sept, 1897, MSS.Eur. C.125/2.
2. Elgin to Hamilton, 30 Dec. 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/8.
3. Elgin to Hamilton, 20 July 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6.
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general movement against the Government, The educated 
sections of the population were, as a whole, "disaffected"
“but they would become a major threat to British rule only 
if they succeeded in obtaining a following among the masses,'?’ 
Elgin summed up the official view by saying that "the 
dangers of the present and future" were concentrated in "a 
movement that they can no more stop than Canute could res­
train the waves, the progress of education and the acquisi-
2
tion of knowledge,"
While Lord Elgin consulted official opinion in the 
rest of India, the Bombay Government failed to find either 
the murderers or the suspected conspiratorial organization. 
Lord Sandhurst's first reaction was to ask for an increase 
of executive powers in order to deal with what might be an 
extremely dangerous situation in the Poona area. But Lord 
Elgin refused to consider this request since Sandhurst 
already had at his disposal in the Regulation XXV of 1827 
"summary powers of arrest and imprisionment which ... 
possibly exceeded those of the Czar of Russia.f'^
It seemed to msmy officials that the Indian press was 
instrumental in arousing hostility towards the Government 
if not in actually precipitating the Poona murders. In the 
opinion of the Bombay Press officer, twelve of the 200
1. Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. C. 125/2.
2. Elgin to Hamilton, 20 July 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6.
3* Elgin to Hamilton, 6 July 1897, MSS.Eur, D,509/6.
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provincial newspapers printed criticism of the Government
which "frequently so far transgressed the limits of fair or
reasonable criticism as to come perilously near" to sedition}
Secretary of State Hamilton refused in the House of Commons
to say that there was a direct connection between the Poona
murders and the Indian press, but he did admit that the
Government of India had for some years been concerned about
"the habitual dissemination of false intelligence and of
appeals to religious animosities by a portion of the
2
Vernacular Press," Neither the Bombay nor the Indian Gov­
ernments were completely confident that a conviction could 
be obtained against the offending newspapers. There had been 
only one previous prosecution under Section 124A of the 
Indian Penal Code which made it a criminal offence to excite 
or attempt "to excite feelings of disaffection to the 
G o ve r n m e n t . I n  the Bangabasi case of 1891, the Chief Just­
ice of the Calcutta High Court dismissed the proceedings 
when the jury failed to arrive at a unanimous decision.^- 
With this single experience of the working of Section 124A 
the Government was reluctant to initiate proceedings against
1. Quoted in Elgin to Hamilton, 3 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6,
2. Pari. Debates, H. of C., 1 July 1897 • 4th Series, Vol.L*
p7b6T.
3. Section 124A of the I.P.C. was passed into law as Act 
XXVII of 1870, in response to the Wahabi movement of the 
late 1860r s.
4. The articles for which the editor of the Bangabasi was 
prosecuted criticised the Government of India for 
passing the Age of Consent Bill in 1891.
Queen Empress v, Jogendra Chunder Bose, India Law Reports, 
XIX Calcutta 35.
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an Indian newspaper editor and then face the probability
that the Indian jurymen would not vo^ te for a conviction* A
Judge might accept the European jurymen*s majority vote and
find the accused guilty. Or the Judge might dismiss the
proceedings because the Indian minority did not agree with
the European majority. But in the former case the decision
would appear to be based on racial considerations; in the
latter the Government would appear to have been mistaken
in initiating proceedings in the first place. In both caes
cases British prestige would suffer.
Two weeks after the Poona murders, Lord Hamilton
suggested that the Government of India should adopt a new
Press Act to circumvent this impasse. The Act would provide
the Government with the executive power to warn erring
newspapers, and then "to confiscate their plant*1 if the
1warnings were disregarded.
Lord Elgin replied to Hamilton*s suggestion that the 
**executive powers for the arrest and punishment of danger­
ous and criminal persons are already ample" and that he and 
his colleagues considered special executive powers to con­
trol the Press as "undesirable." They wanted to test the
%
efficiency of the existing law of sedition before recommend
p
ing new legislation.
But Hamilton telegraphed to Elgin that he regarded
1. Hamilton to Elgin, 8 July 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/17.
2. Telegram from Elgin to Hamilton, 17 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P. 84/20.
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this delay as unnecessary. The political climate in England
was favourable for new coercive measures:'*’ in two or three
months, when the memory of the Poona and Calcutta disorders
had faded, this opportunity might have passed.
Elgin "very earnestly" begged the Secretary of State
to reconsider his views about strengthening the law. In
the first place any immediate legislation would have to be
passed at Simla without the presence of the Indian members
of the legislative Council. This would be a distinct
departure from the ordinary procedure and it "would be
2
politically inexpedient if not dangerous." Secondly, Lord 
Elgin explained, "I am personally averse to these restrict­
ive measures altogether: I do not believe in them." Any 
change in the law should be carried through without any 
"appearance of haste" and only "after a full consideration 
of all possible alternatives." He told Lord Hamilton that 
he was "disturbed" by the proposals for immediate legisla- 
tion. On 30 July, Hamilton, faced with the unanimous
4
opinion of the Governor-General and his Council, agreed
1. Telegram from Hamilton to Elgin, 19 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P. 84/20.
2. Telegram from Elgin to Hamilton, 22 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P. 89/20.
3. Elgin to Hamilton, 20 July 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6.
4. Telegram from Elgin to Hamilton, 29 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P. 84/20.
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to defer the legislation until after the existing law had 
been tested by the impending Bombay press trials.^
On 28 July 1897 the Poona police arrested Bal
Gangadhar Tilak and Keshav Madev Bal of the Kesari, Shunkar
Vishvanath Kelkar of the Poona Vaibhav, and the Natu 
2
brothers. Several days later four more people were taken 
into custody: Kashinath Waman lele of the Moda Vritta, 
Succaram Gopal Parandekar of the Poona Vaibhav, and 
Ramchandra Narayan and Krishnaji Dhondev of the Pratod.
The seven newspaper men were charged under Section 
124A of the Indian Penal Code with attempting "to excite 
feelings of disaffection to the Government" of India. The 
Government of Bombay, in initiating the proceedings, did not 
suggest that there had been a connection between the 
writings of the newspapers concerned and the Poona murders. 
But in each instance the articles in question had appeared 
in the three months preceeding the shootings.
The Natu brothers were held under Bombay Regulation 
XXV of I827 which gave the Government summary powers of 
detention "to ensure a portion of Her Majesty's dominions
1. Telegram from Hamilton to Elgin, 30 July 1897, MSS.Eur. 
P.84/20.
2. The Times of India (Overland Edition), 30 July 1897.
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from internal commotion." This Regulation, and the similar 
Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and Madras Regulation II of 
1819, were used in the frontier areas and against semi­
religious outbreaks such as those of the Kukas in the Punjab 
and the Moplahs in Malabar. But this was the first occasion 
on which it was employed against an educated nationalist.
Lord Sandhurst's Government resorted to the Regulation 
because it possessed no judicially acceptable evidence that 
the Natus were connected with murders although there was a 
rumour that Tilak and the Natus were at "the bottom of the 
whole matter."^*
Five and a half months after the arrest of the Natus, 
Hamilton was pressed in the House of Commons for the reasons 
for their continued imprisonment without trial. He replied 
that the Bombay authorities believed that the Natus "did 
everything in their power to stir up unrest" against the 
Government. One of the Natus was alleged to have sent a 
letter during the plague to a professional nurse "pointing 
out that it would be to her detriment, if she joined and 
worked with a search party." The nurse served anyway and, 
in consequence, "she lost the whole of her private practice" 
through"intimidation". The Bombay authorities also reported 
that, at the time of Gokhale's claim that rape had been 
committed by British soldiers, one of the Natus "had 
attempted in a most assiduous way to induce the police to
1. Sandhurst to Elgin, 25 July 1897, MSS.Eur. P.84/71.
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declare that a woman who had really died from disease had
1
been violated by a British soldier, and died in consequence*” 
There are several curious aspects to Hamilton's state­
ment about the Natus. Bala Saheb Natu wrote a letter to the
Champion of Bombay denouncing as "totally false" the inform-
2
at ion given by Hamilton in the House of Commons. The state­
ment was made on 18 February 1898 but the Bombay Government 
had not mentioned these allegations to the Natus themselves 
during their five and a half months' imprisonment* Nor did 
Sandhurst inform Elgin or Hamilton of these "facts" when 
they asked him for the reasons for the detention.^ Sand­
hurst's Government did not release these "facts" in India 
although it claimed through Hamilton in the House of Commons 
that it possessed a deposition from the nurse in question.^
It seems probable that the Bombay authorities expected to 
find a connection between the Natus and murders but when no 
such link was discovered, they decided to shift their justi­
fication onto these other "facts" for which the Bombay Gov­
ernment may or may not have had evidence.
The Natus were kept in detention for almost two and 
a half years. During the first six months the Government of 
Bombay not only failed to inform the Natus of the specific 
reasons for their arrest, but it also refused to allow
1. Pari.Debates.H.of C.18 Feb.1898, 4th Series.Vol.53. 
pp.1076-77.
2. Quoted by the Bengalee, 7 May 1898.
3. See Sandhurst *to Elgin, 25 July 1897, MSS.Eur.F.84/71. 
Also, extract of Sandhurst to Hamilton, 30 Oct.1897> 
enclosed in Sandhurst to Elgin, 4 Nov.1897,MSS.Eur.F84/71.
4. Pari.Debates, H.of C., 18 Feb.1898,4th Series, Vol.53.
p.1077.-----
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relatives, friends, or lawyers to visit. Regulation XXV of 
1827 authorised the attachment of immoveable property but 
the Government illegally attached the Natus* moveable poss­
essions as well,"1*
The first of the 1897 sedition trials in Bombay ended 
on 27 August when Narayan and Dhondev of the Pratod of 
Islampur were found guilty at the Sessions Court, Satara, 
and sentenced to life and seven years imprisonment
p
respectively. Their sentences were subsequently reduced 
to one year*s rigorous imprisonment and three months simple
3
imprisonment following an appeal to the High Court of Bombay.
Bal Gangadhar Tilak's trial came next. It attracted 
far more publicity than any of the other 1897 trials. By 
1897 Tilak was a well-known figure among Congress followers 
throughout India. His nomination for a second term on the 
Legislative Council of Bombay had recently been accepted by 
Sandhurst; he was a leading member of the Sarvajanik Sabha, 
a member of the Bombay Standing Committee of the Congress, 
and the editor of two influential newspapers - the Kesari 
and the Mahratta. Congress supporters saw in the Government*s 
prosecution of Tilak an attempt to punish a person for 
making independent criticisms of the Government, The timing 
of the prosecution suggested that the Government was trying
1. Sandhurst telegram to Hamilton, 3 March 1898, P.S.L.I., 
Vol.102.
2. Imperatrix v. R.Narayan and K.Dhondev, May Prog. No,352,
I.H.P.Pub.Vol.5413.
3* Indian Law Reports, XXII Bombay 152.
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indirectly to place the blame for the Poona murders on 
Tilak.1
The trial began on 8 September in the High Court of 
2
Bombay, Tilak and Bal were charged with attempting to 
excite disaffection by publishing and printing, respectively, 
two articles in the Kesari of 15 June 1897* The first was a 1 
poem entitled "Shivajifs Utterances" and it related the 
imaginary observations made by Shivaji upon seeing how con­
ditions had deteriorated since his time. The second article 
was ostensibly an account of four lectures delivered at a 
meeting in honour of Shiva;Ji. The lectures included both 
discussion of the morality of Shivaji's killing of Afzal 
Khan and an appeal to leaders of Indian society to ignore 
their differences and to unite in regaining their lost 
"Swatantrya",
The Advocate General, for the Crown, argued that 
Tilak1s poem was intended to excite disaffection by drawing 
a highly unfavourable comparison between India under British 
rule and India at the time of Shivaji, Under Shivaji men
1. See Bengalee, 30 Oct. 1897#
2, Imperatrix v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Keshev Mahadeo Bal, 
Indian Law Reports, XXII Bombay 112.
The more complete proceedings of the final three days of 
the Tilak trial appear in May Prog. No.356, I,H.P.Pub,, 
Vol.5413• The full six days* proceedings may be seen in 
The Times of India, 10 Sept, 1897 and the Supplement to 
TEhe Times of India, 18 Sept. 1897. There are also accounts 
of utie~ trial in A Full and Authentic Report of the Trial 
of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, edited by S. S.Sethur and K. G. 
Deshpande, and in Impepatrix versus Bal Gangadhar Tilak. 
edited by Bhaishanker and' Kanga, Attorneys for the 
Accused, both published in 1897.
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were brave, virtuous, and prosperous; Brahmans and cows were 
protected. But under the British, according to the poem, the 
Indian economy was ruined, cows were slaughtered, Brahmans 
were persecuted, Indian women were attacked in railway 
carriages, and Indians could no longer obtain justice, 
especially when a European and an Indian were involved in 
the same case.^
The Advocate General maintained that by taking every 
issue likely to arouse people’s prejudices and passions,
Tilak had sought to create disaffection. In his opinion,
Tilak could have but one object in repeatedly stating that 
India was suffering under foreign rule, and at the same time 
pointing out that Shivaji was a great man because he estab-
p
lished MSwarajya 1 or self-rule,
For the defence, Mr. Pugh thought that the Crown’s 
case was based on an incorrect translation of many key words. 
He denied that the poem was intended to incite hatred of
the British Government, Rather it was simply a poem in
praise of Shiva ji which pointed out that India was growing 
poorer from overtaxation. That was not sedition since many 
Europeans made the same argument. Nor did he think that the 
complaints about the protection of Brahmans and cows were 
illegal. In 1894 a number of Brahmans had been sentenced*^
1. Imperatrix v. B.G.Tilak and K.M.Bal, 4th Bay, pp.3^7.
May Prog, No.356, op.cit.
2. Ibid, p.5• * '
3. By Mr. Rand. However this was not mentioned by the
Advocate General nor did the Rand murderer refer to this
fact in his confession.
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to prison at Wai for playing music in front of a mosque, and
anyone had the right to criticise a specific court decision
such as this. As for the cows, it was undeniably true that
they no longer received protection from the Government and
it was not an offence to state an obvious fact. According
to Pugh, Tilak was suggesting that people should petition
1
the Government for the removal of their grievances.
In discussing the account of the Shiva ji meeting, the
Advocate General told the jury he thought that the reports
of the speeches were a mere guise for approving political
assassination and spreading discontent. The killing of
Afzal Khan was justified because it was done for the public
good and without selfish motives. The implication of the
article was i Indians should overcome their social and
religious differences, and, remembering that Shivaji and the 
♦ •
heroes of the French Revolution did not commit murder by
p
killing, they should regain their lost independence.
Pugh denied that this was the intention of these 
speeches. The discussion was a continuation of the historica 
question of the morality of Shivaji’s killing of Afzal Khan. 
It had no relevance to modern times. The references 
to the terrible burden did not apply to the British Govern­
ment but to the schisms, the poverty, and the degradation 
of the Indian nation in modern times.^
1. Ibid, pp.16-23.
2. Ibid, pp.8-10.
3. Ibid, pp.29-36.
L.
J
7 8
On the sixth day of the trial Judge Strachey began his 
summing up to the jury. In giving his famous interpretation 
of Section 124A he held that "disaffection means simply the 
absence of affection. It means hatred, enmity, dislike, 
hostility, contempt, and every form of ill-will to the 
Government." The offence, he continued, consists of "the 
exciting or attempting to excite certain feelings." It was 
not necessary to prove that the accused had attempted "to 
induce" action as opposed to feelings. It was "absolutely 
immaterial" if any disturbance had actually resulted.^ The 
Jury was also directed to consider the time of the publica­
tion, the prejudices of the readers who would see the
articles, and the likely effect upon them with regard to the
2
abnormal conditions of plague.
Judge Strachey told the jury that a man was permitted 
by law to argue that in view of Hindu feelings, cows should 
not be killed. A man might also criticize the unjust 
acquittal of British soldiers or the unjust conviction of 
Brahmans. But, he asked, "has it been argued or has it been 
strung upon a string of similar topics in such a way as to 
appeal not to the reason, but to the passions of a people 
whose passions are easily inflamed?"^
"A man may criticise or comment upon any measure 
or act of the Government... .he may express the 
strongest condemnation of such measures, and he
1. Ibid, p.57*
2. Ibid, p.60 et.seq.
3. Ibid, p.70.
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may do so severely, and even unreasonably, 
perversely and unfairly. ... But if he goes 
beyond that, and, whether in the course of 
comments upon measures or not, holds up the 
Government itself to the hatred or contempt 
of his readers, as, for instance, by attri­
buting to it every sort of evil and mis­
fortune suffered by the people, or dwelling 
adversely on its foreign origin and 
character, or imputing to it base motives, 
or accusing it of hostility or indifference 
to the welfare of the people, then he is 
guilty under the section...
The Jury found Tilak guilty by a vote of
six to three, the three Indians voting for his acquittal.
2
Bal was unanimously acquitted. Judge Strachey accepted 
the Juryfs verdict and sentenced Tilak to 18 months 
rigorous imprisonment.
Sympathisers with the Congress movement denied that 
Tilak was guilty.^ They objected to Strachey!s definition of
1. Ibid, p.59.
2. Ibid, p.89.
3. Ibid, p.90.
4. The Bengalee, (25 Sept. 1897) for instance, appeared 
with a black border. It argued that no Indian, 
especially an intelligent one, could be disloyal
to the British Government because the alternative 
was "anarchy" or "Russian domination", and all educated 
Indians realized this.
"disaffection" as "simply the absence of affection*" In 
their view Strachey had misdirected the Jury by stating that 
a seditious feeling might be passive and not necessarily an 
active feeling.'*' It was feared that Strachey*s interpreta­
tion of Section 124A would "seriously affect the liberty of
p
the press and freedom of speech." A campaign was launched 
throughout India to raise enough funds for Tilak to appeal 
to the Privy Council. Its success was immediate. All 
together, over Rs* 50,000 was collected: Rs.10,000 ... by 
Calcutta, Rs.11,000 by Bombay, and the rest by Gujarat,
4
Sind, Madras and Central India."
After making an unnecessary and unsuccessful applica­
tion to the High Court of Bombay for leave to appeal to the 
Privy Council, Tilak made an application to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council itself for leave to appeal 
against his conviction.^ ^
1. Bengalee, 2 Oct. 1897*
2. Quoted from appeal by a Tilak Defence Pund Committee com­
posed of Hon. Surendra Nath Banerjea, Hon.Norendra Nath 
Sen, Hon, Kali Charan Banerjea, J* Ghosal, Motilal Ghose, 
Rabindra Nath Tagore, and others. Bengalee, 9 Oct. 1897.
3. Bengalee, 30 Oct. 1897.
4. Bengalee, 22 Oct. 1898.
5* !Note of Proceedings before the Pull Bench of Her Majesty 
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in re the application 
of Bal Gangadhar Tilak for leave to appeal to the Privy 
Council* l8 Sept. 1897. May Prog. No.362, I.H.P.Pub.,
Vol.5413.
6. A summary of the proceedings before the Privy Council 
appears in the Indian Law Reports. XXII Bombay 528. The 
full proceedings may be found in a Special Supplement to 
India, Dec, 1897, and in May Prog. No.378, I.H.P.Pub.,
VoT75413.
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Herbert Asquith, Q.G., appeared in London on Tilak's 
behalf. He maintained that Strachey had misdirected the Jury 
by giving them a "far too extensive1' definition of disaffec­
tion, In his opinion, "the essence of the offence is that 
you should be seeking to excite in tho minds of those to whom 
your language is addressed an intention or disposition to 
resist the lawful authority of the Government," and not, as 
Strachey had said, merely "any feelings of hatred or ill- 
will or enmity,
Asquith also objected to Stracheyfs treatment of the 
"Explanation" to Section 124A. Strachey had said, in effect, 
that the Explanation was "an exhaustive enumeration of the 
cases which are not intended to fall within the section" and
p
not merely one example of what was not sedition. Asquith 
thought that Strachey's construction of the explanation was 
"most irrational and impractical " when he held that 
comments on the general ,fpolicy or structure 11 and f,the 
spirit or general intention or motive which characterizes
1, "Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Petitioner versus the Queen Empress- 
p.21, May Prog. No.378, I.H.P.Pub,, Vol.5413.
2, The Explanation reads "Such a disapprobation of the 
measures of the Government as is compatible with a dis­
position to render obedience to the lawful authority of 
the Government, and to support the lawful authority of 
the Government against unlawful attempts to subvert or 
resist that authority, is not disaffection. Therefore 
the making of comments on the measures of the Government, 
with the intention of exciting only this species of 
disapprobation, is not an offence within this clause,"
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the Government policy as a whole'* were not protected by the 
Explanation and that such comments fell within the meaning 
of Section 124A. The "purpose of the criticism", Asquith 
continued, ought to be more important than the subject 
matter,^
Asquith further objected to Strachey*s instructions to
the Jury to consider the state of public feeling at the time
the articles were published as no evidence concerning public
feeling had been presented, Strachey had misdirected the
Jury, Asquith felt, by speaking of "an inflamed state of
feeling" which "culminated in the murders" of Rand and 
2
Ayerst. Actually, he pointed out, plague in Poona had sub­
sided over a month before the murders and the search parties 
of British soldiers had been withdrawn on 20 May,^ There 
were lesser points about which Asquith thought Strachey had 
been mistaken. But on 19 November 1897, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council refused Tilak's application
A
for leave of appeal. Thus, in effect, the Privy Council 
upheld Stracheyfs view that "disaffection means any feeling 
of hatred" and not "only such as involves a disposition to 
resist".
1. Ibid, pp.21-22.
2. Imperatrix v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Keshav Mahadeo Bal, 
op.cit. p.66.
3. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Petitioner v # the Queen Empress, 
op.cit., p.19*
4. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Petitioner v. the Queen Empress, op. 
cit., p.26, Also, XXII Bombay 528, India Law Reports.
5. Report by the Legal Adviser, India Office, on the Proceed* 
ings before the Privy Council on the occasion of Tilak's 
application for special leave to appeal against his 
conviction. 29 Nov. 1897, May Prog, No.379, I.H.P.Pub., 
Vol.5413.
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The third Bombay sedition trial of 1897 ended on 17
September, S.V.Kelkar and S.G.Parandekar of the Poona
Vaibhav were tried under Section 124A in the High Court
but, when the Jury failed to agree on a verdict, the case
was held over until the next S e s s i o n s O n  26 November 1897,
at the retrial, both the accused submitted apologies and
2
they were discharged.
The fourth prosecution resulted in a unanimous 
decision of guilty by the Jury in the High Court on 26 Nov­
ember 1897* K.W.Lele of the Moda Vritta was sentenced to 
nine months simple imprisonment.^
Thus four of the five 1897 sedition trials succeeded, * 
This seemed to indicate that the Indian law of sedition was 
adequate. However, the Government of India decided to make 
major alterations in the existing law. Hamilton was largely 
responsible in persuading the Government to act. He did not 
think that the situation in India was -urgent but he wanted 
to be prepared for future trouble and 1897 provided a good 
opportunity to strengthen the sedition law before the effect 
of the Rand murder on British public opinion had worn off.'*
1. Imperatrix v. Shankar Vishvanath Kelkar and Sakharams 
Gopal Parandekar. May Prog, No.366, ibid.
2. Imperatrix v. S.V. Kelkar and S.G.Parandekar. May Prog.
No.372, ibid.
3. Imperatrix v. Kashinath Waman Lele. May Prog. No.374. 
ibid.
4. Including the prosecution of the editor of the Jami-ul- 
ulam of Moradabad, See Chapt. I.
5. Hamilton to Elgin, 12 Aug. 1897, MSS.Eur, C, 125/2.
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The Government of India, in proposing to amend the
sedition law, was careful to state its preference for a
non-executive law of general application, and to reject the
idea of a new law similar to the Vernacular Press Act of
1878 which covered only those newspapers printed in a non-
European language. The preference for a law providing for
action "taken not hy the executive Government hut through
1
the Courts in the ordinary course of law" was shared hy
most of the officials consulted although the Secretary of
2 ^State, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Justice
Strachey^ had originally indicated their preference for a
law containing executive powers to control the press.
In February and March 1898, the Government of India
passed major amendments relating to the sedition law in two
sections of the Indian PenQl Code and in two sections of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. When the Government of India
submitted its proposed amendments to the Secretary of State
in October 1897, it did not plan to amend Section 124A of
5
the Penal Code. However, Hamilton in sanctioning the 
amendments, advised that the definition of disaffection in
1. Gov, Gen, in Council to Sec. of State, 14 Oct. 1897, 
para.2, Peb. Prog. No.182, India Leg, Prog,, 'Vol.5479*
2. Hamilton to Elgin, 23 July 1897, MSS.Eur. C, 125/2,
3. Elgin to Hamilton, 20 July 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/6,
4. Minute by Justice Strachey, 1 Jan, 1898, Enclosure to
S.W.Edgerley, Sec., Govt, of Bombay, to Sec., Govt, of 
India, Leg. Dept,, 10 Jan. 1898, Appendix A35, India Leg. 
Prog., Vol.5479.
5. Gov. Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 14 Oct. 1897, 
op.cit., para,5.
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1
Section 124A ought to he changed. Justice Strachey had 
said in the Tilak trial that disaffection meant "simply the 
absence of affection," Justice Parsons, on the other hand, 
had ruled in the Narayan (Pratod)appeal case that disaffec­
tion could not be construed as meaning "dislike or hatred, 
but is used in its special sense as signifying political 
alienation or discontent, that is to say, a feeling of dis­
loyalty to the existing Government which tends to a disposi-
2
tion not to obey, but to resist and subvert" the Government, 
This interpretation went far beyond the other definitions
given in 1897 and it directly contradicted the rulings of
*1 a 5
Justices Strachey, Farran, and Edge, Strachey thought
that it diluted "the vigour" of his own ruling and reintro­
duced "the old uncertainties which have for years made the 
Government afraid to prosecute," Hamilton proposed to 
resolve the conflict in interpretations by adding an Expla­
nation to Section 124A stating that disaffection "includes 
all feelings of ill-will."^
This proposal aroused great opposition in India from 
Indians and Europeans alike who argued that the definition
1. Sec. of State to Gov. Gen. in Council, 6 Dec, 1897, para. 
3, Feb, Prog. No.183, India Leg. Prog., Vol.5479*
2. Imperatrix v. Ramchandra 'Narayan, Indian Law Reports, 
XXII Bombay 152.
3. See account of Tilak Trial, above.
4. Imperatrix v. Narayan and K. Dhondev, Indian Law Reports, 
XXII, Bombay 152.
5. Imperatrix v, Amba Prasad, Indian Law Reports, XX 
Allahabad 55.
6. Arthur Strachey to M.D.Chalmers, the Law Member, 6 Dec 
1897, Reg.No.75IB/15,MSS.Eur.F.84.
7. Sec,of State to Gov,Gen.inCouncil, 6 Dec, 1897, op.cit. par*:
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of disaffection was far too wide and too vague, and that
certain criticisms which would arouse ill-will towards the
Government were perfectly compatible with a disposition to
obey the Government and to support it against all attempts
to subvert or overthrow it.^
M.D.Chalmers, the Law Member of Elgin's Council,
denied in the Legislative Council that the Government was
altering the meaning of Section 124A except to make it more
2
similar to the British law of sedition* This was a dubious 
argument, According to Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 
a seditious intention was not an intention to show "that 
Her Majesty had been misled or mistaken in her measures, or 
to point out errors or defects in the government or consti­
tution as by law established, with a view to their reforma­
tion, or to excite Her Majesty's subjects to attempt by 
lawful means the alteration of any matter in Church or State 
by law e s t a b l i s h e d . T h e r e f o r e ,  under the British la^
1. See Sec,, Bombay Presidency Association, to Sec*, Govt, 
of India, Leg. Dept,, 26 Jan. 1898, Appendix A47, India 
Leg. Prog., Vol.5479. Also, Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, Sec0f 
British Indian Association, to C.W.Bolton, Ch.Sec,, Govt, 
of Bengal, 21 Jan. 1898, Appendix A 42, ibid.
2. India Leg. Council Prog., 21 Dec. 1897, Vol.XXXVI,
. pp.379-81.
3. James Pitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law 
(3rd ed,, 1883), p.65, article 93*
Stephen's articles on sedition were accepted "almost 
verbatim" by the Criminal Code Commission which 
reported in 1879.
J.P.Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law in England, 
Vol.II, p.299.
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a person was protected in his criticism if he sought reform 
by lawful means. The proposed Indian law gave no such pro­
tection. Chalmers may have realized the weakness of his 
argument because two months later he told the Legislative 
Council that argument about the law of sedition in England 
was
"more or less academic. No one in his senses 
would contend that because a given law is 
good and suitable in England it is therefore
good and suitable in India.... Language may
be tolerated in England which is unsafe to 
tolerate in India, because in India it is 
apt to be transformed into action instead of 
passing off as harmless gas."l
However, a small concession was made to critics of the new
Section 124A, Before the amendment became law on 18 February
1898, the Select Committee altered the Explanation to say
that disaffection included "disloyalty and all feelings of
enmity." It was admitted that "a certain amount of ill-will
2
may be compatible with genuine loyalty."
The other section of the Penal Code relating to 
sedition which was amended was Section 505. Section 505 made 
it an offence to publish or circulate a false rumour, report, 
or statement, with the intention of causing a mutiny or an 
offence against the state or public tranquility. According 
to the Government of India, the section had been "unworkable
1. India Leg, Council Prog., 18 Feb. 1898, Vol.XXXVII, 
pp.33-34.
2. Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the 
Penal Code, Appendix A49, India Leg. ^rog., Vol.5479. 
The original and the amended Sections 124A are appended 
to this chapter.
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owing to the impossibility of proving that a person" knew 
the rumour, report, or statement to he false. The Government 
proposed to remedy this hy rewording the Explanation to the 
section, so that the burden of proving the truth of the 
rumour, report, or statement would lie on the accused. The 
section was also to be extended to cover rumours, reports, 
or statements which were "likely to cause", as well as which 
were intended to cause, an offence,'*’ Thus under Section 505, 
the accused would have been liable to conviction, regardless 
of the actual effect or intention of the rumour, report or 
statement, unless he could prove its truth. Before the 
amendment was introduced into the Legislative Council on 
21 December 1897, a further change was made at the suggestion 
of the Secretary of State. True statements were also to have
been made punishable if they were likely or intended to
2
cause an offence. Critics of these amendments argued that 
the Government would be placing an impossible burden on the 
accused by requiring him to prove that his statement was 
true and that he made it without malicious intention. On 
this Section also the Select Committee made a slight con­
cession, It altered the amended section so that the accused 
would not be required to prove the actual truth of his state­
ment, but only that he had "reasonable grounds for believing"
1, Gov. Gen. in Council to Sec.of State, 14 Oct. 1897, 
op.cit., para.10.
2. Sec, of State to Gov, Gen. in Council, 6 Dec. 1897, 
op.cit., pa,ra.9.
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that it was true and that he made it without criminal 
intent.^
The charges introduced into the procedure of the laws 
of sedition in 1898 were even more important than the amend­
ments to the substance of the offences. The main criticisms 
made by officials against the existing law of sedition have 
already been stated. Prom 1870 to 1897, the law of sedition 
(Section 124-A) had remained almost inoperative, largely 
because officials had anticipated that jury members would 
not vote for the conviction of a person belonging to their 
own community Oas in the Bangabasi case in 1891 and the 
Tilak case in 1897) or that the accused would acquire the 
stature of a martyr through the inevitable publicity 
attending a sedition trial.
The Government of India introduced two amendments
to the Code of Criminal Procedure which were intended to
provide alternative means of dealing with sedition. The
amendment to which the Government of India attached "the
greatest importance" contained a "summary method of stopping
2
the dissemination of seditious" matter. The amendment, 
which became Section 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
authorized Chief Presidency and District Magistrates, as 
well as specially empowered Presidency and First Class Magis­
trates, to take security from any person suspected of
1. Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the 
Penal Code, op.cit., para.5#
2. Gov. Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 14 Oct. 1897, 
op.cit., para,7.
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disseminating or attempting to disseminate seditious matter.
This amendment, like the other alterations to the sedition
laws, was condemned by almost all of the 30 odd Indian and
European groups who submitted criticisms.^ The Rafai-am
Association, a pro-Congress political organization in
Lucknow, said the amendment would "serve as a terror, which
will dry up all feelings of independence" among Indian news-
2
paper editors. The Calcutta Bar objected that the amend­
ment would give extensive powers to Magistrates
"whose actions by virtue of their public 
position and the very wide powers they enjoy, 
are likely to meet with disapproval and to 
be the subject of strong criticism at the 
hands of the press, and who,therefore, will 
be the most intolerant ,•. and the most 
inclined to be prejudiced,"3
The European and Anglo-Indian Defence Association, which had 
been founded in 1883 to protect the privileges of the
A
European community, asked that either the amendment be
1. The only two bodies to give full support to the sedition 
Bills were the Muhammadan Literary Society and the Central 
National Muhammadan Association, Both bodies were in 
Calcutta and their Secretaries held Government appointed 
judicial positions. See enclosures to C.W.Bolton, Ch. Sec., 
Govt, of Bengal, to Sec, Govt, of India, Leg. Dept..
19 Jan, 1898, Appendix A6, India Leg. Prog., Vol.54-80.
2. Bipin Bihari Bose, Sec,, Rafai-am Association, to Sec,, 
Govt, of India, Home Dept., 8 Peb. 1898. May Prog, No,343*
I.H.P., Pub., Vol.5413,
3» N.B.Chatterji, Sec,, Calcutta Bar, to Sec,, Govt, of 
India, Leg. Dept., 24 Peb. 1898, quoted in Englishman,
4 March 1898.
4. S.Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884, p.146.
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cancelled or the Magistrate be required to possess definite
proof of a person's guilt or seditious intent before taking
security for good behaviour.^ In response to these views,
the Select Committee and the Government made a number of
changes in the new Section 108 before it was enacted on
12 March 1898. Magistrates were allowed to require bonds to
be executed for good security without also requiring
sureties. This was important since many Indian newspapers
had such limited capital that the necessity of making even
a small deposit for good behaviour would have compelled them
to cease publication. The other important concession was the
making of all orders issued under Section 108 subject to
2
revision by the High Court.
Besides giving Magistrates the power to demand 
security for good behaviour, the Government extended the 
jurisdiction over cases tried under Section 124A to Chief
Presidency and District Magistrates, and to specially empow-
•5
ered First Class Magistrates.-' This provided the Government 
with another means of acting against political offenders 
without recourse to a jury trial although serious offences
1. W.C.Madge, Sec., European and Anglo-Indian Defence Assoc­
iation, to Sec., Govt, of India, Leg. Dept., 10 Feb.1898, 
Appendix A31, India Leg. Prog., Vol.5480.
2. Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend to 
the Penal Code, op.cit., para.24.
3. This extension was accomplished by making an addition to 
Column 8 of Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code 
in the line relating to offences under Section 124A of 
the Penal Code.
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requiring severe punishments were to continue to he tried 
hy a Court of Session*
The sedition law amendments provided the Government 
with a definition of disaffection which was hoth wider and 
more clearly defined than the old law. Thqy also supplied 
a procedure which was expected to he efficient, swift, and 
free from the embarrassing publicity of past sedition trials* 
The amendments might have been even more sweeping hut for 
the opposition of the non-official European community of 
Calcutta* The President of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 
Alan Arthur, told Elgin that the Europeans opposed the Gov­
ernment's amendments because they feared that an extreme 
law would be overturned by a future "Radical1 Government in 
England.2
The Government of Bombay was not content to rely on 
the strengthened sedition law. It established Press Commit­
tees to warn newspapers which published objectionable matter 
and to supply correct information to misinformed newspapers. 
The Committees, which were appointed by the District Magis­
trate and consisted of both official and non-official
1. Gov, Gen. in Council to Sec, of State, 14 Oct. 1897, 
op.cit., para.8* District and First Class Magistrates 
could not ordinarily pass sentences exceeding two years' 
imprisonment, Rs.1,000 fine, or whipping. See Section 
, 32(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
>'2, Elgin to Hamilton, 10 Feb. 1898, MSS.Eur, F.84/72.
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Indians,^ warned or corrected more than fifteen newspapers
2
in the first year and a half of their existence. The 
Committees were condemned by the 1898 Congress*^ and even 
Hamilton thought a Press Committee "approaches very nearly 
to a Press Censorship without any legal authority behind itt" 
After W.A.Chambers, one of the Congress leaders of Bombay, 
had complained to audiences in England about the autocratic 
nature of the Committees,^ and after the subject was raised 
in the House of Commons, Hamilton officially informed the 
Bombay Government that the "expediency of a measure, so apt 
to be misunderstood, appears to me very questionable,"
1. G.K.Gokhale served on the Poona Press Committee. Sandhurst 
to Elgin, 11 May 1898, MSS.Eur, P.84/72.
2. Reports on the working of the Press Committee, enclosures 
to Govt, of Bombay to Sec, of State, 12 Jan. 1900, Feb. 
Prog. 245B, I.H.P.,Pub., Vol.5872.
3. Resolution VIII, The Bengalee (18 March 1899) published 
a letter from C,Hudson, District Magistrate, Ahmadnagar, 
to the editor of a local newspaper. The letter said the 
editor "is warned that his article of July 10, 1898, on 
the conviction of a soldier and the partiality of the 
Bombay High Court where Europeans are concerned, was con­
ceived in bad taste, and that its tone is objectionable,"
,4. Hamilton to Elgin. 20 May 1898, MSS.Eur. C. 125/3.
■' (2f* India, 5 Aug. 1898. Henry Hyde Champion had served in the
^ second Afghan War as an artillery officer. After the War
he became a pacifist and gave up his commission. He was
converted to socialism by Henry George and became a 
"labour orator and editor" in the East End of London.
After his journal failed he went to India in 1889 where 
he edited the Champion and worked as an engineer. He 
played a leading role in the Presidency Association and 
in 1900 he was selected as Bombay’s only member on the 
General List of the Indian Congress Committee which was, 
theoretically, the ruling body of the Congress. Bengalee,
7 and 21 May 1898.
6, Sec. of State to Gov. in Council, 23 June 1898, July-
Prog. No.222, I.H.P.,Pub., Vol.5414.
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After a couple of years the Committees were quietly allowed 
to lapse.
The other means hy which political alienation was 
thought to be spreading were the schools and colleges* The 
Tilak trial in particular drew attention to this problem*
Mr. Pugh had argued in Tilak’s defence that the substance of 
the Kesari articles was similar to that of books sold in the 
Government book depots and used in the schools aided by 
Government funds.^ These books contained passages to the 
effect that India’s wealth was being drained away by foreign­
ers, that the slaughter of cows by foreigners was a burden
to India, and that the Marathas should regain their former
2
manliness and courage and kill the foreigners. The Bombay 
Government also noticed that Tilak’s report of the Shivaji 
celebration contained objectionable speeches by Professor 
Bhanu of the New English School and Professor Paranjpe of 
the Maharastra Native Institution. Both these Poona schools 
were recipients of Government aid. Furthermore, Professor 
Bhanu’s book, Tales from Maratha History* had been used in 
the New English School for two years without authorization, 
and in the opinion of the Government of Bombay, it ’’contained 
many objectionable passages*" Two other teachers at the New
1. Imperatrix v. B.G.Tilak and V.M.Bal, 4th Bay, op.cit,,
pp.21-22.
2. The Times* 11 Oct. 1897. See also the exhibits submitted 
‘for the defence in A Full and Authentic Report of the 
Trial of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ed. by £•S.Setlur and
K. Gr.Beshpande.
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English School had published "very violent attacks" on the
Government during the plague in their newspaper, the
Sudharak. And finally, Professor G.K.Gokhale of the Fergusson
College, which was also part of the Deccan Education Society,
had made irresponsible statements in England, as already
1
stated, about the conduct of the plague operations.
Because of these "political" activities, the Government
of Bombay decided to insist that the aided schools make
certain reforms in both their constitutions and rules of
behaviour. The Director of Public Instruction entered into
correspondence with the Deccan Education Society, the Poona
Native Institution, and the Ahmadnagar Education Society,
The Government requested the aided institutions to prohibit
their teachers from participating in any political agitation ,
from holding office in any political association, and from
maintaining any connection with a political newspaper or
journal. According to a Government Resolution, politics were
to be entirely dissociated from education, and any departure
from this principle would result in the withdrawal of the
2
Government grant-in-aid.
The Council of the Deccan Education Society agreed to 
suspend Professor Bhanu and Mr, Patwardhan, who was editor
1, Dir, of Pub. Instru, to Chinn . of Deccan Educ. Soe,,
3 Sept. 1897* Appendix L to Abstr. of Dec. Progs, in 
Educ. Dept., Bombay: Educ. Ecclos.Mar. and Leg. Prog.,
Vol.5321, Also, Govt, of Bombay Despatch to Sec. of State,
7 Jan, 1898 July Prog., No.22, I.H.P.,Educ., Vol.5415.
2, Resol. of Gov. in Council, 28 Feb. 1898, Feb. Prog., No.
No.259, Bombay: Educ.Eccles, Mar. and Leg, Prog.,
Vol.5541.
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of the Sudharak, for their political indiscretions,"1' and to
alter its condition so that the Managing Board of Life-
members would no longer have predominant control of the
schools under the Society's charge. This reform was insisted
upon because Gokhale, Bhanu, and Patwardhan had been among
the Life-members on the Managing Board, and their influence
was not believed to be healthy- Similar changes were made in
2
the Poona Native Institution's constitution.
The Ahmadnagar Education Society suspended the Head­
master of Ahmadnagar High School for his speech at the local 
Shivaji celebration in May 1897. In that speech the Head­
master had abused the British and claimed that the British 
had made preparations to leave India in 1857 after only a 
day and a half of Hindu-Muslim combination. The Society also 
dismissed the four masters and one student who managed the 
Sudarshan newspaper which had published the speech^ At the 
suggestion of the Governor in Council, the Ahmadnagar Educa­
tion Society agreed that in the future the District Judge or 
Collector and an Education Inspector would be members of 
the Managing Board.^
1. Dir, of Pub. Instru. to Sec., Govt, of Bombay Educ.Dept., 
13 Oct. 1897, Appendix L to Abstr. of Dec. Progs, in Educ, 
Dept. Bombay Educ. Eccles., Mar, and Leg. Prog., Vol.5321.
2. Letter from Dir. of Pub.Instr., 7 Apr. 1898. May Educ, 
Prog. No,624,: Bombay:Educ., Eccles. Mar. and Leg. Prog., 
Vol. 5541.
3. Letter from Dir. of Pub, Instr., 10 Jan. 1898, Peb, Educ, 
Prog. No. 259, ibid.
4. Letter from Dir. of Pub. Instr., 16 May 1898. July Educ. 
Prog. No.223, ibid.
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A number of explanations were advanced for the growth 
of disaffection in the schools. One was that the rapid 
development of aided-schools, run entirely by Indians, had 
increased the difficulties of providing proper supervision 
for text books and faculty and student behaviour. The Educa­
tion Commission of 1882, under the presidency of Sir William 
Hunter, had recommended that higher education should be left 
as much as possible to private control, and that private 
efforts should be assisted through Government grants-in-aid. 
Since that time the enrollment in private schools and 
colleges had increased almost tenfold while that in public 
institutions had grown by less than a half,**" Government 
Education Inspectors were watchful for direct political 
teaching in the schools but they seem to have been ineffic­
ient. One standard text-book, the Matriculation Manual of 
English, sold 40,000 copies to Indian schools before the 
following passages were discovered by the Education 
Inspectors;
1, "Illustrative of adjectives used as nouns:-
The natives of India, down trodden mortals, are 
treated by Europeans, whether inferiors or 
superiors, whether juniors or seniors, worse 
than criminals,
1. Govt, of India Resolution, 28 Oct, 1899? in J.S.Cotton's 
"Report on the Progress of Education in India, 1892-93 
to 1896-97*"
Nov. Prog. No.2b? I.H.P., Educ,, Vol.5641.
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2, "Illustrative of expanding sentences
a) Tilak was condemned unjustly,
b) Tilak was condemned, though it, the condemna­
tion, was unjust.
3. "Illustrative of compression:-
a) The Press Act, from which all troubles to
Indian liberty are expected to arise, must be
knocked on the head.
b) The Press Act, the source of all troubles to 
Indian liberty, must be knocked on the head.'*'
By 1897, it was apparent that there was a subtle poli­
tical influence at work in the schools: the teaching that 
India had once been united and prosperous, that under British 
rule it was disunited and impoverished, and that a golden 
age was approaching in the future. Sir William Hunter wrote 
an article on this subject for The Times in October 1897 in 
which he supported the view that the myth of an historical 
universal Indian Empire "underlies all Indian conceptions 
of modern politics. It is the cause of much discontent and
1# These were additions made to the book by M.S.Purnalingam 
Pillai, editor of the Jnana Bodini of Madras. The book 
had been written by a Mr. Sheppard and the revised 
editions were published by Messrs. Thompson and Co. of 
Madras.
H.A.Sim, Pri. Sec, to Gov. of Bombay, to W.R.Lawrence,
Pri. Sec. to Viceroy, 7 July 1899, Reg* No.1013, P.S.L.I., 
Vol. 117*
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■bitterness in the native mind' and press. He objected to the 
belief that the English had destroyed the "Empire" or 
"Nation", and that under the native rulers the masses had 
been freer and more prosperous. Hunter regretted that Indians 
derived their knowledge of English activities in 18th 
Century India "from the misleading word-pictures of Macaulay 
and the partisan vituperation of Burke," He thought that 
Indian teachers had adopted Burke*s objective of securing "a 
political conviction" rather than presenting "the historical 
facts,
The Secretary of State advised the Bombay Government 
to take more care in the selection of text books and he 
suggested that teachers and education inspectors encourage 
respect for authority by exhibiting greater strictness in
p
matters of discipline. The Government of India wondered if, 
in substituting Government aid for Government control in the 
schools, the teachers might have become discontented because 
they were no longer eligible for Government pensions.J
1. The Times, 11 Oct. 1897, As it must have been difficult 
for many Englishmen to admit doubts concerning India*s 
prosperity, so it was similarly advantageous for Indian 
politicians to accept the Golden Age Theory. For instance, 
Surendra Nath Banerjea told the 1895 session of the Indian 
National Congress that "it is a beautiful tradition. It 
embalms the ever-present sense of dissatisfaction which 
humanity feels with the present. Dissatisfaction is the 
parent of all progress, It stirs us on to the ceaseless 
activity for the betterment of our race, A golden age is, 
indeed, looming in the future." Report of the 11th I.N.C., 
p.50,
2. Educ. Despatch from Sec. of State to Gov. in Council,
Bombay, 16 Dec. 1897, paras 2 and 5.
July Prog. No.20, I.H.P*, Educ., Vol.5415.
3. J.P.Hewett, Sec,, Govt, of India, to Heads of Local Govts.,
24 June 1898, July Prog, No.30, ibid.
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Unemployment among ex-students was believed to be another 
reason for the political alienation of educated Indians,^ 
However, major education reforms were to wait until Lord 
Curzon's Universities Act in 1904«
The most potent source of anti-British feeling among 
the educated classes of the Bombay Deccan was'the memory and 
glorification of Maratha rule by the Maratha Brahmans. Sir 
William Lee-Warner, who served in many official capacities 
in Bombay before becoming Secretary to the Political and 
Secret Department in the India Office, expressed in 1900 a 
widely felt anxiety at the predominance of the Brahmans in 
the schools and Government service. He said that the 
Brahmans had usurped most of the scholarships which the Gov­
ernment had intended to give to the backward classes. Simi­
larly, the decision to allow higher education to be run 
largely by private enterprise had played into the hands of 
the Brahmans who almost monopolized the private colleges 
with their superior intelligence, solidarity and organizing 
ability. The competitive examinations for Government service 
had also furthered the Brahman ascendancy. In 1869, out of 
26 Deputy Collectors in Bombay Presidency, 12 were Brahmans, 
9 were Europeans, and 5 were Parsis. In 1899, there were 4-3 
Brahmans, 5 Europeans, 12 Parsis, and 3 others. In 1899, 60 
of the 74 Mamlatdars were Brahmans. Yet the Brahmans
1. See Hamilton's speech, Pari Debates, H. of C., 5 Aug. 
1897, 4th Series, Vol.5'27'ppU'36-57.
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represented less than five per cent of the population of 
Bombay. Lee-Warner thought that "the strength and popularity 
of our rule are not broad-based upon the several classes of 
the population, but upon the one class whose interests are 
not identical with those of India as a whole or of 
ourselves." He thought that the memory of the Peshwa^ rule 
"hangs heavy in the air", that if another Peshwa were to 
proclaim himself, the descendants of the Peshwa's Government, 
who maintained their hereditary titles, would assume rule 
"without dispute or question."'*'
While the Governments of India and Bombay were tight­
ening official control over the press and education, the 
Poona murder case was partly solved. On 3 October 1897, 
almost three weeks after Tilak had been sentenced to prison, 
the Poona police arrested Damodir Hari Chapekar, a twenty- 
eight year old Chitpavan Brahman, who made a full and vol­
untary confession. He admitted that he and his brother had 
murdered Rand, and he described their acts of violence 
against the Government, Christians, and Hindu reformers
1. Note on Bombay Affairs, 26 Jan.. 1900, by W. Lee-Warner, 
MSS.Eur. P.92.
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during the previous years. His confession was made "in no 
penetential spirit, hut rather in the spirit of one who has 
done and dared for the cause of his c o u n t r y m e n . W h i l e  he 
waited in jail for his trial, he finished writing his remark-* 
ahle autobiography, the life story of a man with no clear 
opolitical objective other than a passionate belief in the 
necessity of independence from non-Indian institutions and 
influences, which he thought were corrupting Brahman 
orthodoxy.
2
Damodar's father had been an itinerant kirtan singer. 
Damodar had spent his early years travelling with his 
fatherfs troupe, performing kirtans at shrines and at the 
durbars of Native States. He had attended the New English 
School in Poona for at least two years where he discovered 
that the study of English caused one "to look upon his 
elders as fools and despise his good and ancient religion*"^ 
By the time Damodar was fifteen he had developed a 
strong dislike of English people and their ways. In the 
early 1890*3 Damodar and his younger brother, Balkrishna, 
started a club to stimulate courage, physical strength, 
martial spirit, and religious enthusiasm. This club, consist­
ing of about 150 Poona youths, waged mock military battles 
among themselves with slings and stones. After this club
1. Poona Observer and Civil and Military Journal, 13 Oct.1897#
2. A kirtan is the celebration of the Gods' virtues with 
songs and music.
3 *  Autobiography of Damodar Chapekar, Part I, pp.6-10.
Enclosure to 8.W.Edgerley, Sec.G-ovt. of Bombay, to Sec., 
Govt, of India, Home Dept., 25 Aug.l899,
Sept. Prog. No.6, I.H.P.Pub., Vol.5640.
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broke up, forty of the original members formed a second club, 
probably in 1894. Religious discussions were held, small 
weapons were stolen and collected, and gymnastics were
i
practiced. However, this club too, was short-lived.
About the time of the controversy over the use of the 
Congress Pavilion by the 1895 Social Conference, the 
Chapekar brothers started a third club consisting of only 
twenty members. Its object was similar to that of the first 
two? to attain familiarity with weapons, to build up 
physical strength, and to discuss ways of ending British 
rule. This third society developed well beyond the mere pre­
paratory stage. In an anonymous letter published in the 
Sudharak ("Reformer") on 25 November 1895, the Chapekars 
elaborated their purpose. The letter was entitled "A warning 
to the reformers", and its substance was as follows:
"Like your association for removing the obstacles 
in the way of widow re-marriage, [we also] have 
formed a society for removing the obstacles in 
the way of the Aryan religion, that is to say, 
a league prepared to lay down their lives as well 
as to take the lives of others for the sake of 
that religion....There is no necessity for any 
innovation whatever in our religious observances 
or our customs of the present day. Both the 
reformers and the non-reformers are therefore 
hereby warned that ... they should conduct 
themselves with great caution hereafter ....
[or we will] put them to the s w o r d . "2
In 1895-96 the Chapekars, with the help of several 
other members of their club, attacked and severely injured
1. Ibid, Part II, pp.5-10.
2. Ibid, Part II, p.14.
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l
Wasudeo Balwant Patwardhan, an editor of S~u.dh.arak, and 
Professor N . G. Velingar, a Christian teacher at Wilson
p
College, The Chapekars frequently went to Bombay where 
they harassed Christian missionaries and attempted to stir 
up feeling against the Government, They stoned the mission­
aries who preached at Back Bay, they set fire to a mission
4"building, they disfigured the statue of Queen Victoria, 
and they burned down the Examination mandap of the University
5
of Bombay,
Damodar scoffed at the Indian National Congress. It 
was a mere "sham" invented by Hume, Bradlaugh, and other 
Europeans, At the Poona Congress of 1895, when "all the
1. Ibid, Part II, p,14. Parwardhan, although a reformer, was 
an outspoken critic of the administration. In some 
articles in the Sudharak in 1897 he used provocative 
language in counselling the people of Poona to resist the 
unauthorised proceedings of the soldiers engaged in 
plague duty, For this he was suspended for one year from 
his teaching at the New English School upon the advice of 
the Bombay Government. Director of Public Instruction to 
Chairman of Deccan Education Society, 3 Sept. 1897*
Prog, in Educ. Dept,, Dec.
Appendix L to Prog, in Educ, Dept., Dec. 1897,
Bombay Educ,, Eccles., Mar, and leg. Frog., Vol.5321# 
Also, Limaye, P.M. "The History of the Deccan Education 
Society; 1880-1935"* p.l56»
2. Autobiography ofChapekar, Part II, p*28, op.cit.
3. Ibid, PartII, pp. lo-19.
4. Ibid, Part II, p.32.
5. Ibid, Part II, pp.34-35. In this connection, Damodar 
wrote that "mlenccha education" caused loss of manliness, 
caste and religious conviction. But at the time of 
burning the mandup (31 Oct. 1896) there was an agitation 
in Poona against the necessity of going to Bombay to sit 
for University examinations. It seems that Damodar was 
influenced by this agittation.
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Brahmans in our city" were helping the movement, Damodar
1
watched the proceedings with interest* He was not impressed* 
The Congress demands, in his opinion, were futile , since 
"efforts not backed by physical force are doomed to 
failure .
The Chapekars wanted very much to acquire military 
experience. Four times Damodar petitioned the Commander-in- 
Chief at Simla about the possibility of enlisting in the 
army, and he even offered to raise a regiment of Marathas
himself.^ He sent similar petitions to a number of Native
/
States, but they met with no success. Frustrated in India 
itself, the brothers decided that Balkrishna should seek 
military experience in Nepal. Balkrishna actually got as far 
as Allahabad, but then lost heart and returned to Poona.
The brothers went regularly to the bazaar in Poona to learn 
about military affairs from the Indian soldiers. They failed 
to arouse any response, because, according to Damodar, the 
soldiers had an anti-Brahman bias which had been inspired by
1. Least of all by Manmohan Ghose who, "though a Hindu by 
religion, he dresses like a European from top to toe, and 
shaves his mustache like a eunuch...[and] had a European 
to drive his carriage." Ibid. Part, p.17.
2. Ibid, Part II, p«13-
3. This, like most of the claims in the Autobiography, were 
corroborated by police enquiries.
4. B.G. Tilak wrote to the Diwan of Junagad on 10 January 1896 
recommending an unnamed Poona Brahman for military 
service. Karandikar thinks the "inference unmistakably 
points" to Damodar Chapekar.
S.L. Karandikar, Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak: The 
Hercules and Prome~theus of Modern India, p. 130.
5. "Autobiography of D. Chapekar,"op.cit. Part II, p.27#
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the English.^" Damodar was convinced that the English were 
encouraging "the anti-Brahman spirit [which] has spread 
amongst people of all castes." He was particularly concerned 
about the large following of the Satya Shodhak Sahha (the
p
"Truth Searching Association") around Poona and Bombay,
During the plague, in the spring of 1897, the Chapekars 
became incensed by British interference with caste customs. 
With vague hopes of delivering their fellow Hindus from 
foreign oppression, they resolved to assassinate Rand, the 
Plague Commissioner, They followed Rand for several days 
before a suitable opportunity presented itself. Then, while 
Queen Victoria was causing "the raiyats ... to celebrate the 
sixtieth anniversary of her reign ....instead of relieving - 
them" from famine and plague, they shot Rand and Ayerst,^
The Chapekars fled to Bombay. The Poona police, their 
suspicions aroused by the sudden absence of the brothers, 
received information from two Brahmans named Dravid and 
Apte who were serving jail sentences for forgery. Damodar 
was traced through a Bombay gymnasium and was arrested after
1. Ibid, Part II, p.19.
2. This Sabha, founded in the 1870*3 by Jotirao Govindrao 
Pule, worked to educate the backward Hindu castes and to 
reform Hinduism in accordance with the Vedas. Pule had 
died in 1890, but his successor, Narayan Meghaji Lokhandi, 
continued to send Sabha workers around the countryside. 
Lokhandi edited the reformist Din Bandhu. a Bombay weekly. 
He was also president of the Bombay Mill-Hands Association, 
Note by Police* .in Autobiography of D, Chapekar, op.cit,, 
Part II, pp. 19-22.
3. Ibid, Part.II, pp.41-2, Bal Krishna shot Lt. Ayerst 
because, it seems, he feared Ayerst had witnessed his 
brother shooting Rand.
being lured back to Poona by the police.^
Descriptions of Damodar*s two younger brothers were
issued and while the search for the brothers and several
other members of their club continued, Damodar stood trial
for the murder of Rand. He pleaded not guilty and claimed he
had made the confession under the promise of Rs.20,000 from
a police inspector.2 On 3 Pebruary 1898 a jury of four
Indians and one European found him guilty, and he was
sentenced to death. ^
Damodar Chapekar*s confession and trial failed to show
that there was any definite connection between his deeds and
the newspapers, Tilak, or the Natus. The Chapekars had
visited the gymnasium of Bhalu Saheb Natu and they had
4
attended a Shivaji celebration in the Natus' garden. But 
apart from this there was nothing to support the suggestion 
that the Natus or Tilak had had any direct communication 
with the Chapekars and their club. The Inspector General of 
the Poona Police, writing in July 1899, tried to explain
1. Poona Observer and Civil and Military Journal,
6r and 1"3 Oct. 1897.
2. Poona Observer and Civil and Military Journal, 3 Peb,l898.
3. Poona Observer and Civil and Military Journal, .4 Peb.1898*
4. Damodar recited the following "shlok" or song on that 
occasion. "It is necessary to be prompt in engaging in 
desperate enterprises like Shivaji and Baji. Knowing this, 
good people, take up swords and shields, at all events 
now. Rap your upper arms, and we shall cut off countless 
heads of enemies....Listen! We shall risk our lives on 
the battlefield in a national war...."
J. Down, Inspector General of Police, Poona, to Under Sec., 
Govt, of Bombay, Jud, Dept., 15 July 1899, p.12. Enclosure 
to S.W.Edgerley, Sec., Gov. of Bombay, to Sec., Govt, of 
India, Home Dept., 25 Aug. 1899, Sept. Prog. No.5, I.H.P., 
Pub., Vol. 5640.
away this lack of evidence and to justify the continued 
detention of the Natus who, after two years, had not been 
told why they were being held. The Inspector General 
believed that despite Damodar Chapekar*s claim that the Rand 
murder was the inspiration of his own mind, Chapekar*s 
motives and ideas "were but the echoes" of the teaching of 
the Natus and their friends,and that the members of the 
Chapekar club were probably, "unknown to themselves, being 
shaped to a course of action, ..by the men who for political 
purposes of their own worked on the religious fervour of men 
like the Chapekars and incited them to deeds of violence.1*'
One of the Damodar^ brothers, Balkrishna, was arrested 
in December 1898 in Hyderabad State where he had been living 
with a gang of dakoits. While he was waiting for his trial 
in Poona, the Dravid brothers, the two principal witnesses 
in Damodar*s trial who were expected to testify against 
Balkrishna also, were shot and killed in a street in Poona. 
This murder had been preceeded by an attempt to kill one of 
the police officers investigating the case against
p
Balkrishna. ‘ On 9 February 1899, the day after the Dravids 
were shot, the police located the youngest Chapekar brother, 
Wasudeo, He was taken to Police headquarters in Poona for 
questioning where he drew a pistol and fired at the same
1. Ibid, p.8,
2. Telegram from Sandhurts to Hamilton, 9 Feb, 1899,
Official Telegrams, Feb, P.S.L.I., Vol.Ill,
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police officer on whom an attack had been made six days 
earlier* Wasudeo missed the officer hut he ''proudly1' 
admitted that he and Banade, another member of the Chapekar
i
club, had murdered the Dravid brothers* Wasudeo Chapekar 
and Banade were tried for the Dravid murder and were found 
guilty and they were hanged* Another member of the club, 
Sathe, was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for abetting 
the murder of the Dravids* In a separate trial, Balkrishna 
and Wasudeo Chapekar and Banade were sentenced to hang for 
the murder of Band and Ayerst* When they were executed in 
May 1899, all three of them died praying, and Wasudeo
Chapekar and Banade, who behaved defiantly throughout their
2 3trial, went to the gallows calmly*
With these three executions, the Poona murder case
came to an end* The police knew the names of the fifteen
living members of the Chapekar club, five of whom were
regarded as dangerous* The only evidence against these men
came from convicted persons and, in any case, after the
Dravid murders, few persons were likely to be willing to
A
testify*
1* Poona Observer and Civil and Military Journal, 11 Peb.1899. 
2* Tbid, 6 March 1899.
3* The Times of India, 13 May 1899.
4. W.b«Sheppard, ITTsT;. Mag. Poona, to Com., Central Div.,
2 May 1899, enclosure to S.W.Edgerley to Govt, of India,
25 Aug. 1899, op.cit.
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If there was a lesson to "be drawn from the events of 
1897 and their sequel in Poona, it was that the political 
danger to the security of British rule came from two direct­
ions. On the one hand there were the traditional religious 
forces which, in the case of hoth Hindus and Muslims, were 
showing signs of increasing vitality. In normal times these 
forces were not threatening, hut in the extraordinary 
circumstances of a famine or plague or a war in the Middle
Sast, religion was potentially the most disruptive element ^
of all. On the other hand, there was the political aliena­
tion of the educated classes which was a steadier corrosive, 
hut it was not yet really dangerous because the number of 
educated Indians was small and because their influence over 
the rest of the population was slight. However, events in 
Poona suggested that their influence was growing and that 
more Government supervision was needed to direct the changes 
talcing place in Indian society.
Ill
The old and the amended Indian law of sedition.
Act XXVII of 1870, 
 Section 5*
Whoever "by words, either 
spoken or intended to he 
read, or by signs, or by 
visible representation or 
otherwise, excites or 
attempts to excite feelings 
of disaffection to the 
Government established by 
law in British India, shall 
be punished with transpor­
tation for life or for any 
term, to which fine may be 
added, or with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend 
to three years, to which 
fine may be added, or with 
fine*
Explanation: Such a 
disappr obat ion of the 
measures of the Government 
as is compatible with a 
disposition to render 
obedience to the lawful 
authority of the Government, 
and to support the lawful 
authority of the Government 
against unlawful attempts 
to subvert or resist that 
authority, is not dis­
affection* Therefore the 
making of comments on the 
measures of the Government, 
with the intention of 
exciting only this species 
of disapprobation, is not 
an offence within this 
clause.
Act IV of 1898
Whoever by words, 
either spoken or written, or 
by signs, or by visible rep­
resentation, or otherwise, 
brings or attempts to bring 
in to hatred or contempt, or 
excites or attempts to excite 
disaffection towards Her 
Majesty or the Government 
established by law in British 
India, shall be punished with 
transportation for life or 
any shorter term, to which 
fine may be added, or with 
imprisonment which may 
extend to three years, to 
which fine may be added, or 
with fine *
Explanation 1: The
expression ’'disaffection1' 
includes disloyalty and all 
feelings of enmity*
Explanation 2: Comments 
expressing disapprobation of 
the measures of the Govern­
ment with a view to obtain 
their alteration by lawful 
means, without exciting or 
attempting to excite hatred, 
contempt or disaffection, do 
not constitute an offence 
under this section*
Explanation 3; Comments 
expressing disapprobation of 
the administrative or other 
action of the Government 
without exciting or attempt­
ing to excite hatred, conte 
contempt or disaffection, 
do not constitute an offence 
under this section*
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CHAPTER III
THE CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL BILL
As the plague spread from Bombay to the other Pro­
vinces in 1897 and 1898, municipal bodies throughout India 
were forced to devote greater resources to sanitation, and 
where plague actually appeared, to medical facilities. The 
sanitary conditions of the larger towns of India had been 
a cause of anxiety to Europeans throughout the 19th century. 
While there had been great improvement in water supply, con­
servancy, and sewage disposal in the last half of the century, 
it had barely kept pace with the growth of the urban popula­
tions and the rise in the standard by which the conditions 
were judged. Plague gave a special urgency, as far as Euro­
peans were concerned, to the problem of sanitation in 
Calcutta and Bombay because India*s foreign trade was threat­
ened by the existence of plague.
When the disease first appeared in Bombay in Septem­
ber 1896, there was an immediate fear in most of the 
countries trading with India that the plague might be con­
veyed abroad. It was realized that the long period of incu­
bation of the plague bacillus was not adequately provided 
for by the regulations agreed upon at recent sanitary conven­
tions at Venice, Dresden, Paris, and Geneva. The first re­
action of some European countries according to an official 
report, was to impose "both antiquated and exceedingly
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1
onerous51 restrictions on Indian trade. The Secretary of 
State for India, at the instigation of the Government of 
India and the Bombay and Calcutta Chambers of Commerce, 
persuaded the continental Governments to adopt more reason­
able precautions* Then in March 1897, the Venice Sanitary 
Convention agreed upon comprehensive rules, satisfactory to 
the Government of India, for the prevention of the spread of
p
plague* But the degree to which Indian trade would be dis­
criminated against still depended upon the ability of the 
Indian port cities to approach the generally accepted stand­
ards of cleanliness of European countries. Therefore, at a 
time when England's relative share of international trade was 
declining, and after receiving complaints from the local 
Chambers of Commerce, the Governments of Bengal and Bombay 
began to consider new municipal legislation for the two 
leading commercial cities of India, Bombay and Calcutta,with 
a view to improving their _sanitation.
Many officials in India tended to compare the per­
formance of Indian local governing bodies with a standard of 
efficiency and public service which they mistakenly imagined 
to exist in contemporary English local government. As a 
result they were reluctant to give effect to Ripon's
1. R. Nathan, The Plague in India, 1896, 1897> (Government 
of India, Home Department, 189o). Vol.I, p.405*
2. Ibid, pp.368-419.
3. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in 
India, Pakistan and Burma, pp.1-2,
Resolution of 18 May 1882 which recommended that, wherever 
possible, local bodies be granted great independence and 
responsibility, that non-officials serve as chairman, and 
that the elective system be extended. Some officials also 
deplored "the domination of the non-official element in local 
government by the middle classes" and they "looked - unavail- 
ingly - to the 'natural leaders' of society, men of good 
family, the landed gentry for a lead in local affairs."'**
This was especially true of Bengal where, in 1892, a scheme 
was advanced whereby the Government would have tightened its 
control over mofussil municipal boards and would have raised 
the franchise qualifications. But these proposals were sub­
stantially modified owing to the opposition led by Surendra
2
Nath Banerjea.
In Calcutta the elective system, which had been intro­
duced by Act IV of 1876, had gradually enabled members of the 
middle class to undermine the position of the Bengali arist­
ocracy in Calcutta politics. In the.early years of the re­
formed Calcutta Corporation, men such as Raja Rajendra Lala 
Mitra, an important zamindar, and Kristodas Pal, the champion 
of zamindari interests, had dominated municipal affairs. Both 
these men appeared to be 'natural leaders'. But by the 
1890*s, according to a Government of Bengal letter of 1897,
1. Ibid, p.60.
2. Ibid, p.60.
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the city of Calcutta had passed into the control of a group 
of Hindus, "consisting of five lav/yers, two journalists, 
one ground landlord, one piece-goods dealer, andean 
attorney^ clerk."'1' An indication of this shift may be 
seen in the increase between 1882 and 1895 in the number of 
lawyers on the Corporation from 21 to 27, in the decline in 
the same period in the number of property-owners from 17 to
12, and the decline in the number of Europeans and Eurasians
2
from 23 to 20. With this change in composition and control 
there arose a greater Indian jealousy of official interfer­
ence in municipal affairs and an official dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of local self-government under the more 
independent-minded Indians*
For their part, many middle class Indians believed 
strongly in participation in municipal affairs. Among those 
Congress leaders who were prominent in municipal government 
before 1905 were R.M.Sayani, P.M.Mehta, and D.E.Wacha of 
Bombay, G.K.Gokhale and B.G.Tilak of Poona, G.M.Chitnavis of 
Nagpur, C.Sankara Nair of Madras, and Surendra Nath Banerjea 
of Calcutta. These men were not only municipal leaders, but 
after the 1892 Councils Act they were returned to the Legis­
lative Councils, in most cases by their municipalities. They
1. H.H.Risley, Sec., G-ovt. of Bengal to Sec., Govt, of India, 
17 June 1897, Para.30, Jan. Prog, No.28. I.H.P.Munic.,
Vol.5419.
2. Table demonstrating occupations represented on the 
Calcutta Corporation, Appendix B, Risley to Govt, of 
India, 17 June 1897, op.cit.
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were easily the most articulate and able Indians returned 
either by nomination or G-overnment appointment, no doubt 
partly because of their experience of practical administra­
tive problems in municipal government, In the Presidency 
towns, after the elective system had been established by 
legislation in the 1870's enabling Indians to gain majorities 
on the Corporations, pride was taken in the extensive drain­
age, road, water, and sewage developments carried through 
under Indian direction* Naturally the Indians concerned re­
sented any attack on their competence in the one sphere of 
Indian public administration in which they, as a group, were 
given real responsibility. In their defence they often invoked 
Hipon's famous Resolution of 1882 on Local Self-Government,
One of the aims of the Resolution was to provide an outlet 
for the ambitions of members of the westernized middle class 
who might otherwise constitute a political danger and a 
"sheer waste of power"♦ By granting increased autonomy to 
local self-governing bodies, Lord Ripon expected to relieve 
officials of some of their governing responsibilities, ^  The 
Resolution stated that "it is not primarily with a view to 
improvement in administration that this measure is put for­
ward, and supported* It is chiefly designed as an instrument
1* Lord Ripon1s Resolution on Local Self-government, 18 March 
1882, para*6, Panchanandas Mukherji (ed* ), Indian Consti­
tutional Documents (1600-1918), Vol,I.
See also S.G-opal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884, 
1880-1884, pp.83-93":
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of political and popular education."’*' Although the Resolu­
tion specifically excluded Presidency towns from its recom- 
2
mendations, it was looked upon hy many Indians, in and 
out of the Presidency towns, as a promise of Indian para- 
mountcy in local affairs.
Congress leaders advanced several reasons for their 
interest in local self-government. Surendra Rath Banerjea, 
who was a central figure in Calcutta politics from 1876 until 
1899* was of the opinion that "our municipal institutions ... 
are in entire accord with our ancient traditions and the 
inherited instincts of our race, fostered "by the panchayat 
system" and he agreed with Gladstone’s view that "municipal 
institutions ... are the seed-plots upon which and around 
which are developed that political capacity and those habits 
of political thought which ought to be the supreme concern 
of all Governments to foster and to promote."-^ G.K. Gokhale, 
who later became President of the Poona Municipality, said 
that "we value local self-government not only for the fact 
that local work thereby is better done, but also for the 
fact that it teaches men of different castes and creeds, who 
have long been kept more or less apart, to work together for
4
a common purpose."^ These sentiments were not so widespread
1. Para. 5*
2. Para. 4«
3. Bengal Leg. Council Prog., 4 April 1898, p.185.
4* John S. Hoyland, Gopal Krishna Gokhale; His Life and 
Speeches, p.78.
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as to draw educated Indians into local governing bodies in 
all parts of India, but in the Presidency towns their part­
icipation was active. It was against this background that the 
controversy over the Calcutta Municipal Bill began.
But before turning to Calcutta, the parallels and 
differences between the situation in Bombay and Calcutta may 
be noted. The Bombay Government found relatively little 
fault with the work which the Bombay Corporation had done. 
Although Hamilton had seemed almost anxious to assume that 
the Corporation was hindering the cleansing operations of 
the Government, Sandhurst defended the Corporation by inform­
ing Hamilton that there had been friendly co-operation be­
tween it and the Government, and that the work of the execu­
tive had not been interfered with.^
In Bombay the European element was smaller than in
Calcutta, and a number of Indians in municipal affairs shared 
with the Europeans a direct interest in the prosperity of 
trade, while in Calcutta, relatively few Bengalis had 
business connections. In Bombay the broad distribution of 
wealth and numbers between the European, Hindu, Muslim, and 
Par si communities prevented any one of them from gaining a
1. Sandhurst to Elgin, 6 Oct. 1897, MSS, Eur. F. 84/71.
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predominant position over the others and brought about a
willingness to compromise that was absent in the Hindu-
dominated Calcutta Corporation,^ Nor was there in Bombay
an alternative class of Indians, like the Bengali zamindars
with whom the Europeans would have preferred to deal if only
they could or would have taken part in municipal affairs.
Furthermore "the public men of Bombay City had deliberately
maintained a separation between the ’executive1 and the
2
’legislative1 functions," while in Calcutta one of the 
major difficulties was the interference of the Corporation 
with the executive. This was in part due to the superior 
drafting of the Bombay Act of 1888 which served as the 
prototype for municipalities in other large cities and which 
has survived to the present. Finally, Bombay had in the 
person of Pherozeshah Mehta a man who commanded the respect 
of all communities and who exercized a moderating influence 
on the Municipality.^ Calcutta lacked such a commanding
1# These were the differences which the Government of Bengal 
felt made it impossible to adopt in Calcutta a similar 
constitution to that of the Bombay municipality.
H.H.Risley, Sec. Govt, of Bengal, to J.P.Hewett, Sec., 
Govt, of India, 11 Dec. 1897- Enclosure to Elgin to 
Hamilton, 13 Jan. 1898, MSS.Eur. D.509/9.
2. Tinker, op.cit. p. 71*
3- Ibid. p.52.
4# Sec. R.P.Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government in 
Bombay and H.P.feAy , Sir Pherozeshah Mehta: A Political 
Biography, Vol.I & II.
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personality after the death of Kristodas Pal in 1884*^
The decision to introduce the Bombay Improvement Bill 
was arrived at when it became apparent that the conservancy 
operations were having no visible effect on the course of 
plague. The number of plague deaths was rising steadily, 
from 1,936 in 1896, to 11,003 in 1897, to 18,185 in 1898.^
The Bill provided for a special Improvement Trust with a 
strong executive, separate from the Corporation which had 
all it could manage with the ordinary affairs of the City.
The Trust was to build broad streets through crowded areas 
to improve ventilation, reclaim low-lying areas, improve or 
demolish existing insanitary dwellings, and provide new, 
inexpensive accommodation for those persons displaced by re­
development schemes. Since the Trust was to have at its dis­
posal lands surrendered by the Government which were valued 
at approximately Rs. 86 lakhs, the Government thought it 
necessary to have a predominant representation on the Trust.^
1. Although municipal politics in Bombay may have been more 
harmonious than in Calcutta, they were not necessarily 
purer. In 1901 the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, 
Bombay, ruled that two successful candidates for seats 
on the Corporation should be unseated. One of them had 
received 927 votes, of which 65 were cast by dead persons, 
94 by absent voters, and 11 by relatives, servants, and 
friends of absent voters, Bengalee, 13 March 1901.
2. Memorandum, by the Army Sanitation Commissioner on the 
Administration Report of the Municipal Commission for the 
City of Bombay, 1898-99* I.H.P. Munic., Vol.5880.
3. Gov. Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 26 May 1898, May 
Prog. No.65. I.H.P.Munic., Vol.5419.
When the Corporation, which was going to produce most 
of the funds for the Trust's work, was consulted about the 
scheme, "a large majority" of its members agreed that the 
new development agency ought to be constituted separately 
from the Corporation although they thought that it was 
"essential" that at least one-half of the trustees be nomin­
ated by the Corporation.^ To this the Government would not 
agree, and the Bill, when it was passed, provided for only 
four Corporation representatives on the Trust Committee of 
fourteen.
Apart from this one issue of Corporation membership 
on the Improvement Trust, the Bill was not strongly opposed, 
In the Bombay Legislative Council none of the Indian members 
attacked its principles, following the lead of Pherozeshah 
Mehta who did "not agree with those who think it is an
2
attack upon the constitution of the Municipal Corporation." 
The Indian members moved a number of amendments and, with one 
exception, voted together against the Government in support 
of these amendments. Outside the Council, D.E.Wacha and the 
others who objected to the Bill received little support, and 
"the bill for the improvement of the city of Bombay and to 
provide space for its future expansion" was passed after its
1. R.M.Sayani, Chrrnn, Munic. Corp., to Sec., Govt., Gen. 
Dept. 29 Nov. 1897, May Munic. Prog* No.39, ibid.
2. Mehta's Speech, 14 Peb* 1898, Bombay Leg. Council Prog, 
p.32.
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third reading on 2 April 1898,^ seven weeks after it had 
been introduced,.and without any significant opposition. It 
is true that the 1898 National Congress expressed "its deep 
sense of disapproval of the reactionary policy of Government 
with regard to ... the creation of the Bombay City Improve­
ment Trust without adequate popular represent at ion1 as well
2
as to the Calcutta Municipal Bill* But the real grievance 
was the latter measure, and it is doubtful if the Bombay 
Bill would have been mentioned in a resolution had it not 
been for the Calcutta Bill*
The municipal legislation for Calcutta was far more 
radical and far more unpopular. The Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce had been urging the Government to improve Calcutta1 s 
sanitary condition even before plague broke out in Bombay.
But the first real alarm was sounded on 9 October 1896 when 
a boy recently returned from Bombay was discovered in Howrah 
with a suspected case of plague. The Lieutenant-Governor 
immediately appointed a Medical Board to determine what 
action ought to be taken to check the disease in Bengalf 
This Medical Board, in turn, deputed five sanitary officers 
to survey health conditions in Calcutta. The report of the 
sanitary officers showed that many houses were so overcrowded
1* Bombay Leg, Council Prog., p.173*
2. Resolution IX.
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and badly built that ventilation and efficient conservancy 
were impossible; that the subsoil of the city was dangerous­
ly polluted; that wells, courtyards, stables, drains, and 
latrines were unclean and unhealthy.^" On 28 October 1896 
the Calcutta Corporation added 200 coolies and 60 carts to 
the usual conservancy staff in view of a possible outbreak 
of plague, and on 25 January 1897, "under strong pressure 
from Government, " the Corporation added a further 1300 
coolies and 283 carts. This extra staff in less than six 
months removed 10,722 tons of neglected filth from Calcutta,
not including enormous quantities of night-soil removed
2from privies,1
Mackenzie, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, gave the 
public of Calcutta its first knowledge of his dissatisfaction 
with the Corporation on 26 November 1896 while laying the 
foundation stone at the new drainage works at Entally. After 
criticising the sanitation of the city, he made it clear that 
he did not expect the Corporation to do good work 
because it did not include "shrewd, capable men of 
business - manufacturers, merchants, tradesmen and the like" 
and because it was not elected by a homogeneous population. 
The "inevitable" result of having men "whose individual stake
1. Risley to Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, op.cit,, para.4.
^  * -L D 1  d  # j  p  ctlt* 3* # ^  f
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in the town is small, who are not all practical men of 
business; and who represent themselves in the first place, 
and a variety of heterogeneous interests in the second", 
was "far too much speaking for the sake of speaking, " 
frequent and unnecessary interference with the executive, 
too much deference to special interests, and general inef­
ficiency in administrative affairs. He attacked other 
features of the Corporations work, and warned his listen­
ers that if there was not improved cooperation between the 
Corporation, its Executive, and the Government in enforcing 
the existing building and sanitary regulations, in driving 
broad roads through "the pestilential quarters" and 
"pigsties", and in overhauling the present system, then
"there must come a general cataclysm" in Calcutta’s municipal
affairs, and "radical changes" in the municipal constitution# 
Calcutta stood, it was "a disgrace to the Empire and the
nineteenth century",**'
Forty of the seventy-five Commissioners attended a 
special meeting of the Corporation to consider the Lieuten­
ant-Governor's speech, and they passed resolutions express­
ing their "emphatic protest against the condemnation passed 
upon them "by Mackenzie, They denied that "the occasional 
relaxation of the Building Regulations in some of the minor 
details in special cases, as warranted by the bye-laws",
1, Mackenzie's Speech, 26 Nov, 1896, Appendix 7, Risley to 
Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, op.cit.
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interfered with the sanitary arrangements; they rejected 
the claim 1 that in the consideration of public questions 
they are influenced by private interests,1
11 If in any Committee a jobbery is perpetrated 
at the instance of any particular Commissioner, 
there is nothing to prevent the executive from 
having the matter discussed The executive
has rarely, if ever, brought up any such 
matter, though individual Commissioners have 
not been slow to interfere. It may be admitted, 
however, that in some instances a rate-payer by 
hard canvassing has succeeded in achieving 
certain ends which are undesirable, but such 
cases are rare, and they probably exist in all
communities and in every place."
The Commissioners blamed the unsatisfactory working of 
the Conservancy Department on the lack of supervision of 
the Health Officer, who was appointed by the Government and 
who denied that scavenging was his responsibility. Their 
efforts to reform the Conservancy Department, the Commis - 
sioners alleged, had been frustrated by "the inaction of the 
Executive," They pointed to the fact that they had spent 
each year more than Rs.4,35,000,or more than double the 
statutory requirement, on drainage and busti improvements. 
And they defended the elective system, which, apart from 
stimulating public spirit and interest in the municipal 
affairs of Calcutta, had brought "great sanitary reforms"
which would compare favourably with the improvements made
in a corresponding period before the introduction of the
1?G
elective system in 1876,
Most of the problems referred to in this exchange 
between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Corporation were 
not new to Calcutta. The complaints of inadequate sanitation, 
excessive talking, under-representation of commercial 
interests, and unclear definition of respective responsibi­
lities had been made at various times in the history of
2
municipal government in Calcutta.
The Calcutta Municipal Bill of 1899 took an exception­
ally long time to pass through the legislative process. It 
was outlined in a Government of Bengal letter in June 1897, 
given formal sanction in March 1898 by the Secretary of 
State, and introduced into the Bengal Legislative Council 
on 19 March 1898 as "A Bill to Amend the Law relating to the 
Municipal Affairs of the Town and Suburbs of Calcutta and 
to Authorise the Extension of the same to the town of 
Howrah*" On 2 April 1898 it was referred to a select com­
mittee which did not present its report until 26 April of 
the following year* By this time Mackenzie and Elgin had 
left India and the new Lieutenant-Governor, Sir John Wood- 
burn, and the new Governor General, Lord Curzon, had decided
1. Extract from the Prog, of the Adjourned Special Meeting 
of the Calcutta Corporation, 28 Jan. 1897,
Appendix 8, Risley to Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, 
op * c it.
2. Precis of Legislation relating to the Constitution of 
the Municipal Governing Body of Calcutta from 1840 to 
1888. Appendix No.27 to Risley to Govt, of India,
17 June 1897, op.cit.
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that the Bill needed modification. Consequently it was 
referred back to the Select Committee on 7 August 1899 
and was finally passed on 27 September 1899, almost three 
years after Mackenzie's original attack on the existing 
system, and almost a year and a half after it had been 
introduced.
The specific reasons for reforming the Municipal 
Corporation were described at length in the Government of 
Bengal's letter of 17 June 1897. It pointed out that under 
the 1888 Municipal Act, the Chairman of the Corporation, who 
was a member of the Indian Civil Service, had not been able 
to act in contravention of any resolution passed in a 
meeting of the Commissioners and that the Commissioners 
could appoint any special or standing Committee of any size 
to enquire into and report on, or assist the Chairman with, 
a large number of routine matters. This power to appoint 
committees had been abused, according to the Lieutenant- 
Governor, by the "clique of Bengali lawyers and journalists 
whose habits of mind are opposed to all forms of executive 
action," and who, through the elective system, had come to 
dominate the Corporation. They had completely paralyzed the 
Executive with their committees, including a Complaints 
Committee, by interfering with even the most ordinary 
workings of municipal functions.^ While making excessive
1. Risley to Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, op.cit. para.8.
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use of their authority to control the Executive, the Lieu­
tenant-Governor claimed that the Commissioners ' "perverse 
reluctance ... to make use51 of their statutory powers for 
the collection of municipal rates had resulted in the remit­
tance or cancellation of between 5.2 and 6.1 per cent of the 
demand in each of previous three years.1 A later survey of
4
outstanding rates revealed that only slightly more than j *
of the total demand (current and outstanding) had been
2
collected each year in roughly the same period.
The Lieutenant-Governor reiterated his complaint about 
"the practical exclusion of European men of business1 from 
municipal government. It was they ,!who ought to have a pre­
dominant influence in the affairs of the Town" but they 
"stand aside cynically and make themselves felt" through 
their imperfectly informed associations. J  So reluctant were 
European business men to participate in municipal affairs 
that of the four Commissioners nominated by the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce,^ three of them in 1897 were Indians.
The attendance of the ten commercial representatives at . 
Corporation and committee meetings was only 41$ in 1897-98,
1. Para 2, ibid.
2. J.P.Hewett, Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept, to Sec., 
Govt, of Bengal, Munic. Dept., 19 Jan. 1900.
I.H.P.,Munic., Vol.5880.
3. Risley to Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, para.27*
4. Most Indian business men in Calcutta belonged to the 
National Chamber of Commerce. The Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce was laregly a European body.
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compared with 52% for the elected Commissioners and 42% 
for the G-overnment nominees."*" The Lieutenant-Governor hoped 
that Europeans could he induced to participate more actively 
by introducing a system of payment for attendance at 
Committee meetings*
However, the abstention of European businessmen from 
municipal affairs was said to be only one of "the effects 
of the premature introduction of the elective system into a 
community singularly ill-fitted for it." Some of the Com­
missioners, according to the Government of Bengal1s letter, 
were "directly corrupt and receive payment for exercising 
their influence to obtain concessions for their clients; 
others take up cases in which the Municipality is concerned 
and make a profit out of the knowledge which their position 
has enabled them to acquire; others again canvas for appoint­
ments under the Municipality or sell their votes to compet-
2
ing candidates," No examples of this corruption were 
included in the letter to substantiate these allegations, 
nor was their source revealed.
The letter referred to the "great development of party 
spirit and to the formation among the Hindu Commissioners 
of a small caucus who practically settle all municipal 
questions in private conclave, and manage the duties of the
1. Admin. Report for the Commissioners of Calcutta, for 
1897-98, Nov, Prog. No.27, Bengal Munic. Prog,, Vol.5406.
2. Risley to Govt, of India, 17 June 1897, op.cit. para.30«
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General Committee and Corporation on predetermined lines. It 
is no exaggeration, 'but the literal truth, to say that 
certainly for the last ten years, and probably for longer, 
the city of Calcutta has been governed by a clique of [ten] 
Bengali Hindus*
There were other complaints about specific short­
comings in the Corporations performance* The system of
2
water-supply was held to be unsatisfactory and the Accounts 
Department was said to be in a state of confusion.
For all these reasons, the Lieutenant-Governor thought 
that a radical remedy was required which would give the 
municipality an efficient executive free from "the meddling" 
of the present Commissioners* "It is out of the question 
that the whole commerce of Bengal and Upper India should run 
the risk of being ruined by epidemics and consequent quar­
antine, merely in order that the self-conceit of a few 
Bengali Babus may be flattered and that the fetish which
they ignorantly worship and suppose to be Local Self-Govern-
4
ment may retain its pre-eminence," The Lieutenant-Governor 
realized that any attempt to replace "the narrow oligarchy 
which now governs Calcutta by a General Committee repre­
senting real interests" would provoke "a noisy opposition 
[which] will no doubt have to be faced,... The average
1. Ibid, para.30.
2. Ibid, paras 22 -25.
3. Ibid, para- . 21.
4. Ibid, para. 32.
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Bengali graduate of the Calcutta University is conspicuous 
for that ready belief in vague generalities which is a 
characteristic of imperfectly educated minds. It is with 
him an article of faith that Local Self-Government is merely 
an instrument of political education, that its essence is 
speech-making and electioneering, that it bears no relation 
to facts, and gives rise to no obligations in respect of the 
effective administration of the branches of public business 
made over the local bodies. Of this mischievous cult the 
Calcutta Corporation is the central figure, Bor the last 
twenty years it has been dominated by Bengali Hindus, it 
embodies their idea of what a Bengali Parliament should be, 
and it gives the fullest expression of the demoralizing 
doctrine that practical considerations are to be subordin­
ated to the supposed educational influence of Local Self- 
Government’J ^
Mackenzie planned to make two major alterations in 
the constitution of the Calcutta Municipality* The first 
affected the General Committee, which, under the existing 
system was composed of 18 members, 12 of whom were chosen 
by the elected ward Commissioners. Mackenzie*s Bill would 
have enabled the Government and its European supporters to 
capture control of the General Committee by dividing it 
into three equal parts - 4 members chosen by the elected
1. Ibid, para.60.
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Commissioners, 4 by the Government, and 4 "by the Chamber 
of Commerce, the Port Commissioners, and the Trades Assoc­
iation*^
The other and no less important feature of the new
Bill was the careful distinction of the functions of the
Corporation, the General Committee, and the Executive in
such a way as to "prevent irresponsible committees from
interfering in matters with which they have no concern. "
All executive functions, except those specifically excepted,
were to be exercised by the Chairman who, as previously
2
would be appointed by the Bengal Government. By transfer 
ring ultimate authority from the Corporation in most matters, 
and by redistributing the membership of the General Commit­
tee so that the Government nominees and the European members 
would constitute a majority, the new Bill would accomplish 
the Benagli Governments main objective: the supercession 
of the Bengali majority in the Corporation by the European - 
controlled General Committee and Executive. The hope was 
expressed that the European commercial community would in 
the future take an active part in the municipal Government 
of Calcutta.^
After the re-distribution of functions between what
1. Ibid, para.42.
2. Ibid, para. 41.
3. Ibid, para.42.
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were intended to "be three co-ordinate authorities, the only 
substantial power remaining with the elected members of the 
Corporation would be the right to pass the annual budget, 
to fix the rates, to elect 4 of the 12 members of the 
General Committee, and to appoint certain municipal employ­
ees.
Elgin and his Council had given Mackenzie Ma pretty 
free hand’1 in drawing up the Calcutta Municipal Bill.^" 
Mackenzie had been suffering from poor health and, after 
his doctor had advised him that his nervous system had 
"gone to pieces", he retired, prematurely, in April 1898. 
But before this his public speeches had revealed his anti­
pathy to educated Bengalis and he had , in Elgin1s opinion, 
caused himself unnecessary trouble by attacking the personal 
competency of the Bengali Commissioners in his speech at 
the drainage works.^ The Government of India, in approving 
the Bill, made it obvious to Mackenzie that it did not 
approve of his tactics by suggesting that it would be more 
prudent to hold the system of administration, and not 
the personnel, to blame for the failure of Calcutta’s 
municipal government.^ Consequently, when the Bill was
1. Elgin to Hamilton, 23 Dec. 1897, MSS.Eur. D. 509/8.
2. Mackenzie to Elgin, 19 March 1898, MSS.Eur. F.84/72.
3. Elgin to Hamilton, 23 Dec. 1897, MSS.Eur. D.509/8.
4. Gov. Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 6 Jan. 1898,
Jan. Prog. No.34. I.H.P.,Mimic., Vol.5419-
^purposefully moderate in tone, avoiding references to the 
Bengalis, as opposed.to other groups on the Corporation*^ 
Similarly, when the correspondence relating to the Bill 
was first published, most of the sections about "Bengali 
Babus", cliques, corruption, and party-spirit were omitted.
In the last week of 1898, while the Bill was in the
Select Committee and the agitation against it was gathering
force, Lord Curzon succeeded Lord Elgin as Governor General.
Upon his arrival in Calcutta the Statesman reported that
"perhaps no Viceroy - at least since Lord Northbrook - has
2
been received with so much enthusiasm." His ability and 
industry were recognized by both Europeans and Indians, The 
speeches he had made before leaving England had received 
wide publicity in the Indian Press, and his remarks showing 
his sympathy with the scruples and feelings of the Indian 
people seemed to be pointed at what was regarded as the 
oppressive and high-handed measures against plague and sus­
pected sedition during Elgin's regime. Curzon's farewell 
speech in London to the Old Etonians during which he said 
"the mission of the British ,.. is to maintain by justice 
what has been won by the sword" was contrasted with Elgin's 
farewell speech at Simla in the United Services Club when 
he said that India was won by the sword and, if necessary,
1. H.H.Risley1s Speeches of 19 March 1898 (pp.26 ff.) and 
4 April 1898 (pp.193 Bengal leg. Council Progs.
2. 5 January 1899.
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must "be held by the sword. The Bengaleef the Pioneer- and 
the Englishman noticed a similarity between Curzon's
2
speeches and the first utterances of Lord Ripon in India*
The main reservation in the almost unanimous approval 
in India of Curzonfs appointment was apprehension over his 
support for the forward frontier policy and his interest in 
foreign affairs which, it was feared, he might pursue at the 
expense of internal policy.^ Much of the Indian exthusiasm 
for the appointment resulted from a sense of relief at the 
departure of the colourless Lord Elgin, whose name, along 
with Hamilton's, had become associated with repression, and 
whose personality had failed to make an impression on edu­
cated Indians. The Moslem Chronicle described Elgin as "an 
utter failure as Viceroy of India, as much owing to adverse
4
circumstances as to his own sheer innate incapacity.” The 
Bengalee, in commenting similarly, said "whatever personal*** 
ity he had, he effaced it completely... and it was notor- 
ious that others ruled in his name*"^ R.C.Dutt contributed 
an article to the Indian Mirror in which he said he did not 
"think that his [Curzon's] training and predilections will
1. Tribune (Lahore) 1 Nov. 1898. and other newspapers,
. 'l!, &  JJ. Selections, 7 Nov. 1898, P.S.L.I., Vol.110.
2. Bengalee, 7 and 28 Jan, 1899.
3. T. & D. Selections, 12 Sept. 1898, P.S.L.I., Vol.107. 
Even Hamilton was "a little afraid of Curzon's views 
upon frontier questions". Hamilton to Elgin, 24 Aug.1898. 
MSS.Eur. C. 125/3.
4. 25 Peb. 1899.
5* 7 Jan. 1899*
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incline him to popularize in any marked degree the methods 
of Indian administration. But, nevertheless, I have respect 
for Mr, Curzon’s courage and strength of convictions, and 
I Believe his administration will he a pleasant change 
after that of lord Elgin.
While the Indian Press and the Indian National 
Congress welcomed Curzon and expressed high hopes in his 
Viceroyalty, several of the British newspapers most fre­
quently quoted hy the Indian nationalist newspapers were
less enthusiastic. India, for instance, was luke-warm about
2
Curzon’s appointment. The Spectator objected to lfa certain
note of floridness and self-assertion" in his manner of
speaking which, if suited to Parliament, would be out of
place in India. The Spectator also thought that Curzon was
"inclined to ambition and , is delighted by personal
victories. He takes pleasure, that is, in being visibly the
3
instrument by which a great service is done to his country." 
Hyndman's Justice was quoted by the Hindu of Madras as 
saying that it was "hypocritical twaddle" for Curzon to say ; 
that he accepted the post of Viceroy because of his "love 
for India" when actually he was going to India "to squeeze j
1. Quoted by J.N.Gupta, Life and Work of Romesh Chunder 
Dutt. p. 2317.
2. TTTug. 1898.
3. 13 Aug. 1898.
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i
as much as he possibly can out of the starveling Natives."
The Hindustani of Lucknow referred to an article in W.T.
Stead's Review of Reviews claiming that Curzon, whose wife
was American, had been appointed to gain the good will of
2
the United States. However, these comments did little to 
dim the hope that Curzon, even if he did not actually make 
substantial concessions to Congress demands would at least 
treat the Congress with greater justice and consideration 
than Elgin and Hamilton had done in the past. Prom the 
Congress point of view, the first important issue that 
Curzon would be confronted with was the Calcutta Municipal 
Bill. As Ronaldshay has pointed out, it was this issue which 
first brought Curzon into collision with the Congress. Yet 
it was not really within Curzon's power to avoid this part­
icular clash. The Governments of Bengal and India, supported 
by the Secretary of State and pledged to the Bengal Chamber 
of Commerce and other European groups, had committed them­
selves to a drastic revision of Calcutta's municipal govern­
ment. Even if Curzon had wanted to, he could not have 
scrapped the Mackenzie Bill. This, however, was not apprec­
iated by the nationalists.
Soon after he was settled in Calcutta, Curzon learned
1. Hindu, 30 Nov. 1898, T. & D. Selections, 5 Dec. 1898, 
P.SVl.I., Vol.110.
2. Hindustani, 19 Oct. 1898, T. & D. Selections, 7 Nov. 1898, 
P.S.L.lTrVol.llO.
3. Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, Vol.II, p.74.
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that the Bill in its existing form was regarded as unsatis­
f a c t o r y  by Hamilton,'*' Risley (the official member in charge
of the Bill), and W.R.Bright (the official Chairman of the
o
Corporation), After making a thorough investigation for 
himself, Curzon arrived at the conclusion that the Bill had 
been conceived by Mackenzie flpartly in panic, and partly in
i.
a n g e r a n d  that it was "entirely illogical" to leave un­
touched "the old condemned corporation" while setting up at 
the same time a new General Committee constituted on an 
entirely different basis. By leaving the elected Commission­
ers in a majority on the Corporation, he felt that two of 
the main objects of the Bill would be defeated since Euro­
peans would be unwilling to serve in a Corporation in which 
they were a hopeless minority and since there would be 
constant friction between the Indian majority on the Corpor-
A
ation and the European-dominated General Committee. So he 
decided to withdraw the Bill while, at the same time, making 
it clear to both Europeans and Indians that he did not dis­
agree with Mackenzie*s original premise that the Corporation 
was "in urgent need of reform. "
Accordingly Curzon and Woodburn modified the Bill so 
that the size of the Corporation was reduced from 75 to 50 
members by taking away 25 seats from the elected Commiss -
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 10 Feb. 1899, MSS.Eur. C.126/1,
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 16 March 1899, MSS.Eur. B.510/1.
3* Curzon to Hamilton, 9 Feb. 1899, MSS.Eur. D.510/1.
4. Curzon to Hamilton, 2 March 1899, MSS.Eur.D.510/1.
5. Curzon to Hamilton, 16 March 1899, MSS.Eur. D.510/l.
loners. This left a "native wing" of 25 to balance an 
"European wing" of the same size. The Bill, as it was 
finally passed, provided that the 25 elected members would 
be chosen by the rate payers (an electorate of 13,890 out 
of a population of 650,000). Fifteen of the remaining 
Commissioners were to be selected by the Government and the 
other 10 were to be nominated by the European commercial 
bodies. The General Committee, according to the revised 
Bill, was to be chosen in three equal parts by the 25 
elected Commissioners, the 10 commercial Commissioners, and 
the Government. This scheme possessed the advantage that 
the Government, being able to count on the support of the 
commercial members, could easily out-vote the elected 
members* representatives on the Committee. It was based, as 
the original draft Bill had been,
"on the principle of giving adequate represent­
ation on the governing body of the Municipality 
to the three chief interests in Calcutta - to 
the European commercial community which has 
made the city a centre of trade; to the Govern­
ment which has made it the capital of the 
Indian Empire, and is responsible to the World 
at large for its efficient and progressive 
municipal administration; and lastly, to the 
residents, householders, and ground-landlords 
who have been attracted to Calcutta by its 
creation and maintenance as a commercial 
capital*" 1
1. Statement of Objects and Reasons: A Bill to amend the 
Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act of 1888, 15 March 
1898, unnumbered April Muaic. Prog, [following Prog. 
No.124], Bengal Munic. Prog., Vol. 5405.
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Probably no Government measure since the Age of 
Consent Bill controversy aroused as much passion among the 
educated Hindus of Calcutta as did the Municipal Bill*
Coming as it did soon after the sedition Trials, the new 
sedition laws, and the continued detention without trial of 
the Natu brothers, it seemed to the Bengalee that "we are 
truly at the parting of the ways. The Government has defin­
itely resolved to abandon the old lines and to adopt a 
policy of reaction and repression. Speaking at the 1899 
Congress, Surendra Nath Banerjea said it is ‘"one of the 
gravest crises in our history. If we succumb to that crisis, 
the political enfranchisement of our people will be indef­
initely postponed", and he asked "ought we to submit to our
being reduced to the rank of hewers of wood and drawers of
2
water in our own country?" Malabari’s Indian Spectator
of Bombay remarked that "the feeling is gaining ground that
there has been a deliberate change of policy in regard to 
India, and that it involves the up-rooting of all that is
3
most liberal in the policy of British Indian administration!" 
The Bill was treated by the 1898 and 1899 Congresses as an 
attack on the principle of local self-government in India 
as a whole, and not as merely a local Calcutta issue. The 
interest shown by the Congress may have been sharpened by
1. 3 December 1898.
2. Report of the 15th I.N.C., pp.72-73*
3* Indian Spectator. 29 Jan. 1899* T. & D. Selections,
6 Feb. 1899. P.S.L.I., Vol.III.
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the fact that of the twelve elected members on the Calcutta 
General Committee, five had served as, or soon became, 
officials of the Congress - namely, Surendra Nath Banerjea, 
Norendra Nath Sen, J. Ghosal, Bhupendra Nath Basu, and 
Nalin Bihari Sircar*
The specific Indian criticisms of the Bill were stated 
most clearly in the much publicized dissent from the Report 
of the Select Committee by Banerjea and Sen* Banerjea and 
Sen, besides editing influential newspapers, were two of 
the most active Municipal Commissioners* In their Note of 
Dissent they complained that under the new Bill the Execu­
tive and his subordinate officers would no longer be "sub­
jected to the watchful and beneficial supervision of the 
Ward Commissioners";^ that the new system would produce 
unnecessary friction between the different authorities; 
and that the new General Committee would not contain an 
adequate number of the elected representatives of the rate 
payers since the elected members would return only one-third 
of the General Committee while the Government and Europeans, 
who paid only 30.8$ of the municipal rates, would return
1* Note of Dissent, Para.12, Report of the Select Committee 
on the C.M.B. 25 April 1899, July Prog. No.2, I.H.P., 
Munic., Vol.5646.
2* Ibid, Para.13.
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1
two-thirds of its membership, "An emasculated Corporation,
hut lately in possession of supreme power, must view with
uneasiness, if not with positive jealousy, the creation of
authorities, hitherto subordinate to it, but now rendered
independent of it, in respect of the bulk of their powers
2
and func t i ons•"
Banerjea and Sen also thought that the Government was
giving itself excessive powers of interference by enabling
itself (Section 26E) to intervene if "any of the duties
[were] ,»» not performed or • [were] performed in an
imperfect, inefficient or unsuitable manner*" Under the
existing Act of 1888 the Government might interfere (Section
38) only when "general default" of a "serious character"
1.
was committed by the Corporation* Banerjea and Sen ad­
mitted that the Government ought to possess some control 
over the Municipality* "But", they said, "the Government 
having slept over its powers has partly been responsible 
for any default, of which the Corporation might have been 
guilty* Not having exercised the powers of control under 
the existing law, it cannot be said that by actual experi­
ence it has been found that the present provisions are
1* The total municipal rates were paid in the following 
proportions:
Europeans i6.
Hindus 59.5$
Muslims 5 M
Grove rnment 12.5 $
Ibid, para.l9. 
Ibid* para*14* 
Ibid, para.28*
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inade equate
The Calcutta Municipal Bill was designed to withdraw 
a concrete privilege which the Bengalis had enjoyed for many 
years. The Bengali political leaders of Calcutta were deter­
mined not to give up control of the municipal government 
without making an effective demonstration of their disappro­
val. They decided to send a deputation to England to protest 
against the withdrawal of the right of self-government from
Calcutta, and Raja Benoya Krishna Deh was appointed Presi-
2
dent and Secretary of a fund for that purpose. A large 
protest meeting was held in the Calcutta Town Hall on 31 
August 1898 and eighteen ward meetings were organized 
Between September 1898 and March 1899*^
The projected deputation to England was never sent, 
possibly because of a shortage of funds. Instead Raja 
Benoya Krishna approached Romesh Chunder Dutt, who had 
retired from the Indian Civil Service in 1897 in order to 
pursue his literary interests and to help organize the Con­
gress activities in England. Dutt agreed to act as the rep­
resentative of the people of Bengal, and in this capacity 
he wrote letters to India, The Times, and the Manchester 
Guardian; he distributed 6,500 copies of a pamphlet about 
the Municipal Bill by Norendra Nath Chose through the
1. Ibid, para,32.
2. Bengalee, 1 Oct. 1898,
3# See the Report of the Select Committee on the C.M.B., 
p.l, and the Bengalee and the Statesman for this period.
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British Committee of the Congress; he called upon various 
people in the India Office, including Hamilton and Sir 
Alfred Lyall; and he approached Sir Henry Fowler and other 
Liberal Members of Parliament in the hope of inducing "some 
stronger men in the House than Sir W. Wedderburn or Herbert 
Roberts" to participate in a debate on the Calcutta Munici­
pal Bill.'*’
The British Committee of the Congress supported Butt*s 
efforts to arouse popular support in England for the protest 
against the Calcutta Municipal Bill, the Natus* detention, 
and the sedition laws. The Committee supplied speakers to
p
130 public meetings during its lecture season of 1898-99* 
Among those who spoke, besides Butt, were Badabhai Naoroji, 
Wedderburn, Ananda Mohun Bose, and Bepin Chandra Pal*
The Committee drafted an amendment which its Secretary, 
Herbert Roberts, moved in the debate on the address in 
reply to the Queen*s speech. The amendment asked that the 
Municipal Bill be postponed until after a Commission had 
taken evidence and reported on the objections of the rate­
payers. Sir Henry Powler, who seldom supported any Congress 
cause, spoke in favour of the amendment.
perversely
Hamilton, in defending the Bill, argued/that no
1. R.C.Butt, letter to Raja Benoya Krishna Beb, 3 Feb. 1899, 
quoted in J .N.Gupta, op.cit. p.24l£
2. India, 2 June 1899*
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motion "struck deeper at the root of self-government in 
India'1 than Robert's did since it proposed to interfere with 
what Hamilton called the process of local self-government 
in the Bengal legislative Council, He alleged that in 
recent years there had been "a steady deterioration both in 
the character of those who serve on the municipality as 
well as in the class of work done." Under the new Bill, he 
said, the interests of the Muslims and poorer Hindus would 
receive the consideration they had not been given in the 
past. He also repeated the familiar claim that the Bill was 
in the interest of the whole of India since plague in 
Calcutta would damage commerce elsewhere. After Hamilton's 
speech, the amendment was withdrawn,^
In India, Curzon's and Woodburn's decision to reduce 
the number of elected Commissioners from 50 to 25 was made 
public in the Supplement to The Calcutta Gazette on 12 July 
1899, by the publication of the Government of India letter 
to the Government of Bengal, dated 17 June 1899* This letter 
made public for the first time a passage from the Government 
of Bengal's letter of 17 June 1897 outlining the reasons 
for a municipal reform. Among the reasons was listed "the 
growth of party spirit and the appearance among the elected 
Commissioners of a class of professional and in some cases,
1. Pari. Debates, H. of C., 14 Peb. 1899. 4th Series, 
VblT&&7pp"*_ 923-970,
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l
corrupt politicians,"
Great exception was taken by the Calcutta newspapers 
and Municipal Commissioners to this charge of corruption* 
The peculiar aspect of this charge of corruption was that 
while it was omitted from all published correspondence 
before 12 July 1899, Mackenzie, speaking in the Bengal Leg­
islative Council on 4 April 1898, had said "we all know 
that when it comes to the question of making appointments
in the Municipality, there is canvassing, there is jobbery,
2there is even corruption* " Apart from a demand for an
'i
enquiry by the Bengalee, little was heard of the charge 
until 12 July 1899 when the Government of India quoted the 
Government of Bengal's letter of 17 June 1897.^ However, 
from 12 July 1899 onwards, the demand for an enquiry into 
the charges of irregularities was persistent* When Banerjea 
tried to raise the subject during the debate on the Munici­
pal Bill in the Bengal Legislative Council, Woodburn, as 
President, several times ruled him out of order* He said 
"the point to which we are limited is the discussion of the 
changes in the Bill which the Government of India have 
desired should be made. I cannot allow any discussion of 
the reasons which have led the Government of India to come
1. A.H.L.Fraser, Sec* to Govt, of India, to Sec. to Govt* 
of Bengal, Leg. Dept. 17 June 1899, July Prog. No.5.
I.H.P. Munic., Vol.5646.
2. Bengal Leg. Council Progs,, 4 April 1898, p.217.
3. 9 April 1899.
4. Supplement to The Calcutta Gazette, 12 July 1899.
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to their decision* That the Commissioners were not
allowed to question the charges of dishonourable behaviour
which they emphatically denied only heightened their sense
2
of grievance.
If there had been irregularities among the Commiss­
ioners of a serious nature, they were not among the main 
reasons for the introduction of the Calcutta Municipal Bill# 
As the matter is scarcely mentioned in the official and 
private correspondence on the Bill beyond the initial refer­
ence in the Government of Bengal’s letter of 17 June 1897
the
and the quotation fron/letter which is contained in the 
Government of India’s letter of 17 June 1899, it would seem 
that Mackenzie had made the charge without first ascertain­
ing its validity. Hamilton personally doubted that evidence 
of corruption would be produced.^ And if Curzon’s Govern­
ment had refrained from mentioning the charge in its other­
wise moderate letter of 17 June 1899, then the nationalists 
would not have been provided with such a convenient focus for 
opposition.
There had been talk in Calcutta about the possibility 
of the elected Commissioners resigning from the Corporation* 
Some Commissioners had considered withdrawing after Mac­
kenzie ' s abusive speech at the drainage works in November
1* Bengal Leg. Council Progs., 7 Aug. 1899, p.130.
2. Bengalee, 12 Aug. 1899.
3. Hamilton to Curzon, 28 Sept. 1899, MSS.Eur. C.126/1.
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1896 tut had decided against it,1 In 1898 the idea of
either resigning or boycotting municipal elections had heen
2
brought up again. The Bengalee had said "it is all very 
well to strenghten the Executive and make it practically 
irresponsible, hut the strongest executive would he impotent 
for good among an unwilling population1 who will non-co- 
operate with them, Even military force, as was illustrated 
in connection with the recent plague cases, will not avail 
to enforce the orders of the Executive. A municipal govern- 
ment to he successful must he popular."
Curzon had written that he was "not the least afraid" 
of the Municipal Commissioners acting on the suggestion 
that they resign. He did not take seriously the threat in 
the Press because he felt the Calcutta newspapers had "a 
sub-latent consciousness that, having unanimously appealed 
to me as a thoroughly impartial arbiter, it would he some­
what ridiculous if they now turned around and attacked me
A
for the result," This statement contains one of those 
self-deceptions about Indian public opinion which were to 
haunt Curzon1s relations with educated Indians for the 
remainder of his Viceroyalty. Pew people had actually
1* Amrlta Bazar Patrika, 14 July 1899, T. & D. Selections,
24 July 1899, P.S.L.I., Vol*115,
2. Indian Mirror, 14 Sept, 1898, T. & D* Selections,
19 Sept, 1898, and Power & Guardian. 2 Oct, 1898. T. & D, 
Selections, 3 Oct. 18987 P •S.L.I., Vol,107• ’
3. 21 Jan, 1899.
4. Curzon to Hamilton, 19 July 1899, MSS.Eur, D.510/2.
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appealed to him as an "impartial arbiter"; there had been 
frequent demands that he either withdraw the Bill entirely 
or allow a Commission to enquire into the charges of 
inefficiency on which the Bill had been based. Having made 
this initial mistaken assumption about the nature of the 
Indian opposition, it was easy for him to discuss it with 
self-righteous indignation and regard his critics as 
"ridiculous".
On the first day of September 1899, after receiving 
a final refusal from the Bengal Government to withdraw or 
substantiate the charges of corruption, and in order to 
emphasise their protest against what they regarded as the 
"disenfranchisement" of local self-government, 28 of the
X
elected Commissioners resigned from the Corporation.
The Calcutta Municipal Bill was passed on 27 September 
1899 by a vote of 12 to 6 after the Legislative Council had 
sat as a Committee for eleven days and rejected most of 
565 amendments which were moved. The six members who opposed 
the Bill were Hindus, except for J.G.Apcar, who was an 
Armenian and the nominee of the Municipal Corporation on 
the the Legislative Council. Supporting the Europeans were
1. Ronaldshay,(op.cit. Vol.II. )Ronaldshay says "the storm 
broke" on 27 September 1899 but actually it was on
1 September that the resignations occurred. The Bill 
was finally passed on 27 September.
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two Muslims and a Hindu zamindar, At times the opposition
became slightly bitter, but at the end of the debate,
three of the British members singled out Surendra Nath
Banerjea for ?lthe excellent good temper, patience and
courtesy" with which he had "conducted his difficult task.
A number of Calcutta newspapers appeared with black borders
and the Advocate of Lucknow published an obituary notice on
2
Local Self-Government.
The bye-elections for the 28 seats vacated by the 
resignations were held on 5 October 1899- Only 12 of the 
seats were filled and of these, only two were contested.
(In the 1898 elections these had been contests in 13 of the 
25 wards.) Of the 12 persons elected in the bye-elections, 
seven were Europeans or Eurasians, three were Muslims, and 
two were Hindus. Hindus had registered in several other 
wards as well, but withdrew after the list of candidates 
had been published or soon after the polls had been closed, 
in order, according to the Amrita Bazar Patrika, "to create 
fun or to oust the Musulmans and Europeans who sought 
to represent them." In any case, the same papers continued, 
those Hindus who stood for election were ’Very indifferent 
members of socie by." ^  The Government of Bengal had, then, 
to appoint sixteen persons to serve the unexpired portion
1. Bengal Leg. Council Prog. 27 Sept, 1899, p«1220,
2. T. & D. Selections, 9 Oct., 1899, P.S.L.I., Vol. 117*
3- 8 Oct. 1899, T. & D. Selections, 16 Oct. 1899, P*S.L.I.f 
Vol.117-
of the vacant seats on the Corporation until the new
1
Calcutta Municipal Bill came into effect on 1 April 1900.
Curzon was anxious that people in England should not 
think that the 28 Commissioners had resigned in protest 
against his decision to reduce the rate payers* representa­
tion on the Corporation. He wanted Hamilton to convey the 
idea to Parliament that they had resigned because of Mac­
kenzie *s charges of corruption, and not because of any
2
action of his own Government, In actual fact the resigna­
tions were as much a protest against the Bill itself as 
against the allegation of corruption,, but the Indian press
placed most of the blame for the Bill on Mackenzie. So 
Curzon was justified in seeking to avoid the odium for the 
dramatic resignations. Hamilton, for his part, thought that 
the resignations had been due to the Government's refusal 
to either withdraw or prove the charges of corruption. But 
as he doubted the Government * s ability to produce evidence 
of corruption^ and as the case would be f,a very difficult 
one to argue" without evidence, he wanted to preclude any­
one in the House of Commons from asking him about the 
accuracy of Mackenzie*s charges. He planned to do this by
1. W.R.Bright, Chrmn. of Corp. of Calcutta, to Sec., Govt, 
of Bengal, Munic. Dept. 6 Oct. 1899, Dec. Prog. No.126. 
Bengal Munic.Prog., Vol. 5631*
2. Curzon to Hamilton 6 Sept. 1899, MSS.Eur. D.510/2.
Also, Curzon to Hamilton, 18 Oct, 1899, MSS.Eur.D,510/3.
3. Hamilton to Curzon, 28 Sept. 1899, MSS.Eur. C,126/1.
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saying that the Commissioners resigned in protest against
the general action of the Government and not against the
charges of corruption. However, the British Committee of
the Congress failed to exploit this potentially embarrassing
issue and when Herbert Roberts asked for a discussion of
the Calcutta Municipal Bill, he did not seek the reasons
2
for the resignations*
The new Calcutta Municipal Act (Act III of 1899) 
came into effect on 1 April 1900. On the reformed Corpora­
tion there were 24 Europeans and Eurasians - four more than 
in 1897* On the other hand, the number of Hindus declined 
from 39 to 16 and the number of Muslims from 13 to 7. Thus 
the balance of power had shifted to the Europeans and 
Eurasians as the Government had intended.
However, it is highly doubtful if the Bill achieved 
the desired results in several other directions. A Gov­
ernment of Bengal Resolution, commenting on the working of 
the Bill in its first year, declared that there had been 
ffan admitted absence of the friction and obstruction which 
at times marked the proceedings of the Corporation under 
the former law." But it noted only slight improvement in the 
collection of outstanding debts in the drainage and water
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 20 Oct. 1899, MSS.Eur.C.126/1.
2. Indian Debates, H. of C., 27 Oct. 1899, pp.5-6.
3. Report on the Munic. Admin, of Calcutta, 1900-1901,
Nov. Prog. No.9, Bengal Munic. Prog., Vol.6099.
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supply systems, and in the application of the building 
regulations to existing houses.'1' Curzon wrote in April 
1901 that he believed "the existing Municipal administra­
tion of Calcutta to be vile and the influence of the Local 
Government to be almost a farce. No one dares make a move, 
or take a step, in Calcutta, for fear of the Bengali party," 
He complained that Woodburn did not have the courage needed 
to raise the taxes, and he himself was "stirring up so many
things in India that am reluctant to add to their number,
2
unless compelled," But the'Bengali party*, which had been 
vigilant over expenditure when it managed municipal affairs 
and had campaigned against the Calcutta Municipal Bill as 
the champion of the poor people, was even less likely to 
consent to a higher tax rate now that it had been removed 
from its position of responsibility. However, the Englishman, 
which had been a strong supporter of the Calcutta Municipal 
Bill, said in an editorial that "it is not a question of 
money. It is merely a question of energy." In its opinion 
the reformed Calcutta Municipality "neglects the work of
3
conservancy and drainage in a manner that is scandalous."
In the last analysis, the Government of Bengal created 
for itself considerable ill-will and widened the gulf of
1. Resolution by the Govt, of Bengal on Admin. Report of the 
Calcutta Munic., 1900-1901, 26 Oct. 1901, Nov. Prog.
No.10, Bengal Munic. Prog., Vol.6099*
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 April 1901,
MSS,Eur. D.510/7#
3. 24 July 1902.
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racial antipathy in passing an extreme piece of legislation 
which achieved little of its purpose beyond removing the 
Bengalis from authority* If it had been an isolated 
measure, it might not have attracted as much notice as it 
did. However, it was viewed as another attempt to return to 
a more autocratic form of government.
CHAPTER IV
THE NATIONALISTS AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Between the passing of the Councils Act of 1892 and 
the decision in 1903 to partition Bengal, the economic 
aspects of British rule, rather than the political, most 
occupied the attention of Indian nationalists. The severe 
famines of 1897 and 1899-1900 gave weight to Indian com­
plaints about the over-assessment of the land, R.C.Dutt 
challenged Lord Curzon to defend the Government's policy of 
assessment, Curzon accepted the challenge and, in his reply, 
to Dutt, laid down a more liberal policy of revenue collect­
ion, Lord Curzon*s Government also passed several pieces of 
legislation designed to protect the poorer agricultural 
classes from debt, alienation of land, and exorbitant rents. 
The people who supported the Congress were generally in 
opposition to protective legislation of this type. They 
believed that their personal interests would suffer, or that 
the specific measures were unlikely to benefit the poorer 
classes, or that only economic liberalism of the kind 
favoured by Ranade ^  would lead to agricultural prosperity. 
Closely related to the problem of the land revenue system 
was the "drain." One of the reasons for keeping the demand on 
agricultural land as high as the Government did was the need
1. See below)p'p" ^ i0 -|[a
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to pay for India's foreign agency and expenses in London.
The belief that the drain was the main source of India's 
poverty was probably shared by the great majority of Indian 
nationalists in this period and it would be difficult to 
over-estimate the effect of this belief on Indian political 
thinking.
The Land Revenue Question
R.C, Dutt was the first Indian to rise to the 
position of Officiating Divisional Commissioner in the Indian 
Civil Service. After retiring from government service in 
1897, he accepted a three year lectureship in Indian history 
at University College, London. During his stay in London 
he worked on his translations of Indian epic literature and 
his economic history of India. He also spoke at public meet­
ings, assisted the British Committee of the Indian National 
Congress, and wrote letters to the press about the Sedition 
Bill, the Calcutta Municipal Bill, and land revenue policy.
In 1899 he returned to India in order to preside over the 
Indian National Congress.^-
Dutt's decision to join the Congress gave it an added 
respectability at a time when it was still subject to the 
suspicion aroused by the arrest of the Natus and Tilak. But
1. J.N. Gupta, Life and Work of Romesh Chunder Putt
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Dutt maintained a distance between himself and the Congress, 
neither joining the British Committee 1 nor emerging as the 
leader he might have been had he more actively supported its
work. In 1874 he had written contemptuously of the Bengali's
2"servility1 and lack of self-reliance; perhaps his feelings 
towards other Indians remained complex. Norendra Nath Sen 
engaged him to write occasionally for the Indian Mirror for 
the unusually high rate of two guineas an article,^ Dutt 
also offered to conduct and finance India upon the condition 
that he could keep any profits. This offer the British 
Committee turned down,^
Dutt is best known today for his writings on economic 
history, but during the years following his retirement, his 
campaign for reform of the Indian land revenue system 
attracted most notice. E b  believed that the increasing fre­
quency of famines was the result of over-assessment of the 
land. Before the British came to India, the cultivators* 
condition, he believed, was relatively less depressed and
pj
the agricultural classes were better able to resist drought.
1. Bengalee, 28 May 1901.
2* S.CTDutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, p.182.
3. J.N.Gupta, op.cit, p.238- Behramji Malabari, who edited 
the Indian Spectator, usually paid contributors Rs.3 per 
column although sometimes he paid as much as Rs,5 or 10, 
Englishmen who contributed occasionally accepted 8 annas 
per column. [Malabari] "The Native Press - Then and Now", 
East . and West, Vol.Ill, No.34. (Aug. 1904), p.847.
4. Masani. Naoro.ii, p*315.
5. Dutt saidT (letter to Lord Curzon, 12 Feb. 1900, Open 
Letters to Lord Curzon, Part I, p.22) that "no Higher rent 
than one-sixth the gross produce was ever actually 
realized in any province of India" before British rule 
began.
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Dutt wrote a series of open letters to Lord Curzon in 1900 
in which he set out his specific objections to current land 
revenue policy. His argument was, in general, that in Bombay, 
Madras, and the Central Provinces the land was over-assessed, 
that the system of periodic re-settlements under which rents 
were raised every 20 or 30 years discouraged the landholder 
from making improvements.^ In contrast to the poverty pre­
vailing in these provinces he cited the permanently settled 
areas of Bengal where, he said, there was no loss of life 
from famines and where accumulated capital was not retained 
by only a few but was "fairly distributed among intelligent, 
enterprising, and industrious men in all districts and in
p
all classes." In the Punjab and the North West Provinces 
and Oudh he thought the principle of the revenue system was 
"fair",^
Dutt advanced seven principles which he thought ought
to guide the Government's land revenue policy. The princi-'
pies were as follows;
1. In zamindari areas where the revenue settlement was 
not permanent, the State demand should have been 
limited to one-half the rental paid by the tenant to 
the landlord.
2. In ryotwari areas, one-fifth of the gross produce of 
the soil should have been the maximum demand on a
1. Letters to Lord Curzon, 12 Feb., 20 Feb., and 6 April
1900, Ibid.
2# Letter to Lord Curzon, 25 April 1900, Ibid, p.60,
3. Letter to Lord Curzon, 12 May 1900, Ibid., p.75#
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single holding, and one-tenth should have heen the 
limit of the Statefs average demand for a whole 
district.
3« In such areas, the sole ground for enhancement should 
have heen a rise in prices.
4* Thirty years should have heen the minimum period of
assessment. [Most parts of the Punjab and the Central 
Provinces were under 20 year settlements.]
5# No looal cesses should have heen levied except for
direct benefit of the land, and these should not have 
exceeded 6 of the land revenue demand. [Local rates 
were used to finance roads, schools, salaries of 
village watchmen, etc.]
6. Payment of water-irrigation rates should have heen
optional, not compulsory.
7# Appeal against assessment should have heen allowed
to an independent tribunal.^
These seven recommendations, with minor differ-
2ences, were reiterated in a memorial to the Secretary of
1* Letter to Lord Curzon, 12 May 1900, ibid, pp.78
2. For instance, Dutt urged that he the maximum rate of 
local cesses; the memorialists suggested 10$. Dutt rec­
ommended that a rise in prices should he the only ground 
for enhancing the revenue demand; the memorialists added
another ground, namely, a rise in the value of land due
to the construction of Government irrigation works. Dutt 
suggested that in ryotwari areas it was impracticable to 
realize one-half the net produce while the memorialists 
mentioned this as a possible ceiling for the Government 
demand.
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State from eleven former Government officials,^
Both Lord Curzon and Lord Hamilton wondered
whether Dutt might not be correct in his belief that the
land revenue assessment was too high in some areas. Both men
also admitted they were perplexed by the involved nature of
p
the land question. Hamilton gave Dutt*s statements and 
figures to Sir Charles Bernard, a land revenue expert, to be 
analysed. Bernard convinced Hamilton "that Dutt did not 
understand what he was talking about, and that not only his 
conclusions, but his whole statement of fact on which the 
conclusions were based, are erroneous." But at the same 
time, Bernard, too, had "a sort of uneasy consciousness that 
our assessments in certain parts of India are too high.
Curzon met Dutt shortly after the latter presided 
over the Lucknow Congress of 1899 and decided that Dutt was
1. Dutt, Open Letters to Lord Curzon, g B i  Memorial 
which was dated 26 December I960, was drafted by R.K. 
Buckle, former Director of Revenue Settlement in Madras. 
It was signed by Dutt, Buckle, J.H.Garstin (former Member 
of Council, Madras), J.B.Bennington (former Collector, 
Madras), H. J.Reynolas (former Revenue Secretary, Bengal), 
Richard Garth (former Chief Justice, Bengal), C.J.O'Don- 
nell (former Commissioner, Bengal), A.Rogers (former 
Settlement Officer, Bombay), W.Wedderburn (former Acting 
Chief Secretary, Bombay), John Jardine (former High Court 
Judge, Bombay), and J.B. Goodridge (former Settlement 
Commissioner, C.B*)*
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 Jan. 1900, MSS. Eur. C. 126/2.
Curzon to Hamilton, 25 Jan. 1900, MSS. Eur^ D. 510/4 
Curzon to Hamilton, 20 June 1900, MSS. Eur. D.510/5.
3. Sir Charles Edward Bernard had had experience of land 
revenue work in the Bunjab, the Central Brovinces, and 
Bengal, as well as having served as Secretary to the Gov-* 
ernment of India, Revenue and Agricultural Department. In 
1900 he was Secretary to the India Office, Revenue and 
Statistics Department.
4# Hamilton to Curzon, 1 Peb. 1900. MSS. Eur. D. 510/4.
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"an amiable and I daresay an accomplished man, but has 
the incurable vice of the Bengali, namely, the faculty of 
rolling out yards and yards of frothy declamation about 
subjects which he has imperfectly considered or which he 
does not fully understand.
Hamilton was less charitable in his opinion of Dutt. 
While he had "a sort of internal hankering after the Dutt- 
ian views", Hamilton believed that Dutt had "so attempted 
to support his case by many inaccuracies and mis-statements, 
that, personally, I believe his character as a man of 
accuracy is gone," He was "afraid" that Dutt was "an unreli­
able , shifty,fellow,
The Government of India sent Dutt's open letters on 
the land problem to the local Governments for their opinions. 
Sir Bampfylde Puller was appointed to draft a Resolution in 
answer to Dutt and the memorialists on the basis of the 
Local Government's replies. However, Curzon was not satisfied 
with the long, complex, and learned draft which Puller pre­
pared and he undertook personally to write a Resolution 
which would "be a vindication of our Land Settlement and 
Revenue policy urbi et orbi, an answer to our critics, and 
an attempt to convince a doubting public, and to lay down
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 11 Jan. 1900, MSS.Eur. D.510/4.
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 27 April 1900, MSS. Eur. C. 126/2. 
Hamilton, like Curzon, sometimes perverted the arguments 
of his critics in order to ridicule them more easily in 
his private correspondence. Por instance, he wrote to 
Curzon that Dutt and the Dutt school were claiming "that 
high assessments cause drought. "
Hamilton to Curzon, 9 Jan. 1901, MSS.Eur. C. 126/3*
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the lines of a sustained and liberal policy in the future.1
His aim was not to convince the experts, or even primarily
the Indian public. Attentive as he was to his future in
British politics his purpose was to persuade "English public
opinion, the English House of Commons, and the English Press"
that the revenue system was on the whole wise and fair, and
that whatever defects existed would be corrected by himself.^
Curzon took great pains to make his Resolution clear
and readable. It was published in the Gazette of India on
2
18 January 1902. The Resolution was intended to establish 
four propositions: that Butt's statistics concerning the
incidence of the land revenue demand were incorrect; that
/
the actual incidence did not greatly exceed, and sometimes 
did not even approach, the maximum demand suggested by Dutt; 
that the severity of recent famines was not influenced by 
the level of the revenue assessments; and finally, that the 
Government intended to lay down three principles of its own 
which would mitigate any possible harshness in the existing 
revenue system.
Unless the statistics contained in the replies from 
the local Governments were grossly inaccurate - and there is 
little reason to believe they were - Dutt was in error in 
some of his contentions. For instance, Dutt had stated that
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 7 Aug. 1901, MSS. Eur. 510/8.
2. The Resolution, along with the local Governments' reports 
on Dutt's letters, were published by the Government of 
India in 1902 in Land Revenue Policy of the Indian 
Government.
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the revenue demand in the Central Provinces equalled ahout 
one-third of the gross agricultural produce;^ the Govern­
ment of the Central Provinces replied that the proportion 
of gross rental .to produce "ranges from one-sixth to on,e- 
2
fourteenth," Putt, in urging that one-fifth of the gross 
produce he the maximum assessment in Bombay, implied that 
this figure was often greatly exceeded;-' the Bombay Govern­
ment said that apart from the exceptionally fertile areas of 
Gujarat, one-fifth was seldom exceeded and that the average 
assessment for the Province as a whole was nearer to one- 
tenth than to one-fifth*^ Dutt had blamed over-assessment 
for the frequency and severity of famines, but the Government 
of India maintained that there was little connection between
land revenue demand and famines, claiming instead that cli-
5
matic conditions were to blame. The Government argued that 
not even the complete abolition of the land revenue demand 
would enable a community to withstand the failure of the 
rains. Proof of this could be seen in the estimate that the 
agricultural classes of the Central Provinces lost Rs. 40 
crores between 1895 and 1902 - "an amount equivalent to the
1. Letter of 12 Peb* 1900, Open Letters to Lord Curzon, p.27*
2, Resolution of 18 Jan, 1902, para, l7T
Philip Woodruff (The Men Who Ruled India s The Guardians, 
p. 158) incorrectly states that "the average was less 
than one-twentieth*"
3* Letter of 6 April 1900, Open Letters to Lord Curzon, 
pp. 46-49, 53*
4* Land Revenue Policy of the Indian Government,
Pub, by order of the Gov. Gen. of India in Council 
(Calcutta 1902), p. 59- 
5* Resolution of 18 Jan* 1902, para.£.
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total land revenue of 50 years.'^The Government was not 
prepared to accept Dutt's contention that the Permanent 
Settlement protected Bengal from famine. The relative immun­
ity of Bengal (excluding Bihar) to famine was due to special 
advantages of climate, soil fertility, and trade, and not to 
the Permanent Settlement. The Government believed that when 
Butt stated that the Permanent Settlement had secured the 
prosperity of the Bengal peasantry, he was confounding the 
result of the Tenancy Acts of 1859 and 1885 with the effects 
of Cornwallis1 Settlement. In fact, the Government said, in 
consequence of the Permanent Settlement "the Bengal cultiva­
tor was rack-rented, impoverished, and oppressed" by the 
zamindars until the Government had intervened. Furthermore * 
the tenantry of Bihar had displayed less resistance to
2
famine than the peasantry of many temporarily settled areas.
The Government Resolution discussed five of the
seven principles recommended by Dutt and the memorialists
regarding future revenue policy. To the recommendation that
the Government demand on zamindars in temporarily settled
areas should not exceed one-half the rental, the Government
replied that there was a progressive tendency to approach
that level, and that since this was the case, it did not
•3
propose to issue new orders upon the matter.
In discussing the second point, namely, that in
1. Ibid, para. 28.
2. Ibid, paras. 5 and 6,
3. Ibid, para. 13*
165
ryotwari tracts the maximum revenue demand should not exceed
one fifth of the gross produce, the Government warped the
argument of Dutt and the memorialists hy implying that they
had recommended one-fifth as the standard revenue demand.
Having thus misrepresented the suggested rule, Lord Curzon1s
Resolution proceeded to show that by taking one-fifth of the
gross produce, the Government would be enhancing the demand
1
in most places.
The memorialists had asked that improvements in the 
land carried out with private capital be exempted 'from 
enhancement. The Resolution replied that there was a variety 
of rules in the different Provinces governing the types of 
and periods for which improvements were exempt. The Govern­
ment intended to consider how "the expenditure of private 
capital upon the improvement of land" might be stimulated 
and how legitimate profits on such expenditure could be 
secured. But it refused to surrender increased profits
arising from the growth of population, introduction of new
2
crops, and improvement of irrigation and communications.
The demand for a 30 year minimum on the period of 
assessment was rejected on similar grounds. Where there was
1, Ibid, par, 17. Philip Woodruff (op. cit,, p. 158) in 
showing that the arguments of "poor Dutt" were demolished 
by Curzon, ignored the discrepancy between what Dutt had 
actually written and what Curzon stated Butt had written.
2. Resolution of 18 Jan. 1902, para. '10.
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"much waste land, low rents, and a fluctuating 
cultivation, or again where there is a rapid 
development of resources owing to the con­
struction of roads, railways, or canals, to an 
increase in population, or to a rise in prices, 
the postponement of a re-settlement for so 
long a period is both injurious to the people, 
who are unequal to the strain of a sharp 
enhancement, and unjust to the general tax­
payer who is temporarily deprived of the 
additional revenue to which he has a legiti­
mate claim.111
To the suggestion that local cesses should be limited to
S i ' f o (Dutt) or 10$ (the memorialists) of the revenue demand,
the Government replied that only in Sind, Madras, and Coorg
did local taxation amount to more than 10$. It did not think
local taxation was "on the whole either onerous or excessive"
unless, as there was reason to believe, landlords shifted
the burden on to their tenants. The Government hoped it
could "mitigate imposts which are made to press upon the
cultivating classes more severely than the law intended,"
2
but otherwise it did not plan to move in the matter.
Having dismissed or discounted most of Dutt*s argu­
ments, Lord Curzon1s Resolution concluded with three 
positive proposals concerning land revenue, and herein lies 
the statesmanship of the Resolution. The first was that when 
large enhancements were made at each settlement - and large 
enhancements were necessarily "the direct consequence of 
long-term settlements" - the enforcement of the increased
1. Ibid, para. 23.
2. Ibid, para.181.
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l
assessment should he gradual and progressive, and not sudden.
The second principle enunciated by Lord Curzon was that
greater flexibility should be introduced into the collection
of the land revenue demand in years of crop failure. And
finally, he emphasised the expediency of granting prompt
exemptions from the revenue demand in areas of general
2
economic deterioration.
There was nothing novel about these three principles, 
Indian landowners and politicians had in the past repeatedly 
complained of the inflexibility of revenue collection. Sir 
Anthony MacDonnell's Famine Commission had emphasised the 
value of revenue suspensions and remissions, "as a measure 
of constant application" when the condition of the soil 
deteriorated.^ But these principles had often been lost 
sight of by Provincial Governments, and most especially in 
Bombay where they were in need of authoritative re-statement
4
and enforcement.
Curzon may have been right in saying that revenue
relinquished by the Government was not used by the cultiva­
te
tor for protection against famine. He was also probably 
correct in his belief that although remissions and suspen­
sions were vital in years of famine, in average years the 
assessment was reasonable. However, in making his recommend­
ations for graduated enhancement, flexibility, and liberality
1. Ibid, para, 34.
2. Ibid, paras. 36-38.
3. Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, paras. 270- 
71.
4. See below,pp. ^ o h . - ocf.
5. Resolution of 16 Jan, 1902, para. 29*
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in depressed areas, Curzon was tacitly acknowledging the 
general assumption behind Duttfs arguments that suffering 
during famine could be reduced by reforming the land revenue 
system*
Dutt refused to give in to Curzon's overwhelming 
performance. He reaffirmed in letters to the Pioneer that 
the land revenue assessment was f,not moderate and equitable; 
and sufficient margin is not left to landlords and cultiva­
tors to meet the strain of occasional bad harvests.ir The 
existing revenue practices, in his view, were not in con­
formity with the description made in Curzon*s Resolution.^*
Philip Woodruff has said that with the land revenue 
Resolution Lord Curzon scored an undoubted intellectual 
victory. But "sonorous, pompous and usually acid, the 
sentences flow from his lordship*s pen; every paragraph
2
makes a telling point and every other alienates the reader." 
It was the Resolution of a politician, of a Government front­
bencher trying to reveal the Opposition in a ridiculous 
light. It was not written in the detached and dispassionate 
tone which Curzon*s predecessors had customarily used in 
public controversy.
With his advocacy of the Permanent Settlement, Dutt 
laid himself open to the charge that he was a champion of 
zamindar interests and that he ignored the welfare of the
1. R.C.Dutt and others, Land Problems in India, p.36, 
letter to Pioneer, 12 March 1902.
2. Woodruff, op.cit., p.157.
1
peasants. And the charge was made, Dutt was himself a
zamindar. In 1902 he was elected an honorary member of the
2
British Indian Association. This would have been unthinkable
in 1874 when he published The Peasantry of Bengal in which he
described the peasants as "a worthier class" than the zamin-
dars^and included as an appendix some anti-zamindari extracts
from Bankim Chandra Chatterji^ Banga Darsana, Dutt had hoped
that his book would lead to an inquiry into the landlords*
treatment of their ryots. The zamindari spokesman, Kristodas
Pal, gave Duttfs book a "scathing" review in the Hindoo
4Patriot under the title of "Revolutionary",
A complete change in Dutt*s attitude to the zamindar- 
ryot problem would appear to have taken place. In 1874 he 
had written "seldom in the annals of any country has hasty 
legislation been productive of effects so calamitous as the 
ill-conceived Permanent Settlement " while in 1899 he 
stated that "no single act of the British Grovernment that can 
be named has done so much for the prosperity and well being 
of the people as the permanent settlement of the land revenue 
of Bengal effected by Lord Cornwallis in 1793*'^ In 1874 
Dutt held that the peasants could expect assistance only
1. For instance by C.W.McMinn, Famine Truths,"Half Truths, - 
Untruths., pp.68-9. McMinn (p.70) described Dutt as "a 
Mazzini disguised as Uriah Heep."
2 o  Ibid., p.68,
3- p.59*
4. J.N.Gupta, op.cit. p.57. / W
5. R.C.Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, p.49.
6. R.C.Dutt, Open Letters to Lord Curzon, "Famines in India!1, 
p. 15* reprinted from the Fortnightly Review of August 
1897*
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from alien rulers and not from the Indian aristocratic and 
middle classes. Most of the bhadralok, he said, owned zamin- 
daris and their sympathies therefore lay with the land­
owners.^" Twenty-five years later he was suggesting that the 
interests of "the voiceless millions of cultivators and 
artisans" could be better safeguarded by Indians (or, by
implication, the middle classes who joined the Congress)
2than by foreigners.
In his land revenue Resolution, Lord Curzon attempted 
to capitalize on Dutt's advocacy of the Permanent Settlement. 
Dutt had not actually recommended the extension of the Perm­
anent Settlement in his open letters, knowing that the India 
Office had firmly rejected the idea^ and that many of the 
retired civilians who supported his other revenue recommend­
ations did not agree with him on this issue. But Dutt's 
views on the benefits of a Permanent Settlement were implicit 
in his open letters and explicit in most of his other 
writings of this period. In his Resolution, Curzon chided
Dutt and the other critics of the Government for not paying
4
more attention to tenant rights. In doing so, he neglected
to mention that Dutt had urged the extension of ^ occupancy
rights to all settled tenants in Northern India. Nor did 
Curzon refer to the rejection of this proposal by the
1. The Peasantry of Bengal, p.76.
2. Report of the 15th i Tn .C., p.21.
3. Dutt and others, Land Problems in India, p.36.
4. Resolution of 16 Jan. 1902, para. 51
5. Letter of 12 May 1900, Open Letters, p.75.
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Governments of the Punjab and the North West Provinces and 
Oudh.^ Nevertheless, Dutt had ceased to regard the tenantry 
problem as crucial to agricultural prosperity#
No doubt part of this shift of opinion may be ex­
plained by Dutt’s view that the Bengal rent laws of 1859t 
1868, and 1885 had given to the tenantry the security pro­
vided to zamindars by the Regulation of 1793* But it must be 
emphasised that in the late 19th century when Dutt and other 
Indians spoke of extending the permanent settlement, they 
were not usually thinking of creating a zamindari system 
where it did not already exist.
The shift in Dutt's position, then, was as much one 
of emphasis as of principle. As a young Civilian he had 
concerned himself with the oppression of the tenantry by the 
zamindars? as a landowner and a retired Civilian he exhib­
ited no hostility to tenantry interests in claiming that the 
permanent limitation of the Government's demand would be the 
best protection against famine. Effective tenancy laws had a
p
definite place in his panacea for Indian agriculture. He 
wanted to see the accumulation of wealth in the hands of all 
agricultural classes, without which there could be neither
1. Gov't, of Punjab to Govt, of India, No.243, 28 Dec.1900, 
para.2, and Govt, of N.W.P. and 0. to Govt, of India.,
No.4256, 22 Dec. 1900, para.4, Land Revenue Policy of 
the Indian Government, pp. 74 and 8l.
2. See, for instance, his paper, "Famines in India, 1770 to 
1900", (Open Letters to Lord Curzon, p.18) in which he 
said "wise laws have been made to restrict the demands 
of landlords [in Bengal and Northern India], though a 
further extension of these laws may be still necessary".
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protection against calamity nor incentive to improvement♦
When most other Congress advocates of the Permanent Settle­
ment discussed the agricultural problem, they did not mention 
tenancy measures. The only Congress session during the first 
twenty years which passed a resolution recommending tenancy 
legislation was in 1899, the year Dutt presided. Dutt was 
probably responsible for this resolution because the recom­
mendation was not repeated in subsequent years when Dutt was 
not present and because the resolution was in line with 
Dutt’s Open Letters. It did not make the usual request for 
an extension of the Permanent Settlement but instead asked 
that no enhancements should be carried out except upon the 
grounds of a rise in prices.^
The term "Permanent Settlement", when it was used 
in the Congress in the early Sessions, meant a Permanent 
Settlement of the Bengal type. But gradually it evolved to 
include a permanent ryotwari settlement and, in Dutt's case, 
even to include the permanent limitation of the landlord*s 
demand on the tenant. That the Congress passed a resolution 
almost every year requesting the extension of the Permanent 
Settlement can not be attributed solely to zamindari influ­
ence, When most delegates to the Congress from Bombay and 
Madras used the term, they were thinking of a permanent 
ryotwari settlement. There were also at least a few members 
who kept quiet at the annual Congress sessions but who held
1. Resolution II of 1899.
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radical social ideas, judged by contemporary Indian
standards. One such person was K. Perraju, a pleader and
member of the Madras Legislative Council, who wrote that
"zamindars have not done anything socially or politically to
merit state aid and p rotecti o n . A n o t h e r  was C.Sankara
Nair, who "strenuously advocated the cause of the tenants
against the landlords, though he was a Malabar landlord of
sorts." Nair, who had a strong anti-Brahman bias and favoured
the abolition of caste, was President of the 1897 Congress
2
and became a High Court Judge in 1903.
Those Congress leaders who were anxious that the 
Congress should appear to be a truly national rather than a 
class or sectional organisation were sensitive to the sug-
■5
gestion that the Congress championed zamindari interests. 
Because of this sensitivity and the ambiguity of the term 
"Permanent Settlement" it is not easy to discover the 
social and economic values of the individuals who spoke in 
favour of the Permanent Settlement, much less those of the 
Congress as a whole. Yet the views expressed in the early 
years of the Congress before the Subjects Committee became 
effective in filtering out all contentious issues, and 
before the "Permanent Settlement" came to mean various 
ideas, are revealing.
1. K. Perraju, "Impartible Estates in India," Hindustan.
Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VII, No. 5 (May 1903) 
p." 424.
2. The Statesman, 6 Jan, 1898, quotes a biographical 
sketch of iTair from the Pioneer.
3. See speech of V.R.Natu, Report of the 10th I.N.C. pp. 37-8.
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First mention of the Permanent Settlement in the
Congress was made at the second session* D.E.Wacha stated
that the Bengali ryots were not materially Better off then
ryots in other parts of India^ and A. 0.Hume alleged that the
Bengali "masses" were the poorest in India, implying that
2
the Permanent Settlement should not be extended. In reply, 
Moti Lai Ghose gave "an unqualified denial1 to Hume Vs esti­
mate of the conditions of the Bengali lower classes.^
In 1888 a resolution advocating the extension of the 
Permanent Settlement was approved by the Subjects Committee 
for the first time. An English delegate, one J.E.Howard of 
Allahabad, argued that a careful study ought to be made of 
the subject before the Congress as a whole passed such a 
resolution. He mentioned J.S.Mill*s maxim that unearned 
increment from the land should go "to the whole people" 
rather than to individual proprietors. He and Telang advised 
the Congress to postpone discussion of the Permanent Settle-
4
ment until it had been fully considered. Accordingly, the 
problem was referred to the Standing Committees which were 
instructed to submit reports to the 1889 Congress^. In the 
usual manner the reports were not handed in the following 
year. Nevertheless, the 1889 Congress passed a resolution 
advocating the extension of the Permanent Settlement. It was
1. Report of the 2nd I.N.C., p.61.
2. m ; pietr.------------
3. Ibid, p.69.
4. Report of the 4th I.N.C., pp. 115-17.
5. Resolution XIV of 1888.
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introduced by Boilumta Nath Sen, whose intimate connections
Will 3
with the Bengal zamindars bean mentioned, and was sup­
ported by S.Subramania Iyer, Iyer told the Congress how he 
had first become a landowner fifteen years previously when 
he invested money saved from his legal career in Tanjore. 
Since that time, he complained, the revenue demand on his 
land had been raised. He argued that the Permanent Settlement 
was needed in order to secure for the tenant or ryot the 
fruits of his improvements.1
In subsequent years if there was opposition to the 
extension of the Permanent Settlement it was expressed in 
the secrecy of the Subjects Committee although in 1894 a 
European landowner, Captain Banon from Kulu in the Punjab, 
introduced an amendment to the Permanent Settlement Resolu­
tion. The proposed amendment said that the Congress would 
not object to the re -assessment of Bengal if this would 
enable the Government to extend fixity of the revenue demand 
to the rest of India. Banon told the Congress that it would,
v
by passing his amendment, controvert the allegation that the
Congress favoured the richer as against the poorer classes.
He believed the original resolution alienated Mthe support
of the radical party in England who are against landlordism
and the unearned increment." No one would support Banonrs
2
amendment and it was dropped.
1, Report of the 3th I.N.C., p.60.
2. Report of the 10th I.N.C., p.39.
3 C See- keJavAJj
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If one were to attempt to draw inferences about Con- 
gress attitudes to the Permanent 'Settlement from the meagre 
information available in the first twenty Congress Reports, 
four facts would have to be considered. First, the three 
persons who suggested that championing the Permanent Settle­
ment might be inadvisable were British."** Pour other persons 
who seemed hesitant about supporting the Permanent Settlement
in the early years before its meaning became ambiguous were 
2
from Bombay. Thirdly, the three persons who spoke most 
often in favour of the Permanent Settlement were Peter Paul
Pillai, barrister, zamindar and agent of the Madras Land­
holders1 Association, Boikunta Nath Sent zamindar and zamin­
dar *s pleader, and R.N.Mudholkar, zamindar and pleader.^
1. Hume, J.E. Howard, and Captain Banon. Robert Knight, 
editor of the Friend of India and Statesman, also opposed 
its extension. He thought the Bengal Permanent Settlement 
had been an "economic mistake", (Robert Knight to Ram 
Gopal Sanyal, 13 Sept. 1886, quoted by Ram Gopal Sanyal, 
Reminiscences and Anecdotes of Great Men of India, Both 
Official and Non-OfflciaTV for theLast One Hundred Years, 
p. 15b) However, the Permanent Settlement Resolutions of 
1891 and 1897 were introduced by Pringle Kennedy and John 
Adams, respectively. (Kennedy's wife and daughter were 
murdered by a terrorist in the Muzaffapur bomb case in 
1908.) Wedderburn wrote in 1897 that he favoured the 
extension of the Bengal type of permanent settlement in 
which collection of the land revenue would be assigned 
"to men of good local standing, and on terms which made 
them interested in the improvement and prosperity of the 
land," He had written in 1878 that "we merely state a 
commonplace when we condemn government interference 
between Labour and Capital. (Ratcliffe, Wedderburn,
PP. 35, 44.)
2. Wacha, Tyabji, R.M.Bhide,and V.R.Natu. Ranade, on the 
other hand, tried to add a plea for the extension of the 
Permanent Settlement to a resolution at the 1887 Congress. 
(Report of the 3rd I.N.C., p.143).
3* B.N.Senspoke in Id89, 1892, 1893, and 1894, P.P.Pillai 
in 1892, 1893, 1894, and 1903, and Mudholkar in 1890,
1896, 1901, and 1904.
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Finally, no Indian delegate openly suggested that there 
might he a conflict of interests between ryots and landlords. 
This silence or omission may only in part be explained by 
the unwritten rule of the Congress that subjects likely to 
arouse controversy should be avoided.
If the Congress treatment of the issue of the Perma­
nent Settlement gives little revealing evidence of Congress 
social attitudes, other issues drew the Congress teeth. One 
such issue was the Cadastral Survey. The 1893 and 1894 
Congresses passed resolutions expressing
"the profound alarm which has been created by 
the action of the Government in interfering 
with the existing permanent settlement in 
Bengal and Behar (in the matter of survey and 
other cesses) ... and deeming such interfer­
ence with solemn pledges a national calamity.1
The Congress pledged "itself to oppose in all possible
legitimate ways all such reactionary attacks on permanent
settlements and their holders."*" The survey cesses referred
to in this unusually strong-worded resolution were those
levied on the zamindars of Bihar for the Cadastral Survey^*
The Cadastral Survey was intended to supply a definite
record of rights for the tenants in permanently settled
areas so that zamindars would not be able to take unjust
rents. While the Congress resolution itself objected to the
1. Immediately before this resolution was unanimously
adopted by the 1893 Congress, a Brahmo missionary named 
Pundit Lakshman Prasad intimated that he wished to move 
an amendment if the proposed resolution "goes against the 
Cadastral Survey." President Naoroji said it did not so 
the Brahmo withdrew his amendment. Report of the 9th 
I.N.C.. p.116.
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cess and not the Cadastral Survey itself, the speech made by 
Boikunta Nath Sen in introducing the resolution in 1894 
revealed that more than the cess was involved. He said that 
the Survey (as distinct from the cess for the maintenance of 
the Survey records) was a violation of the permanent settle­
ment and that tenure holders and agriculturists "do not 
require it." Boikunta Nath Sen also criticised the Govern­
ment for including the lands of the Maharaja of Darbhanga in 
the Survey and then proceeded to praise Darbhanga for "the 
bold attitude he has taken, the noble and magnanimous way in 
which, at considerable sacrifice, and I may say even risk, 
he has been trying to maintain the integrity of the perma­
nent settlement."'1" This is interesting because some of the 
villages in the Darbhanga Raj estate had been singled out as 
areas in need of Government interference in determining fair 
rents. The Maharaja of Darbhanga*s brother, Raja Remeshwar
Singh was also mentioned for having "of late years very
2greatly and severely enhanced his rents." The question
may be raised as to whether the generous financial support
3
given to the Congress by the Maharaja of Darbhanga was
1, Report of the 10th I.N.C., p.35#
2, t.P.No.l88 of 1892, East India (Bihar Correspondence) 
Copy of Correspondence,..as to the Advisability of 
carrying out the proposed Cadastral Survey., Enclosure 
No.7 to No.3* H.S.Beadon, Col.of Darbhanga, to Com. 
of Patna Div., 20 Peb. 1889.
3, teAcA*), pp’ 9\8T conb ^ °\ M .
related to the Congress position on the Cadastral Survey.
An examination of the reception given to Government 
efforts in the Punjab and Bombay to reduce agricultural 
indebtedness and to limit the transfer of land from the 
agricultural classes to the non-agricultural classes further 
indicates that the Indians who joined the Congress were 
generally unsympathetic to the interests of the lower 
classes.
In 1886, S.S.Thorburn1s book, Musalmans and Money­
lenders in the Punjab, was published. It warned that the
1. Lord Handoli/|Churchill sent a pape!r criticising the
Cadastral Survey to The ^ Times of 31 July 1893* He said the 
paper came from "an Indian gentleman of high position.....
I cannot vouch for every allegation in the letter, but I 
can endorse from knowledge its general tenour." Lord 
Lansdowne was "quite sure" that the paper had been written 
by Darbhanga or his advisors because both the actual 
language and the argument agree "exactly with those Mem­
oranda which Durbhanga has, at different times, sent me." 
(Lansdowne to A.MacDonnell, 26 Aug. 1893 > Ms.Eng. Hist. 
d.236) The paper was published while Gladstones Home Rule 
Bill was before Parliament and when Conservatives were 
apprehensive about the future of Irish landlords under 
the prospective Irish Legislature. The paper seemed 
calculated to play on Conservative sympathies. It stated 
that if the Government of India*s present anti-zamindari 
policy was continued, it "must lead to the same state of 
things in India as is now the case in Ireland. It sets 
one class against another." The author of the paper went 
on to say that Sir Anthony MacDonnell, one of the 
Cadastral Survey's architects, was "a Home Ruler and 
holds very strong Irish views on the subject. His scheme 
is nothing more than an attempt to be generous to the 
tenants at the expense of the landlord." In the author's 
view, the ryots were not in "need of any further 
protection."
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land of the western Punjab was passing out of the hands of 
the Muslim peasantry into the hands of the Hindu money­
lenders at an alarming rate* Thorburn believed that unless 
there was "some Act of Bunniah spoliation", "half of our 
magnificent peasantry" might rise up against the "despised" 
money-lenders. Or there might be a serious rebellion if the 
agrarian unrest came into contact with an Islamic religious 
fanatic, a famine, or a land reform agitator.^ Thorburnfs 
views were shared by other Punjab officials who were 
concerned about the effect of land transfers on the Punjab 
peasantry "who furnish the flower* of the Native Army of 
India, and who look forward, amid all the hardships and
glories of a military career, to spend their declining years
2on their ancestral acres."
The warnings of the likely consequences of unchecked 
borrowing and alienation attracted the notice of the Govern- 
ment of India, and on 26 October 1895, Denzil Ibbetson, 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, invited 
the views and proposals of the local administrations on the
1. S.S.Thorburn, Musalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab, 
pp. 39-41*
2. Speech of Sir Charles Rivaz, subsequently Lt. Gov. of the 
Punjab, India Leg. Council Prog., 27 Sept. 1899,
Vol. XXXVIII, p. 327.
Thorburn wrote with feeling about the different burdens 
borne by the Punjabi peasantry and the Bengalis. The 
former had to fight India's wars, were over-taxed, and 
were harrassed in the law courts while the Bengalis were 
"drones", contributing little to India's army or revenues.
S.S. Thorburn, His Majesty's Greatest Subject, p. 115.
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problem of land transfers. Ibbetson remarked that "the gift 
of the free power of transfer" had produced "evils1 which 
amounted "to a positive political danger" in some parts of
1
India and contained "the germs of danger to the commonwealth." 
Thorburn was appointed to inquire into the problem in the 
area between Rawalpindi and Lahore. His conclusions, which 
bore out his earlier estimates of the extent of land alien­
ation, were set out in his "Report on Peasant Indebtedness" 
in 1896.
The amount of land changing hands in the Punjab had 
increased rapidly. Sales averaged about 88,000 acres a year 
from 1866 to 1874. Prom 1875 to 1879, sales averaged about
93.000 acres annually, from 1880 to 1884, 160,000 acres, 
from 1885 to 1889, 310,000 acres, and from 1890 to 1894,
338.000 acres a year. Mortgages were registered at the
annual rate of 143,000 acres from 1866 to 1874, and then at
"212,000, 296,000, 590,000, and 554,000 acres a year in
2
the succeeding quinquennial periods."
Thorburn believed that before British rule began, 
most land in the Punjab was held by the village community 
and that the transfer of land out of the community was rare. 
The British created individual property rights and set up
1. Govt, of India, Dept, of Rev. and Agric., Land Rev.,
Confid. Circ. No.24/75-1, 26 Oct. 1895, to all local 
Governments and Administrations. Enclosure to Govt, of 
India, Dept, of Rev. and Agric., Land Rev. No. 58 of 1895, 
to Sec. of State, 30 Oct. 1895, Rev. Letters from India, 
1895.
2. H.Calvert, The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab, p. 263.
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the laws and law courts which enabled cultivators to offer 
their land as security for loans and which enabled money­
lenders to foreclose on their loans. The process of transfer 
was greatly facilitated, according to Thorburn, by the 
British system of land revenue which, unlike that of earlier 
regimes, was inflexible and forced cultivators to turn to 
the money-lender in years of scarcity. The technical laws 
also gave a definite advantage to the money-lender and his 
lawyer friends over the ignorant cultivator,^
Thorburn favoured a return to the Lawrence school of 
administration in the Punjab. In 1897 he wr&te a novel,
His Majesty^ Greatest Subject, about a future Viceroy of 
India. One of the first things the Viceroy did after assuming 
office was to consider 1 the measures to elasticise the Land 
Revenue collections, disable money-lenders from holding 
agricultural land, and substitute village courts of equity
for the detested technical law-courts and system of the
2
Government*1 In 1907, before the Viceroy could carry out
his reforms, the Muslims formed a no-rent league in the
Punjab, refused to pay the Hindu money-lenders until their 
accounts were "examined, principal separated from interest, 
compound interest cut out, and all payments already made duly 
credited." The District Collector, Mattra Das, a member of
1. Thorburn, op.cit. pp. 47-50. Also, Thorburn, The Punjab 
in Peace and War, pp. 229-39.
2. Thorburn, His Majesty's Greatest Subject, p.151,
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a Lahore banking family, informed the no-rent league that 
under the Contract Act and the Civil Procedure Code, they 
had to pay the money-lenders their demands* The Hindu 
servants of the Courts were sent to attach the property of 
the cultivators, a Hindu- Muslim riot ensued, and soon com­
munal explosions flared up throughout India.'1’ The British 
were taught a much-needed lesson - like that of 1857 - and
the Viceroy was able to throw over "a great part of the 
existing laws and institutions" and substitute "simple pro­
tective and restrictive laws adapted to the mental darkness 
of the needy peasant millions."^ Prom 1908 onwards, the 
peasants "were no longer harassed and fleeced by usurers and 
usurers1 allies, the law-courts and the pleaders. They were 
no longer required to pay land revenue when their crops had 
failed." They were able to borrow from the Government at 
four per cent interest instead of from the money-lender at 
thirty-six per cent. India was to"be governed on Indian 
lines, the form of rule being a benevolent and conservative 
despotism."^ One of the Viceroy's more despotic actions was 
to lock up 300 Indian politicians and to deport a half dozen 
M.P.fs. The results were beneficial; "treason-mongering
5
ceased to be attractive."' The Viceroy was unusual in 
another way. He threw over his English fiance^ and married
Ibid 
Ibid 
Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
1.
2 .
3*
pp.155-59. 
p*304. 
p.277. 
pp.303-04. 
pp. 97-99.
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an Indian Princess.^
The remedies prescribed by Lord Curzon*s Government 
for Indiafs political problems were more prosaic. It passed 
into law in October 1900 the Punjab Land Alienation Act.
The Act divided the population of the Punjab into three 
categories. Pirst, there were the agricultural tribes. 
Secondly, there were other agriculturists who possessed a 
long standing interest in the land. The final group included 
the money-lenders. The Act applied restrictions only on the 
first class. A member of an agricultural tribe was permitted 
to sell land to other members of his tribe or group as he 
wished, but if he chose to mortgage his land to someone not 
belonging to his own tribe or group of tribes, the mortgage 
had to be "in one of three prescribed forms, which secure 
that either the mortgagor shall remain in cultivating 
possession at a reasonable rent, or that the mortgagee shall 
hold possession for a reasonable time not exceeding 20 years,
at the expiry of which the mortgage debt and interest
2
thereon will be considered cancelled."
It was realized that the money-lenders of non-agri- 
cultural castes would be reluctant to lend money to peasants 
who were -unable to offer their land as security. However,
1. Ibid, p.279- Marriages between Indian Civil Service off­
icers and indigenous women were discouraged. In 1903, 
Government officers in Burma, where intermarriage was 
becoming increasingly frequent, were warned that such 
marriages would damage their opportunities for future pro­
motion. Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon
in the Home Department, p.324-.
2. Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon in the 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.25.
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members of the agricultural tribes could be expected to be 
less improvident and when they did need capital, they would 
be able to borrow from their own caste members or from 
agricultural banks and co-operative societies,*** There would 
be far less political danger in the alienation of land by, 
for instance, a Jat peasant to a Jat money-lender than by a 
Jat to a Khatri.
Before the Act was passed, it encountered strong
criticism from many Punjabi Congress supporters. The
majority of the Punjabi Hindus who attended the Congresses
belonged to the money-lending and commercial castes. Among
those most closely connected with the Congress in the Punjab,
excepting the Bengalis, nearly all were Banias, Khatris,
Aroras, or Agarwals, Lala Lajpat Rai and Lala Murli Dhar
were Agarwals, Bakshi Jaishi Ram was a Khatri, and Lala
Harkishen Lai was an Arora, Although none of these persons
seems to have been a money-lender, Lala Lajpat Rai, Dyal
2Singh Majithia, Lala Harkishen Lai, and at least ten 
other persons who attended the Congress were officials of
1. The number of co-operative societies in the Punjab rose 
from 300 in 1901 to 1,000 in 1911*
A, Latifi, The Industrial Punjabs A Survey of Facts, 
Conditions and Possibilities." p,xviii,
2 a i)yal Singh died- in September 1898 and therefore was not 
a party to the Alienation Bill controversy.
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the Punjab National Bank or the Bharat Insurance Company.^- 
The Indian Association of Lahore and the Congress 
press in the Punjab were united in opposition to the Alien­
ation Bill. The Indian Association addressed a letter to all 
the sahukars of the Punjab, asking them for their opinions 
and commenting that the Bill would lower the value of the 
land, destroy the credit of the agricultural classes and 
injure the livelihood of the classes who, "unable to compete 
with Europeans in commerce and manufacture," invested their
p
money in land. The Tribune of Lahore charged that the 
Bill appeared to be an attempt to divide and rule and that 
the "rather jubilant" attitude of the peasants was an indi­
cation of their ignorance, because the Bill would take away 
their credit. The Tribune also estimated that the Punjabi
1. Harkishen Lai as Honorary Secretary, Dyal Singh Majithia 
as Chairman, Jaishi Ram, Lala Lai Chand, and Bhagwat 
Ishar Das - all Congress members - had started the Punjab 
National Bank in Lahore in 1897, with capital of almost
lakhs. By 1901 it had opened a branch in Rawalpindi 
and had a working capital of 15 lakhs. The Bharat 
Insurance Co., Ltd., was said to be the first exclusively 
Indian life insurance company. Delegates to the Congress 
were often elected on the grounds of the Bharat Insurance 
Co. The Bharat Insurance Co. was floated in 1896 with 
the help of Seth Jassawala, a Parsi merchant of Lahore, 
and others. Its constitution required all its shareholders 
to be Indian.
Bengalee, 19 Jan. 1901, See also L.R.Nair and P.N.Kirpal, 
op.cit., p.36, and K.L. G-auba, The Rebel Minister: The 
Story of the Rise and Pall of Tala Harkishen ljar^p.20.
2. The letter was published in the Rafiq -1- hind, Lahore,
25 Nov. 1899. T, and D. Selections, 1 Jan. 1900, para,21, 
P.S.L.I., Vol. 119.
3. Tribune, 9 Dec. 1899, T. and D. Selections, 18 Dec. 1899, 
para. 953 (ii), P.S.L.I., Vol. 118.
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sahukars would lose about twelve crores as a result of the
Bill.^* No other major Congress newspaper may so definitely
be identified with a single class as the Tribune may be
with the money-lenders. In 1891 the Tribune published a
series of articles and a pamphlet complaining about "the
illegal and outrageous oppression of money-lenders by execu-
2
tive authorities." One of the examples of oppression it 
gave was of the District Magistrate of Amballa District who 
ordered the panchayats to settle disputes between debtors 
and money-lenders. The panchayats then coerced the money­
lenders into surrendering part of their claims on the 
debtors.
Not all the Muslim newspapers favoured the Bill
although it was the Muslim peasantry who stood to benefit
most from the restriction on alienation. Lord Curzon and the 
Punjab Government were prepared to abandon the Bill in the 
event of Muslim opposition. Curzon thought there would be 
"no loss of dignity in withdrawing a Bill which has been
designed in the interests of parties who are unwilling to
accept it."^ But this was not necessary because the Muslim 
community in general, including the PaisaAkhbar, the news­
paper with the largest circulation in the Punjab, backed the
1. Tribune, 21 Ncv, 1899, T. and D. Selections, 4 Dec. 1899, 
para. 914 (iii), P.S.L.I., Vol. 118.
2. [Tribune], Philanthropy Run Mad (1892), p.22.
3. Ibid., pp. 63-6.
4. Curzon to Hamilton, 10 May 1899, and its enclosure,
Rivaz to Curzon, 3 May 1899, MSS.Eur. D.510/1.
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Government.'*'
The educated Muslims of the Punjab had with a few 
exceptions remained aloof from the Congress prior to the 
Alienation Bill. At the 1899 Congress - the second consecu­
tive session at which no Punjabi Muslims appeared - a reso­
lution was adopted which would not have been accepted by 
the Punjabi Muslims. It expressed regret at the introduction of
the Bill which would reduce the credit of the agriculturists
2
and landholders and "make them more re source less* 1 The 
Congress opposition to the Punjab Land Alienation Bill had 
been foreshadowed by an 1895 resolution criticising proposals 
to restrict the right of private land alienation. The 1895 
Congress endorsed the view that agricultural indebtedness 
was due not to the abusive use of the right of alienation, 
but to the ignorance of the agricultural classes and the 
,fapplication of a too rigid system of fixed revenue assess­
ment which takes little account of the fluctuating conditions 
of agriculture in many parts of India.
1. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 17 Feb. 1900, T. and D, Selections,
12 March 1900, para. 247, P.S.L.I., Vol. 121*
Maulvi Muharram Ali Chisti, editor of the Rafiq -i- Hind, 
law student, and staunch Congress supporter^ organised |
the Muslim zamindari support for the Alienation Bill. The 
Legislative Department of India printed 87 pages of trans­
lations from Muharram Ali*s Rafiq -i- Hind articles on 
the Bill. The views of no other person, official or non­
official, were given so much space. Translations from 
Rafiq -i- Hind, enclosure to Sec., Rev, and Pin. Dept., 
Punjab, to Sec., Govt, of I., Leg. Dept., 7 July 1900, 
Appendix A-37, India Leg. Dept. Prog., Vol. 5938.
2. Resolution II of 1899*
3. Resolution X of 1895*
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The 1899 resolution was introduced by Lala Murli
Dhar, a pleader from Amballa who owned no land himself and
who was anxious not to appear to he an advocate of the
sahukars. He admitted that the agricultural classes had
suffered at the hands of the money-lender whom he called
"a money-grabber, a contemptible leech, ... a man who sucks
the blood of the poor agriculturist.” His concern was with
the zamindar who would not be able to transfer his land or
to borrow in order to pay the Governments revenue • demand.^"
On the other hand, Lala Kanhaiya Lai* a pleader in the Lahore
High Court, complained that the object of the legislation
2
was "to crush down the money-lender." The anonymous author 
of the introduction to the Report of the Lucknow Congress of 
1899 also left no doubt about his sympathies. "Why", he 
asked, "in your zeal to protect the agriculturist from the 
consequences of his extravagance or improvidence ... punish 
the money-lender for his shrewdness in making the best 
investment of his money? Surely he, too, in equity is 
entitled to some protection.
Hone of the Congress members of the Indian Legis­
lative Council attended the debates on the Bill at Simla.
The Muslim member, Nawab Muhammad Hay at Khan supported the 
Government while Sir Harnam Singh of Kapurthala argued 
against the Bill in speeches which Lord Curzon believed to
1. Report of the 15th I.N.C., pp.44-5-
2. Ibid, pp.46-7v
3. Report of the 15th I.N.C. (1899), p.xviii.
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be written by "some interested pleader at Lahore• Sir
Harnam maintained that the Bill would cause a decline in the 
market value of agricultural land and in "its availability 
for the investment of capital" which in turn would hamper 
"the accumulation of capital itself in the hands of the
p
commercial classes."
When the 1900 Congress met at Lahore, the Muslim 
delegates from the Punjab objected to the repetition of the 
resolution condemning the Punjab Land Alienation Bill. In 
the Subjects Committee, Muharram Ali Chisti succeeded in 
getting this resolution omitted.^ This was one of the few 
occasions on which the delegates from one religious commun­
ity tried (and succeeded) in blocking a resolution favoured
A
by the majority community. The decision of the Subjects 
Committee, which was composed of 6 Muslims and 116 non- 
Muslims, to give in to Muslim opinion was an indication
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 15 Aug. 1900, MSS. Eur. L. 510/5*
2. India Leg. Council Prog., 22 June 1900, Vol.XXXIX,
pp. 211-212.
3* Bengalee, 30 Lee. 1900. President Chandavarkar announced 
to the Congress that the matter had been dropped at the 
request of the Muslim members of the Subjects Committee 
at least until the working of the Act had been studied. 
(Report of the 16th I.N.C. p.70.) The decision was 
reached in deference to the Muslims, and not out of 
sympathy with the peasants as Azim Husain has suggested. 
(Fazl -i- Husain: A Political Biography, p.77*).
4. Resolution XIII of lb8b provided that when the Hindu or 
Muslim delegates as a body objected to the discussion of 
a subject, then it would not be discussed.
5. Report of the 16th I.N.C., pp. 24-25.
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of the leaders* determination to keep communal problems out
of the Congress. However, they failed to win over the
Punjabi Muslims permanently to the Congress. In 1901 Sheik
Umar Baksh, a Lahore pleader, Muharram Ali Chisti, and four
other Muslims went to the Congress in Calcutta, But in 1902,
1903 and 1904 no Punjabi Muslims attended, and in 1905 only
Sheik Umar Baksh made the trip to Benares.^
The forebearance of the 1900 Congress in dropping
the Punjab Alienation Act resolution was notable when one
considers that besides the money-lenders, many members of
the legal profession stood to lose some of their practice
2
under the working of the Act. Most of the leaders of the 
Congress in the Punjab were lawyers, including Lala 
Harkishen Lai, Lajpat Rai, Lala Murli Dhar, Kali Prasanna 
Roy, and Bakshi Jaishi Ram* At the Lahore Congress of 1900, 
203 out of the 420 Punjabi delegates were in the legal pro­
fession. The only specific mention of lawyers in the 1900 
Congress session was made by Surendra Nath Banerjea who
1* See the lists of delegates for those years.
2. The Act confined jurisdiction over cases under the Act to
revenue officers and thus kept them out of the law courts.
There was a certain amount of animus towards the legal 
profession in the writings of British observers who said 
that lawyers took unfair advantage of the poor. See
S.S.Thorburn, Musalmans and Moneylenders (p.l33“34) and 
His Majesty*s Greatest Subject (p.65). Also Monier 
Williams, Modern India and the Indians; Being a Series 
of Impressions, Notes, and Assays, p.145* Sir Michael 
0 *l)wyer (India'As I Knew It 1 lob5-1925» pp.254-55) 
wrote in 1925 that ^ He ^unjab Land Alienation Act "was 
and still is strongly opposed by the urban middle classes, 
who regard the peasantry as theirs to exploit."
192
asked with regard to the Alienation Act, "who has ever heard
of a law which places the whole of the legal profession
under a ban?"^ The number of students in the Punjab Law
School declined from 433 in 1896-97, to 248 in 1900-01, to
159 in 1901-02. Sir Charles Rivaz, Lieutenant-Governor of
the Punjab, attributed the drop in part to the Alienation 
2Act,
Despite earlier signs of stiff opposition to the 
Alienation Bill, the Act came into effect in June 1901 with­
out much excitement or difficulty. But its effects were 
momentous. Whereas before 1901 the agricultural tribes were 
losing land, after the enactment of the Alienation Act the 
process was reversed, as the statistics demonstrate;
Annual Average area sold in acres.
By Agricultural 
Tribes
To Agricultural 
Tribes
Gain or 
loss
1902-03 to 1905-06 150,000 149,000 - 1,000
1906-07 to 1910-11 170,000 178,000 + 8,000
1911-12 to 1915-16 188,000 217,000 +39,000
Similarly, the amount of land mortgaged to and 
reclaimed by the agricultural tribes exceeded the amount of 
land mortgaged by the agricultural tribes by an annual 
average of 150,000 acres from 1902-03 to 1905-06, by an
1. Report of the 16th I.N.C., p.71.
2.Bengalee, 10 Pet. 1903*
3* H.Calvert, op.cit,, p.266.
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average of 275,000 acres from 1906-07 to 1910-11, and by an
average of 244,000 acres from 1911-12 to 1915-16.^
The Punjab Land Alienation Act did not put an end to 
peasant indebtedness or to the transfer of land. But it did 
largely prevent the Khatris, Aroras, and Banias from acquir­
ing land from Muslim and low caste Hindu peasants* As a
measure of social engineering it had no equal in the post­
mutiny period of British rule.
In Bombay, legislation was passed to meet a problem
similar to that in the Punjab, i*e., extensive transfer of
land to the money-lending and professional castes - in this
case, Marwaris, Gujars, and Brahmans - from the peasants -
the Marathas and Kunbis. The problem had been recognised as
acute in 1875 with the attacks on money-lenders by indebted
cultivators in the Poona and Ahmednagar Districts. Decisive
police intervention prevented wide-spread killing but there
were 951 arrests and 501 convictions for assault, arson, and
2
other offences in the two districts. The Deccan Riots Com­
mission, which was appointed to inquire into the causes of 
the disturbances, recommended the curtailment of the legal 
advantages enjoyed by the money-lenders in realizing their 
debts. To this end the Deccan Relief Act of 1879 was passed, 
covering the districts of Ahmednagar, Poona, Satara, and 
Sholapur.
1. Ibid, p.267.
2. Deccan Riots Commission Report, para.10.
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The Act, however, had little effect* By 1899 the per 
centage of land alienated in those four districts was 
35.02, 24.42, 12.53, and 21.72 respectively.1 The 
Famine Commission of 1901 estimated that probably "one-fourth 
of the cultivators in the Bombay Presidency have lost 
possession of their lands; that less than a fifth are free
from debt; and that the remainder are indebted to a greater
2
or lesser extent." The Government of Bombay regarded this 
situation as "fraught with alarm" because the discontent 
created among those persons losing land to money-lenders 
would be fertile ground for the work of political agitators. 
The agitators the Government had in mind were the Maratha 
Brahmans who had organized the no-rent campaign throughout 
the Presidency in 1896-97 and who directed from Poona an 
organization "for calling public meetings to protest against 
the acts of Government whenever they appear distasteful to 
certain classes."1 Even in the 1875 riots, Government off­
icials had suspected the collusion of educated and high 
caste persons with the rioters. The Deccan Riots Commission 
absolved such persons from having "organized or fostered" 
the riots "with any comprehensive design" but found "that in
1. Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, para. 334*
2. J.W.P.Muir-Mackenzie, Sec., Govt, of Bombay, to Sec., 
Govt, of India, Dept, of Rev. and Agric.., 7 Oct. 1899, 
Rev.(Confl.) No. 7100/168 of 1899, para.8.
Bombay Rev. Prog., Land, Vol. 5777.
3* J.W.P.Muir-Mackenzie, 7 Oct. 1899, op.cit., para.12.
some cases the rioters had the support and countenance of 
persons of influence in their neighborhood."**’ Since that 
time the loyalty of persons of influence had become even 
more doubtful, as the attitude of the Maratha Brahmans 
towards the Government in 1897 had shown. The fact that the 
Brahmans were often the persons into whose hands the land 
was passing had no great mitigating influence on the possi­
bility that Brahmans might be able to exploit the discontent 
of the dispossessed* In the 1875 riots, while the alien-
seeming Marwari and Gujar Sahukars were the victims of
2
attacks, the Brahmans usually escaped molestation.
In order to prevent extensive transfer of land in 
the future, the Government of Bombay introduced the Bombay 
Land Revenue Code Amendment Bill of 1901. It gave the revenue 
officials the authority to cause lands for which the revenue 
was in arrears to be forfeited, and to grant the former 
cultivator a new short-term lease for the land on the condi­
tion that the right of occupancy would lapse if the leasee 
alienated his land without official permission. The Govern­
ment expected that under the Bill, a new class of occupants 
would appear along side of the older type of occupants. The 
older type would be the men with means and credit who would 
retain their transferable and hereditable right to the land.
1. Deccan Riots Commission Report, para. 119.
2. Ibid, para.12. The reasons for the comparative immunity 
of the Brahman money-lenders are discussed in ibid, 
para. 39*
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The new class would consist of the cultivators without means 
who could not pay the land revenue and who would have 
neither the power of transfer nor the traditional 30 year 
settlement,***
When the Bombay Government asked for leave to intro­
duce the Bill in 1899, the Governor, Lord Sandhurst, dis­
sented from the view of his Government that a Bill of this 
sort was advisable. He thought that the "clever, active and 
unscrupulous” class in the Deccan, who had been involved in 
the cow-protection, Shivaji, Ganapati, and no-rent move­
ments, would find the Bill "just what they have been looking
for." They would represent the Bill as an attack on the
2
rights of property and stir up trouble. Despite Sandhurst^ 
objections, the Government of India assented to the Bill and 
it was introduced into the Bombay Legislative Council on 
30 May 1901.
The Bill was "unanimously" condemned by the Indian 
newspapers of Bombay Presidency^ and was severely criticised 
in numerous public meetings.
Lord Hamilton and Sandhurst1s successor as Governor
1. Speech of James Monteath, Sec. to Bombay Govt., Rev, and 
Pin, Depts., Bombay ^eg. Council Prog,, 30 May 1901,
Vol.XXXIX, pp. 178-86.
2. Sandhurstfs Minute of Dissent is included in J.W.P.Muir - 
Mackenzie, 7 Oct. 1899, op.cit.
3. Summary of newspaper comment on the Bill, T. and D. 
Selections, 24 June 1901, para. 432, P.S.L.I., Vol.135. 
Actually there was at least one newspaper which supported 
the Bill. It was Dnyanodaya, a Bombay Anglo-Marathi 
weekly which was edited by an Indian Christian. Its cir­
culation was 625#
of Bombay, Lord Northcote, believed that the opposition to 
the Land Revenue Code Amendment Bill was almost entirely 
organized by the. money-lenders. Hamilton said that in 
Northern India, where the forms of land tenures were various 
any state action to limit the alienation of land affected a 
large number of interests. But in Bombay, under the ryotwari 
system the only persons "prejudically affected would be the 
money-lenders" and, to a lesser extent, the legal classes 
who represented the money-lenders in court or who wanted to 
buy land,***
Yet the agitation against the Bill was not so simple 
as Hamilton and Northcote were ready to believe. The money­
lenders were, of course, deeply stirred, for the Bill was 
designed to prevent them from acquiring land and it would 
place obstacles in the way of recovering their debts. Some 
criticisms of the Bill were motivated by a concern for the 
money-lenders welfare. Tilak, for instance, predicted that 
the Bill would ruin the sahukar and destroy the mutual relat
p
ionship between money-lender and ryot, Tilak1s newspaper 
the Mahratta, whose editor, N.C.Kelkar, was the son of a
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 2 Oct. 1901, MSS. Eur, C.126/3.
2. Pradhan and Bhagwat, op.cit., pp.132-33*
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money-lender,^ complained of the Governments "zeal to kill
money-lenders." The Government, it said, feared the social
and political influence of the money-lender over the ryot
and "it was evidently to the interest of the Government that
2
the money-lender he crushed and his influence undermined," 
N.C.Kelkar wrote an article in which he protested that the 
Bill would interfere with the realization hy the money­
lenders of their "legal dues" from the cultivators.^ Daji 
Abaji Khare defended the money-lenders in the Legislative 
Council and alleged that the Bill was aimed "at the 
extinction of the saving classes. " ^  Finally, S.M.Paranjpe,
5
editor of the Kal, landowner, and the son of a money-lender,
1. Statement of English Newspapers and Periodicals Published 
in the Bombay Presidency During 1905,
May Jud. Dept. (Confid. ) Prog. No.2,
Jud. Dept. Prog., Confid., Vol. 7476.
The editors of the Gujarati (Bombay) and the Shri Saya.ji 
Vijaya (Baroda) were Ban!as and the editor of the 
Dnyan Prakash and the Karmanuk (Poona) was a money­
lender . These newspapers were among the most widely 
circulated in the Presidency, Statement of Anglo-Vernacu­
lar and Vernacular Newspapers and Periodicals, published 
in Bombay Presidency during 1905, ibid,
2. Matoatta. 7 July 1901, Bombay Newspaper Report, 13 July 
1901, para. 30.
3. N.C.Kelker, "The Recent Land Legislation in Bombay", 
Kayastha Samachar, Vol.IV, Nos. 3 and 4
(.Sept. - Oct. 1901), p.237.
4. Bombay Leg. Council Prog., 23 Aug. 1901, Vol.XXXIX,
P. 327.
5. Statement of the Anglo-Vernacular and Vernacular News­
papers and Periodicals Published in the Bombay Presidency 
During 1905.
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and Bala Sahib Natu, a landowner and a money-lender, were
active in the agitation against the Bill.'*" This connection
between the money-lenders and the Bill's opponents no doubt
influenced the agitation.
The official in charge of the Bill in the Bombay
Legislative Council insinuated that the opposition to the
Bill arose out of misrepresentations and concern for the
money-lender by organizations such as the Sarvajanik Sabha
2rather than out of economic or practical objections. Five 
of the elected members of the Legislative Council who re­
garded this as "a breach of decorum" and an insult to their
3
integrity, walked out of the Legislative Council in protest. 
There definitely were other important elements 
behind the deep resentment against the Bill besides the 
money-lenders and their friends. In the hundreds of ex­
tracts from the Bombay press commenting on the Revenue Code 
Bill, there are few that may be identified as solely con­
cerned with the money-lenders. It is doubtful that the 
officials who compiled the selections would have omitted 
"interested" comments if many had appeared. On the other
1, Sed Kesari, 3 Sept. 1901, Bombay Newspapers Report,
7 Sept. 1901, para, 50.
2, Speech of James Monteath, Bombay Leg, Council Prog.,
23 Aug, 1901, Vol.XXXIX, p, 272,
3* Ibid, pp. 367-68. The five were P.M.Mehta, Sir Balchandra 
Krishna, G.K.Parekh, D.A.Khare and G,K.Gokhale. Wacha 
said the exit was pre-arranged. Report of 17th I.N.C., 
p.
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hand^ the absence of "interested" comment does not necessar­
ily mean the press campaign was not a money-lenders' agita­
tion, Many editors had probably learned to be circumspect in 
commenting on class interests in order to avoid giving the 
Government grounds for its claim to protect the poor from 
the wealthier classes.
Granting that some critics may have had direct con­
nections with the money-lenders, the bulk of the criticism 
did not mention money-lenders' grievances, G.K.Gokhale's
criticisms, for instance were clearly not motivated by class 
interest* He argued that the Bill was unlikely to help the
large class of ryots who were "practically serfs in the hands 
of [sahukars]" because the sahukars would not allow land 
which was mortgaged to them to be forfeited to the Government, 
Instead the sahukars would pay the revenue themselves. But 
if the Bill did work, and a large portion of the land was 
forfeited into Government hands, then the Bill would vir­
tually constitute "a scheme for the nationalization of for­
feited lands,
Most of the Bombay newspapers thought the Bill would
2
lead to nationalization of the land or state landlordism 
in the following way. The landed proprietor would be unable
1. Bombay Leg. Council. Prog., 24 Aug. 1901. Vol. XXXIX, 
pp. 336-44.
2. State landlordism was distinguished from the ryotwari 
system in that, under the latter, the cultivator was 
secure from enhancement for thirty year periods.
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to borrow from the money-lender because he could no longer 
offer his land as security* In consequence he would not be 
able to pay the revenue demand and the Government would 
cause the land to be forfeited. The landed proprietor would 
become a tenant-at-will of the Government or perhaps even a 
field labourer. The general view was that to come under the 
new form of short-term lease would be far more objectionable 
than whatever hardships were involved in the alienation of 
land to the money-lenders. ^
The Bombay Government made a tactical mistake by not 
making a convincing effort to persuade its opponents that it 
did not intend to bring large areas of land under direct 
state control. James Monteath, the member of the Bombay Leg­
islative Council in charge of the Bill, actually gave the 
impression that state land-lordism was the aim of the Gov-
ernment when he said that unless arrears of revenue were paid
up better than in the past, "there will be an opportunity 
of creating the special [non-transferable] tenure in some
2
districts on a very extensive scale". Lord Hamilton thought 
that this statement was "very injudicious". He believed that 
the Bill "should have been described as a merciful effort 
on the part of the Government to try and prevent" the 
conversion of the ryots into "the money-lenders1 serfs;
1. There is a general summary of newspaper comment on the 
Bombay Revenue Code Amendment Bill in the Bombay News­
paper Report, 22 June 1901, para. 43.
2. Bombay J p  g. Council Prog., 30 May 1901, Vol.XXXIX, p.186.
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instead of which Monteath so described the Bill as to allow 
an interpretation to he put upon it that the Government were 
taking advantage of the exceptional impecuniosity of the 
cultivators, caused by a continuance of drought, to curtail
1
their rights of occupancy for the benefit of the Government,1
Hamilton did not dare reject the Bill, "for such a slap in
the face to a Presidential Government would be an encourage-
2
ment to the money-lending class all throughout India. "
Instead limitations on its scope were imposed administrative­
ly when the Government of India sanctioned it. The operation 
of the Act was restricted to narrow limits by laying down 
that the new tenure should not be "forced upon cultivators 
whose revenue had been remitted or suspended,
Any land measure which the Bombay Government intro­
duced between 1896 and 1902 would probably have been regarded 
with deep suspicion by many educated people in Bombay Presi­
dency. Several factors had combined with the unpopularity of 
the plague measures and the detention of the Natus to create 
distrust of the Government. One was the introduction in 1899 
of a Bill to amend the Khoti Settlement Act of 1880. The 
Bill was not of great importance and it applied only to 
Ratnagiri District, The controversial section required
4
tenants to pay their rents to the Khots in a fixed cash
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 2 Oct, 1901, MSS. Eur. C.126/3.
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Aug. 1901, MSS, Eur. C. 126/3.
3. Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon in the 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.27.
4. The Khots were hereditary revenue collectors.
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payment instead of in a share of the crop. The Bombay Gov­
ernment hoped that this would remove one of the means by 
which the Khots, who were mostly Brahmans, oppressed their 
tenants,^"
The five Indians on the Bombay Legislative Council
who were connected with the Congress voted against the first
2
reading of the Bill, Daji Abaji Khare, who acted as spokes­
man for landlord and money-lending interests, argued that 
the Khots had converted Ratnagiri from a sterile to a 
fertile district, that the Bill would excite "false hopes 
in the breasts of ignorant ryots", and that "above all it 
entirely supersedes vested interests."^ In the Congress 
itself M.R.Bodas, a Brahman High Court Pleader, had com­
plained of the "retrograde" policy of the Government in 
introducing the Khoti and "other tenancy Bills. &  Tilak 
wrote a series of articles deploring Government usurpation 
of Khoti rights, "Just as the Government has no right to rob 
the Sowcar and distribute his wealth among the poor, in the
same way Government have no right to deprive the Khot of his
5
rightful income and distribute the money to the peasant*"
The Khot Amendment Bill was finally passed as Act III of 
1904.
1. Bombay Leg. Council Prog., 25 Jan. 1899, Vol. XXXVII, 
p. 13-4.
2. D.A.Khare, G.K.Parekh, G.B.Garud, Balchandra Krishna, 
and H.Chandavarkar,
3. Bombay Leg, Council Prog., 25 Jan. 1899, Vol.XXXVII,
pp. 21-28,
4. Report of the 14th I.N.C., p,65.
5- Pradhan and Bhagwat, op.cit., p.134.
There was another and more important cause of 
friction between the Bombay Government and the educated 
classes in the years 1896 to 1902. It involved both the level 
of the land revenue assessment and the rigidity with which it 
was collected in years of drought. The last round of 
revision settlements of the revenue demand had been carried 
out during the period of high prices caused by demand for 
Indian cotton during the American Civil War and by the par­
tial failure of crops in the years 1866-68. Prom 1870-71, 
prices began to fall, and the fall was associated in the 
public mind for years afterwards with the revision settle­
ments.^
Whether the settlements made during the late 1860s
were too high is a matter for debate. The Bombay Government,
in commenting in 1901 on R.C.Dutt's allegation that the
Bombay assessment was excessive, argued that the rapidity
with which land passed into the hands of the money-lending
classes was proof that these shrewd people regarded land as
a profitable investment and, therefore, that the revenue
2
demand was light. The Bombay Government even suggested that
1. E. Keatinge, Rural Economy in the Bombay Beccan, p.25.
2* This is not an unreasonable argument. Inquiries in the 
Punjab were said to have proved that money-lenders were 
most active in the more fertile districts of the Punjab, 
that as the peasants margin of profit increased, he fell 
into greater debt, and that only a minor proportion of the 
cultivator’s debt was the result of borrowing to pay the 
Government's land revenue demand. Agricultural indebted­
ness in the Punjab was said to be a function of agricul­
tural prosperity rather than of poverty.
H. Calvert, op.cit., pp.251-62.
the resources of the Bombay cultivators were so great during 
the famines of 1896-97 and 1899-1900 that "it may reasonably 
be doubted whether in any country in the world so large a 
proportion of the population could have been thrown out of 
occupation and deprived of their ordinary means of liveli­
hood for such lengthened periods with less disastrous 
1
results." On the other hand, the Famine Commission of 1901 
questioned the Bombay Land Records Departments estimate 
of the burden of the revenue demand and concluded that of
all the Provinces of British India, only in Bombay was the
2
incidence of the assessment "full". Significantly, in 1900 
when new revision settlements were due to be made in Bombay, 
most of the existing settlements were not altered.^ The 
practice in Bombay and other provinces up to this time had 
been to increase the assessment by a considerable amount, 
and often by as much as a quarter.
Reference has been made above to the stringency 
employed in collecting the revenue during the 1896-97 famine 
in consequence of the no-rent campaign. In the two years 
intervening between that famine and the next, the Government 
experienced further difficulty in collecting the revenue and 
resorted to coercive measures on an exceptional scale, as
1. Memorandum in reply to the letter of R.C.Dutt concerning 
Land Revenue Settlements in the Bombay Presidency, 
paras. 26 and 31.
Land Revenue Policy of the Indian Government.
2. Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901. paras. 265- 
68.
3. Keatinge, op*cit., p.25.
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the following figures show:^
Number of notices served for non-payment of revenue demand.
Ave. of 5 years to 1896-97 1897-98 1898-99
Northern Division 32,605 44,713 53,651
Central Division 35,284 1,26,665 109,216
Southern Division 13,933 28,987 32,973
Cases of distraint and sale of moveable property.
Ave. of 5 years to 1896-97 1897-98 1898-99
Northern Division 189 475 375
Central Division 26 194 2,269
Southern Division 226 352 667
Number of forfeitures and sales of occupancy.
Ave. of 5 years to 1896-97 1897-98 1898-99
Northern Division 573 942 565
Central Division 92 287 703
Southern Division 90 136 413
1, Reports of the Revenue Settlements of the Northern,
Central, and Southern Divisions and of the Department of 
Land Records and Agriculture for the Year 1898-99- 
Bombay Rev, Dept, No. 6680, 25 Oct. 1900,
Bombay Rev, Prog,, Land, Vol. 5967-
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The determination not to pay the revenue increased with the - 
famine of 1899-1900, The Collectors of Surat, Nasik, Kaira, 
and Ahmedabad Districts reported organized combinations 
against the payment of the revenue demand. In all four dis­
tricts, the principal offenders were the money-lenders and 
the more prosperous agriculturists who were in a position to 
meet the demand. Members of the Sarvajanik Sabha were not 
implicated as they had been in the earlier famine, Revenue 
officials succeeded in breaking the resistance to payment by 
serving notices on, and causing the forfeiture of, lands 
belonging to defaulters, and by singling out the leaders of
the no-rent campaign for the more extreme forms of compulsion
1
such as attachment of moveable property,
A series of letters signed "Gujarati” appeared in 
The Times of India during 1900., alleging that in collecting 
the revenue, subordinate officials had been oppressive. The 
Bombay Government appointed Evan Maconochie of the Department 
of Revenue and Agriculture, Government of India, to make a
formal inquiry after Goculdas Parekh made similar accusations
in the Legislative Council. Maconochie found substance in
some of the complaints but the Government of Bombay refused
2
to accept his conclusions. Instead it referred to reports
1, Extracts from Reports by Collectors of Kaira, Ahmedabad, 
Broach, Surat, Khandesh, and Nasik.
Bombay Leg. Council Prog., 24 Aug. 1900.
Appendix H, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 189-92.
2. Evan Maconochie, Life in the Indian Civil Service, p. 125♦
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of the Collectors as proof that "there had been organized 
opposition to the levy of assessment from people well able 
to pay it" and that the principles governing the suspension 
of the demand for those unable to pay had "on the whole been 
properly and equitably applied.
The attention of the Government of India was drawn
to the controversy by letters and editorials in The Times
of India, by Vaughan Nash's articles in the Manchester
Guardian,2 and by the instances in which the Government of
Bombay ignored the warnings of P.S.P. Lely, the Commissioner
of the Northern Division,^about the necessity for revenue
suspensions and about the system of wages and fines for
4
short work on the relief works. After making inquiries, 
the Government of India suggested that a more liberal policy 
might be followed. Rigorous discrimination between those 
able and those unable to pay the revenue, the Government of 
India advised the Bombay Government, "devolves minute and 
inquisitorial inquiries as to the circumstances of thousands
1, Famine Dept. Resolution No.3161, 22 Aug. 1900. This 
Resolution, along with the reports on the allegations 
in letters signed "Gujarati" to The Times of India of 
4 July, 18 July, and 7  August 1900/ are contained in 
Bombay Leg, Council Prog,, 24 Aug. 1900, Appendix F,
Vol. XXXVIII.
2. These articles were published as a book in 1900;
The Great Famine and Its Causes.
3* Lely was remembered in Gujarat for many years after the 
famine by the jingle "Lely, Lely, raish no beli" or 
Lely, the protector of the people. L.S.S, O'Malley,
The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930, p.184.
4. Curzon to Hamilton, 18 and 25 July 1900, Nos. 32 and 33, 
MSS.Eur. D. 510/5.
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of petty farmers ... and it opens the door to the evils of 
personal favouritism and official c o r r u p t i o n , L o r d  Curzon 
also wrote privately to the Governor, Lord Northcote, sug­
gesting a more liberal policy of suspensions and remissions,
and Curzon visited Gujarat and discussed the matter with
2
district officials. The result of this pressure on the 
Bombay Government was to bring its policy into line with the 
recommendations of F. S. P. Lely.
The Famine Commission of 1901 found that the action 
of the Bombay revenue officials during the scarcity had been 
"directly in conflict with" the "vital" principles of famine 
policy, including the rule that "nobody should be forced to 
borrow in order to pay the assessment." Actually the Bombay 
Government was more liberal in the matter of revenue suspen­
sions in the 1899-1900 famine than in the 1897 famine. Of 
the 1899-1900 demand, 31$ was suspended,2^ But the need for 
liberality was much greater in the second famine since many 
cultivators had exhausted their savings in the first.
The hostile reception given to the Bombay Govern­
ments attempt to give the cultivators greater security of
1. P.P.Cd. 1179 of 1902, East India (Famine) Papers regarding 
the Famine and Relief Operations in India during 1900- 
1902, Vol. 1, paper No.68. T.W.Holderness,, Sec., Govt, of 
India, to Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bombay, Famine, No.1058-171-
1-F, 23 May 1900.
2. Maconochie, op.cit., p.127.
3. Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, para. 241.
4. Ibid, para. 240.
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tenure may, then, he partially explained hy the general sus­
picion with which the Governments revenue policy as a whole 
was regarded. However, apart from the distrust of the Govern-? 
mentfs wisdom and motives, there was a principle influencing 
the Bombay politicians and probably educated Indians in other 
provinces as well. The principle was stated by Ranade in an ; 
essay in 1880 called "The Law of Land Sale in British India" 
and was quoted during the 1901 discussion of the Bombay
Revenue Code Amendment Bill by Daji Abaji Khare in the Legis-
1 2 lative Council and by the Gujarati. Ranade questioned the
wisdom of the Governments efforts to legislate in accord­
ance with the instincts and traditions of Conservative India. 
Ranade believed that India was
"passing from semi-Feudal and Patriarchal 
conditions of existence into a more settled 
and commercial order of things, ... from 
payments in kind to cash payments, from the 
laws of custom to the rule of competition, 
from a simple to a more complicated Social 
Organization. No Economical Legislation can 
succeed under such circumstances, which seeks 
to run against the current, or stem the torrent.
In all countries property, whether in land or 
other goods, must gravitate towards that class 
which has more intelligence, and greater 
foresight, and practices abstinence, and must 
slip from the hands of those who are ignorant, 
improvident, and hopeless to stand on their -* 
own resources. This is a law of Providence."^
1.Bombay Leg. Council Prog., 23 Aug. 1901. Vol.XXXIX, p. 326.
2- Gujarati, 25 Aug. 1901, Bombay Newspaper Report,
31Aug- 1901, para. 53*
3* M.G.Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics, pp. 325-26.
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In the matter of industry and trade, and even of 
agricultural credit, Ranade was in favour of State interven­
tion and protection. But with land ownership, he believed 
that a laissez faire policy was most likely to bring about 
agricultural prosperity.1 In 1883 he criticized the Bengal 
Tenancy Bill because he thought it would set one class 
against another, violate the pledges given to the zamindars 
in the Permanent Settlement, and "cover the land with one 
dead level of pauper Tenants". It would Msimply confiscate
the interests of one class to benefit another, and can only
2
be justified on Socialistic or Communistic principles." 
Anything tending to retard the accumulation of wealth was to 
be avoided in India because only the free action of economic 
processes could break down the social conditions inhibiting 
Indiafs national prosperity. Those social conditions included 
the "prevalence of Status over Contract; of Combination over 
Competition;" the absence of a large middle class; laws and 
institutions which encouraged subdivision and not concentra­
tion of wealth; religious ideas which condemned the pursuit 
of wealth; and "scarce, immobile, and unenterprizing" 
capital.^
1. Ranade was in favour of some state intervention to 
prevent the unfettered transfer of land to the money­
lender, as opposed to the capitalist farmer, since the 
former often failed to improve the land. D.G.Karve, 
Ranade, the Prophet of Libertaed India, pp. 89-90,
2. M ,  G r . Ranade, "Prussian Land Legislation and The Bengal 
Tenancy Bill," Essays on Indian Economics, pp. 276-90.
3. Lecture to Deccan College, Poona, 1892,' ibid, pp. 22-23.
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Although other Indians did not give such full 
reasons for their opposition to tenancy and land-alienation 
measures, it was evident that these views were widely held.
In the North West Provinces and Oudh a Tenancy Bill was 
passed for the purpose of preventing landlords from manipu­
lating the village records, from arbitrarily ejecting 
Tenants or enhancing the rents, and from shifting tenants 
from field to field in order to prevent the accumulation of 
occupancy rights. The two Congress leaders on the Legislative 
Council of the North West Provinces and Pandit Bishambar 
Nath,'*' and two of the Lucknow Congress newspapers, the
Hindustani and the Advocate, attacked the Bill as likely to
2
injure the zamindars. A Bill to provide tenants in Madras 
with occupancy rights was similarly criticised by the 
members of the Congress in the Madras Legislative Council.
P. Batnasabhapati Pillai, C. Jambulingam Mudaliar, C. Vijay- 
araghavachariar, and P. Rangia Naidu expressed resentment at 
the imputation that zamindars and ryots oppressed their 
tenants and at the interference with the freedom of land- 
lords* and tenants1 rights to make their own contracts^
Pillai, Mudaliar, and Vijayaraghavachariar also opposed the 
Bill to secure to tenants in the Malabar District compensa-
1. N.W.P. and 0. Leg. Council Prog., 15 Oct. 1901, pp. 51-53 
and 65-69*
2. Hindustani, 11 Oct. 1899, T. and D, Selections, 6 Nov.1899*, 
para.855• and Advocate, 7 Nov. 1899* T. and D. Selections, 
13 Nov. 1899, para, 876, P.S.L.I., Vol. 118,
3. Madras Leg. Council Prog., 13 June 1898, Vol. XXV, 
pp. 146-53, 166-68, 186-90, and 192.
This Bill was not passed during Lord Curzon1s Viceroyalty.
tion for improvements. The Bill was intended to remove one
of the causes of the periodic Moplah riots against their
Hindu landlords and the British,'1' but these three Congress
leaders argued that the Moplahs already received sufficient
compensation for eviction and that the Bill would reward the
2
Moplahs for their violence.
The conclusion that may be drawn from the discussions 
of land policy in the period under review is that the edu­
cated Indians who made their opinions known in the news­
papers and the legislative councils were almost entirely
3
devoid of altruism when their landed interests were affected* 
They often spoke of the impoverished condition of the poorer 
classes but their solution was the removal of the drain, the 
protection and encouragement of Indian industries by the 
State, the reduction and the stabilization of the land 
revenue demand, and the adoption of a more flexible policy 
of collecting the land revenue in years of drought, A redis­
tribution of wealth was not a part of contemporary schemes 
for India’s economic regeneration unless the redistribution 
took place through free competition. Middle class Indians 
borrowed the anti-imperialist vocabulary of European Social­
ists, and Dadabhai Naoroji spoke in England about the
1. Madras Leg. Council Prog., 24 Jan, and 14 Nov, 1899,
Vol. XXV., pp. 21-29 and 344.
2. There were Moplah risings in 1873, 1885, 1894, and 1896. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social 
Analysis, p.244. bUow.
3. The e xcep t ion to this was in Bengal. See M H H I  pp » X l Z j  *5 0Y,
I - 214j
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•’iniquitous distribution of wealth."'1" and the socialists "to
2whom the future belongs", but nationalists in India avoided 
radical political thought.
The Drain.
The ’drain* gained special prominence during the 
1890’s because of the increasing amount of the Indian 
revenues required to pay Home Charges. The persistent com­
plaint punctuating many writings and speeches between 1895 
and 1910 was that India was being ’drained*, ’throttled1, 
’bled’, ’sucked’, and ’exploited’ of her wealth, that the 
British were removing the surplus capital without which no 
economy could develop.
In the description of the ’drain’ which follows, it 
is important to remember that few officials were impressed 
by the drain argument. Lord Curzon, for instance, described 
as ’nonsense* the idea that India ’is bleeding under British 
rule’. Sir John Strachey thought that
’The payments made by India are the result 
and the evidence of the benefits which she 
derives from her connection with England,
1. Speech at Holburn, 29 July 1905, to meeting under the 
auspices of the Metropolitan Radical Federation and the 
National Democratic League, of which Naoroji was a Vice 
President. Bengalee, 23 Aug. 1905.
2. Masani, Naoro,ii. p.398.
3. Curzon’s speech to the Anjuman-i-Islamia, Lahore, Enclo­
sure to Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April 1899, MSS.Eur.510/1.
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In place of constant anarchy, bloodshed, and 
rapine, we have given her peace, order, and 
justice 5 and if our Government were to 
cease, all the miseries from which she has 
been saved would inevitably and instantly 
return* Her payments in England are nothing 
more than the return for the foreign capital 
in its broadest sense which is invested in 
India, including as capital not only money, 
but all advantages which have to be paid 
for, such as the intelligence, strength, 
and energy on which good administration and 
commercial prosperity depend,'1
But if officials were not usually sympathetic to the
'drain1 argument, the nationalists were not convinced by the
Strachey thesis either* In 1904 R.C.Dutt was urging
2
'Retrenchment and Representation' while Lord Curzon was 
increasing Government expenditure and saying that political 
reform had progressed as far as was possible.*^ With this 
wide measure of disagreement between the official and the 
nationalist outlook, the ultimate solution could only be a 
political one*
The key to the drain was to be found in the financial 
arrangements between the United Kingdom and India* These 
arrangements were submitted to a variety of analyses between 
1895 and 1905* In 1895 the Welby Commission was appointed to 
inquire into the military and civil expenditure in England 
on behalf of India and 'the apportionment of charge between 
the Governments of the United Kingdom and India for purposes
1* India: Its Administration and Progress (1903), p.195*
2. fcomesti Ibutt, India in the Victorian Age:
An Economic History of the fteople. Tlw4), p*612.
3* Curzon's speech on the 1904-05 Budget Statement, 30 March 
1904, India Leg* Council Prog., Vol. XLIV, p*560.
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in which both are interested'. The appointment of this 
Royal Commission followed a demand hy the Indian Parliament­
ary Committee, for an inquiry into the economic condition of 
India.^ Wedderburn, Naoroji, and W.S.Caine were members of 
the Welby Commission, and H. Morgan-Browne (Secretary to 
the British Committee of the Indian National Congress),
G.K. Gokhale, G.Subramania Iyer, D.E.Wacha, Surendra Nath- 
Banerjea, and Naoroji appeared before it as witnesses. The 
final Report, which was presented in 1900, was not signed by 
Wedderburn, Caine, and Naoroji who appended their own Report, 
declaring their disappointment that the Welby Commission did 
not consider 'whether the Government of India, with all its 
machinery as then existing in India, had, or had not, 
promoted the general prosperity of the people in its charge, 
and whether India was better or worse off by being a pro-
p
vince of the British Crown*.
The drain and its consequences were discussed in 
numerous speeches and in several books during the period 
under review. Among the principal books were R.C.Butt*s 
England and India: A Record of Progress during a Hundred 
Years (1897)> The Economic History of British India (1902), 
and India in the Victorian Age: An Economic History of the
People (1904); William Digby*s Prosperous* British India 
(1901); and Dadabhai Naoroji*s Poverty and Un-British Rule
1. India, Dec. 1896.
2. P.P.Cd. 131 of 1900, Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol.IV. 
Pinal Report of the Royal Commission on the Administration 
of the Expenditure of India. Report by Sir. W. Wedderburn,
W.S.Caine, and D. Naoroji, para.3*
in India (1901)*. The drain was also referred to, although 
in less detail, in Prithwis Chandra Ray*s The Poverty 
Problem in, India (1895), M. Gr. Ranade ' s Essays on Indian 
Economics (1899), and 0. Subramania Iyerfs Some Economic 
Aspects of British Rule in India (1903)*
It is necessary to understand what an Indian nation­
alist meant when he used the word * drain*. The most common 
meaning attached to the word was the wealth that left India 
for which there was no equivalent return in merchandise or 
treasure* By this definition, the drain equalled the surplus
of exports over imports or the visible balance of trade.^
2
In the ten years, 1899-1900 to 1908-09, the value of India's 
exports annually exceeded its imports by an average of 
£15,051,000. This should not be regarded as the amount by 
which India was impoverished each year. In the years 1903 
to 1908, the following countries also had large annual 
export surpluses: Brazil (£14,099,000), Australian Common­
wealth (£19,898,340), Russian Empire (£33,175,000) and the 
United States (£98,698,000).^ An export surplus is frequently 
a feature of the trade of a country in the early stages of
1. The drain was defined as the surplus of exports by R.C. 
Dutt (India in the Victorian Age, p.528),Naoroji (Poverty 
and Un-Sritish Rule in India, p.34) and Digby 'Prosperous1 
^British India,' p. 216. this is also the definition accepted
. by Cf.J.Hamilton, The Trade Relations Between England and 
India 1600-1896, p. 136, and by Holden jhirber, John 
Company at WorTE, p.304.
2. This period is used rather than a period covering the 
1890's because the 1890*s are unrepresentative and would 
be less illuminating due to the exchange crisis and the 
fall in exports during the famine years.
3. Quoted from the Financial and Commercial Supplement of 
the London Times, 30 Sept. 1910, by Theodore Morison 
The Economic Transition in India, p.206.
industrial development.
Sometimes the 'drain* was used to include, besides
the visible balance of trade, estimates of the interest paid
to England on private capital investment and the remittances
of European non-officials. Naoroji apparently was doing this
1
in 1901 when he stated that the annual drain was £30,000,000
although the average export surplus in the preceeding four
2
years had been only about £13,000,000 per annum. Naoroji 
and the other persons who followed him in estimating the 
drain at £30,000,000 seem not to have understood the mechan­
ics of private remittances. In the first place, private 
remittances to Europe in this period, were not much in excess 
of fresh European investment in India- so that, in balance, 
the amount of private money leaving India was not large.^ 
Secondly, most of the private remittances were made through 
Exchange banks. The European in India wishing to make a 
remittance would pay Rupees into the Indian branch of an 
Exchange bank and receive a bill payable in Sterling in 
London. The London branch would honour the bill from money 
received from the sale of Indian goods in the United Kingdom 
or from bullion imported from India.^ In either case, the
1. Naoroji, op.cit. p. viii.
2. Lutt, India in the Victorian Age, p.528.
3. Sir George Cambell estimated in 1887 (The British Empire, 
p.70) that the private remittances were about balanced by 
the flow of fresh capital into India from Europe. Quoted 
by Digby, op.cit. p.231.
4. The function of the exchange banks described by Vera 
Anstey, The Economic Development of India (4th ed., 1952), 
pp. 116-17*
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actual transfer of capital would be shown in the trade 
figures. Thus, to count the money remitted privately in this 
manner as part of the drain would be to count it twice.
Sometimes the word 'drain* was used figuratively and 
included expenditure in India on such items as the Army or 
European A g e n c y B u t  the usual meaning was surplus of 
exports for which India received no commercial equivalent.
Theodore Morison devoted two chapters of his book, 
The Economic Transition in India (1911). to the drain. He 
made a distinction between the "actual" and the "potential" 
drain. The actual drain was the excess of exports, or 
£15,051,000 per annum from 1899-1900 to 1908-09* The poten­
tial drain which Morison computed consisted of, besides the 
excess of imports, the increase of the Government of India's 
capital liabilities in England (£4,193,000 per annum), the 
"interest on private capital, earnings of English merchants 
and professional men, and freights earned by English ships 
in Indian waters". The potential drain represented the 
amount by which India's exports would have had to exceed 
her imports in order to avoid borrowing capital abroad to 
meet her foreign obligations. Morison estimated the poten­
tial drain to be £21,000,000 per annum for the years 1899- 
1900 to 1908-09* In arriving at this figure he guessed that 
the amount of foreign capital invested privately in India
1. A.J.Wilson seemed to be doing this when he set the drain 
at £35,000,000 annually. (An Empire in Pawn, p,64).
was at most £2,000,000 or one-half as large as the amount
borrowed by the Indian Government in England.**' Dr. Anstey
regards Morison1s discussion as one of the most intelligent
analysis of the drain. Neither Anstey nor Morison regard the
drain as impoverishing* On the contrary, they both believe
the money spent on European agency, railway development, and
2
defence as well spent, on the whole.
As already indicated, a surplus of exports was not 
necessarily incompatible with increasing prosperity. A 
country with such a surplus would accumulate credit abroad. 
Actually, it was the Home Charges, on which India*s foreign 
credit was spent, that Indian nationalists objected to. In 
order to pay the Home Charges, the Government of India, in 
the years 1899-1900 to 1908-09, not only paid to England the 
£15,051,000 representing the annual balance of trade, but it 
also had to borrow in England enough to pay the remainder of 
the £17,598,000 representing the average annual Home Charges! 
In these years, the Home Charges usually amounted to more 
than one-fourth of the total expenditure of the Government
4
of India.
The surplus of exports was transformed into credit 
fcr India through the sale of what were known as Council 
Bills. When an importer in Europe wanted Rupees to pay for
1. Morison, op.cit., pp. 197-203.
2. Anstey, op.citAppendix G. pp. 599-600.
Morison, op.cit.,pp.240-41.
3- Morison, op.cit., pp. 196-8.
4. General Statement of the Gross Expenditure charged against 
Revenue in India and England, Statistical Abstract relat­
ing to British India from 1899-1900 to 1908-09, pp.50-51.
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his imports from India, he paid Sterling to the Secretary of 
State in London in return for Council Bills. These Bills 
were then presented at the Government treasury in India 
where the holder received rupees out of the Indian revenues 
in exchange for the Bills. In this way the Secretary of 
State obtained most of the money required to pay the Home 
Charges.^
Exchange difficulties between 1873 and 1898 added a
considerable burden to the amount paid from the Indian
revenues for the Home Charges. Until 1893 India was on a
silver standard and England was on a gold standard so that
India had to meet her obligations in England in gold. As
long as the gold value of silver remained constant this
arrangement was satisfactory to India. But after 1873 the
value of silver began to depreciate. The result was that
India was forced to remit more silver (i.e., spend more
rupees) in order to meet the same obligations in England. In
1873-74, the exchange value of the rupee had been about 2s.;
2
by 1892-93, the exchange value had fallen to Is 2d. This 
meant that in 1892-93 the Government of India had to raise 
Rs.264,780,000 to meet the Home Charges of £16,532,000. Had 
the exchange rate of 1873-74 still prevailed, the Government 
would have had to spend Rs.177,520,000, or Rs.87,260,000 
less for the 1892-93 Home Charges.^ In 1893 a committee
1. The Secretary of State sold Council Bills to be drawn on 
the Indian Treasury at the annual rate of £17,500,000 from 
1899-1900 to 1909-10. Sir John Strachey, India: Its Admin­
istration and Progress (1911), pp.210-11.
2. Cambridge History of^Tndia, Vol.VI, p.321.
3. Strachey, op.cit., p.197.
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was appointed under the presidency of Lord Herschell to 
consider the problem, and in accordance with the committee*s 
recommendations the Government of India closed the mints to 
the free coining of silver in 1893*
As the Government ceased to add to the number of 
rupees in circulation, the demand for rupees began to grow, 
the price of rupees rose, and by 1898 the exchange value of 
the rupee had reached the desired ls,4d, After 1898 the 
exchange rate was maintained for fifteen years at ls,4d, 
with only minor fluctuations,^
The stabilization of the rupee at ls.4d. saved the 
Indian taxpayer large sums of money on the remittances to 
England. But the currency legislation affected the cotton 
goods trade unfavourably and this obscured for some of the 
Congress supporters the benefit conferred upon the balance of 
payments by the currency reforms. When the gold value of 
silver had been low, Indian exporters and manufacturers had 
been at an advantage in selling to gold standard countries. 
For the same reason the Government of India and importers 
had lost through exchange. After the gold value of the rupee 
increased, the Indian cotton industry no longer possessed 
its former advantage. It was actually at a disadvantage in 
its principal market, China, which continued on the silver 
standard, and sought its cotton goods increasingly from its
1. P.P.Cd. 7236 of 1914, Final Report of the Royal Commission 
on India. Finance and Currency, 1914 (Chamberlain 
Commission), paras,15-20.
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own mills or from Japan, rather than from gold standard
countries like India. The decline of the Chinese demand for
Indian cottons was one of the reasons for the five year
1
slump after 1900 in the Bombay mills, and the nationalists 
blamed the Government currency legislation for the difficult­
ies in the one major industry in which Indian investment
2
predominated over foreign.
It would be misleading to suggest that the Home 
Charges exactly or even approximately represented the amount 
by which India was impoverished or exploited. An analysis of 
the components of the Home Charges shows that some of the 
charges were similar to those paid voluntarily by independent 
countries.
The Home Charges consisted in 1901-02 of the follow4- 
ing items. The year 1901-02 is taken as the year between 
1899-1900 and 1908-09 in which the Home Charges most closely 
approximate to the annual average for that decade.
1. D.H.Buchanan, The Development of Capitalist Enterprise 
in India pp. 155, 200.
2. "See Speech by Vithaldas Damodar Thakarsey,
Report of the 18th I.N.C., p. 99-
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Railways, interest and annuities £6,416,373
Interest on debt (excluding that
on the railway debt) ...... 3,003,782
Management of debt 48,628
Army Services .............. . 4,383,059
Stores ...................   1,918,206
Civil Charges, Furloughs, Pensions,
Allowances, and Miscellaneous .....  1,370,903
Charges on account of Departments
in I n d i a    227,704
T o t a l £17,368,655
The Home Charges may be divided between two categor-
2ies: the "economic" payments and the "political" payments.
The economic payments consisted of the interest on the rail­
way and the permanent debt, the management of the debt, and 
the stores, or in other words, foreign expenditure of a type 
which any independent country might make in the early stages 
of industrial development and railway building.^ The politi­
cal charges would be the military, administrative, and civil 
charges, pensions, and allowances which India could not pre­
sumably have paid as an independent country. If such a hypo­
thetical division is made for the year 1901-02, the economic
1. These figures are compiled from the Statistical Abstract 
... 1899-1900 to 1908-09, pp. 70-71, and the Moral and 
Material Progress Report for 1901-02, pp. 134-35*
2. Theodore Morison suggested these categories, op.cit.
PP. 236-37.
3. It is not intended to suggest that an independent India 
would have spent as much as British India did on these 
items,
charge was £10,386,989 and the political charge was 
£6,981,666.
The individual items of the Home Charge may be exam­
ined, The largest item was the railway charge and it was 
increasing rapidly in the period under review. In 1899-1900 
it was £5,913>780; by 1908-09 railway payments in England 
amounted to £8,249*846, However, the nature of the payments 
was changing. In the former year £2,172,336 of the railway 
expenditure had been interest paid on guaranteed lines, while 
in the latter year none of the expenditure was on guaranteed 
lines.^ The early railway lines had been built by European 
Companies whose profits were guaranteed by the East India 
Company at the rate of 5 per cent. Private European capital 
probably could not have been attracted at the mid-century 
without a guarantee, and five per cent was a low rate of
p
interest for railways before 1870, But the arrangement was 
unsatisfactory from several points of view. The Government 
took the risk without the opportunity of receiving the 
profits while the Companies reaped the profits with little 
incentive to economy. Daniel Thorner has labelled the 
guarantee system as "Private Enterprise at Public Risk",^ 
During the latter half of the century the Secretary of State 
for India found that India could borrow in London at lower
1. Statistical Abstract ... 1899-1900 to 1908-09, p.70.
2. W.J.MacPherson, "Investment in Indian Railways, 1845- 
1875". Economic History Review, 2nd Ser., Vol.VIII,
No.2 (195577 p.i8i; --------
3. Investment in Empire; British Railway and Steam Shipping 
Enterprise in India; 1825-1849» (1950).
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rates of interest for State Railways and that private com­
panies would enter contracts on terms more advantageous to 
India. In guaranteeing the early railways, the right had 
been reserved to purchase the lines after the lapse of 
certain periods of time, and the Secretary of State exercised 
this power so that by the end of 1907, the last of the
i
guaranteed railways had been bought up. With the decline 
of payments on the guaranteed railways and the increase in 
the volume of traffic, the public works of India began to 
show a profit to the public revenues for the first time after 
1900. In 1900-01, there was a slight profit; in 1901-02 it 
was £750,000; and 1904-05, they earned India £2,000,000.2
India borrowed in England at a lower rate of interest 
than other foreign countries did. In the early years of this 
century, Japan, for instance, paid A - i  to 5 per cent on its 
foreign loans while India paid about 3^ cent.^ The 
yield to British investors on Indian railways in 1907 was 
3.87 per cent; on colonial railways 4.0 per cent; on American 
railways, 4.5 per cent, and on other foreign railways, 4.7 
per cent.^ Thus, at the beginning of the century, Indian 
nationalists had less reason to complain about the current 
rate of interest paid to foreign capitalists, Furthermore, 
they could no longer say that railroads were unprofitable to
1. Statistical Abstract ...1899-1900 to 1908-09, Note, p.49.
2. Cambridge History of India, Vol.VI, pp.325-26.
3. Morison7 op.cit., p.239.
j4. Albert H, Imlah, "British Balance of Payments and Export 
of Capital, 1816-1913"* Economic History Review, 2nd Ser, 
Vol,5, No.2 (1952).
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the state.
Rather, it was the priority given to railway con- 
struction,and the public debt incurred by the earlier and 
more extravagant expenditure which were ope# to criticism. 
Complaint was made that the total outlay before 1902 on rail­
ways had been £226,000,000 compared to £24,000,000 spent on 
irrigation works,*** that some railways were built for military
purposes and could not be expected to yield a commercial 
2
return, and that other railways were built at the request 
of English manufacturers who wanted to open Indian markets 
to cheap, British manufactured goods, thereby hastening the 
de-industrialization of India and converting her into a 
producer of raw materials only.*^
While the railway or 'productive* debt was increas­
ing, the ordinary or ‘unproductive1 debt was decreasing. The 
ordinary debt had included the £12,000,000 owed to the stock­
holders of the old East India Company, the cost of suppress­
ing the mutiny, and expenses arising out of other wars. The 
ordinary debt stood at £96,000,000 in 1862; by 1897 it had
1. Dutt, India in the Victorian Age, p.550.
2* Speech'of h.B.Wacha, Report of the 17th Indian National 
Congress, p. 46. The North-Western kailway, a large part 
of which was classified as military, accounted for a net 
charge to the Government of Rs,25.33 crores up to the end 
of 1900. The net charge of all the other State railways 
to the endof 1900 was Rs. 6.08 crores.
Statement of Financial Statistics of State Railways ....
for and to the end of, the Year 1900.
Supplement to Gazette of India, 6 July 1901.
3. For a fuller nationalist view, see D.E.Wacha, Indian 
Railway Finance (1912), W.J.MacPherson gives instances 
in which British commercial groups influenced railway 
policy in directions not necessarily beneficial to India. 
"Investment in Indian Railways, 1845-1875", op.cit.
been reduced to £72,721,161, or by more than 24 per cent* In 
the same period the rate of interest paid on the debt dec­
lined from 4.543 V e r  cent to 3-393 per cent. In consequence 
the annual charge of interest on the permanent debt was 
reduced between 1862 and 1897 by about 50$ not including 
exchange, or by 16 per cent including exchange.*^ By 1909 
the ordinary, or unproductive debt had been reduced still 
further, to £37*700,000.^
Looking now at the Total Permanent Debt of India, 
including the productive and unproductive debt, and the debt 
held in India as well as in England, it will be seen that it 
was growing rapidly in the period under review, and that it 
was increasing more rapidly in England than in India. In 
1899-1900 the Total Permanent Debt in India was Rs.1,124*75 
millions; in 1908-09 it was Rs.1,345#66 millions. In England 
during the same period, the debt rose from £119-64 millions 
to £160.97 millions.^ Even these figures do not give an 
adequate idea of the degree to which the Indian Government 
depended on foreign capital. The Welby Commission reported 
that 'out of Rx.103,000,000 borrowed in India, Rx. 25,000,000 
was actually held at home [United Kingdom], that 
Rx. 48,000,000 was held by Europeans in India, and that only 
Rx. 30,000,000 was held by Natives of India1.^  Why was more
1* Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Administration 
of the Expenditure of India, paras. 121-29.
2. Strache.y, India: Its Administration and Progress (1911). 
p.251.
3. Statistical Abstract ....1899-1900 to 1908-09, p.267.
4. Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol.IV, Final Report, 
para. 350.
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of the Government’s capital not borrowed from Indians them­
selves? The most important reason was that English interest 
rates were lower than Indian ones. The Government of India 
could borrow in England at the rate of between 3 and 4 per 
cent. In Bombay, according to Wacha, capital could be 
borrowed for as little as 4 to 5 per cent but in most places 
Indians wanted 6, 7, 8, or 9 per cent,^* A study is needed 
of the Government’s efforts, or lack of them, made to raise 
Indian capital. Again, a word of caution is needed about the 
significance of the Indian debt and the interest paid on it, 
India’s public debt was small compared to that of the United 
Kingdom, and the interest India paid to the United Kingdom 
on private and public loans was only a fraction of the
£60,000,000 or so which the United States was annually remit-
2
ting to Europe about 1910 as interest. It is a truism, but 
nevertheless worth repeating, that the significance of 
India’s foreign obligations was not to be found in their 
absolute size. The question is whether India should have put 
surplus capital back into her economy at once, or invested 
it in railways in the hope of future economic expansion.
M.G.Ranade was among the minority of nationalists 
who felt that ’far from complaining, we have reason to be 
thankful that we have a Creditor who supplies our needs at
1. Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol.Ill, Minutes of 
Evidence, Question 17,566.
2, Morison, op.cit., p.215.
230
such a low rate of interest'.^ A more common view was that 
foreign investment was more or less the same as foreign 
exploitation. The Power and the Guardian of Calcutta made 
this point when it said that from the point of view of an 
Indian, an influx of British capital
'will he one of those irreparable evils which 
make their sinister influence felt upon 
distant generations. It is doubtful if the 
indigenous population will ever have strength 
enough to shake off the financial bondage which 
the larger and freer influx of foreign capital 
will necessarily impose upon the country. What 
the zealous capitalist calls increased material 
prosperity is from another point of view 
nothing but greater exploitation'.2
The next item of the Home Charges - the £4,383,059 in 
1901-02 for army services - was the section of the Charges 
open to easy attack. In 1900 India employed about one-third 
of the whole British Army. The Indian revenues were charged 
with the cost of training these men in England (16,000 men a 
year in 1890), with a major share of the pensions, with their 
transport to and from India, and with all expenses incurred 
by the Troops between the day they left England and the day 
they returned, or for an average of six years per man.
Between 1875-76 and 1896-97, the net army expenditure in
1. In Augural Address to the 1st Industrial Conference,
Poona, 1890. Essays on Indian Economics? A Collection of 
Essays and Speeches, p.l86. Ranade also said that although 
^ hie re was 'good cause for complaint' about the Home 
Charges for pensions, administration, and defence, 'we 
should not forget the fact that we are enabled by reason 
of this British connection to levy an equivalent tribute 
from China by our Opium Monopoly'.
2. Power and the Guardian, 15 July 1899* T. and D. Selections, 
■ZTTTuTy"111997 ‘F/S’IT.T., Vol. 115.
England rose from £3,476,000 to £4,133,000* Because of the^'^ 
fall in the exchange value of the Rupee this meant that the 
cost to India increased from Rs.38,580,000 to Rs.68,650,000* 
In the same period, the total army expenditure in England 
and India, including exchange, increased from Rs*162,590,000 
to Rs.259,730,000.1
Much of the increase had nothing to do with the 
direct defence of India, and it was not only the nationalists 
who complained of this. In one of the numerous formal repre­
sentations made hy the Government of India about military 
2
costs. Lord Lansdowne*s Government expressed its opinion 
to the Secretary of State that
•the revenues of India have been charged with 
the cost of many changes in organization not 
specially necessary for the efficiency of the 
army in this country, and with the cost of 
troops employed on Imperial service beyond 
the limits of India. Millions of money have 
been spent on increasing the army in India, 
on armaments, and on fortifications, to 
provide for the security of India, not against 
domestic enemies, or to prevent the incursions 
of the warlike peoples of adjoining countries, 
but to maintain the supremacy of British power 
in the East. *3
1. Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol.IV, Final Report, 
paras. 218-227.
2. See P.B.C. 8131 of 1896, Suakin Expeditions 
Correspondence between the Government of India and the 
Secretary of State in Council regarding the incidence of 
the cost of Indian Troops when employed out of India,
3. Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol#II, First Report,
No.l of Appendix 45, Government of India to Secretary 
of State, No,70, 25 March 1890, para. 21.
Government protests against the financial arrangements 
with the United Kingdom were a favourite source of 
ammunition for nationalist speakers. This particular 
despatch of Lansdowne's was quoted by Srinivas Rao at the 
1902 Congress. Report of the 18th I.N.C., p.103.
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On 18 July 1900, about one-tenth (23,022) of the 
Indian army were serving outside of India, including 9,186 
men in South Africa and 10,616 in China, although in these 
particular instances the Home Government paid the costs.^
The manner in which expenses for military expeditions beyond 
India1s borders were divided before 1895 may be seen in the 
following statements
Expedition Late Ordinary Extraordinary charges
charges.
Paid by Paid by 
India England
Paid by 
India
Paid by 
England
1st
Afghanistan
_ .
1838-42 All None All None
1st China 1539-4-0 All Ifone None All
2nd China 1856-57 None All None All
Persia 1856 All None Half Half
3rd China 1859 None
except
expense*
of
Indian
Navy
vessels
All
3
None All
Abyssinia 1867-68 All None None All
Perak 1875 All None None All (by 
Colonial 
Government)
Malta 1878 None All None All
2nd
Afghanistan
■
1878-80
,. . .
.
All
■
None
All but 
£5,000, 
000
£5,000,000
Egypt 1882 All None All but 
£5,000
£5,000
Soudan 1885-86 All None None All
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 18 July and 15 Aug. 1900, MSS.Eur.
D.510/5.
2. Indian Expenditure Commission, Vol.II, First Report. 
Appendix No.45, para. 123 of sub-appendix to No.13 Gov. 
Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 20 Aug. 1895, Mil.Lept. 
No.154 of 1895.
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In 1900, upon the recommendation of the Welby 
Commission, India was relieved of a total of £257*000 on 
account of the Home Charges, This sum included one-half the 
cost of transporting Troops to and from India (£130,000) and 
one-half the military charge for Aden (£72,000). The Congress 
and the Government of India were disappointed with the size 
of the relief granted. The Government of India protested to 
the Secretary of State that the £257,000 1 falls far short of 
according to India the just and liberal treatment which was 
claimed for her*,'*'
The slight relief given on account of the Home 
Charges was more than offset by the decision to increase the 
pay of the British Army, The increase, which ultimately 
meant an additional charge of £786,000 per annum, on the
Indian revenues, was unsuccessfully resisted by Lord Curzon1s
2Government. A still further although temporary increase in 
the military expenditure occurred in 1904-05 and 1905-06 
with the reorganization of the Indian Army. The reorganiza* 
tion involved an additional expenditure for India of 
£869,932 in India, and £1,401,933 in England, Altogether the 
net Indian military expenditure in England and India grew
1. P.P. No. 169 of 1902, Indian Expenditure (Royal Commis­
sion). Copy of Further Correspondence No.3* 
Government of India to Secretary of State, 6 June 1901.
2. P.P.No.237 of 1903, East India (Liability for Increase in 
British Soldiers* Pay),
Return of the Correspondence....
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from £15,376,473 in 1899-1900 to £19,602,988 in 1908-09.1
-The history of India*s economic relations with Great 
Britain generated at least as much nationalist indignation 
as the contemporary financial arrangements Between the two 
countries. R.C.Dutt gave organized expression to the pre­
vailing belief about the early period in The Economic 
History of British India* He rejected the notion that 
India's 'intense poverty* and 'repeated famines' could be 
explained by factors such as increasing population, drought, 
peasant improvidence, and alienation of land to the money­
lender. The narrowing of India's sources of wealth was due to 
other reasons.
India in the eighteenth century was a great 
manufacturing as well as a great agricultural 
country, and the products of the Indian loom 
supplied the markets of Asia and Europe. It 
is, unfortunately, true that the East Indian 
Company and the British Parliament, following 
the selfish commercial policy of a hundred 
years ago, discouraged Indian manufacturers 
in the early years of British rule in order 
to encourage the rising manufacturers of 
England. Their fixed policy, pursued down the 
last decades of the eighteenth century and the 
first decades of the nineteenth, was to make
1. Statistical Abstract ... 1899-1900 to 1908-09, pp.68-9* 
In 1904, in the Governor-General's Legislative Council, 
the Military Member, Sir Edmond Elies, made a rather 
feeble attempt to prove that military expenditure was 
decreasing in proportion to revenue receipts^ and not as 
Gokhale had alleged, increasing. To support this tenden­
tious point, Elies selected as the starting point for 
his comparison the years 1896-97 to 1899-1900 when 
revenue was low due to famine and plague, and when 
military spending was high as a result of the Prontier 
Wars. India Leg. Council Prog., 30 March 1904, Vol.LXIII, 
p. 525.
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India subservient to the industries of Great 
Britain, and to make the Indian people grow 
raw produce only, in order to supply material 
for the looms and manufactories of Great Britain. 
This policy was pursued with unwavering resolu­
tion and with fatal success; orders were set out, 
to force Indian artisans to work in the Comp anyfs 
factories; Commercial residents were legally 
vested with extensive powers over villages and 
communities of Indian weavers; prohibitive 
tariffs excluded Indian silk and cotton goods 
from England; English goods were admitted into 
India free of duty or on payment of a nominal 
duty•.1
Pour Western writers were often invoked in support of 
nationalist views. H.H.Wilson's continuation of Millfs 
History of British India was used to prove that Indian tex­
tiles were kept out of British markets by prohibitive duties 
while India, was prevented from protecting her own industry. 
"The foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political in­
justice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor 
with whom he could not have competed on equal terms". Had 
Indian goods not been kept out of England, "the mills of 
Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their out­
set, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even
2  ^by the power of steam." Robert Montgomery MartinJ and Sir
1. Dutt, The Economic History* of British India, pp.vii-viii.
2. H.H.Wilson, Mill’s History of British India, Vol.VII.
The History of British India. Prom l805 to 1835t (1845) 
Pootnote, pp. 538-39* quoted by R.C.Dutt, Economic 
History of British India, pp. 262-63 and by P.M.Mehta, 
Industrial Exhibition of 1902, Report of the 18th I.N.C.,
p . 16 0.
3. The Political, Commercial, and Financial Condition of the 
AngTo-Eastern^Empire, in lb32 (1832) and The Indian 
Empire; History^ Topography, Geology,... 3 Vols. (T859). 
Cited by Naoroji, Poverty and Un-B^tish Rule in India, 
p.viii; Digby, ’Prosperous1 British India, pp.xxl, 8T; 
and R.C.Dutt, The Economic History afTlBritish India,
pp. 289-90, 409'z vr.
George Wingate 1 were quoted about the exaction of "tribute1
from India, Finally, Brooks Adams' view that plunder from
India was instrumental in financing Europe's industrial
2revolution was accepted.
The portion of the Home Charges expended on pensions, 
furlough allowances, exchange compensation allowances, and 
on the employment of foreign agency in general was objected 
to because it represented to nationalists both a denial of 
the promises of equality contained in the Queen's Proclama­
tion of 1858'and an extravagant means of running the Govern­
ment. The cost of foreign agency was higher than is some* 
times realized. Probably in no other country in the world 
were civil servants paid so liberally. In Algeria, for 
instance, the highest judicial officer, the First President 
of the Court of Appeal, received a furnished house and £720 
each year while the Chief Justice of Bengal earned £4,911, 
including exchange compensation allowance,^ Other compari­
sons between French salaries in Algeria and British salaries
4in India reinforce this point. In 1892 a Parliamentary 
Return was prepared showing the amount of money received 
from the revenues of India in 1889-90 by persons earning
A Few Words on Our Financial Relations with India (1859) 
Cited by Naoroji; op.cit,, pp.viii-ix; hutt, op,cit., 
pp.419-20; and Butt, India in the Victorian Age, 
pp, xvi, 214, 219*
2. The Law of Civilization and DecaysAn Essay on History 
{ 1895)pp. 259-607 Cited by Ligby, op7cilFT, pp.31-33 5’ ' also 
in Surendranath Banerjee's Presidential Address,
Report on the 18th I.N.C., p.43*
'3* India List and India Office List for 1902, p.174.
4. Strachey, Indias Its Administration and Progress (1903), 
p.84, Note.l.
237
Rs.1000 or more. In the following totals, sums paid in 
England have "been converted from sterling into rupees at the 
rate of ls^d.1
Paid hy the Government, 1889-90
Annual Salaries Paid to Europeans in India Rs.8,77,14,431 
Absentee Allowances " u M n 46,36,314
2
Pensions '• ,f " " 23,28,882
Amounts Paid to Europeans in England 5,56,60,170
Rs. 15,03,39,797
Paid by the Railway Companies, 1889-90
Amounts paid to Europeans in India 
Amounts paid to Europeans in England
Total Paid to Europeans from the
Revenues of India, 1889-90.
Total Government Expenditure in
England and India, 1889-90.
1* The actual rate of exchange for 1889-90 was Is.4*566d.
R.C .Du11 (Economic History of British India, p.444) 
converted the figures from "the Parliamentary Return into 
sterling at the rate of 2s., thus exaggerating the amount 
received by Europeans.
2, Eurasian pensions are included in this figure.
3* P.P. No.192 of 1892. East India (Salaries; Return of the 
Number of all Persons who received from the Revenues of 
India, during the Year 1889-90, Annual Allowances .... of 
which the Amount was not less than 1,000 Rupees for each 
Person.
1,16,06,891 
8,17,830
Rs. 1,24,24,721
3
Rs.16, 27,64,518
Rs.82, 47,31,700
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Ladabhai Naoroji called the exclusion of Indians
from positions of responsibility India*s ’moral drain*• By
employing Europeans where Indians could perform the job, he
said, the British Government was stunting the capabilities
and intelligence of the Indians,^ In 1900 Naoroji wrote to
Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State, hinting that if the
pledges of equality were not honoured, India might ’under
the persistence of the present evil bleeding fall from the
British frying pan into the Russian fire or free itself from
2
a destructive rule*.
In the Indian Legislative Council in 1904, Lord 
Curzon vehemently denied that Indians had received an inade­
quate share of the civil employment. He stated that in 1867 
there were 13,431 Government posts in India with a salary 
above Rs.75, and of these, Europeans and Eurasians held 55 
per cent, In 1903 the total number of posts was 28,278, of 
which only 42 per cent were held by Europeans and Eurasians, 
Curzon demonstrated the improvement of the Indian position in 
another way. He said that the aggregate pay of the European 
and Eurasian Government servants had increased by 6 per cent 
since 1867 while the pay of the ’Natives* had grown by 191 
per cent,
Curzon thought that these and other figures he 
produced proved ’how honestly and
1. Naoroji, op.cit., pp.56-58.
2, Naoroji to Hamilton, 12 Oct, 1900. Quoted in the Bengalee, 
4 June 1901.
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faithfully the British Government ha^f 
fulfilled its pledges, and how hollow 
is the charge which we so often hear of 
a han of exclusion against the children 
of the soil.... Will anyone tell me in 
the face of these figures that our 
administration is unduly favourable to 
the European or grudging to the native 
element? I hold, on the contrary, that 
it is characterised hy a liberality 
unexampled in the world*, i
Curzon rested his case largely on the unquestioned 
increase in the proportion of Indians in subordinate posi­
tions in the Civil Service, But it was the superior positions 
which Indians coveted, and Lord Curzon had definite views on 
the racial superiority of Europeans which disqualified all 
but a few Indians from holding these positions. Those few 
Indians who could proceed to England and pass the civil 
service examinations might be employed. But
held by Englishmen, for the reason that they 
possess, partly by heredity, partly by up­
bringing, and partly by education, the 
knowledge of the principles of Government, 
the habits of mind, and the vigour of 
character, which are essential for the task 
and that, the rule of India being a British 
rule, and any other rule being in the 
circumstances of the case impossible, the 
tone and standard should be set by those p
who have created and are responsible for it*.
Curzon believed that *the greatest peril with which our 
administration is confronted* was 'the system under which 
every year an increasing number of the 900 and odd higher
•the highest ranks of civil employme^nt/in 
India ... must nevertheless, as atf¥ufe b<
1. India Leg* Council Prog., 30 March 1904, Vol.XLIII, p.562.
2. Ihid, p.560.
posts that were meant and ought to have been exclusively and 
specifically reserved for Europeans, are being filched away 
by the superior wits of the Native in the English examina­
tions*. Curzon realised regretfully that the time had passed 
when a racial qualification could be placed on the entrance 
to the civil service,^ But the Government of India found a 
number of reasons for keeping Indians out of the higher posts
in the Forest, Customs, Salt, Opium, Postal, Telegraph,
2
Survey, Jail, and Police Departments. Apart from the nec­
essity of sitting for the I.C.S. examination in India, there 
were other barriers to Indians. For instance, the Post Office 
Department preferred to send Europeans to arrange postal 
services during military operations in China, Africa, and the 
North West Frontier. Again, in some areas of Assam and Bihar, 
travel could be done only with the assistance of the planters, 
and this ruled out Indians for assignments in these areas,^
In the Preventative Branch of the Customs Department, Euro­
peans were preferred because of their ability to withstand 
'great exposure in all weathers' and the need to enforce
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April 1900, MSS. Eur.D.510/5.
2. See Hon.Sec., Indian Association, to Sec. Govt, of India, 
Home Dept., 18 Dec. 1899. Enclosure to C.W.Bolton, Sec., 
Govt, of Bengal, to Govt, of India, Home Dept., 9 March 
1899. Dec, Prog. No.236,
Also, J.P.Hewett, Sec., Govt, of India, to Sec., Govt, of 
Bengal, 20 Dec. 1900. Dec, Prog. No.237, I.H.P.,Pub.,
Vol.5874.
3. A.U.Fanshawe, Dir.-Gen. of Post Office of India, to Sec., 
Govt, of India, Finance and Commerce Dept., 25 April 1898.- 
Oct, Prog. No,290, I.H.P., Pub., Vol.5640.
customs and port rules on European officers and sailors,
Indians were not permitted to sit for Police Department
Examinations in London. Most central and district jails were
run by medical officers,^* and the Indian medical Service was
open only to those persons ’registered in the United Kingdom
2
under the Medical Acts'. Other Departments needed Europeans 
because Indian performances had not 'been found to be alto­
gether satisfactory', because of the high standard of scien­
tific accuracy' required, 'the rough and solitary life', the 
poor quality of Indian applicants, the need for 'energy and 
physical capacity1.*^
G.Subramania Iyer contributed an article to the 
Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar in which he contra­
dicted Lord Curzon*s statement that Europeans were not unduly 
favoured in the civil service.^" Using the same figures as 
Curzon, Iyer proved that the number of posts carrying 
salaries of Rs, 1,000 or above which were held by Europeans 
and Eurasians had increased more between 1867 and 1903 than 
the number held by Indians, The increase in the Public Works 
Department for Europeans and Eurasians had been 133> for 
Indians, 11; the increase in the Land Revenue Department
1. J.P.Hewett to Sec., G-ovt. of Bengal, 20 Dec. 1900, op.cit.
2. Gov, Gen. in Council to Sec. of State. 13 Oct. 1898,
Oct* Prog, No,168, I.E.P.,Pub., Vol.5414.
3. J.P.Hewett to Sec., Govt, of Bengal, 20 Dec. 1900. op,cit,
4. G, Subramania Iyer 'Employment of Indians in the Public 
Service  Fiction and Fact',
Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.X, No,4
(UcT.T9"0T)7 P;327. ------------
for Europeans and Eurasians had been 95, for Indians, 19; 
in the Medical Department (Civil) the increase, had been 
95 and 6, respectively; in the State Railways, 95 and 0, 
respectively. In only one Department - the Judicial - had 
the number of Indians holding positions with salaries over 
Rs,1,000 gained more than the number of Europeans and 
Eurasians. Taking the total net increases of all such posi­
tions between 1867 and 1903, the Europeans and Eurasians 
increased their share by 591, Indians by 84.^
In conclusion, it may be said that an important part 
of the background to the disorders beginning in 1905 was the 
firm rejection of two of the major demQa&s of the Indian 
National Congress, The Congress had asked for a vast reduc­
tion of the Home Charges; instead India was relieved of only 
£257,000. The Congress had demanded the Indianization of the 
civil services; Lord Curzon, in reply, gave an unqualified 
assertion of the racial basis of employment in the higher 
positions of the Civil Service.
1. These figures are compiled from the Tables appended to 
ibid, pp.330-44.
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CHAPTER IV
UNITY AND ORGANIZATION IN THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
The Congress movement suffered a prolonged relapse 
after the well-attended Congresses of 1894 and 1895* This 
relapse took the form of poor attendances, internal divisions, 
a reluctance among its earlier supporters to continue to 
finance its activities in England and India, and a widespread 
indifference to the Congress organization and platform among 
educated Indians in general. Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of 
State, wrote in 1900 that "there is little doubt that the 
Congress is losing its popularity and influence"^* and a year
p
later he was contemplating the total collapse of the Congress. 
The Governor-General was no less sanguine. Lord Curzon 
“believed "that the Congress is tottering to its fall, and one 
of my greatest ambitions while in India is to assist it to a 
peaceful demise."^ This ambition was neither entirely fanciful 
nor based on a false assessment of the Congress movement.
The roots of the Congress weaknesses extend back to the 
early years of the movement. The Congress began hopefully in 
1885# Attendances grew steadily in the first five years, 
reaching almost 2,000 in 1889* The organizers were able to 
boast that the Congress attracted men from almost all geograph­
ic areas, races, and classes, excepting the old aristocracy
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 22 February 1900. MSS.Eur. C. 126/2.
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 24 January 1901. MSS.Eur. C. 126/3.
3# Curzon to Hamilton, 18 November 1900. MSS.Eur. D. 510/6.
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and the lower classes. In the first years the Congress also
enjoyed the sympathy of British Indian officials. Lord
Dufferin, the Governor*General, had been consulted by A.O.
Hume before it was started, and at the 1886 Congress he
entertained the Congress leaders while in the following year
the Governor of Madras, Lord Connemara, extended a similar 
2
invitation.
Government tolerance was forfeited through the employ­
ment of certain tactics in the years 1886 to 1889* when the 
Congress tried to gain for itself the support of the Indian 
masses. Using the methods which Bright and Cobden had used in 
their anti-Corn Law campaign, the Congress circulated 50,000
4copies of two tracts, published in 12 different translations. 
In an idiomatic language, they explained how the Congress 
could make British rule less despotic and impoverishing. Mass. 
meetings, sometimes drawn together by traditional Indian 
entertainments, were held as an exercise in the political 
education of the people. Hume, the General Secretary of the 
Congress, argued that the poverty of the masses was so over­
whelming that only by channelling the popular discontent into
5
legitimate forms could an agrarian uprising be avoided.
1. Report of the 2nd r.N.C., p.5*
2. A.C.Mazumdar, tndian~"Rational Evolution, (1st ed,), p.79*
3. Wedderburn, Hume, p.68.
4. A Congress Catechism by M. Viraraghava Chariar and 
^Conversation between Molvi Parid ud Lin, M.A., Vaquil 
(Barrister") of the High Tjoy?t, Practicing in the Zillah 
Court~of Hakikatabaci, and Rambaksh, one of the Mukaddams- 
(Chief Villager) of Kambakhtpur. English translations 
appear as an Appendix to the Report of the 3rd I.N.C.
5. Wedderburn, op.cit., p.68.
Grave exception was taken to the two pamphlets by Lord 
Lufferin and Sir Auckland Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
the North West Provinces and Oudh, who thought that the pamph­
lets misrepresented Government policies and were designed to 
create hatred of British officials among the masses* Lufferin 
was not convinced of either the unrest among the masses or of 
their growing poverty* On the contrary, the reports requested 
by the Viceroy indicated an improvement in the economic con­
dition of the very poor* Furthermore, Lufferin saw in the 
Congress efforts a dangerous parallel to attempts to arouse 
agrarian discontent in Ireland.^ Colvin, too, felt"the 
extreme unwisdom and unfairness of writing and circulating
[the pamphlets] among ignorant and excitable people, foreign
2to us in blood*" The Congress only represented "the wishes
*
of a class, and that a minute and exceptional class. Colvin 
believed that it was absurd for this class to claim to repre­
sent the interests of the peasantry when, for the most part, 
it had, through its representatives in the Legislative 
Council, opposed the Government’s tenancy legislation in 
Bengal, in 1885, and Oudh, in 1886.^
These views were made public in October 1887, when 
Hume’s and Colvin’s correspondence on the Congress was 
published and again on 30 November, 1888 by Lufferin in a 
farewell speech* Lufferin asked, with reference to the
1. Lufferin to Cross, 17 August 1888, No.107, MSS* Eur*E*243/25
2. Audi Alteram Partem, p*17*
3« Ibid. p.
4* Ibid. p.11.
5. Ibid.
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Congress, how any reasonable men could "be content to allow
this microscopic minority to control their administration."
He stressed the unrepresentative nature of the Congress, whose
selfish platform was defended by "no Native statesman of
weight or importance." He regretted the circulation among the
masses of the pamphlets which, he said, "were animated by a
very questionable spirit, and whose manifest intention is to
excite" hatred of the Government. He also referred to Hume's
"silly threat" that the Congress "hold in their hands the keys
not only of a popular insurrection but of a military revolt."**'
The Government showed its growing suspicion of the
Congress in other ways. In November 1887. the Government of
India established an intelligence department called the
Special Branch of the Department for the Suppression of Thagi
and Dakoiti to watch religious, social and political movements
and to report on the activities of Indians connected with 
2
them. The head of this new department, Col. P.D. Henderson, 
along with the Head Constable of Allahabad and the Madras • 
Commissioner of Police, were reported to have been seen near 
the Congress pandal at Bombay in 1889.^ The efforts of the 
previous year's Reception Committee at Allahabad to find a 
suitable site for the Congress pandal had been frustrated by 
the municipal authorities until the Maharaja of Darbhanga came
1. Bufferin's Speech at St.Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta,
30 November 1888. Enclosure to Dufferin to Cross,
3 December 1888, No. 121., MSS. Eur. E. 243/25.
2. Govt, of India., Sec/Int. Despatch to Sec. of State., No,179 
15 November 1887 s cited in Govt, of India., Home Dept, Jud., 
to Sec. of State., No.6., 28 March 1901., P.S.L.I.,Vol.131.
3# Report of the 5th I.N.C., p.19.
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forward and purchased Lowther (later Darbhanga) Castle and 
its grounds for the use of the 1888 Congress.^* In 1890 the 
Government of Bengal issued, for the first time, a circular 
advising Government officers not to attend the Calcutta 
session. Pherozeshah Mehta objected to this circular in a 
letter to Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General, who replied 
that Government servants might attend the Congress as obser­
vers but otherwise they would remain neutral with regard to
political matters, not placing pressure on anybody to join or
2
abstain from any legally conducted movement. Previously 
Indian members of the Civil Service had collected funds and 
acted as propaganda agents for the Congress.^ After 1890, 
although pressure was doubtless applied in private, the Vice­
roys, Governors, and Lieutenant Governors refrained from 
attacks on the Congress until Lord Curzon, during his Vice­
royalty, attempted to ridicule the economic thinking of the 
Congress.
Organized Indian opposition to the Congress movement 
also appeared in 1887 when the United Indian Patriotic Associ­
ation was founded. Although most of its members were Muslims 
from the North West Provinces and Oudh and although the Ass­
ociation collapsed after a few years, the views of the orig­
inal members are significant as they were shared by an import­
ant section of Indians, who remained aloof from the Congress
1. A.C.Mazumdar, Indian National Evolution (2nd ed.).,p#73*
2. Beport of the 6th I.N.C. , p. xxxiv.
3. Lufferin to Cross, 24 September 1888, No.112. MSS.Eur.
E.243/25.
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in later years. As the reaction of Government officials 
had been, the opposition of the Patriotic Association was 
stimulated by the Congress demand for representative institu­
tions and by the campaign among the villages to interest the 
masses in politics, Syed Hosain Bilgrami, Secretary of the 
Nizam of Hyderabadfs Council of State and an admirer of the 
civilizing effects of British rule, thought that:
’’Those who have a stake in the country and have 
something to lose in the general upheaval 
apprehended from the spread of democratic tendencies 
which have no home in this country, ought to 
appreciate the full importance of keeping supreme 
power intact and untouched, and hedging it round 
with as much of the elements of awe and reverence 
as can be saved out of the wreck of old ideas and 
traditions which are in the process of being 
ruthlessly destroyed by a blind, ill-judged, and^ 
ill-digested imitation of European radicalism,”
Another member of the Patriotic Association, the Maharaja
of Benares, dismissed democracy as a Western institution,
unsuited to Hinduism whose basis was the Varna (caste) system,
and he asked "how would you care to have Kalvars and Mochis
2
as our legislators.” A third member, the Raja of Bhinga, a 
Rajput, said that ’’the brave races of India are as yet 
untouched; the natural leaders of the people still hold aloof”
i.
from the Congress,
Lord Lufferin saw the Patriotic Association as the 
first Indian conservative party in recent history,^" and he
1. Letter to Syed Ahmed Khan, 20 August 1888, in The Seditious 
Character of the Indian National Congress, pub• by the 
llnited Indian Patriotic Assn. (188b) , p.55.
2. The Seditious Character of the Indian National Congress,
p. 45- "
3# Ibid., p.3,
4. Lufferin to Cross, 1 February 1887, No*26. MSS,Eur.E.243/22.
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predicted that his proposed Legislative Council reforms would 
help the Conservatives "and provide us with that kind of 
strength among the Natives which we most need,"'*’ Lufferin 
was under the completely mistaken impression that, by giving 
the right of nomination to certain municipalities, Universi­
ties, and Muslim bodies, less radical members would be 
returned to the Councils than had been in the past. Previously
the Government had appointed Councillors after informal con-
2
sultations with local political associations. He did not 
think that the Congress was a seditious organization nor did 
he doubt the good intentions of its principal members. The 
main threat to the Government came from a small minority
■a
within the Congress, J from the agitation among the masses, 
and from a possible union between the “Indian Home Rulers11 
and the British radical party,^ But he nevertheless suggested 
in a rash moment, that when the Councils were enlarged, "a 
legitimate opportunity would be afforded of getting rid of 
the Congress."
Luring Lord Buffering Viceroyalty (1884-1888) the 
Congress had been impugned for seeking representative institu­
tions and for trying to arouse the masses. Luring Lord Lans- 
downe1s Viceroyalty (1888-1894) serious doubt was cast on the 
motives and integrity of several Congress members who champ­
ioned the cause of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Early in 1889 the
1. Lufferin to Cross, 15 March 1887, No.32. MSS.Eur. E,243/22.
2. Lufferin to Cross, 20 March 1887* No.33. MSS.Eur. E.243/22.
3. Lufferin to Cross, 3 Lecember 18o8,No .121.MSS.Eur.E.243/25.
4. Lufferin to Cross, 4 January 1887, No.22. MSS.Eur.E.243/22.
5. Lufferin to Cross, 17 August 1888, No,107.MSS.Eur.E.243/25•
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British Resident in Kashmir, Colonel Nishet, accused the 
Maharaja of intriguing with the Russians against the British, 
and he succeeded in securing the Maharaja's resignation. A 
Council under the direction of the Resident was set up to 
replace the Maharaja. The Maharaja, however, denied that he 
had either intrigued with the Russians or that he had resigned 
voluntarily. He charged instead that the Government of India 
had Broken its treaty pledges and acted upon forged letters 
between himself and a Russian agent.^ The Maharajafs allega­
tions were supported by the Indian Political Agency. This 
agency had been started in London by William Ligby and in 
Calcutta by Shishir Kumar Ghose and W.C. Bonnerjea for the
purpose, inter alia, of defending the interests of the Native
2States and their rulers. The Agency in London published a 
book by Ligby which contained official papers relating to 
Kashmir and the Government of India's actions.^
The Political Agency enlisted Charles Bradlaugh's 
support for the Maharaja, Bradlaugh questioned the Under Sec­
retary of State for India in the House of Commons in June 1889
1. A,P.Nicholson, Scraps of Papers India's Broken Treaties 
Her Princes andTthelr Problems, p.iQ4.
2. J.M.Banerji, "William Ligby: Friend of India". Hindustan 
Review Vol.xii, No.73. (Sept.1905). p.250-52.
A recurring theme in nationalist writing in India was that 
Indian rule in the Native States and Indian rule before the 
British came was more enlightened than Englishmen often 
suggested. See Dadabhai Naoroji; India Reform No.ix: The 
State and Government of India under its Native Rulers.
3# Condemned Unheard: the Government of India and H.H. the 
Maharaja of kashmir: A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Sir Ughtred 
r a ^ - ^ h u t t r e w o g t h : ------------------- ------------------------ ------
251
I
but received an evasive answer. At the end of the year he 
went to India for the Congress Session where he contacted
p
Motilal Ghose. On 3 July 1890, Bradlaugh forced a debate 
in the Commons on a motion for the adjournment on the Kashmir 
issue* By this time the India Office and the Government of 
India, realizing that the letters in question were probably 
not authentic, had decided to defend their action on the 
grounds of misgovernment by the Maharaja. The Maharaja*s 
demand for an investigation into the Government of India*s 
allegations had been refused and Bradlaugh tried to elicit an 
explanation from the India Office as to why the Maharaja was 
not allowed 1 any judicial or Parliamentary inquiry" into the 
charge s. ^  These tactics of the Maharaja *s sympathisers could 
not reasonably be objected to by the Government of India 
which had acted with dubious legality in Kashmir. But in 
India certain events reflected unfavourably on the good 
faith of the Maharaja’s well-wishers.
The Government of India came into possession of the
correspondence which passed between Shishir Kumar and Motilal
A 5Ghose of Calcutta and Pandit Gopinath of Lahore. J  These
letters revealed that the agitation for the restoration of
1. Pari .Debates, H.of C. 20 June 1889, 3rd Series. Vol. 337. 
pp« 299-301.
2. Copy of Motilal Ghose letter to Pandit Gopinath, n.d.p.769, 
Demi-Off. Corresp., Pol.and Sec. Dept. Vol.3*
3* Pari.Debates. H. of C. 3 July 1890, 3rd Series. Vol.346. 
p.699#
4. The Ghose brothers edited the Amrita Bazar Patrika, one of
the most outspoken newspapers in Dengal. Although they were
fervid nationalists, they attended the Congress irregularly
5* Pandit Gopinath edited three Lahore newspapers, including
the popular Akhbar-i-Am, and attended occasional Congresses
the Maharaja to the gadi (throne) was being directed from 
Calcutta by Shishir Kumar and Motilal Ghose, and from Lahore 
hy Congress members and ex-servants of the Kashmir State, hut 
with little support from Kashmir itself . Motilal sent detailed 
instructions to Lahore explaining that a petition, on Kash­
miri paper, should he circulated in Kashmir. And he repeated­
ly asked for more money for Ligby1 s work in London. ^  Jogen-
dra Chandra Bose went to Jammu to seek support for their
2
efforts and he wrote a pamphlet defending the Maharaja.
Lespite these activities, Government intelligence sources 
reported that sympathy in Kashmir for the Maharaja was negli- 
gible.J The Maharajafs Congress advocates worked without the 
benefit of financial aid from the Maharaja.^
The Ghose brothers somehow obtained a copy of a Foreign 
Office Confidential Minute on Kashmir, written by Sir Mortimer 
Durand, which they published, in an edited version, in their 
newspaper, the Amrita Bazar Batrika. in October 1889* Sections 
of the Patrika version were misquoted and fabricated in such 
a way that the intention of the Government of India seemed to
be to annex Kashmir while the original Minute gave no such
impression. Lord Lansdowne, characterized the Patrika version
1. Copies of these letters appear on pp.719-807, Demi-Off. 
Corresp., Pol. & Sec. Dept., Vol.3*
2. Jogendra Chandra Bose was editor of the Tribunet one of the
leaders of the Congress in the Punjab, and a former 
employee of the Maharaja1 s. The title of his pamphlet was 
Cashmere and Her Prince s An Authentic Exposition of the 
IteceirE" Imbroglio in Cashmere .
3* Extract from SecT' Report of T. and D, Dept., No.29*
17 Aug. 1889- Enclosure to Lansdowne to Cross, 19 Aug.1889, 
No.38. MSS. Eur. E.243/27.
4. Motilal Ghose, Speeches and Writings, p.146.
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as a "sheer and impudent fabrication" ;*** it is difficult to
believe, in reading the original and Patrika version side by
2
side that the intention was not malicious*
Soon after the Amrita Bazar Patrika published its 
copy of the Minute, the Government of India drafted and en­
acted a Bill to Prevent Disclosure of Official Documents and 
Information, providing penalties up to transportation for 
life for wrongfully obtaining or communicating information 
of State importance.^ Lord Lansdowne used the occasion of 
its introduction in the Imperial Legislative Coancil to ex­
pose the differences between the true copy and the Amrita
A
Bazar Patrika's copy.
The Confidential Minute on Kashmir was one of three 
highly confidential matters leaked by the Congress Press. The 
Bengalee made public Lord Bufferin's despatch outlining his
5
proposals for the expansion of the Indian Legislative Councils; 
and subsequently the Hindu of Madras printed a letter from 
its London correspondent divulging the contents of one of 
Lord Lansdowne's letters on Council reforms.^ The Government 
never discovered how these latter two items were obtained but 
William Digby was thought to have secured the Kashmir despatch
7
from the India Office ' and it is possible that he got hold
1. Speech of 17 October 1889, India Leg. Council Prog., p.272,
2. The true and the Patrika copies are enclosed to Lansdowne 
to Cross, 17 Oct.~I8ra97~No.46. MSS. Eur* E.243/27*
3# A similar law was passed in Parliament in 1889*
4# India Leg. Council Prog. 17 Oct. 1889, pp.271-76.
5. Lansdowne to Cross,14 Oct, 1889, No.46. MSS.Eur.E.243/27.
6, Lansdowne to Cross,19 May 1890, No. 76. MSS.Eur.E.243/28,
7* T. and D. Dept., C.S.B. No.551 of 1889, to Bradford,
16 Sept. 1889*, Demi-Off, Corresp., Pol,and Sec. Dept.,
Vol.3* |
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of the other two items as well* This hypothesis is supported
by the fact that Digby was the London correspondent for the
Patrika, the Bengalee, and the Hindu . ^
After the Kashmir affair, Pandit Ajudhia Nath, the
Joint^General Secretary, made a special point of dissociating
2
the Congress from Ligbyfs Political Agency, Ligby ended his 
formal connection with the Congress in 1892 when he resigned 
as Secretary to the British Committee of the Congress although 
he continued to use his Indian Political Agency. He made him­
self persona non grata with the Government of India in 1892 
by writing to the Liwan of Mysore State, asking him to settle 
certain claims with a Madras client of Ligby fs Agency. Ligby 
implied to the Liwan that he possessed great influence with 
the India Office and the House of Commons, and he expressed 
the hope that he would not be compelled to publish the details 
of the claim in the newspapers. In an interview with Ligby in 
Lecember 1892, Lord Lansdowne informed Ligby thart; the Govern­
ment of India would not tolerate any attempt to exploit the 
native Chiefs.^
1. A.C.Lethbridge, Gen.Supt. for Sup. of T. and L., to L.M. 
Stewart, Council of India, 12 Oct.1892, Confid.C.S.B. No.619 
Enclosure to Memorandum on Ligby, Lemi-Off .Corresp. ,Pol, j 
and Sec.Lept., Vol.4.
2. Report of 6th I.N.C.(l890) p*60.
3. Memorandum of an Interview between the Viceroy and Mr.
William Ligby on the 16th Lecember 1892, p.131# Lemi-Off. 
Corresp., Pol.and Sec. Lept.,Vol.5« Another friend of the
Congress, Seymour Keay, a former Radical M.P. put forward a ! 
claim in 1904 to the Nizam of Hyderabad for Rs.5,00,000 as
a reward for his efforts to have Berar returned to Hyderabad 
The Nizam repudiated the claim and the Foreign Office in­
formed Keay of its displeasure. (Col.Sir.L.W.K.Barr, Resid­
ent, Hyderabad, to Ampthill, 5 June 1904, No.66. MSS.Eur.
E.233/34/1.) Both Keay and Ligby were business men. Keay man 
aged and partly owned some cotton mills in Hyderabad; Ligby
was Chairman of Madras Electric Tramway Company.
The other possible means by which the Viceroy’s letter 
and despatch may have fallen into Indian hands is through 
W.C.Bonnerjee. In December 1895 a genuine printed copy of one 
of Lord Elgin's letters about Kashmir was found in the hands 
of one of the Ghose brothers and its contents were communi­
cated to the Maharaja of Kashmir. According to Elgin's Private 
Secretary, W.C.Bonnerjee employed an European in Calcutta for 
the purpose of obtaining copies of this and other private 
letters.^ Fortunately for the Congress, no definite proof 
was found, and Lord Elgin was denied the pleasure of putting
"one of the most prominent leaders of the Congress in the
2
dock on the charge of stealing letters."
It is not always possible to determine why or even
when individuals left the Congress. There was no formal mem­
bership, and not more than a handful of persons from any one 
province regularly made the trip to the annual sessions. Those 
that did attend were but a fraction of the Indians who read 
the pro-Congress newspapers, attended Provincial Conferences 
and protest meetings, or passively supported the Congress.
Yet it does seem that after 1890 a particular class appeared 
less often at the annual session. There were a large number 
of exceptions, but generally this group consisted of titled 
and wealthy landholders who had often attained success in a 
profession as well, and who maintained close relations with 
the European community, either socially or professionally in
1. Note by H.Babington Smith. Enclosure to Elgin to Hamilton,
10 March 1897. MSS.Eur. L.509/4.
2. Elgin to Hamilton 10 March 1897, op.cit.
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the towns, or officially with Government servants in the 
districts. This class enjoyed the special respect of much of 
the professional class from which the Congress drew most of 
its members. When a new political or literary society was 
formed, a landholder was more often than not asked to he Pres-^ 
ident and to donate funds; at most public functions this 
class was seated on the speakers1 platform; in newspaper 
accounts of public gatherings, middle class editors listed 
the names of titled and aristocratic persons first. Naturally, 
then, the defection of this class from any public movement 
would have been a setback. But this happened at the time of, 
or soon after, the adoption of militant proslytizing tactics 
by the Congress, These tactics, and the consequent disapproval 
by Government officials, may have influenced many wealthy and 
titled persons to withdraw from the Congress. It is a fact 
that the following men from Bengal did not attend the Congress 
in the decade after 1891; Sir Jotendra Mohun Tagore; Raja 
Rajendra Narain Deb, President of the Indian Association; 
Maharaja Kumar Nilkrishna Deb; Nawab Ghulam Rubbani, a member 
of the Mysore Princes family residing in the 24 Parganas;
1
Rajendralal Mitra, President of the British Indian Association; 
Peary Mohan Mukherji, Honorary Secretary of the British
1. Rajendralal Mitra was Chairman of the Reception Committee 
in 1886, the only year in which he attended the Congress. 
Prom 1856 to 1880 he served as Director of Wards Institu­
tion where he supervised the education of numerous zamin- 
dars* sons. He was a noted Orientalist and was elected 
President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1885. He 
died in 1891. G.P.Pillai, Representative Indians, pp.57-64i
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Indian Association; Syama Charan, Joyobind, and Doorga Charan 
Law, zamindars and three of Bengal's wealthiest Indian 
merchants; Sitanath Roy, zamindar, merchant and Secretary of 
the National Chamber of Commerce; Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, zam­
indar and editor of the Hindu Patriott and Raja Shashi Se- 
khareswar Roy of Tahirpur. In the rest of India, where fewer 
men of great wealth had joined the Congress than in Bengal, 
the number of defections was less dramatic* In Madras, it 
included Sir Savali Ramaswami Mudaliar, Vice President of the 
Mahajan Sabha and Sheriff of Madras, Raja Sir T. Madava Rao;^ 
P. Somasundaram Chettiar, a leader of the Madras mercantile 
community, Hazi Mahomed Abdulla Badshaw, Merchant and Vice 
President of the Central Mahomedan Association, Raja T. Rama 
Rao and P. Chentsal Rao Pantulu, zamindars and members of the 
Madras Legislative Council. Prom Northern India there was 
Sirdar Uttam Singh, landowner, banker, and political pension­
er (Lahore), Nawab Reza Ali Khan, landowner (Lucknow), and 
Nawab Shameshad Lowla, landowner (Lucknow).
This did not mean the end of the Congress connection 
with people from these social strata, for the Congress con­
tinued to receive support from the Chowdhury family of the 
24 Parganas, some of the Tagore family, Raja Benoy Krishna 
Deb, and the Maharaja of Larbhanga in Bengal; the Raja of
1. T.Madava Rao was President of the Reception Committee in 
1887, after which he did not attend the Congress. A Maratha 
Brahman, he served in high offices in the States of Travan- 
core, Indore, and Baroda. He died in 1891. G.P.Pillai, 
Representative Men of Southern India, pp.33-46.
2. See 'Ap'pendicTes 1;0 ^ongress"Reports. “
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Ramnad, Mir Humayun Jah, and his son, Nawab Syed Mahomed in 
Madras; Dyal Singh Majithia in the Punjab; and Raja Rampal 
Singh in the North West Provinces*1 Congress sessions were 
attended by other, less well-known persons of the same class 
from time to time* However, it is safe to state that fewer 
well-known representatives of the monied, titled, and landed 
classes went to the Congress after 1890 than before, and that 
those who did go vrere the exceptions.
There are other reasons why the Congress attendance in 
the years 1890 and 1893 was smaller than in 1888 and 1889* The 
sense of mission which showed itself in the first years slack­
ened* When officials expressed disapproval of the Congress 
pamphlets, some members had second thoughts about their cam­
paign among the masses. Although the 1888 Congress rejected
2
a proposed resolution repudiating the pamphlets, no serious 
further effort to involve the masses in the Congress was made 
for many years# There was also a feeling that by 1889 one of 
the main functions of the Congress had been "accomplished11, 
namely, the consolidation of Indian public opinion. As British 
officials in India "as a body deny utterly the justice of our 
contentions," the Congress was advised to begin what Wedder- 
burn called a "flanking movement" or the education of the 
English electorate in the Congress platform. Accordingly the
1, See below, pp. A#ty-cW.
2. Lansdowne to Cross, 11 Dec.1888. No.l. MSS.Eur.E.243/26. 
Lansdowne also wrote that he was told by some Indians in 
Bombay that they had quit the Congress on account of its 
intemperate claims.
3# These ideas were expressed in Hume's letter to Congress- 
leaders in February 1889. Wedderburn, Hume, pp.85-6.
1890 Congress resolved to hold the 1892 Congress in London,^ 
The possibility of carrying out that project was not great 
for the expense would have been prohibitive and many Congress
2
members feared the loss of caste which a sea voyage entailed. 
However, not only was the matter discussed, it was also sug­
gested that the Congress in India should suspend its sctivi-
3
ties in India until after the English session of the Congress, 
Although the English session was never held, steps were 
taken in 1889 to enlarge the sphere of nationalist influence 
in England, The British Committee of the Indian National 
Congress was formed on 27 July 1889, with Wedderburn as its 
chairman and Digby as its Secretary to supervise the accounts 
and activities of the Indian Political Agency.^ After the 
Political Agency was disowned by the Congress, the British 
Committee became the sole official Congress organ in England, 
The first move towards reviving the Indian Parliamentary Com­
mittee was also made in 1889 when a meeting was held at the
1. Resolution xi.
2. This was shown in the debate in the 1889 Congress on an 
amendment moved by John Adam, Principal of Pachiappa's Col­
lege, Madras, to the resolution asking that examinations 
for the Indian Civil Service be held simultaneously in 
England and India. Adam's amendment recommended that can­
didates who succeeded in the Indian examination should pro­
ceed to England for further training so that they would be 
familiar with Western society, culture, and political inst­
itutions before being finally admitted into the Civil Ser­
vice. But the amendment, which would have restored the res­
olution to the form in which it was passed in 1885, was 
dropped when the idea of sea voyage was strongly opposed. 
Report of the 4th I.N.C., 27-38.
3. S.N.&anerjea1s Speech, Report of the 7th I.N.C.(1891)p »11*
4. Resolution xiii(d) of 1889 formally approved the appoint­
ment of the British Committee.
National Liberal Club under the Presidency of George Yule."1" 
The Committee had originally been started in 1883 with the 
assistance of John Bright "to secure ‘combined Parliamentary 
action in matters affecting Indian public interests1," but it
p
began to function in July 1893 for the first time*
The small number of M.P. *s active in the Parliamentary
Committee received information on Indian affairs from the
British Committee of the Congress and were often assisted by
it in their election campaigns* The British Committee also
organized public meetings and lecture tours for Indians
visiting England and for other people interested in Indian
reform. It published a newspaper, India, which was intended
to be "a store-house from which arms and materials are
supplied to all those who are willing to strike a blow on
behalf of India".^ The weakness of the Congress movement in
India after 1890 may partly be explained by the existence of
India, the British Committee of the Congress, and the Indian
Parliamentary Committee, and by the under-lying belief that
the main hope for Indian reform resided in England rather
than in India.
Another of the Congress objectives was fulfilled in
its early years when the numbers and privileges of the Indian
members of the Legislative Councils were increased by the
Indian Councils Act of 1892. There was dissatisfaction that
1. Wedderburn's Speech, Report of the 5th I.N.C.(1889). p.8. 
George Yule was a Calcutta merchant who presided over the 
1888 Congress,
2* India, Vol.vii, No.5. (May 1896). p,133.
3. Wedderburn, Hume, p.97.
eve/i
the right of election and provision forAgreater freedom of
discussion and criticism were not explicitly included in the
Act,'*’ but nevertheless, the Congress had gained a major
victory, and many Congressmen were returned to the reformed 
2
Councils. Peelings of resentment against the Government for 
excluding Indians from responsible positions were also blunted 
by the fact that eight other persons associated with the 
Congress served as High Court Judges between 1885 and 1905:
M. G. Ranade, K.T. Telang, N. G. Chandavankar, Badruddin Tyabji, 
R.C. Mitter, Guru Das Banerji, C. Sankara Hair and
S. Subramania Iyer.
A.O. Hume, who had been responsible more than any other 
individual for the success of the early Congresses, left India 
before the 1892 session, and no effective organizer with an 
all India influence emerged in his place. The person who 
might have filled the role, M.G.Ranade, stated in 1892 that he 
intended to retire from the High Court after a year or two 
and devote most of his time to Congress work. He did not how­
ever, and, as P. Ananda Charlu said, "the withdrawal by Mr.
1. See, for instance, Resol.I of l893i Resol.IX(b) of 1894,
Resol.II of 1895, Surendra Nath Banerjea's Presidential 
Speech at the 1895 Congress.
2. Including the following from 1893 to 1899: P.Rangiya Naidu, 
P.Ananda Charlu, C.Sankara Nair, Kaliana Sudaram Iyer, 
N.Subba Rao Pantulu, A.Subapathy Mudaliar, C.Vijayayaghava- 
chariar, P.Ratnasabhapati Pillai, C.Jambulingam Mudaliar, 
Raja Rampal Singh, Pandit Bishambar Nath, G.M.Chitnavis,
Guru Prasad Sen, the Maharaja of Darbhanga, Sali gram Singh, 
Surendra Nath Banerjea, W.C.Bonnerjee, lal Mohun Ghose, 
Kalicharan Banerjea, Norendra Nath Sen, Ananda Mohun Bose, 
Pherozeshah Mehta, V.R.Natu, C.H.Setalvad, R.M.Sayani, 
J.U.Yajnik, D.A.Khare,. Balchandra Krishna Bhatavadekar, 
G.K.Parekh, D.S.Garud, and B.G.Tilak.
Hume of the loving and loveable despotism... told upon our
efficiency11.^ The occasion of Hume's departure was not wholly
pleasant, for Hume had been discouraged by the failure of the
2
Congress to provide funds for its work. He also found him­
self at odds with the moderates in the Congress over the 
inevitability of an agrarian revolution. In a circular to 
Congress leaders on 16 February 1892, he said that "no 
earthly power can stem an universal agrarian rising in a 
country like this" and when it comes, "there will be no lack 
of leaders".^ The circular attracted much attention in both 
England and India, and the British Committee of the Congress 
communicated a resolution which it had passed to the London 
Times, dissociating itself from the "unjustifiable conclu­
sions" to which Hume appeared to have been driven "in face of
the consideration of the deplorable condition of large
4portions of the Indian people." Hume returned to India once 
again and, in his final parting speech on 18 March 1894, he 
warned the Congress supporters that they would face a period 
of reaction against the rising tide of democracy. He told 
them not to become despondent but to acquire "that habit of
1. P. Ananda Charlu, "The Indian National Congress: A Retro­
spect" Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachart Vol.viii, 
Nos. 1 and 2 { July .Aug. 1903), pp.26-21.
2. Naoroji wrote to Wacha on 23 December 1891 that "Hume is 
discouraged for want of funds. It will be disastrous to 
India if he gives up." Quoted by Masani, Naoroji, p.312.
3- Quoted by Masani, Naoro.ji. p.313.
4. Ibid, p.314. Tilak, through the Kesari, was one of the few 
Congress editors to support Hume 1s pre diction. Pradhan and 
Bhagwat, Tilak, p.79*
O  n
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unwavering persistence that as a nation you so sadly lack*
He said also that "a want of a due conception of the sanctity
of a promise ... is the characteristic sin of the East....
I speak from painful experience - men promise, promise, 
promise - no doubt in all good faith; hut when the time comes 
for performance, how often do they allow any trifle to inter­
vene, to prevent their redeeming their word?fr^ In the years 
1894 to 1904, there was little cause for Hume to change his 
estimate of the Congress membership*
The Congress drew its membership from, roughly speaking, 
three groups in Indian society - the professional classes, the 
landholding classes, and the commercial classes* In Upper 
India the landholding classes, for the most part, did not 
join the Congress and often opposed it* But they lacked the 
organization and education to form an effective opposition 
party. In Bengal, however, an organized alternative to the 
Congress existed in the form of the British India Association, 
the zamindars1 political organ. There, at least until the 
founding of the Congress, the landholding community, through 
its size, wealth, education, and proximity to the seat of 
government, exercised greater influence on the Government of 
India than any other vested interest in any other Province.
1. Mr. A.0.Hume's Farewell to India, pp. 13-16.
2. Ibid.pp.l9-£0. It is clear from the context and from N.G.
Chandavarkar1s speech (p.23) that Hume was referring
to Congress funds.
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As the Congress had been started after the Ilhert Bill con­
troversy, similarly, the British Indian Association was 
founded in 1851 soon after a successful agitation by the 
Anglo-Indian community against proposals to reduce the racial
privileges held by Europeans in the matter of the jurisdiction
1of law courts over criminal cases. The British Indian Ass­
ociation made what was probably the first attempt to bring
political agitation in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras under a
2
common organization, and as the Congress did in later years, 
it maintained a paid agency in London from 1852 to 1856 for 
the purpose of influencing Parliament. In time, however, 
the Association became increasingly identified with the land­
owning interest, it criticised the Government with increasing-
4
ly less vigour and independence, and it turned down suggest­
ions that its membership fees should be lowered to meet
5
middle class complaints of inability to pay.
1. Bimanbehari Majumdar, History of Political Thought from 
Rammohun to Bayananda (182l-o4)+ Vol.i, pp.174-76.
2* See Sujata Ghosh, "The British Indian Association (1851- 
1900)". Report of the Regional Records Survey Committee 
for West Bengal (19$7-5bT, p.4i0.
also, Iris M7Jones, TSejSrigins and Development to 1892 
of the Indian National Congress (unpublished London 
(Thesis, M.A. , 1947), pp. 165-66.
3* Ibid., p.168. Also Sujata Ghosh, op.cit,, p.22.
4. In its radical, younger days, the British Indian Associa­
tion took a leading part in the demand for more favourable 
working conditions and legal rights for the indigo planta­
tion ryots, after the Indigo disturbances of 1859-60, It 
also gave financial assistance to Rev. James Long in the 
Nil Larpan case, Sujata Ghosh "The British Indian Associa­
tion and the Indigo Disturbances in Bengal,"
Indian Historical Records Commission! Proceedings, 
Yol.xxxiv, Part Tl, (Dec.1958) pp.141-42,
5. Jogesh Chandra Bagal, History of the Indian Association 
1876-1951, p.9.
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Debarred from joining the British Indian Association 
and feeling a need for an organization of their own, members 
of the middle class founded two political societies in 1876, 
the Indian Association and the short-lived Indian League* The 
establishment of the Indian Association was welcomed by the 
British Indian Association "in an openly patronising manner 
Soon, though, major differences divided the two during the 
discussions about the Bengal Tenancy Bill in the early 1880fs 
when members of the Indian Association first supported the 
principle of tenancy protection and then criticised the Gov­
ernment for compromising with the zamindars before the Bill 
2
was enacted. Resentful of middle class complaints of zamin- 
dari oppression, the British Indian Association withheld its 
assistance from the National Conference, organized by the 
Indian Association, in 1883. Then the passing of the Bengal $
Tenancy Act in 1885 removed this source of dissension and it 
claered the way for co-operation between the two associations 
at the Congress Session at Calcutta in 1886.^
The British Indian Association entered the Congress 
with the understanding that delegates from various local poli­
tical bodies would meet once a year at the Congress, formulate 
a general policy on issues of national importance, and then 
disband for twelve months, "leaving the execution of that 
policy" to the individual local organizations. After a
1. Sujata Ghosh, "The British Indian Association, 1851-1900", 
op.cit,, p.41.
2. Bagal, op.cit., pp.70-72.
3. Ibid, p.64.
4# See Report of the 2nd I.N.C. p.10.
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constitution was drafted in 1888 which would have converted 
the Congress into "a separate and permanent organization'1, 
the British Indian Association informed the Congress "that 
while the Association had co-operated with the Congress for 
the past three years and would do so in the future, it def­
initely objected to the tentative" constitution* The delegates 
from the Association tried without success to have a resolu­
tion adopted by the 1888 Congress embodying their view that 
the functions of the Congress should be limited and in the 
following year the Association instructed its delegates to 
participate only in the discussion of the expansion of the 
Legislative Councils and the extension of the Permanent 
Settlement*^" As already noted, after 1889 contact between 
the Congress and the wealthier Bengal zamindars decreased*
Despite a certain amount of jealousy and difference of 
opinion on the role of the Congress, the cleavage was by no 
means as clear-cut as the division between Congress support­
ers and the aristocracy in the Punjab and the North West 
Provinces and Oudh* On a large number of issues the Indian 
Association and the British Indian Association were agreed in 
principle, if not in degree, in opposition to the Governments 
of India and Bengal, and in some agitations, such as that for 
the Indianization of the Civil Service, joint consultations 
were held, with Surendra Nath Banerjea attending meetings of
p
the British Indian Association's Managing Committee* But
1* Sujata Ghosh "The British Indian Association(1851-1900)", 
op.cit. pp.42-3*
2* Ibid* p.4-1*
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the application of the elective system under the Councils of
1892 brought the Bengali zamindars into frequent opposition
to the Bengali Congress leaders of the Indian Association,
In the first Bengal Council elections, in 1893, only
two of the six Indians elected were known as zamindars,'** and
2
one of these, Maharaja Jagadendranath Roy of Nat ore, was 
nominated after the Government had disallowed the election of 
a lawyer whose residency qualifications were held inadequate. 
Of the six, four were important members of the Congress: 
Surendra Nath Banerjea, Ananda Mohan Bose, W.C.Bonnerjee, 
and the Maharaja of Darbhanga; one was a Muslim; and only 
the Maharaja of Natore belonged to the British Indian 
Association.
In the second elections, in 1895, not a single import­
ant zamindar candidate was successful as four lawyers and a 
newspaper editor (S.N.Banerjea) were returned. Ananda Mohun 
Bose defeated Rajkumar Sarvadhikari for the University seat 
and Guru Prasad Sen, another Congress leader, was elected 
after his opponent, Raja Surjakanta Ac hare a Chowdhury of
1* Not including Ananda Mohun Bose, who came from a family 
owning estates in Sylhet and Myensingh and who himself 
owned a tea plantation. Hem Chandra Sarkar, A Life of 
Ananda Mohan Bose, p,2.
The Government of Bengal and the British Indian Association! 
in deprecating the successes of the professional classes 
in elections, invariably ignored the fact that many middle 
class politicians owned zamindaris.
2. The Maharaja was at various times closely associated with 
the middle class nationalists. He presided over the 1892 
protest meeting against the Bengal Municipal Bill, he was 
Chairman of the Reception Committees of the 1897 Bengal 
Provincial Conference and the 1901 Indian National 
Congress. He also became Secretary of the Bengal Land­
holders Association. Bengalee, 14 Pec. 1901.
Mymensingh withdrew.*1 The key contest was for the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation’s seat between S.N.Banerjea, Secretary
of the Indian Association and the favourite of the Congress
press in Bengal, and Kalinath Hitterf who was supported by
the British Indian Association, the Hindu Patriot, the
2
Englishman, and the Pioneer. After Banerjea won, by 41 votes
*5
to 23, the Pioneer alleged that he had received the votes
of persons acting ’’under the terror of immediate personal
pressure and the horror of being shown up in a certain native
newspaper”, and it stigmatized the voting system as ”a
4.
scandal and a deception". The Hindu Patriot commented 
similarly, attributing Banerjeafs victory, firstly, to his 
bullying of Municipal Councillors by threatening to expose 
them in the press and, secondly, to Kalinath Mitter’s 
"resolute contempt for the vulgar arts of the professional 
canvasser11.^ The Amrita Bazar Patrika suggested that zam­
indars should not be returned to the Legislative Councils, 
because, it said, being in possession of large estates, they 
would not act independently of the Government and the District 
officials.^ The Bengalee resolutely opposed this argument,
1. Bengalee, 27 July 1895* Previously a candidate from 
another old family - Sitanath Roy of the Bhagyakal family- 
had withdrawn from the contest* Bengalee, 27 April 1895.
2. Ibid. 8 June 1895#
3. Later in the year, when the Bengal Legislative Council was 
about to select one of its members for a seat on the 
G-overnor General's Legislative Council, Banerjea withdrew 
his candidacy, leaving the field clear for the election
of the Maharaja of Darbhanga. Ibid. 26 Oct. 1895*
4. Quoted by the Bengalee, 1 June 1895.
5. Quoted from the Madras Standard by the Bengalee, 15 June 
1895. ---------------- --- -----
6. Bengalee, 8 June 1895.
saying that "r e present at ive Government means a Government
that is representative of all classes. The zamindars form a
most important class of the community. To exclude them from
our Councils is to declare that representative institutions
1
are an impossibility in this country," Despite this senti­
ment, the elections indicated a decisive victory for the 
middle class Congress candidates over their moderate, upper 
class opponents.
There was talk of starting a new moderate party in 
Bengal* A meeting was held at the Calcutta Town Hall to dis­
cuss the possibility, and the Hindu Patriot backed the pros­
pect with an editorial entitled "The Parting of the Waters". 
The General Superintendent of the Thagi and Dakoiti Depart­
ment reported that he knew of no other "such definite change 
of opinion... among the leaders of Native Opinion and this
may be the beginning of a new departure, which will probably
pbe echoed in the [other] Provinces."
The new Moderate Party did not materialize but most of
the larger Bengali zamindars remained outside the Congress.
At the time of the 1897 Council elections, when again not a
single zamindari candidate was elected, the Hindu Patriot
explained why the zamindars did not join the Congress.
"The chief cause, in our opinion, has been the 
attitude of the so-called leaders of the people 
towards the zemindars. Many of the former look
Bengalee, 18 May 1895.
2. lit. Col,A.S.Lethbridge to H.Babington Smith, 1 July 1895# 
Register No.413B. MSS.Eur. P.84.
3. One of the successful candidates, Saligram Singh, a Vakil 
occasionally practising in Calcutta, did own land.
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upon the latter in the same light in which the 
followers of Tom Mann and John Burns look upon 
the territorial magnates1 of Great Britain,..,.
In the elections to the Council or to Municipal­
ities, the zemindars have seldom received even the 
scantiest support from the rising village politi­
cians, The zemindar is approached only when money 
is wanted.M 1
The 1892 Councils Act, Besides ending the predominance of
the landholding classes in the Bengal Legislative Council, had
considerably reduced the relative strength of the landholders
in the other Provincial and the Governor-General *s Legislative
Councils. Before the 1892 Act, in the Governor-General1s
Legislative Council, from 1862 to 1888, out of a total of 36
Indian members, 23 had been landholders and only 3 had been
lawyers while in the same period 17 Indians on the Bengal
Council had been diwans, zamindars, or zaminadri agents, and
9 had been in the legal profession. In Madras the balance
between landholding and professional interests had been
roughly even; in Bombay, the number of merchants had been
equal to the number of zamindars, sirdars, Chiefs, Amirs,
Nawabs, and ex-diwans. In the North West Provinces and Oudh,
where a Legislative Council was established in 1887, 3 of the
2
first 4 Indians to receive appointments were landholders.
By contrast, after the passing of the Councils Act, 
from 1893 to 1907, the District Boards in Bengal, Bombay, 
Madras, and the North West Provinces failed to return, as the
1. Quoted by the Bengalee, 26 June 1897.
2. Pari.Accounts ana Papers 1890, Vol.liv, C.5950(42). 
Statement of the Additional Members of the Councils of the 
Governor General, Bengal, Bombay, Madras, and the North 
West Provinces and Oudh for making laws and Regulations.
Government had intended, representatives from the landed 
classes. Instead, they returned, out of 54 Councillors, 36 
barristers and pleaders and only 10 landholders. In the elec-r 
tions by District Municipalities to the 4 Provincial Councils, 
40 out of 43 members chosen were barristers or pleaders. This 
imbalance was partially corrected through Government appoint­
ments, so that, of all the 338 non-official members returned
to the reformed Legislative Councils, 77 (22$) were land­
owners while 123 (36$) were lawyers.***
The success of the lawyers in elections to the Legis­
lative Councils may be explained by several factors. The 
Bombay Government was of the opinion that:
“Merchants, bankers and land-holders have, as a 
rule, only a purely local influence which does 
not extend beyond their own town or district, 
whereas a pleader, and notably a High Court 
Pleader, possesses influence in various districts, 
understands the art of canvassing and ...has the
support and good-will of his brother lawyers at
the various centres of the Divisions’1.
Pleaders, too, were often more capable and better educated 
than the men of other vocations who did, it should be remem­
bered, constitute the majority of the District Boards and 
Municipalities in most areas. The Arundel Committee said in
1. Report of the Committee Appointed to consider reforms in 
The Indian Councils (Arundel Committee), para. 45*
MSS. Eur. D.573/29# Also P.P.Cd. 4435 of 1908, East India 
(Advisory and Legislative Councils.) Vol.II, Part I,
Replies of the Local Governments. Sir Harold Stuart, Offfg 
Sec. to Govt, of India, to Ch.Secs, of Prov.Gov’ts. 24 Aug. 
1907# Home Dept. Public, Enclosure No.l to letter from 
Gov’t of India, No.21, 10 Oct. 1908.
2. S.W.Edgerley, Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Leg.Dept, to Sec* 
to Govt, of India, Home Dept.,12 April 1899# para.3#
July Prog. No.20. I.H.P.Pub.Vol.5639*
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its Report in 1907, 1 that "the more stable elements of the
community" were not always willing to run for office because
canvassing for votes was regarded as derogratory and, more
importantly, these elements would not risk defeat by persons
2
of inferior social status.
The issue of representation came to a head in 1898 
when the Government of Bengal introduced and passed a Bill 
to amend the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. This Bill, which had 
been demanded by the Bengal zamindars, was intended to ease 
some of the restrictions placed on the realization and en­
hancement of rents by the Tenancy Act of 1885. During the 
debate in the Legislative Council on the Amendment Bill three 
of the elected members, Surendra Nath Banerjea, Kali Charan 
Banerjea, and Norendra Nath Sen, opposed the Bill as being 
harmful to the interests of the ryots because it gave zamin­
dars and their agents new opportunities to raise their tenants' 
rents. The Secretary of the Bengal Revenue Department,
Michael Finucane, who had himself edited the Tenancy Act of 
1885, rejected the amendments moved by the three members who, 
he said "represent the popular view". "There is scarcely a 
single alteration proposed in the law in favour of zamindars
which", he complained, "one or other of those Hon'ble Members
4is not prepared to strike out". And the amendments were
1. "Report of the Committee appointed to consider reforms 
in the Indian Councils", signed by A.T.Arundel, Denzil 
Ibbetson, H. Erie Richards, and E.N.Baker. MSS.Eur.D.573/29.
2. Ibid. para. 46.
3. Bengal Leg. Council Prog., 2 April 1898, pp.66-82.
4. Ibid., p.68.
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defeated.
H.H.Risley declared in the Legislative Council two
days later that the stand of the three Bengali members was
further proof that the elective system
"gives undue prominence to a section of the 
community - Young Bengal, New India - whatever 
you choose to call it, the soi-disant democratic 
section of a society which, from -top to bottom,
is essentially undemocratic It leaves the
elder generation and those who follow in their 
steps out in the cold.....It does not give us, 
as a rule, either here or in the Mufassal, the 
genuine representative Hindus, the men we really 
want. " 1
One of the justifications used for not granting greater 
representation to Indians in the Legislative Councils was 
that only British officials understood and sympathized with
the needs of the Indian "people" so distinct from the Indian
2
"classes". The corollary to this common assumption was that 
the interests of educated Indians were in basic conflict with 
the interests of the remainder of Indian society. Yet the 
issue was not as clear-cut as officials tended to assume. In 
Bengal in 1885 and 1898, the Government yielded to the 
pressure of the zamindars over tenancy legislation despite
1. Ibid, 4 April 1898, pp.195-96.
2. See Dufferin to Cross, 20 March 1887, No.33* MSS.Eur.
E.243/22.
Also Lansdowne to Cross, 12 Feb. 1889, No.10. MSS.Eur.
E.243/265 Curzonfs Farewell Address to Byculla Club, Bombay, 
16 Nov. 1905. Lord Curzon in India, Being a Selection From 
His Speeches As TTceroy and Governor-General of India 
ldi'8-ig05t eci. Sir Thomas Raleigh/ p.Sb5; Cf.N.Curzon, 
'British Government in India The Story of The Viceroys 
and Government Houses, p. 131; and Govt, of India Despatch 
to Sec. of State, 21 March 1907, No.7 of 1907.
Govt, of India, Home Dept, pub., MSS.Eur.D.573/29.
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the protests of the Bengalee and a minority of the middle- 
class nationalists*1
The British Indian Association and another land­
holders1 organization, the Zamindari Panchayet, reacted sharp­
ly to the pro-ryot stand of the elected members of the Bengal 
Legislative Council in 1898* In representations to the Gov­
ernment, they requested the right to return a representative
2
of zamindari interests direct to the Council. The British 
India Association maintained that the Regulations issued under 
the 1892 Councils Act had in effect withdrawn from the Assoc­
iation the privilege of electing a member of the Council, a 
privilege of "long established usage, sanctioned by the 
action, of successive Lieutenant-Governors1 who had appointed 
or recommended members of the British Indian Association to 
the Indian and Bengal Councils 39 times between 1863 and 1892*. 
In 1893 the Association had asked for the right under the new
1. Rokeya Rahman, Social and Administrative Policy of the Gov- 
ernment of Bengal: 1877-1890 (unpublished London Thesis,
K X “ T953T p p34'2-43 i------
Also, Bagal, op.cit* pp.5Off.; Bengalee, 2 April 1898.
There can be few times when the Government of India modi­
fied a Bill in response to Indian opinion as radically as 
it did the Bengal Tenancy Bill between 1883 and 188?. In 
the face of zamindari opposition, sections providing pro­
tection to ryots in regard to occupancy rights, compensa­
tion for ejectment, and enhancement of rent were omitted. 
C.E.Buckland, Bengal Under the Lieutenant Governors, p.811.
2. Pransankar Roy Chaudhuri, Hon.Sec., Zamindary Panchayet,
to Gov. Gen. of India, 8 Oct.1898. Nov.Prog.No. 118., I.H.P* 
Pub., Vol.5414* Rai Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, Sec*,British 
India Assn., to Ch.Sec. Govt, of Bengal, 30 April 1898.
Nov.Prog.No.114# Ibid.
3. Ibid., para 12, The names of these members are contained in 
Appendix B. This evidence indicates that Indians were 
elected in certain cases to the Legislative Councils even 
before the Councils Act of 1892.
Regulations to recommend members to the reformed Council, and 
although the Viceroy, in his reply, refused to grant that 
right, he did say that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal 
"intends ordinarily to consult the British Indian Association 
and other bodies of land-holders, and the Governor-General 
in Council has no doubt that the recommendations of the Asso­
ciation will receive full consideration at the hands of the 
Government." Despite this assurance, the British Indian Asso­
ciation had not been consulted since the Councils Act of 1892 
was passed.^-
When it received the zamindars1 representations, the 
Government of India agreed to re-examine the position of the 
landed interests in the Legislative Councils. The Provincial 
Governments were asked whether or not the Regulations issued 
under the 1892 Councils Act had given an undesirable pre­
ponderance to the professional classes and, in particular, to 
the legal profession. The Bombay Government replied that in 
the Bombay Council, the only seat held by landed interests 
was that reserved for the large jagirdars and zamindars of 
Sind. The landholdings of the Presidency proper were usually 
small and the peasant proprietors seldom spoke English, so 
that, in the absence of suitable candidates, the official
members of Council had to be relied upon to safeguard the
2
landed interests.
1* Ibid. para. 15.
2. S.W.Edgerley, Sec., Govt, of Bombay, Leg.Dept.,to Sec.,
Govt, of India, Home Dept., 12 April 1899? para 2.
July Prog. No.20., I.H.P.,Pub., Vol.5639.
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The Governments of the North West Provinces and Oudh 
and Madras each nominated to their Councils a land-holder to 
represent his class. This arrangement was held to he suffic­
ient in the North West Provinces and Oudh;^" the Madras Gov­
ernment did not helieve that the landholders* seat was an 
adequate measure of the influence which that class possessed 
in the Madras Council*
"There is a most intimate connection between the 
professional classes and the richer Government 
ryots, the former being to a very large extent 
recruited from the latter and constantly investing 
their savings in the purchase of land*"
Although all five of the elected Indian members were lawyers, 
the Government of Madras thought that "no better representat­
ives could possibly be found for the interests of the Govern-
2
ment ryots"* With the zamindars, also, "the legal members 
are closely associated, because investment in small zamindaris 
coming into the market is much in favour with the professional 
classes."^ In fact since 1893, the legal members had defended 
zamindari interests with greater ability than the zamindars 
themselves could have* But the Madras Government also made it 
clear that some of the legal members supported the interests
4
of the ryots*
1* J*0*Miller, Ch*Sec* ,Govt. of N.W.P.& 0., to Sec* Govt, of 
India, July Prog.No.16. Ibid.
2* H.Tremenheere, Sec.,Govt* of Port St.George. Leg.Dept., to 
Sec*, Govt, of India, Home Dept., 31 Jan. 1&99, para 6.
July Prog. No.17* Ibid*
3. The per centage of the numbers of the legal class who owned 
-land in Madras in 1891 was stated to be 18.98$. In Bombay ■ 
it was 13*57$ and in the North West Provinces it was 15*16$. 
General Report on the Census of India, 1891, p.116.
4. Ibid.', para.7.
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The result of these enquiries was, then, that only in
Bengal was it possible and desirable to increase the represent
tation of the landholding classes. This was effected by taking
one of the two seats previously assigned to the mofussil muni-?
cipalities and giving it ta the Bengal zamindars.^ However,
before this change was announced, hostilities were opened by
the zamindars against the active Congress supporters in
Bengal for the attitude of some of them towards the Bengal
Tenancy Act Amendment Bill.
Raja poaiy Mohan Mukherji made a speech at the 1898
annual meeting of the British India Association in which he
denounced the Congress and advised the Government to remember
that !,men of wealth and station, men who have a large stake
in the country, are the real pillars of State, that anything
which strikes at their influence and authority reacts on the
strength of the Government11, whose stability depended upon
2
the maintenance of "social gradations". The Hindu Patriot 
urged young officials "to mix freely not with the noisy agi­
tators, who know more of the exploits of a Garibaldi or a 
Mazzini than of every-day life of the dwellers in huts and 
hovels who constitute the nation, but with the local aristoc­
racy" who are alone familiar with the needs and condition of
the local population.^ The Congress newspapers, including
a 5
the Bengalee , the Amrita Bazar Patrika, the Hindu, the
1. Gov.Gen. in Council to Sec. of State, 6 July 1899.para.5* 
July Prog. No.21. Ibid.
2. Quoted in Bengalee, 6 Aug. 1898.
3. Quoted from the Hindu of Madras by the Bengalee, 14 May 1898
4. Bengalee, 18 June 1898.
5. Bengalee, 25 June 1898.
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1 2 Madras Standard and the Advocate, denounced the British
Indian Association and the Hindu Patriot for their unpatriotic 
attitude, and in particular, for their support of the Calcutta 
Municipal Bill, which was at that time before the public.
Before Lieutenant-G-overnor Mackenzie left Bengal in 
April 1898, he informed Elgin that he had "not failed to 
accentuate1 the split between the two parties in Bengal, a 
split which he regarded as "a great gain".^ In reply to a 
farewell address, Mackenzie told the British Indian Associa­
tion that democratic notions, if pushed to an extreme in 
India, would cause trouble* He said he thought the Associa­
tion had fallen "into strange company of late, but I trust 
this was only a temporary aberration. No doubt times change 
and circumstances alter, " he went on in an obvious reference 
to the tenancy legislation, "and you, gentlemen, are the best 
judges of who are your friends, and who are your enemies."^
One of the most serious aspects of the split from the 
Congress point of view was the possibility that zamindari 
contributions to Congress funds might cease. It was a real 
possibility, for the Hindu Patriot, in commenting on the 
Bengalee 1s support of ryot interests, declared that the zam­
indars "will remember it when the hat is again sent round to 
them for the benefit of the microscopic minority the sole
Bengalee, 9 July 1898.
2. Bengalee, 18 June 1898.
3. Mackenzie to Elgin, 5 April 1898, Appendix No.xx. MSS.Eur. 
P. 84/72#
4. Statesman. 14 April 1898.
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ambition of which seems to be to secure monopoly of repre­
sentation in the Legislative Council*"1
The Indian middle class had relied heavily for its 
public activities in the second half of the 19th century on 
the patronage of the Indian chiefs and zamindars. For example, 
a number of nationalist newspapers had received pecuniary 
assistance. Rai Jaiprakash Lai, Diwan of the Dumroan Raj, 
gave funds for the maintenance of the Behar Herald which was 
edited by Guru Prasad Sen, for years the most active Congress 
worker in Bihar. The Indian Mirror was started in 1861 by 
Manmohan Ghose with money supplied by Debendranath Tagore.
Byal Singh Majithia, the very wealthy Sirdar who was known to 
finance most political movements in the Punjab,^ set up the 
Tribune Press and continued to pay for its operation for many
5
years. Raja Benoya Krishna Deb helped Surendra Nath Banerjea
convert the Bengalee from a weekly into a daily in 1899.^ And
Raja Rampal Singh of Kalahankar supported the Hindustani of 
7Lucknow. '
Another common form of assistance received by the 
middle class from zamindars and Chiefs was money for living,
1. Quoted from the Hindu of Madras by the Bengalee, 11 June
1898.    --
2* Bengalee, 21 Oct. and 25 Dec. 1900.
3, lioke Nath Ghose, The Modern History of the Indian Chiefs, 
Rajas, Zamindars, Part II, pp.76-79.
4. Statesman, 29 "Sept. 1898.
5* Lajpat Rai Nair and Prem. Nath Kirpal, Dyal Singh Majithia 
(A Short Biographical Sketch), pp.46, 90-91.
6. Surendra Nath Banerjea7 A Nation in Making, pp. 144-45.
7. Bengalee, 25 Dec. 1900.
studying, and travelling outside of India* The Raja of Bhinga 
established a scholarship for Kshatriyas to study at Oxford 
or Cambridge;^ the Raja of Ramnad sent Vivekananda to the
p
Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893; Sir Muncherji
Bhownagree drew an annual pension from Bhownagar State while
*
he was in the House of Commons;*' the Raja of Vizianagram was
believed to have given Rs.5,000 towards Surendra Nath Baner-
jeafs expenses as a member of the Congress delegation to
England in 1890;^ Dadabhai Naoroji started the East India
Association in London in 1866 to represent the nationalist
cause with donations from the Gaekwar of Baroda, Holkar of
Indore, Sindia of Gwalior and the Rao of Cutch.^ In 1873 the
Gaekwar of Baroda gave Rs.50,000 to Naoroji for various serv­
er
ices he had performed in London.
It is therefore not surprising that the Congress 
itself received considerable money from the landed and titled 
classes, and that even a partial withdrawal of that money was 
a matter of serious financial concern for the Congress.
Congress expenditure falls under two headings: the
1. C.H.Rao, Indian Biographical Dictionary. 1915, p.45*
2. Bengal District (xazatteers, Efowrah. (1909) by L.S.S.O'Malley 
and Monmohan Chakravarty, p.48.
3. Bengalee, 25 Aug. 1900.
4. Note by C.S.Bayley, 18 June 1899, Enclosure to Curzon to 
Hamilton 28 June 1899, MSS.Eur. D.570/2. However Banerjea 
says in a passage of his autobiography which is seemingly 
intended to show his self-sacrifice that he cashed Rs.4,000 
worth of Government securities to finance his trip. This 
was, according to Banerjea, the larger part of his and his 
wife's only savings. S.N.Banerjea, A Nation in Making,p.Ill,
5* Famous Parsis? Biographical and Critical Sketches,
G.A.Natesan, (ed.) p.lit).
6. Masani, Naoroji, p.137.
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money spent on the annual session and, when it was kept up,
the Joint General Secretary's establishment,^ and secondly,
money spent on agitation in England. Each of the annual
sessions between 1897 and 1903 cost the Reception Committee
between Rs.30,000 and Rs.50,000. This included the cost of
the pandal, decorations, and sometimes lodgings and food for
the delegates. Some of this expenditure was recouped from
fees collected from the delegates and visitors although the
practice of waiving fees for certain groups restricted that
inc ome s ome what •
The Reception Committee in the host city bore the sole
financial responsibility for the annual meeting. The Chairman
of the Reception Committee was usually a Brahman, a wealthy
or titled person, an ex-Government servant, or, in other
words, someone possessing influence with a wide range of 
2
classes. Greater publicity was given to contributions to the 
Congress in its early years than later when contributors 
became reluctant to be known to the Government as Congress
1. After Hume left India, from 1892 to 1894, no money was 
assigned by the Congress to the Joint General Secretary 
and his clerical staff, and from 1895 to 1898, a lump sum 
was designated for the British Committee, India, and the 
Joint General Secretary*s Office, The evidence suggests, 
however, that in these years there was very little activity 
or expenditure by the Joint General Secretary.
See Resolutions m i l  of 1895, XXII of 1896, XIX of 1897, 
and XXV of 1898.
2. In 1905, the prototype of this person was found. He was 
Munshi Madho Lai. He was a Brahman, a lawyer, a banker, a 
landholder, an ex-judge, and a member of the U.P.Legisla­
tive Council. He donated Rs.5,000 to the Congress and 
Industrial Exhibition funds.
Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.xi, No.3* 
(Mar.l9Q5j« p.£83. Also. C.H.Rao, Indian Biographical 
Dictionary, 1915t p.261.
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supporters,'*' Nevertheless it is possible to suggest a ten­
tative pattern of financial help, using the press, official 
observations, and the annual Congress reports, especially
p
those of 1887 and 1889 which contain lists of contributions.
Bombay and Bengal seem to have had the least difficulty
7 A
in attracting funds. In Bombay City, Wacha , J  Telang, 
Pherozeshah Mehta, and Naoroji may have been influential in 
persuading the Hindu and Parsi industrialists to assist the 
Congress, Among the millowners who gave were V. Dipchund,
rj Q
Gr.G.Tejpal, and J.N.Tata. In the Bombay Deccan, the 
Maratha Brahman Congress leaders were closely associated with 
the moneylenders, bankers, and merchants through their caste,
1. Report of the 4th I.N.C., p.vii,
2# Report of the 3rd I.N.C., p.l3« a^d Report of the 5th I.N.C
pp. 79-B2:
3. Wacha was a mill agent and was an active member of the 
Mill-Owners Association.
4# Telang was responsible for getting "the wealthy shettias
of Bombay, his friends" to subscribe to the 1889 Congress.
See Wacha1 s speech at the 1903 Telang Anniversary, Bombay, 
quoted by the Bengalee. 7 October 1903.
5. He was a partner xn Gama and Co. from 1855 to 1858 or 59, 
and then he started a firm of his own in England with two 
other Parsis. Masani, Naoroji, pp.71-78.
6. Rs.1275 in 1889* Report of 5th I.N.C.p.80.
7* Rs.1000 in 1889, IbidV, p.80.
8. Rs.1000 in 1895* Letter from H.Kennedy, Com, of Bombay
Police, to E.C, Cox, 20 July 1899. Enclosure to Curzon to
Hamilton, 27 Sept. 1899. MSS.Eur.D.510/3.
Tata also gave money to Behramji Kalahari for his 
Indian Spectator which often differed with the Congress*
(tfnsigned article by Malabari, "The Native Press - Then
and Now". East and West, Vol.iii, No.34. (Aug. 1904)p.853.) 
Tata was often criticised for his failure to support 
Congress finances. His 1895 contribution seems to have been 
his only. His biographer is wrong in saying that "his 
participation in politics was confined to regular attend­
ance at the Congress": he did not even attend the Congress 
except upon rare occasions, (P.R.Harris, Jamsetji Nusser- 
wanji Tata: A Chronicle of His Life, p.258).
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1 2 the Sarvajanik Sabha, and the Congress itself*
Starting in 1901, the Congress held an Industrial
Conference in conjunction with its own session, and when the
1902 Congress and Conference met in Ahmedabad,^ previously
little affected hy nationalist politics, the cotton mill-
owners responded by attending and by contributing towards the
A
Reception Committee 1s expenses. A majority of the 195 
Ahmedabad delegates were millowners, mill agents, mill 
engineers, mill managers, bankers, Seths, Shroffs, and 
merchants* Ambalal Desai* Chairman of the Reception Commit­
tee, explained why "commercial Guzerat" had become interested 
ia the Congress. It had seen that the leading industrial
1# See occupations of Sarvajanik Sabha members attending the 
1892 Congress, Appendix to Report of the 8th I.N.C.
2# When the Congress was held in Poona in 1895, an exception- 
ally large proportion of the delegates (437 out of 1584) 
belonged to the commercial classes. Most of them came from 
Poona and the surrounding area. See Table, P.C. Ghosh, 
thesis, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 
1892-"1909»J 'p.55-51; Report o f  the 11th I.N.O., Appendix ii. 
Pradhan and Bhagwat (Tilak, pp.20, 97-98) say that 
Mahadeo Ballal Namjoshi ‘•was largely instrumental in es­
tablishing a contact between the merchants and trading 
class and the extremist party led by Tilak." Namjoshi 
helped start the Poona Metal Factory and the Poona Indus­
trial Exhibition, and he purchased the Kesari's first 
printing press. He died in 1896.
3. The local political association, the Gujerat Sabha, con­
sisted of 23 persons in 1901. Commissioner, N.D., to 
Under Sec., Bombay Rev. Dept. Telegram No.169, 1 Aug.1901.
§ombay Rev. Prog., Land, Vol.6239. eport of the 18th I.N.C.. p.l.
5. Actually 261 persons were elected to attend the
Congress at a meeting in Ahmedabad on 6 December 1902, 
but 67 of these came from outside Ahmedabad.
Ibid, Appendix.
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countries of the West had used political power to advance 
their commercial position. The erection of protective barriers 
"for the exclusion of foreign products... has been an object 
lesson to the commercial classes" who had realized the vital 
relation between economics and political action by the State.^ 
The decision to associate itself with an Industrial 
Conference had an important side effect on the Congress since 
the Conferences were attended and patronized by high Govern­
ment officials in 1902, 1903, and 1904. This, one would guess, 
would have given the Congress added respectability and would 
have partly dissipated the fear of official disapproval among 
potential contributors of the Congress. P.S.P.Lely, the 
Commissioner of the Northern Division, Bombay Presidency, 
received an assurance from the Ahmedabad Reception Committee 
in 1902 that the Congress and Industrial Conference Accounts
would be kept separate, but the money collected as entrance
2
fees was turned over to the Congress.
Another source of funds in Western India were the 
Indian Chiefs, including the rulers of Kolhapur, Baroda,
■3 4
Junagad, Bhownagar, and Gondal. The Gaekwar of Baroda and 
the Thakur of Gondal were especially helpful to Dadabhai
1. Report of the 18th I.N.C., pp.5-6.
2. Bengalee, 14 April 1903«
3. The Governors of Bombay wrote in 1906 that Junagad State 
was giving Mehta and Naoroji about Rs.600 a month "for the 
exercise of their moral influence in behalf of the State 
at headquarters." Lamington to Morley, 26 Dec.1906. 
Microfilm Reel No.675, MSS.Eur. B. 159.
4. H.Kennedy to E.C.Cox, 20 July 1899, op.cit.
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Naoroji in London in the 1890rsf^ Naoroji, in fact, was
given so much money that he was able in 1895, to turn down an
2
offer from J.N.Tata of Rs.5,000 towards his campaign expenses. 
The question of the way in which Naoroji used his money arose 
in 1892 when certain British newspapers claimed that he had 
received £28,000 from the Indian Princes.^ John Biddulph, 
Agent at Baroda, 1893-95, reported that more than Rs.100,000 
had been removed from the Baroda Treasury without the Minis­
t e r ^  knowledge and that Naoroji was heard to boast during a 
visit to Baroda "that he could do what he liked with the 
Irish members. However, a number of officials were willing 
or anxious to believe the worst about the nationalists, and 
such hearsay is worth little without independent confirmation. 
The Reception Committees of the Congresses held in the 
Bombay Presidencies not only raised the necessary funds with 
seeming ease, but the Bombay leaders, at the 1903 Congress
1. The Gaekwar admitted in 1899 in an interview with Lord 
Curzon that he gave £1,000 to Naoroji campaign funds 
and Rs. 1,000 annually to the Congress, "Memorandum of 
Conversation with the G-aekwar of Baroda." Enclosure of 
Curzon to Hamilton, 12 July 1899. MSS,Eur.I).510/2,
William Lee-Warner, Secretary of the Political and Secret 
Department, India Office, was told that the Thakur of 
Gondal gave Rs.500,000 to Naoroji*s campaign expenses,
W.Lee Warner to C.S.Bayley, 30 Aug.1897. p.195, Political 
Dept. Demi-Off. Corresp., Vol.12, See also Masani,
Naoroji, p.373.
2. Masani, Naoroji, p.372.
3. Ibid. p.322.
4. Note by C.S.Bayley, 18 June 1899, op.cit, P.H.0 1Donnell 
(History of the Irish Parliamentary Party, Vol.ii, p.428) 
wrote that in 1878 the Irish members were offered financial 
assistance from the Indian nationalists if Ireland would 
return some Indian members to Parliament. Cited by Dr. Mary 
Cumpston, "Some early Indian Nationalists and their allies 
in the British Parliament, 1851-1906", English Historical 
Review, Vol.LXXVI, No.299(April 1961), pp.2S2-"83.
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when the movement was in the doldrums and no other Province
was willing to take its turn as host to the next session,
invited the Congress to Bombay for the 1904 meeting - the
second time Bombay Province had held a session in three years.
The Reception Committee of the 1904 Bombay Congress, which
was said to have been the most successful in many years,
raised Rs, 1,58,231, or roughly twice as much as at any pre-*
vious Congress.^" Of this sum, Rs.36,058 was transferred to
the Industrial Conference whose total expenditure was
Rs#3,47,192 and whose accounts were kept separately. After
financing the Congress session and contributing to the
Industrial Conference, the 1904 Reception Committee was able
to deposit a further, unspent Rs.69,895 in the Congress
2
account in the Bank of Bombay, This enormous surplus may be 
attributed only in part to the fund-raising techniques of the 
Bombay leaders. The Universities Act, the Official Secrets 
Act, and the proposed Partition of Bengal no doubt acted as 
a stimulus also,
Bengal was the other Province in which the Reception 
Committees found funds with comparative ease. There it was 
the legal profession, its clients, and some of the zamindars, 
rather than the commercial classes, who subscribed. Among the
1, Rs,13,000 of the first Rs,60,000 collected was contributed 
by the Indian Chiefs. The largest single contribution was 
Rs.5,000 from the Caekwar of Baroda.
2, A  full statement of the Accounts of the 1904 Congress and 
Congress Industrial Exhibition, Bengalee, 29 Dec. 1905#
larger zamindars who contributed before the Tenancy Bill
controversy in 1898 were the Maharajas of Darbhanga, Cooch
Behar, Hutwa, Dumraon, Mymensingh and Natore, as well as
Raja Benoya Krishna Deb, Raja Shashi Sekhareswar Roy of
Tahirpur, Maharani Sharnaraayi of Cossimbazar, Rai Yotindra
Nath Chowdury of Gati, 24 Parganas, Maharaja Sir Jotindra
Mohan Tagore, Sir Surendra Mohan Tagore, and members of the
2Debendra Nath Tagore family. To what extent Government 
pressure was successfully applied in 1898 and later to per­
suade these persons not to give to the Congress may only be 
guessed at. Sir Lachmeswar Singh, Maharaja of Darbhanga, Pres­
ident of various landholding associations, and one of the most
1. The relative value of the largest holdings in Bengal may 
be seen in the following list of "Capitalized Values".
The list was quoted from Capital (Calcutta) by the Moslem 
Chronicle, 11 November 1899 •
Darbhanga Raj Rs,2,50,00,000
Cooch Behar Raj 2,50,00,000
Orissa Temple Endowments 1,00,00,000
Burdwan Raj 75,00,000
Nawab Abdul Gunifs Estate 50,00,000
Hutwa Raj 30,00,000
Gidhur Raj 30,00,000
Dumroan Raj 25,00,000
Murshidabad Nawab*s Estate 25,00,000
Moh sin Endowment 25,00,000
Tagore Pamily Endowment 15,00,000
Tippera Raj 15,00,000
Natore Raj 15,00,000
2. These names are given in C.W.Bolton's letter to C.S.Bayley, 
18 July 1899, Enclosure to Curzon to Hamilton, 2 Aug.1899. 
MSS.Euf. D.510/2* Bolton*s letters also said that the 
brothers Sir Jotindra Mohan and Sir Surendra Mohan Tagore 
subscribed to the Congress from fear of the Press and not 
from sympathy with the Congress* The Debendra Nath Tagore 
family were active Congress supporters and included Jyot- 
irindra Nath Tagore who helped start the Hindu Mela, 
Rabindranath Tagore, J. Ghosal, and Sarala Devi Ghosal, 
the most active woman in the Congress at this time.
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important benefactors of the Congress, was seen by Lieutenant 
Governor Mackenzie at the time of the debate on the Bengal 
Tenancy Act Amendment Bill. Afterwards Mackenzie wrote that he 
thought he had "now brought him to see that the Congress is 
hostile to the zamindars and ought not to be allowed to 
’blackmail* him any longer."'1' The Maharaja died on 17 Decem­
ber 1898 and was succeeded by his brother who was not a
2
friend of the Congress.
In 1897, Raja Benoya Krishna Deb resigned from the Con­
gress.^ His resignation, however, may not have been influenced 
by official pressure..
The differences between the Congress and the larger 
zamindars have been emphasised above but the connections 
between the two groups were also many, and some of these con­
nections may have been instrumental in securing zamindari 
funds for the Congress. They certainly influenced the attitude 
of the Congress towards the Permanent Settlement as will be 
demonstrated in a subsequent chapter. Among the Congress 
members in Bengal who were closely linked with the landholding 
community was Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter. He was an influential 
member of both the British Indian Association and the Zamin­
dari Panehayat, and he was Chairman of the Reception Committee
in 1887 - probably his only Congress activity before he
4resigned from the High Court in 1890. There was also Guru
1. A.Mackenzie to Elgin, 5 April 1898, op.cit.
2. Speech of S.Sinha, Report of 18th I.N.C., p.119.
3. At the time of his resignation, The Arnrita Bazar Patrika 
was attacked by the Englishman (4 Nov. 1897) for referring 
to such people as "whining curs".
4. G.P.Pillai, Representative Indians, p.321.
Prasad Sen, lawyer, zamindar, and editor of the Behar Herald, 
the mouthpiece of the Behar Landholders* Association5 
Saligram Singh, lawyer, zamindar, and Secretary of the Behar 
Landholders' Association;2 Boikunta Nath Sen, a lawyer who 
owned extensive properties, managed the Cossimbazar Raj 
estate, and held legal briefs for most of the important zam­
indars of Murshidabad District ;3 J. Ghosal, zamindar and
merchant who was connected through marriage to the Maharaja
4 ,
of Cooch Behar and the Debendra Nath Tagore family; Asutosh 
Chowdhri, Secretary of the Bengal Landholders* Association 
and related by marriage to the^  Tagores; and finally Surendra 
Nath Banerjea, who.se "great friend1' was Raja Benoya Krishna 
DeV* and who received money on various occasions from the 
Maharaja of Vizianagram and Maharani Sharnamayi of Cossim— 
bazar. ® There were also a number of other Congress leaders 
from Bengal who were zamindars: Ananda Mohan Bose, R.C.Dutt, 
Bhupendra Nath Basu, Aswini Kumar Dutt, Abdul Kasim, Ambica 
Char an Mazumdar, Jagendra Nath Mukerji, and Prithwia 
Chandra Roy. In other words, it was in the ordinary course 
of things for the Bengali politician to be a land-owner.
Bengalee, 21 Oct. 1900.
2* See obituary in Hindustan Review, Vol.xii, No.71.
(July 1905) p.93.
3* Bengalee, 10 March 1903; Boikunta Nath Sen complained at 
the 1893 Congress that the Bengal zamindars had not been 
given a seat on the reformed Legislative Councils. Report 
of 9th I.N.C. p.51.
4. J.Ghosal married Debendra Nath's daughter and the son of 
this marriage, J.Ghosal of the Bombay Civil Service, 
married the eldest daughter of the Maharaja of Cooch Behar
5. S.N.Banerjea, A Nation in Making, pp.144-45.
6 . Ibid. pp.104-05. Vizianagram gave Banerjea Rs.15,000 for 
thelndian Association's Building Fund.
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However, this would hardly lead them to attitudes similar to
those of the great Bengal landowning families.
The sources of Congress income in Madras were more
diffuse than in Bombay and Bengal. Madras lacked an Indian
industrial class as wealthy as Bombay*s and a zamindari classs
as large and lightly taxed as Bengal*s. Nor did it have
patrons as generous as Baroda and Darbhanga. In the early
years of the Congress funds were received on one or more
1 2occasions from the rulers or zamindars of Mysore, Travancore
1# The annual incomes of the largest zamindari estates in 1904 
in Madras were as follows:
Vizianagram Rs.16,00,000
Venkatagiri 12,14,000
Ramnad 9,25,732
Sivaganga 9,28,433
Pittapuram 9,13,919
Nazvid 7,91,354
Karvetnagar 6,26,036
Kalahasti 5,35,159
Nidadarole 5,24.002
Jeypore 4,75,000
Parlakime di 4,67,433
Bobbili 4,60,000
J.Thompson, Gov.of Madras, to Ampthill, 20 Sept.1904#
No.370. MSS.Eur. 233/34/2.
2. The Maharaja of Mysore gave Rs.1,000 to the 1887 Congress 
and was later told that the Government of India did not 
consider it advisable for Native Chiefs to take any part 
in politics in British India. The Nizam of Hyderabad, who- 
had given a much larger sum to the United Indian Patriotic 
Association, was advised similarly.
Dufferin to Cross, 8 Oct. 1888. No.114. MSS.Eur.243/5.
Cochin, Ramnad, Vizianagram, Bobbili, and Venkatagiri; ^
successful lawyers such as P. Ananda Charlu, Eardly Norton,
P. Rangia Naidu, and S. Subramania Iyer; and merchants such
2
as Sir Savalai Ramaswami Mudaliar and Sabapathy Mudaliar.
Of all these people, the Raja of Ramnad seems to have given 
the most.^ In 1894 alone he donated Rs.10,000^ and in 1897 
he invited the Congress to meet at Madura, offering his
5
"means and services" if it did. ' It may only be an accident 
of the greater publicity given to Congress finance in Madras, 
but one receives the impression that Congress members of the 
professional class in that Province gave more frequently from 
their own pockets than members in either Bombay or Bengal,
1. The Raja of Venkatagiri gave Rs.500 to the 1887 Congress 
and Rs.200 to the 1o98 Congress. (Bengalee, 31 Dec. 1898). 
Such small contributions do not necessarily signify active 
sympathy with the Congress, although the Raja of 
Venkatagiri may have been grateful to the Congress for 
its demand that the Permanent Settlement be extended. 
Venkatagiri was President of the Madras landholders' Asso­
ciation from its founding in 1890 until his death in 1916. 
Venkatagiri, like his brother, the Raja of Bobbili, repre­
sented the Madras landholders on the Madras Legislative 
Council.
Alladi Jagannatha Sastri, A Pamily History of Venkatagiri 
Rajas, pp.127-131*
Also, Maha-Rajah of Bobbili, A Revised and Enlarged Account 
of the Bobbili Zeminda~ri.
2. Report of the 3rd I.N.C., p. 13* and Report of the 5th I.N.C 
pp/'rFBF;"
3« Raja Bhaskara Sethupathi, like previous Rajas of Ramnad, 
often faced financial embarrassment from the uneconomic 
management of his estates. He died in 1903* A. Vadivelu, 
Ruling Chiefs...of India, p.570-1. The only obvious simi­
larity between Ramnad, Baroda, and Darbhanga was that each 
was educated by an English tutor.
4. Report of 11th I.N.C., p.57*
5* Report of the I4tTT"I.N.C., p.96.
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and relied less on large landowners, Chiefs of Native States, 
or industrialists. Door-to-door canvassing was used in Madras 
before it was adopted in other Provinces, In I887, when
30,000 Tamil copies of Viraraghava Chariar's Congress Cate­
chism were circulated, Rs.5,500 was collected from 8,000 
persons in amounts ranging from one anna to Rs.1-8, and 
Rs.8,000 was given in sums of Rs.1-8 to Rs,30. The Recep­
tion Committee of the 1894 Madras Congress boasted that
almost half of its Rs.40,000 came in small amounts and that
2
door-to-door collections had been made. Once again, in 
1898 the Madras Reception Committee collected "funds in 
driblets from the mass of people instead of in hundreds and 
thousands from a few rich individuals." At that time it was 
predicted that this system would become general in view of 
"the forced coldness of the money aristocracy due to official 
influence", and the success of this system was cited as proof 
that the Congress was "striking its roots in the hearts of 
the people,"^
Details of Congress finance in other Provinces are not
readily obtainable. The death in 1898 of Sirdar Dyal Singh
Majithia was a severe loss to the Congress in the Punjab
where he had helped the nationalist cause with money from
his vast estates and successful business activities,^
1# Report of the 3rd I.N.C., p.11.
2* Report of the 10th I.N.C.,pp.9» 14,
3* Report of the l4th I.N.C., p.iii.
4. Dyal Singh was Chairman of the 1893 Lahore Reception 
Committee, President of the Lahore Indian Association, 
and Proprietor of the Tribune, the leading Congress 
newspaper in the PunjaFI
The Congresses of 1898 (Madras), 1899 (Lucknow) and
1900 (Lahore) experienced difficulty in finding funds. The
causes have already been suggested: the death of Lyal Singh
and the Maharaja of Darbhanga, Government pressure, and the
hostility of the Bengal zamindars. It was suggested that in
view of the lack of support from the aristocracy, the Congress
would have to rely more heavily on the middle and lower
classes. At the same time, a renewed emphasis was placed on
the need for the political education of the masses. In 1899,
30,000 copies of an appeal for funds was distributed, and in
1901, the Calcutta Reception Committee had 15,000 Bengali,
4
Uriya, and Urdu pamphlets printed. Various economies were 
also suggested, including the reduction of the costly decora­
tions and celebrations which had become a customary part of 
the annual session.  ^ In 1899, under the pressure of financial 
need, it was decided to have the chairs for the Congress made 
in India instead of following what was apparently the more
g
natural course of importing them from Australia.
1, Report of the 14th I.N.C., p.iii, also, Report of the 15th
I.N.C., pp.v-vi, Report of the 16th I.N.C., p,2;
Bengalee, 1 Jan. 1901.
2, Bengalee, 12 April 1901; also, Report of the 15th I.N.C., 
p.vi,. However, the Bengalee (14 March I903), in comments 
on the failure to carry out schemes for enlisting the 
masses, said "the wisdom, inculcated by Chankya, the Indian 
Machiavelli, that it is folly to lead the masses, seeing 
that in the case of success, the fruit of it is equally 
shared by all... still influences, unconsciously perhaps, 
not a few of us."
3, Statesman, 7 Sept. 1899#
4, Bengalee, 25 Dec, 1901.
5* Bor instance, Speech of Kali Prasanna Roy, Chairman of
Lahore Reception Committee, 1900. Report of the 16th I.N.C.
p . 8,
Bengalee, 16 Sept. 1899#
There were two funds in India from which the Congress 
could draw in the event of an emergency. One was the Congress 
Permanent Fund. This was established in 1889, when Rs.59,000 
was voted to it by the Congress. Actually, only Rs.5,000 was 
collected in the first year of the Permanent Fund, and this 
was lost when the Oriental Bank of Bombay went into liquida ~ 
tion in the Bombay financial crisis of 1890. More money
p
was voted to the Fund by the Congresses of 1890 and 1892, 
and in 1893, an "Indian Friend", believed to be the Maharaja 
of Darbhanga, gave Rs.15,000 to the Fund. At one point the 
Fund contained as much as £4,000 but by 1895, £1,900 had 
been borrowed to pay back debts which the Standing Congress 
Committee had failed to remit to the British Committee.^ It 
seems that by 1899 the Fund was wholly depleted for in that 
year the Congress appointed a Committee to take, among other 
things, "such steps as they may deem fit to raise a permanent 
fund for carrying on the work of the Indian National Congress. 
This proposal was not acted on.
The other fund was the National Fund in Bengal. It was 
started in 1883, according to Surendra Nath Banerjea, "as a 
memento" of his imprisonment for contempt of court. The 
original sum of Rs.20,000 was given to the Indian Association 
which later agreed to contribute the annual accumulation of
1. A.C.Mazumdar, Indian National Evolution, p.300.
2. Resolutions XII of 1890 and XVII of 1892.
3* Note by C.S.Bayley, 18 June 1899, op.cit,
4. Report of the British Committee of the Indian National 
Congress for 1894-95• Bengalee, 7 Dec. 1895.
5# Resolution X(ii) of 1899*
6. A Nation in Making, p,8l.
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interest (Rs«500) to the Congress Permanent Fund, However, in
1896, 1897, and 1898 no contribution was made by the Indian 
1
Association* Banerjea wrote that "this fund was most useful
2
in the anti-Partition agitation.1
The Presidency Association of Bombay almost came into 
possession of some money in 1897 when the Bombay Branch of 
the East India Association voted to discontinue payments to 
the London Branch of interest accruing to the Associations 
Bombay Bank deposit. The Bombay Branch was founded in 1868 
to collect funds and act as an agency for the London East 
India Association which, in turn, had been started by 
Dadobhai Naoroji in 1866. Holkar gave the new Branch Rs.25,000 
in 1872 and a Board of Trustees was appointed to send the 
annual interest to London. However, in 1896, when L.A.Khare 
was the only surviving Trustee and the London East India 
Association had passed into the control of Indians and 
Englishmen hostile to the Congress movement, payment of 
interest was discontinued. The Bombay Branch voted in 1897 
to dissolve itself and turn the Trust fund over to the Bombay 
Presidency Association. The London East India Association, 
acting through Sir Lepel Griffin, Sir William Rattigan, and 
Sir M. Bhownaggree, filed a plaint against Khare in the High 
Court of Bombay. Justice Tyabji refused to accept Khare^ 
claim that the London Association had ceased to have any 
moral right to the money, and he ordered Khare to give the
1. C.W.Bolton to C.S.Bayley, 18 July 1899, Enclosure to 
Curzon to Hamilton, 2 August 1899. MSS.Eur.D.510/2.
2. A Nation in Making, p.81.
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money to the London Branch.'*'
The amount of money spent in England hy the British
Committee of the Indian National Congress each year was
usually larger than that spent hy the Reception Committee of
the annual Congress session. The newspaper India was the
chief expenditure, costing ahout £2,000 a year from the time
it became a regular monthly, in 1892, until 1898 when it was
2
converted into a weekly. After that presumably the deficit 
was even greater. India contained little advertising and it 
was distributed free of charge to M.P.'s and other people 
interested in India,^ The activities of the British Committee
4
cost another £1,000, and included political breakfasts, and 
lecture tours, and the preparation of material for Parliamen­
tary debates, British newspapers, and witnesses appearing 
before such bodies as the Welby Commission on Indian Finance.
Theoretically, the £3,000 budgeted for the British 
Committee and India was to be supplied by the Congress in 
India. For this purpose the annual session usually passed a 
Resolution assigning Rs.60,000 to the British Committee and 
India.^ The bulk of this sum would have been collected if 
the annual subscription fee of Rs.6 had been paid for each 
of the copies of India sent to India, and, indeed, at one 
stage, when 10,000 copies of each issue were sent, the whole
Bengalee, 10 Feb. 1903.
2. Speech of Surendra Nath Banerjea, Report of the 10th I.N.C., 
p.155.
3# Wedderburn, Hume, p.98.
4. Banerjea, Re-port of the 10th I.N.C., p,155.
5. See monthly issues of India; Masani, Naoroji; and 
Wedderburn, Hume.
6. Rs.40,000 was voted annually from 1889 to 1891.
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Rs,60,000 should have been gathered* But most people who 
received India did not pay, and the money that was remitted 
to the British Committee often consisted, in part, of surplus 
funds from the Reception Committee ^  or donations from Princes 
and zamindars. In the seven years from 1894 to 1900, the 
total amount transmitted to the British Committee hy the 
Congress was Rs.2,25,800, or Rs.32,257 per annum. This was 
slightly more than half the amount promised.
Hume, Wedderburn, and Naoroji sent periodic letters 
to the Congress Standing Committees reminding them of the 
Congress promises. These reminders, when they became public, 
caused the Anglo-Indian press to suggest that the Congress 
was bankrupt J and they encouraged officials like Curzon and 
Woodburn, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in their belief 
that the Congress was losing strength.^"
The reluctance of people in India to contribute to 
Congress activities in England was possibly related to the 
improbability of their Liberal and Radical friends achieving 
success in Parliament against the Liberal Front Benches and 
the large Conservative majority. There was also a feeling in
1. Rs.25,000 of the surplus of Rs.28,000 from the 1896 
Congress were sent to the British Committee. (Bengalee,
13 Feb. 1897.). There was a surplus of about Rs.30,000 
from the 1894 Congress, also, (Bengalee, 13 April 1893)
2. Letter from Alfred Nundy, Assistant Secretary of tlie 
Congress, reviewing Report of the British Committee, 
Bengalee, 29 May 1901.
3. Report of the 5th I.N.C., p.lxv; Bengalee, 13 Feb,1897.
4# durzon to Hamilton, 2 Aug. 1899, and its Enclosure,
C.W.Bolton to C.S.Bayley, 18 July 1899. MSS.Eur. D.510/2.
29 3
India that the British Committee was extravagant and often 
inactive, and that India was not well conducted,'*" Further­
more, the only direct communication to Congress supporters 
from the British Committee was more often than not the 
occasion of another appeal for payment of outstanding dehts. 
Alfred Nundy, the Assistant Secretary of the Congress, found 
during his fund-raising tour in 1900 that
,Tmore than one Secretary adopted the plan of never 
opening the cover of a letter from the British 
Committee from fear it may contain a demand for 
money; and "by far the larger number of them after 
reading the letter, either throw it away or file 
it, instead of circulating it to members of a 
Committee where one exists,n 2
The failure of the Secretaries of the Standing Congress 
Committees to collect subscriptions for India became a 
crucial problem only after the death of the Maharaja of 
Darbhanga in 1898, The Government of Bengal reported that he 
had given Rs.10,000 annually to India^ and he was also said
4
to have paid for the conversion of India into a weekly.
Hume and Wedderburn had also largely helped the British
1. For instance, Speech of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya,
Report of 17th I.N.C, p.80: Mahratta, 6 Aug.1899, T & D 
Se 1 ections, 14-Aug7lET99, para.590, P.S.L.I. Vol. 116; 
Bengalee, 20 Jan. and 26 Dec. 1900. 24 and 29 May 1901.
2. Bengal ee, 24 Dec. 1900.
3. C.wTBolton to C.S.Bayley, 18 July 1899, op.cit. C.S.Bayley 
believed that Darbhanga gave large amounts but he had no 
proof that he contributed Rs.10,000 a year. Note by
C.S.Bayley, 18 June 1899, Hamilton Papers, op.cit. An 
informant of Lee Warner1s, who claimed he had seen the 
Congress accounts, said that Darbhanga donated Rs.50,000
a year to the Parliamentary Indian Partyfs funds”, This, 
although not impossible, is difficult to give credence to, 
W.Lee Warner to C.S.Bayley, 30 Aug.1897, Pol.Dept., Demi- 
Off. Corresp. Vol.12. _
4. Hamilton to Elgin, X b  7 . h*
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Committee in lieu of contributions from India, and neither 
of them was willing to continue to supplement Congress funds 
from their own resources. In the first years of the Congress 
Hume had spent "ten or fifteen thousand rupees out of his 
own pocket" for work in England and India. ^  In later years,
Wedderburn bore the greater burden so that by 1904, he had
2
spent £10,000 or Rs.150,000 on the Congress* In 1900, when 
he decided not to stand for re-election to Parliament, it was 
said that he was retiring because he had been physically and 
financially overtaxed by his work for the Congress.^
By 1899 the signs of strain between the British Com­
mittee and the Congress in India were beginning to show in 
public. In October 1899, Wedderburn and Hume sent a tart 
letter to the Standing Congress Committees, saying "it is 
almost incredible but is none the less the fact, that of the 
Rs.60,000 voted annually ... only Rs.16,205 have as yet been 
received on account of 1898 and only Rs.2,064 on account of
A
the current year, now in its last quarter." Ten weeks later, 
at the Congress session, Surendra Nath Banerjea made his 
third appeal for funds for India and the British Committee.
1. Annually, it seems. Speech of Surendra Nath Banerjea, 
Report of the 5th I.N.C.
2. Speech of D.E.Wacha, Report of the 20th ItN.C.p»227» 
Naoroji and Bonnerjee also gave money to India. According 
to Alfred Nundy, Wedderburn, Hume, NaorojX and Bonner jee 
all helped raise the special Deficit Fund in 1896 but 
then none of them contributed from 1897 until 1901. 
Bengalee, 29 May 1901.
3."Manifesto" sent by Wedderburn, Hume and Naoroji to 
Secretaries of the Standing Congress Committees.
Bengalee, 28 Nov. 1900.
4. Enclosure to Curzon to Hamilton, 28 Dec,1899* MSS.Eur.
D.510/3*
He repeated the familiar argument that "your voice will he 
like that of one crying in the wilderness” unless the same 
voice was heard in the British Parliament, Platform, and 
Press, He reminded the Congress that the Irish agitation for 
Home Rule had little success until it was transferred to 
England, and this, he said, demonstrated that "we must follow 
the same methods”,**“ However, the argument that reform would 
come only from appealing to the British electorate seemed to 
he losing its appeal because in 1899 it brought a mere 
Rs#3,000 while Banerjea's similar appeal in 1892 had 
attracted almost Rs.13,500^ and his 1889 appeal had produced 
Rs.65,000.4
The 1899 Congress, besides contributing a niggardly 
Rs*3j000 for arrears of debts to the British Committee and 
India, passed a resolution saying that funds should be raised 
for the establishment of a new agency in London ”for the pur­
pose of organizing, in concert with the British Congress 
Committee, public meetings for the dissemination of informa- 
tion on Indian matters". The reason for passing this reso­
lution is obscure in the Congress Report but it would seem 
to reflect the feeling that the British Committee was inade­
quate. The new agency was to be under the direction of that 
year's President, R.C.Dutt, who, significantly, had not joined
1. Report of 15th I.N.C., pp.104-05.
2. Ibid. p.xxvi,
3. Report of the 8th I.N.C., p.115.
4. Report of the' 5th I.N.C., p.lxv.
5. Resolution XXII.
the British Committee since arriving in London in 1897* As 
this resolution was not followed up,**- the British Committee 
alone continued officially to represent the Congress effort 
in England *
However, there was another organization, called the 
London Indian Society, which claimed to represent Indians 
Resident in the United Kingdom, Whereas the British Committee 
was a closed body largely controlled by Englishmen, the 
London Indian Society, with its open meetings and predomin­
antly Indian composition, was the more natural focus of 
allegiance for Indian students. The Society made special 
arrangements to meet students arriving in England and to help 
them find lodgings. The India Office had the Society*s annual 
conference in December, 1898 **specially reported'1 and found 
that the proceedings, which were intended to correspond to
the Indian National Congress session, were "violent in
2
language"»
The British Committee, realizing that its expenses 
far exceeded the contributions received from India, reduced 
in 1900 the number of copies of India allocated for India, 
from 10,000 to 6,000, or just 800 more than the actual number 
of subscribers (not necessarily paying). It was hoped that 
by limiting the supply to the demand, waste expenditure would 
be reduced. At the same time, the British Committee decided
1. S.N.Banerjea, A Nation in Making, p,165.
2. Undated foolscap signed by W.Lee-Warner, attached to 
T. and D. Selections, 19 June 1899, P.S.L.I., Vol.114.
to increase the subscription rate from Rs.6 to Rs.9* As an
inducement to more efficient collection, the local Congress
bodies were allowed to keep 4/54 of the amount subscribed.^"
In the same year Alfred Nundy toured India for the purpose of
collecting funds and improving Congress morale. In neither
task did he have notable success. During the first six weeks
2
he raised Rs.4,000 for the British Committee.
In a further effort to solve the financial problem, 
the Indian Congress Committee decided in 1901 that instead of 
sending funds and correspondence direct to the British Com­
mittee, the Standing Committees should send them to Wacha, 
the Joint General Secretary, in Bombay, who would then remit 
them to London.*^ Evidently the British Committee regarded 
this as a usurpation of their functions or they thought that 
Wacha was not likely to have any more success than themselves 
in collecting funds, for the British Committee sent a circular 
to the Standing Committees, contradicting the Indian Congress 
Committee's previous circular. The British Committee informed 
the Standing Committees that subscriptions should be sent 
direct to London and that in the future, India would be sent 
only to those persons who paid in advance. Subsequently, when 
the circulation of India to defaulters was stopped, the 
Secretaries of the Standing Committees found that they were 
unable to collect any of the outstanding subscriptions, and
1* R.C.Butt's circular letter to the Provincial Congress 
Committees. Bengalee, 16 Feb. 1900.
2. Bengalee, 24 April 1900.
3. Alfred Nundy1s Circular Letter to Secretaries of Standing 
Congress Committees, Bengalee, 28 June 1901.
almost none of the current ones.
The British Committee had already announced, on
24 February 1901, that it had finally decided to give up its
rooms in London and discontinue India if the outstanding
balance of Rs.37,500 had not been received by the end of
June 1901. But by the last week of June, the total collections
o
for 1901 amounted to only Rs.12,000. Then, after the 
Bengalee had expressed regret at the shut down of the British
i 4
Committee, W.C.Bonnerji and "others" made contributions
and Dadabhai Naoroji deposited Rs.25,000 with Wedderburn as
a guarantee against loss for the remainder of the year. The
British Committee was able to continue operations and it
turned down R.C.Dutt’s offer to take over India,
India continued to be a difficult concern after these
adjustments* It was converted into a Joint Stock Company with
2,000 shares priced at £1 each for sale in India. The shares
did not sell, at least in Bengal, where Bhupendra Nath Basu
and Nalin Behari Sircar, in order to spare Bengal the shame
of defaulting, it was said, put up the whole of Bengal’s
allotted £400. In 1905 the Standing Congress Committees
were relieved of their responsibility for collecting funds
for the British Committee by the Joint General Secretary
1* Alfred Nundyfs Circular Letter to Secretaries of the 
Standing Congress Committees, 25 June 1901, Bengalee,
28 June 1901. ---  ----
2. Ibid.
?• Bengalee, 18 June 1901.
Bengalee, 21 June 1901.
5. Masani, Naoro.ji, p.315.
6* Speeches of Bhupendra Nath Basu and Surendra Nath Banerjea 
at the Burdwan Provincial Congress. Extraordinary Edition 
of the Bengalee, 28 June 1904.
(Cokhale) and his establishment."*" Other sources of income
were also found including a fund-raising campaign by Gokhale's
2
Servants of India Society,
The trouble experienced in finding money for the Con­
gress was only part of the general crisis through which the 
movement was passing between 1896 and 1904. On almost all 
sides there were reports of apathy and inactivity,*^ or alter­
nately, factionalism. In the Central Provinces and the North 
West Provinces and Oudh, the Congress leaders had not yet 
followed the other Provinces in holding Provincial Confer­
ences,^ Each year a contingent from these two Provinces 
appeared at the Congress, but apart from this there seems to 
have been little political activity.
In the Punjab the first Provincial Conference was in 
1895 and it was attended by 40 persons,^ But after a couple 
of years the Conference was discontinued.^ The Indian 
Association of Lahore, the main spirit behind the Congress in 
the Punjab, had, in 1897, only 24 members and subscriptions
1, Bengalee, 24 Jan. 1905*
2. Masani, Naoroji, p.315.
3* Malabari wrote in 1903 ’’What has come over our local 
Associations? Prom every province comes the cry - no 
attendance, no funds, no regular work - in short, no
corporate activity to speak of They seem to have
suffered almost concurrently with the rise of the 
Congress movement, "Ranade and His Times" East and West, 
Vol.II, No,25, (Nov,1903), p.1299.
4. Kaya3tha Samachar, Vol.VI, No.5. (Nov,1902), p.490,
5* Bengalee, 28 DecT 1895.
6. Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VI, No.5. (Nov.1902), p.490.
1
amounting to Rs,144 per annum. Not only was the number of
Congress members small, but they were confined to the areas
in and around Lahore, Amritsar, and Umballa. In fact in the
years 1894 to 1904 only 13 Punjabi delegates from other
Districts travelled to a Congress outside the Punjab. In no
other Province was the Congress membership limited to such a 
2
small area.
In Bengal the lack of enthusiasm for the Congress
cause was also marked. As early as 1895 the Bengalee had
warned that the Bengalis were in danger of being left behind
■5
by the more energetic Bombay politicians. The Sanjivani 
in 1898 implored the Bengalis to shake off their lethargy and 
"take part in the sacrifice for the mother".^ And in 1899 
Ambica Charan Mazumdar, the President of the Provincial Con­
ference, acknowledged that the Congress had "ceased to 
exhibit any tendency towards further development and
5
expansion".
In 1900 the Bengal Provincial Conference was held in 
Bihar (Bhagalpur) for the first time in an effort to interest 
the Biharis in the Congress once again, as some of them had 
become resentful of the position of the Bengalis in the Bar,
1. Its membership was larger previous to the Government 
decision in 1890 to forbid officials from participating 
in political movements, L„W.Dane, Off*g Ch.Sec. to Govt, 
of Punjab, to Sec, to Govt, of India, 20 April 1897*
June Prog. No.13, I.H.P.Pub,, Vol.5180.
2, See L.R.Gokhale, The First Twenty Years of the Indian 
National Congress^, Vol.l. Part II. Table III.
3* 21 Tpril"TS957---
4* 10 December 1898, T & D Selections, 2 Jan, 1899, P.S.L.I., 
Vol.III.
5  ^ Quoted in Bengalee, 20 May 1899*
1the Civil Service, and education in Bihar, and, in conse­
quence, had withdrawn from the Bengali-dominated movement in 
Eastern India, There was an anti-Congress demonstration in 
Bhagalpur and some of the Bengali leaders refused to make the 
long trip from Calcutta, including J.Ghosal, A.M.Bose, and
W.C.Bonnerjee. Nevertheless the 1900 Conference at Bhagalpur
2
was a qualified success. But when the Bengali leaders 
decided to hold the 1902 Provincial Conference in Cuttack, 
Orissa, the combination of anti-Bengali sentiment ^  and poli­
tical apathy was too great, and the Conference was cancelled. 
In April 1904 four months after the plans for the Partition of 
Bengal had been announced, the Provincial Conference had to
4
be postponed due to lack of preparation and organization.
After the first few years of the Indian National Con­
gress, there was a falling off of activity by the Indian 
Association of Calcutta. It no longer issued annual reports 
or, it seems, even held annual meetings except for the pur-
15
pose of electing delegates to the Congress, In the first 
15 years of its existence (1876-1891), the Indian Association
1. See Speech of Dip Narain Singh, Chfmn of Reception Commit­
tee, Bhagalpur, Bengal Provincial Conference, Bengalee
21 April 1900. Also, Brajendrenath De, "Reminiscences of 
an Indian Civilian" Calcutta Review Vol.133* No.2#
(Nov.1954), p.92.
2. Bengalee, 14 April 1900,
3. See Brajendranath Be, op.cit, Calcutta Review, Vol. 130.No.3« 
(Peb.1954), p.145. Also, Bengalee, 7 lDec.1904. Por an 
interesting sidelight on the divisions within the Bengali 
community in Orissa, see Radha Krishna Bose, The Present 
Situation of the Bomiciled Bengalees of Orissa and the Way 
"Out of It. (Cuttack 1917).
4* Bengalee, 15 June 1904#
5# Surendra Nath Banerjea, as editor of the Bengalee,
published reports of the meetings of Muslim, European, 
Eurasian, cultural, trade, and official organizations, but 
not of the Indian Association in the years 1897 to 1905#
had been active in a number of directions: in organizing the
National Conferences of 1883 &ncL 1895 at Calcutta, in org-
anizing mass meetings in the mofussil to explain to the ryots
2
their "real needs11, in forming "Rent Unions" among the ryots 
as protection against zamindari oppression, and in establish­
ing night schools for adult education*^ It also sent agents 
to famine areas to collect information during the grain 
scarcities of 1884, 1886-87, and 1889, and in 1884, in con­
junction with the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, it opened relief
4centres in distressed villages. Dwarkanath Granguli, the 
Assistant Secretary from 1882 until his death in 1898, was 
particularly enthusiastic about this line of work, and 
although his successor, Dwijendra Nath Basu,visited scarcity 
areas in Howrah District in 1901, the activities of the 
Indian Association were, for the most part, confined to 
Calcutta after Ganguli!s death*
The number of Branches of the Indian Association had 
declined also. After Banerjea's tour through Northern India
4
in 1877 there were 10 Branch Associations,^ by the end of
7
1885 there were 80 Branches in Northern India and Bengal, 
and in 1886 twenty-one Branches sent delegates to the
o
Congress, During subsequent years most of these Branches
1# Bagal, op.cit. p,80,
2. Ibid. p.109.
3. Ibid. pp. 46-49*
4. Ibid. pp. 78-108.
5. Bengalee» 28 Aug. 1901.
6. BagaX, op.cit, p.21.
7. Ibid.p.79.
8. Appendix, Report of the 2nd I.N.C.
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disappeared or were succeeded by organizations with different 
names.
Political activity in Madras, too, was said to he
sluggish, ^  In 1900 the Mahajana Sabha, whose name was more
synonymous with the Congress movement in Madras than the
Indian Association was in Bengal, had a membership of 200 and
2
required a quorum of 15 members to conduct its business. The
Madras Provincial Conferences were held annually except 1903
when the experiment of convening four District Conferences
was made instead.^
In Bombay political activity was temporarily suspended
in 1897 after the Rand murder, the sedition trials, and the
detention of the Natus, The moderate Deccan Sabha discontinued
its work in order to demonstrate its disapproval of the
murder and it became active again only in January 1900 after
4.
the Natus had been released. Little was heard of the 
Sarvajanik Sabha while Tilak was in 3ail and its Journal was 
discontinued after 1897* f,The decadence in the activity and
1. Speech of John Adams, President of Madras Provincial 
Conference, Bengalee, 16 April 1898.
Also, Madras Mail, 30 Dec. 1898, T.& D. Selections,
2 Jan.“T89$, P.S.L.I., Vol.Ill,
2. Curzon address to Mahajana Sabha, 11 Dec. 1900.
Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedieston. Vol.I. • p.395.
3. Bengalee, 20 June 1903* The District Conference at Bezwada 
in Say 1903 was the 12th annual Kistna District Conference. 
The existence of District Conferences in Madras while 
other Provinces were having difficulty in organizing even
a Provincial Conference, suggest that more attention was 
given to organizational activities in Madras than else­
where, Report of the Twelfth Kistna District Conference 
Held at Bezwada on 2jrd and 24th May 1903* (Bezwada, 1904)»
4. Bengalee, 2 Peb. 1900.
the influenceM of the Bombay Presidency Association was
deplored by the Native Opinion of Bombay while the Bengalee
reported that many of Mehta*s and Wacha*s earlier associates
had quit politics.^ In 1897 and 1898, when plague was still
2
rampant, the Bombay Provincial Conference was not held*
The political life of the Bombay Presidency was 
revived by the publication on 17 March 1899 of an article in 
the Poona newspaper, Kal. The editor of Kal was Shivram 
Mahadeo Paranjpe, a 32 years old Chitpavan Brahman who was an 
officer of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha and a member of the 
Poona Standing Congress Committee. A close associate of 
Tilak’s, he had participated in the no-rent campaign in 
1896-97* He started the Kal in 1898 as a Marathi weekly and 
almost immediately it gained one of the largest circulations 
in India. Paranjpe was warned by the Bombay Government in 
1899, 1900, 1904, 1905, and 1907 that the tone of the writing 
was seditious. On 3 September 1904 Paranjpe published an 
article which, in the view of the acting Viceroy, lord 
Ampthill, and the Governor of Bombay, Lord Lamington, hinted
4at the assassination of Lord Curzon, who was then in England. 
Paranjpe was finally convicted of seditious libel in 1908 
and sentenced to 19 months imprisonment.
The Kal article of 17 March 1899 discussed the action
of the Chapekars and Ranade in murdering Rand. Ayerst, and
-  ■■ ■■ ■■        - .     .     - .   — -—  —  . .
1. Bengalee, 16 June 1900.
2. TbTa'. "2' Peb. 1900.
3* Sedition Committee, 1918. Report, p.3.
4. Ampthill to Curzon, 19 Sept. 1904. No.59. MSS.Eur.E.233/37*. 
5* Sedition Committee, 1918. Report, pp.3,5.
the DravicL brothers, and it suggested that their deeds should 
be looked at "not from the point of view of the laws made by 
Councils, but from the point of view of the law of God, and 
the injunction of religion* They are, in a word, not murder­
ers, but martyrs", India*s grievances were compared to
1
Russia1s and the assassination of Plehve was praised.
The Congress Committee of Calcutta, acting on the 
advice of a member of the Standing Congress Committee of 
Bombay City, issued a condemnation of the Kal article and 
sent a telegram to the Standing Committee of Bombay, urging 
it to take similar action. At a meeting attended by 14 
members, the Bombay Committee adopted a resolution saying
that Paranjpe should "be excluded from all connection with
2
the Congress", In London, the London India Society met to 
consider a resolution "that this Society regrets and condemns 
the recent statements in the (Poona) Kal with regard to the 
Poona murders and considers them prejudiced to the best int­
erests of India." Unexpectedly, the Society defeated this 
resolution by a majority of one vote. Badabhai Naoroji, who 
had presided over the meeting, decried the attitude of the 
members who, he said, "had virtually expressed their concur- 
ence" with the Kal1 a justification of assassination. He 
threatened to resign the Chairmanship of the Society if the 
next meeting did not change its decision.-^
1. Pol.Dept. Minute Paper, Registry No.420, P.S.L.I., Vol.112
2. Statesman, 20 April 1899.
3. T. & D. Summary of Newspaper (unspecified) articles.
T. & D. Selections, 26 June 1899, P.S.L.I. Vol.114.
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In India most of the Congress press expressed disap­
proval of the Kal article hut a number of newspapers quest­
ioned the right of any Congress Committee to censure or expel 
a person from the Congress, It was suggested, that without a 
written constitution, the right did not exist.^ The Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, which seldom missed an opportunity to attack 
the Calcutta-Bombay leaders who in effect ran the Congress, 
commented
"So you Bengalis are now controlled by a certain 
clique of Bombay! An open quarrel between the Poona 
Party and the Bombay clique is imminent, and the 
action of the Calcutta Committee has made it almost 
inevitable. An open split seems to be at hand.
Unless the differences are soon amicably settled, 
the next Congress will have to decide either to 
lose the Bombay clique or the Bekhan sympathy. The 
crisis in fact is serious,"2
The Mahammadan of Madras, a pan-Islamist paper, detected a 
dilemma for the Congress leaders loyal to British rule be­
cause they were confronted with "an inner and widening ring 
of Extremists who apotheosize the assassin". The Moderates, 
it went on, must realize that they may be
"the unwilling tools of malcontents, who use 
constitutionalism as did a certain Egyptian King 
his avaunt-guard of cats, which he pushed on before 
his army, knowing that the foe, regarding these 
animals as .sacred, would refrain from showering 
their missiles for fear of hurting them and thus 
give the astute royal tactician time to rush the 
position. The moderates, who would draw the line 
at assassination have brought into being a 
Frankenstein from whose presence they now blench;
Advocate (Lucknow), 7 April 1899, T.& B. Selections,
10 April 1899; also Indian Mirror (Calcutta), 22 April 1899 
and Tribune (Lahore), 22 April 1899, T. & B. Selections,
1 M a y T S ^ T  P.S.L.I., Vol.113.
2. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 April 1899* T«& B. Selections,
TO’“5pFir,T8g5;""pvs.T;i., voi.113.
but as they, like the Extremists, go on the same 
bill of indietment, with the difference - and a 
vast difference it is - that they talk, while the 
Extremists act, truth to tell - granting sound the 
[premises] common to both - the latter are more 
logical.’1 1
Soon after the Kal controversy had subsided, Tilak,
having been released from jail, resumed the editorship of the
Kesari. In his first editorial he wrote, "political movements
must now be resuscitated in Poona, forgetting all distinctions
2
between the so-called moderationists and extremists". How­
ever these distinctions were not to disappear. A dispute 
arose at the 1900 Bombay Provincial Conference at Satara when 
Tilak tried to persuade the Subjects Committee to adopt a 
resolution condemning Lord Sandhurst's administration for its 
Plague and repressive policies.
Tilak had moved a similar resolution in the Subjects 
Committee at the 1899 Lucknow Congress, only to be told by 
the President, R.C.Dutt, that the resolution was out of order 
since it was only of Provincial interest. After Tilak cor­
rectly pointed out that previous Congresses had passed reso­
lutions on Provincial subjects, Lutt forced Tilak to with-
3
draw the Resolution by threatening to resign if he persisted. 
The Satara dispute followed a similar course. It began during 
the nominations for members of the Subjects Committee. The 
Poona delegation, headed by Tilak, submitted a list of 20
1. Mahammadan. 26 June 1899, T,& L, Selections, 3 July 1899, 
P.S.L.I., Vol.115.
2# Kesari, 4 July 1899, T.& L. Selections 24 July 1899.
P73TL7I.. Vol.115.
3. Ram Gopal, Tilak, pp.205-06.
names. The President, Goculdas Kahandas Parekh, ruled 
that Bombay, Poona, and Satara could each nominate only 6 
or 7 persons and Poona complied by submitting seven names,,
But then one of the Poona delegates tried to add several more 
names. Pinally, after a noisy demonstration the President 
agreed to name two more Poona delegates to the Subjects 
Committee.
During the Subjects Committee meeting Tilak moved that 
his resolution condemning Lord Sandhurst be adopted, Parekh 
threatened to resign if the resolution was selected but Tilak 
produced a written statement signed by 124 of the 175 or so 
delegates at the Conference, asking that the resolution be 
included, Tilak was relying on a rule adopted at the 1891 
Provincial Conference which said that if one-third of the 
delegates wished to discuss a subject rejected by the Subjects 
Committee, then the matter would be discussed. When Parekh, 
like Dutt in 1899, refused to consider it, there was an up­
roar from Tilak*s supporters and the Conference seemed likely 
to break up in disorderly scenes. So Parekh agreed to adjourn 
the Conference until they had worked out a compromise,"^
Later in 1900 there was more dissension, this time 
over the selection of the President of the Congress.
Bishambar Nath, P. Ananda Charlu, G.M. Chitnavis, Wedderburn,
2
Caine, and Norton were all mentioned as possible Presidents, 
but in the end N. G-.Chandavarkar was chosen. He was a controv-
1. Kesari, 20 May 1900, T.& D. Selections, 28 May 1900, 
P.S.L.I., Vol. 123* Also,Letter signed "A Voice from Bombay11, 
Bengalee, 17 June 1900 and S. L.Karandikar, Tilak, p.174.
2. %engale"e, 25 Oct., 6 Nov., 17 Nov., 22 Nov. 1900.
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ersial choice because, as President of the Prarthana Samaj,
he was closely identified with the social reformers in Bombay,
to whom Tilak and other orthodox Hindus were vehemently
opposed, and because he had not attended a single Congress
session in ten years* Por these reasons his selection as
Congress President "disgusted" a portion of the Indian PressJ
The selection was also controversial because Chanda-
varkar had been designated to fill a vacancy in the Bombay
High Court, pending the Secretary of State's sanction* Chan-
davarkar conferred with the Governor of Bombay, Lord North-
cote, before accepting the Presidentship and Northcote
approved, hoping to use Chandavarkar to split the moderates
of Bombay of whom he was a recognized leader, from the more
extreme Congress members. Lord Hamilton was sceptical about
2giving the appearance of rewarding political agitation but 
finally consented after hearing Lord Curzon's argument in 
favour of confirming the appointment, Curzon felt that the 
Congress, in selecting Chandavarkar as President, "wanted to 
hold out the olive branch to me". If Hamilton failed to 
approve Chandavarkar1 s appointment, Curzon warned that the 
moderates would be thrown back "into an attitude of hostility 
and revenge".
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 21 Peb. 1901. MSS.Eur, D*510/7*
See also comments of Mahratta 30 Dec. 1900, Vyapari 
(Poona), n*d* and Mo da Vritta n.d.
T. & D. Selections, 31 Tfec. 1900, P.S.L.I., Vol.128*
2* Hamilton to Curzon, 7 Peb. 1901. MSS. Eur* C. 126/3-
”1 should he sorry to see this done because, 
as I have often told you, the Congress is, in 
my opinion, rapidly sinking into insignificance.
Any tactics that might savour of persecution 
would at once revive it as a fighting force, 
and give us much trouble in the futureH,1
Although there was no lack of political feeling and con­
troversy in the Bombay Presidency between 1899 and 1905, the 
Presidency Association, the Sarvajanik Sabha, and the Deccan 
Sabha scarcely functioned during this period.
Other signs of disunity appeared during the attempt to 
provide the Congress with a constitution. Por those people
who thought the Congress was beginning to resemble an "annual
2
Christmas tamasha [festival] of only three days duration11, 
a written constitution seemed a logical solution* Resolutions 
concerning the drafting of a constitution had been pressed 
at the Congresses of 1887, 1894- and 1895, but it was in 1898 
and 1899 that one was finally drafted and adopted.
The 1899 Constitution itself is not of particular 
importance because it functioned ineffectively for less than 
two years, but the reasons for its failure are interesting.
It provided an organizational framework on three levels which 
was supposed to restore vitality to the Congress movement. At 
the top, there was to be an Indian Congress Committee, con­
sisting of 45 members with an Honorary and a paid Assistant 
Secretary. This Committee was to meet at least three times a 
year to nominate the President, draft resolutions, and make
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 21 Peb. 1901. MSS.Eur. D.510/7#
2. Speech of P. Rathnasabapathy Pillai,
Report of the 14th I.N.C., p.126.
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rules for the election of Congress delegates* At the Provin­
cial level, Provincial Congress Committees, whose rules and 
bye-laws were subject to the approval of the Indian Congress 
Committee, were to carry "on the work of political education, 
on lines of general appreciation of British rule and of con­
stitutional action for the removal of its defects, throughout 
the year, by organizing Standing Congress Committees, holding 
Provincial Conferences, and by such measures as they may deem 
proper*" The functions of the third level bodies, the Stand­
ing Congress Committees which were in theory already in ex­
istence, were not defined."*-
The most notable feature of this constitution is that 
it laid down an important departure from previous practice by 
providing for an elected Committee to exercise general 
control over the Congress. Porty of the 45 members of the 
Indian Congress Committee were to be elected upon the rec-
2
ommendation of the different Provincial Congress Committees 
in a set proportions 8 from Bengal, 8 from Bombay, 8 from 
Madras, 6 from the North West Provinces and Oudh, 4 from the 
Punjab, 3 from Berar, and 3 from the Central Provinces. It is 
true that there was nothing in the constitution to guarantee 
that the Provincial Committees would be representative of 
nationalist opinion in any .one Province as provision had not 
been made for election to the Committees. Nevertheless., the
1* Resolution X of 1899*
2* In the absence of Provincial Committees, the assembled 
Congress delegates of the respective Provinces would 
elect the Committee members.
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new constitution was likely to end the virtual monopoly of 
the Calcutta and Bombay City leaders over the Congress; This 
seems to have been one of the objectives of some of the 
delegates who had been pressing for a written constitution* 
The Punjabis, in particular, had been seeking a con­
stitution since 1893*^ In 1895 the foremost Punjabi leader, 
Bakshi Jaishi Ram, suggested that all office holders in the
Congress should be elected and that each Province ought to be
2
represented on Ma Cabinet or Council” of the Congress, This 
view was opposed by some of the better known leaders from 
that time until the Surat split in 1907- These leaders, 
especially those from Bombay and Calcutta, maintained that 
the Congress was too young for set rules,^ and that some of 
the oldest parliamentary bodies in the world functioned with­
out a Constitution* The real issue was probably whether or 
not the men who helped organize the Congress in its first 
years and who continued to give it financial help, had a sort 
of proprietary right to continue to run the Congress as they
1* Speech of Surendra Nath Banerjea,
Report of the 11th I.N»C., p. 17.
2. Seport of the 11th p*60*
3# Por instance, speech of J, Ghosal, Ibid. p.50.
Report of the 19th I.N.C. p.xvi*
saw fit,^
The first meeting of the Indian Congress Committee 
was held at Delhi on 10 October 1900* It was a disappointment 
for those who wanted the new Constitution to be a success. 
Only seven out of the 45 members attended: the Joint General
Secretary (Wacha) from Bombay, four members from the North
2 3West Provinces and Oudh, and two from the Punjab, Bengal,
4
Madras, Berar, and the Central Provinces were unrepresented* 
But at least a start had been made towards giving the 
Congress a ruling body responsible to and representative of 
its members.
The next Congress, at Lahore in 1900, redistributed 
the seats on the Committee at the request of the still dis­
satisfied delegates from the Punjab and the North West 
Provinces and Oudh. Bengal, Bombay, and Madras each gave up a 
seat while the Punjab gained two and the North West Provinces
1* The Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar, [Vol.IX, No.l. 
(Jan.1904), p.77. ] said" that the present leaders were 
obliged to take responsibility for the Congress on them­
selves and probably would continue to do so until there 
was an organization to relieve these "few leaders of the 
heavy pecuniary responsibility which they bear almost 
alone at present”.
The Indian Spectator, 6 January 1901, (T. & D. Selections
14 Jan. 1901, P.S.L.I,, Vol.129) reported that ”the handful
of veteran leaders” were not representative of the
majority of the Congress members ”who would like to see 
the Congress take a racial or religious colour.”
The Indian Spectator did not think that anything ”can 
prevent the present numerical preponderance from being 
translated into a moral one.”
2.. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Bishen Narain Dhar, Ganga 
Prasad Varma, and Alfred Nundy.
3. Bakshi Jaishi Ram and Lala Harkishen Lai,
4. Mahratta, 21 Oct. 1900, T. & D. Selections, 29 Oct. 1900.
f.S.L.l., Vol.128.
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and Oudh gained one,*^ The Lahore Congress also elected a 
new Indian Congress Committee for 1901*
The new Committee met at Allahabad in September 1901 
and again the attendance was poor* When none of the Bengali 
members came, it seemed probable that the Bengalis were 
intending to abolish the Committee at the Calcutta Congress 
at the end of the year. It seemed that they had not brought 
the subject up at the Lahore Congress of 1900 because they 
knew that the Punjabis, with their majority, would reject 
such a move. Just before the Calcutta Congress of 1901 it was 
announced that the Indian Congress Committee would be done 
away with. But the opposition to this was so strong, espec­
ially among the Punjabis that the question was not formally 
raised. Instead the Bengal and Bombay delegates, acting in 
concert, prevented the election of a new Committee. Further­
more, according to one delegate, the three men who "entirely 
ruled" the proceedings - Wacha, Mehta, and Bonnerjee - 
neglected to notify the delegates of the decision taken by 
the Indian Congress Committee to reduce the expenditure on
the British Committee of the Congress in order to make more
2
funds available for "propagandism" in India. That this 
decision of the Indian Congress Committee should have been 
■unpalatable to Wacha, at least, is understandable because he 
wanted to cut Congress expenditure in India so that the
1. Resolution I.
2. A Discontented Congresswallah, "The Indian National 
Congress" Kayastha Samachar, Vol.V, No.l. (Jan.1902), 
pp,57-58.
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Congress work in England could be extended.^ Whether this
was one of the reasons for suppressing the Indian Congress
2
Committee or not, discontent was widespread. The Punjabis 
let it be known that they would quit the Congress if the next 
session did not obey the 1899 Constitution and restore the 
Indian Congress Committee.^
The next session (1902) was to be held in Ahmedabad.
If the Congress Committee had still been in existence, it 
would have selected the next President, as the 1901 Committee 
had picked Wacha. But as no Committee was elected at the 1901 
Congress, some people expected a reversion to the pre-1899 
practice whereby the Reception Committee consulted the 
Standing Congress Committees, or where they existed, the new 
Provincial Congress Committees. However, in 1902, no Commit­
tees outside Bombay were consulted. Wacha simply wrote to
1. Interview with D.E.Wacha, quoted from the Kayastha Samachar 
by the Bengalee 15 Oct. 1901.
2. Alfred Nundy wrote of the "total demoralization" of the 
Congress ranks due to the abolition of the Congress 
Committee. Nundy asked W.C.Bonnerjea why he and P.M.Mehta 
objected so vehemently to the Committee, and Bonnerjea 
replied that the Committee was too cumbersome to accurately 
reflect the views of most members, that its members would 
not always attend or feel a proper responsibility for such 
a large Committee; that some of the "young and comparative­
ly inexperienced members" would be given more responsibili­
ty than they could handle, and because the existing Com­
mittee had taken a stand on a particular is sue! to which 
the older leaders had objected. Nundy did not reveal what 
the issue was. Alfred Nundy, "The Troubles of the National 
Congress" East and West. Vol.II, No.26 (Dec.1903),
pp.1404-7.
3. "Squabbles in the Congress Camp and the Forthcoming
Congress" Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VI, Nos.3 & 4 (Sept- 
Oct. 1902 )'7" pp"."'3’4 3 -4’5 '*
3 2 i.
Surendra Nath Banerjea, asking him to preside, and after
hesitating, he accepted,'*’
This minor incident brought more disapproval on the
Congress inner circle* The Hindu and the Madras Standard of
Madras, the Indian Social Reformer of Bombay, the Advocate of
Lucknow, the Kayastha Samachar of Allahabad and the Indian
Nation of Calcutta all complained of the unconstitutional
2
method used to select Banerjea, It was less Banerjea 
himself, than the arbitrary method, to which exception was 
taken although John Adam, Eardley Norton, R.N. Mudholkar, and 
Kali Char an Banerjea were mentioned as candidates possibly 
deserving notice before choosing a man who had already served
■j
as President. Furthermore, Banerjea, following A.M.Bose, 
R.C.Dutt, Chandavarkar, and Wacha, would be the fifth consec­
utive President from the Bombay-Calcutta coterie*
Nevertheless Surendra Nath Banerjea presided at the 
1902 Congress Ahmedabad and the proceedings passed without 
incident. But the Punjabis deliberately stayed away in pro­
test against the despotism of the leadership,^
1, Banerjea wrote in his autobiography with his usual lack of 
false humility that when Wacha invited him to preside over 
the Ahmedabad Congress, he "replied begging to be excused
 Sir Dinshaw wrote back to say that there was the
great Delhi Durbar of 1902; a counter-attraction and a 
counter-influe nee had to be set up" and Banerjea therefore 
accepted. A Nation in Making, p.173*
2* Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VI, No,5 (Nov.1902), pp.477-79; 
also in same 1ssue : "President of the Coming Congress", 
reprinted from the Madras Standard.
3. Ibid. “
4. A Madras Delegate, "The Coronation Congress", Hindustan 
Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VII, No.l, (Jan.1903),
p. 31.
In 1903 Lai Mohan Chose returned to the Congress 
movement after a long absence to preside over the Congress at 
Madras, He had been the leader of the unsuccessful attempt to 
start a new moderate party in Bengal in 1895 although at the 
time it' was suggested that he was motivated less by disagree 
ment with Congress policies and tactics than by personal 
resentment at his failure to be recognized as a Congress^ 
leader.^ Lai Mohan Chose used his 1903 Presidential speech 
to insinuate that Pherozeshah Mehta was guilty of despotism 
and demogoguery, and he reminded the Congress delegates
"that as the very aim and object, the raison d ’etre, 
of this National Congress is to introduce some little 
popular element into the autocratic constitution of 
the Indian Government, so if they aspire to be the 
leaders of our people, they should be especially 
careful that their own acts may not be condemned as 
autocratic by the rank and file of our party".
In the Subjects Committee, Pherozeshah Mehta made a long 
speech defending his conduct against allegations of despotic 
behaviour. Discussion in the Committee was agitated, center­
ing on the constitutional question, with the Punjab and 
Madras delegates pressing for a constitution laying down 
regular and representative methods of procedure.^ G. Subra- 
mania Iyer made explicit his views on the failure of the
Bengalee, 29 June 1895.
hal Mohan Chose was a successful criminal lawyer, as his 
brother, Manmohun Chose, had been. They came from a 
prominent zamindari family and Lai Mohan was a member of 
the Bengal Landholders' Association. He was the unsuccess­
ful Liberal candidate for Greenwich in the 1885 General 
Election.
2. Report of the 19th I.N.C., p.11.
3. Bengalee, 29 Itec. 19o3; Report of the 19th I.N.C., p.xvi.
Congress leadership and this so angered some of the older 
leaders that they succeeded in persuading the Subjects Com­
mittee to pass "a vote of censure" on him.^
The 1903 Congress would have been notable for Lai 
Mohan Ghose's Presidential Speech alone, for it was the first 
time the Congress leadership had been challenged before an
open session of the Congress. But the 1903 Congress was
2
marred by low attendance and a storm which flooded the Con­
gress Hall, making it necessary to shift the meeting to a
verandah where speakers shouted against the noise of falling
•a
rain before a small audience.-' The Hindustan Review 
declared that the 1903 Congress was distinguished from all 
its predecessors as f,a distinct and dismal failure".^ 
Altogether, the Congress reached a low point in that year, so 
low, indeed, that some nationalists suggested "that the move- 
ment might with advantage be stopped for a time."^
1. Alfred Nundy, "The Troubles of the National Congress", 
op.cit., p.1404#
2. The Madras Congress of 1894 had been attended by 1163 
delegates, the Madras Congress of 1898 by 614, and the 
1903 Congress by only 538 delegates.
3. Report of the 19th I.N.C., p.xvii.
4. riinAusian Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.IX, No.l,
(Jan.1904), p*76.
5# W.C.Bonnerjee, A Call to Arms, p.5*
The possibility that -the Congress might collapse had been 
mentioned before, by the Indian Mirror, 14 Dec.1898,
(T.& D. Selections, 19 Bee. ltf^ B. P.S.L.I. Vol.110) and by 
the Kesari, 11 Dec.1900 (T. & D. Selections, 31 Dec.1900, 
P.S.L.I. Vol,128). The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 13 Lee.1898. 
(T. & L. Selections, 19 Dec.1898, P.S.L.I. Vol.110) 
reported that a minority of the delegates at the 1897 
Congress had suggested that the Congress should close its 
operations. The Bengalee, 9 Dec.1899, admitted that it
did "not indeed regard the Congress as a permanent insti­
tution". And the Poona Vaibhav, 28 Dec.1899, (T.& D. Selec­
tions, 15 Jan.1900,P.S.L.I., Vol.120) advised the Congress 
to disband since its lavish expenditure had achieved 
nothing.
Apart from the arguments over the organization of the 
Congress there were differences of opinion on its functions. 
Some members, such as Wacha and Kali Prasanna Roy, regarded 
the Congress criticism of Government policies as either 
inadequate or superficial. In the place of speech-making they 
wanted committees of experts to prepare the Congress case in 
detail on each subject before submitting it to the annual 
session.^ It was pointed out that the Congress had for years 
demanded an enquiry into the corruption of the Indian Police, 
but when the Police Commission was appointed the Congress 
sent neither witnesses nor evidence. Similarly, it sent no
2
witnesses to give evidence before the Universities Commission 
A need, too, was felt for a Congress literature systematic­
ally presenting the nationalist argument about the "drain”,
3
the Indianization of the Civil Service, and similar subjects. 
The British Committee had published various pamphlets and so 
had individual Indians. But the Congress in India as a body 
had almost entirely limited its agitation to the platform 
ever since it had abandoned the attempt to recruit the masses 
to the nationalist movement.
There was a body of thought which held that the Con­
gress should limit either the type or the number of delegates
1. See Speech of Kali Prasanna Roy, Chairman of the Lahore 
Reception Committee, 1899, Report of the 15th I.N.C., p.6; 
also, Interview with D.E.Wacha from the Kayastha Samachar: 
Bengalee. 15 Oct. 1901.$ Speech of A.M.Bose, Report of ' 
the 14th I.N.C., p.35.
2. See quotations from the Indian Nation: Kayastha Samachar, 
Vol.VI, No.6. (Bee.1902), p.609.
3. See Speech of N.Subba Rao Pantulu, Chairman of the Madras 
Reception Committee, 1898, Report of the 14th I.N.C., p.14
attending the annual session# Lala Lajpat Rai, for instance, 
thought the practice of bringing people who had no qualifi­
cation "except in increasing the number of delegates from a 
particular class” ought to be abolished so that "the honour, 
the dignity and the prestige of the Congress” could be pre-
served# Norendra Nath Chose and Ananda Charlu would have
2
kept out the "nobodies”, others would have given greater 
attention to the election of delegates.^
The expediency of constitutional or legal methods of 
agitation was another issue over which opinion was divided 
although it did not become a central issue to the Congress 
until 1905. The ideas of Tilak and Lala Lajpat Rai in the 
pre-1905 period stand out as the most serious challenge to 
the older conception of the proper functions of the Congress 
movement. Mention has already been made of Tilak1 s advocacy of 
the boycott of European goods, of the refusal to pay land
1# Lajpat Rai, "The Coming Indian National Congress - Some 
Suggestions”# Kayastha Samachar, Vol.IV, No,5. (Nov.1901), 
pp.377-78*
2. P.Ananda Charlu, "The Indian National Congress* A 
Retrospect", Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar 
Vol.VIII, N osTT & 2 ('July-Aug.T9'03), p .14.
3- The method of election was, it seems, one of the matters 
which "agitated the Madras and Punjab delegates". The 
Report of the 1903 Congress, after mentioning the demand 
for a written constitution, says that "it is not disputed 
that, in sending up delegates, there have been proceedings 
which should have been avoided....[but] nothing to indicate 
any systematic abuse in the election proceedings. After 
all it is common knowledge that the best regulated elect­
ions do not invariably result in the return of the best 
man, A good deal has to be left to the good sense and 
patriotism of the educated men of the various localities". 
Report of the 19th I.N.C., p.xvi,
1
revenue to the Government, of the methods of Shivaji. In 
1902 he revealed to a Poona audience the new lines along 
which he was thinkings
"You must realize that you are a great factor in 
the power with which the administration in India 
is conducted* You are yourselves the useful lubri­
cants which enable the gigantic machinery to 
work so smoothly*
Though down-trodden and neglected, you must 
be conscious of your power of making the adminis­
tration impossible if you but choose to make it 
so. It is you who manage the railroad and the 
telegraph, it is you who make settlements and 
collect revenues, it is in fact you who do 
everything for the administration though in a 
subordinate capacity. You must consider whether 
you cannot turn your hand to better use for 2 
your nation than drudging on in this fashion. "
Lala Lajpat Raifs ideas, published in Sachchidananda 
Sinha's Hindustan Review and Behramji Malabari's East and 
West, probably reached a more widespread audience than 
Tilak1 s. He wrote that few of the Congress leaders could be 
called true patriots because patriotism required an ascetic, 
self-denying life, and the present leadership was both in­
active for most of the year and unjustifiably confident in 
the ultimate success of the Congress agitation. He asked 
Indians to realize that politics "is a religion, and a 
science, much higher, both in its conception and in its 
sphere, than mere political agitation" and, further, "that 
no nation is worthy of any political status if it cannot 
distinguish between begging such rights [the Congress
1. See above^pp* 31-36*
2. Quoted by Theodore Shay, The Legacy of the Lokamanya, 
pp.94-95.
Demands] and claiming them"."1'
Surendra Nath Banerjea, on the other hand, is repre­
sentative of the cider generation. BanerjeaTs view was that 
"in due time we shall want Home Rule and get it too* But for 
the present we shall be satisfied with much less....We are
making steady progress, and we are bound to win in the long 
2
run". Banerjea resisted all suggestions that peaceful pol­
itical agitation was useless and should be abandoned for 
other methods* The reform of the Legislative Councils, the 
modification of the Educational Commission^ recommendations 
- these were concessions obtained by traditional methods. And 
even when these methods - their critics called them the 
methods of mendicancy - did not succeed, Banerjea thought the 
very act of trying brought "a distinct moral gain - do we 
not feel all the better and nobler for it?"^ The difference 
in outlook was between a generation believing in self-improve­
ment and a generation impatient for self-rule.
The demand for new and more determined methods of 
pplitical agitation was closely related to the desire for a 
democratic Congress organization and although Tilak, Lajpat 
Rai, and C.Subramania Iyer were foremost in pressing for these 
changes, it is misleading to call the disputants "moderates" 
and "extremists". A large number of people who supported 
change did so because they wanted a representative constitu­
1. Lajpat Rai, "The First Principles of Political Progress" 
East and West, Vol.l, No.10. (Aug.1902). t>td. 1038-40.
2. T?engaTee /" 15"June 1895.
3. T H d T “SS July 1904.
tion for the Congress and a comprehensive program of politi­
cal agitation, and not because they favoured extra-legal 
methods, Alfred Nundy, Kali Charan Banerjea, Lai Mohun Ghose 
and Norendra Nath Ghose were as "moderate" and pro-British 
as Mehta, Charlu, Banerjea, or Bonnerjee, yet they were 
among the harshest critics of the older leadership. When 
Tilak and his friends chose the constitutional issue in 1907 
as the issue over which to join battle with the older leaders, 
they did so with the comforting knowledge that they were 
acting under the banner of democracy and majority rule.’1'
Priends of the Congress in England tried to rally the 
movement away from its drift towards disunity and inactivity.
In 1903, Wedderburn, Naoroji, Bonnerjee, and Hume contributed
2"A Call to Arms" to the Hindustan Review.1 In it they each
^he Times of London had this to say about the Congress: 
xil t  asks for a better system of representation, but its 
own methods are a direct negation of all recognized 
principles of representation. It clamours for an elective 
form of Government but it dares not to introduce the 
proper system of election into its own organization 
because its controllers know that if they did, the result 
would instantly be that they would be swept away by an 
inrush of apostles of disorder* It is, in short, a 
complete and constant refutation of its own programme and 
the most striking of all existing proofs of the utter 
impossibility of granting self-government to India. Prob­
ably there was never so remarkable an instance of a body, 
formed to secure self-government, but controlled in the 
most autocratic manner by a mere handful of men who being 
to this extent men of ability and common sense, know that 
no other than autocratic methods are possible under 
existing conditions in India."
Quoted without date, in The Congress Split (anon., 
Calcutta 1908), pp.xxii-m,
2. A Call to Arms, {Allahabad 1903), reprinted in pamphlet 
form "from ‘the Hindustan Review, Dec. 1903*
urged the nationalists to overcome their despair. Wedderburn, 
writing in the vein in which he and Hume had often written 
before, spoke of the failure of the British mission to 
awaken "this great and ancient race to a higher national 
existence,1 But unlike Hume, Wedderbum professed optimism 
about the future.'1' "Por the last eight years this country 
has been dominated by the party of aggression abroad and 
selfish class interests at home". Now the pendulum was about 
to swing towards the Liberals. "With a fresh Parliament, and
an awakened national conscience, the Court of Appeal will be
2 3open." W.C.Bonnerjee, too, expected much of the Liberals.
On the other hand, Naoroji and Hume tended to minimise the 
significance of a change of Government in England. Naoroji 
thought the struggle against "an intelligently and blindly 
selfish power" would have to be continued until "Self-Gov­
ernment under British Par amount cy" was attained, and until 
then, "there is no chance of the evil bleeding, of the
plunder of an unceasing foreign invasion, the cause of all
4our sufferings, ever ending."
Hume's message broke a long period of silence which
1. The differences between Hume and Wedderburn had, of course 
been demonstrated before and they were recognized in an 
article in 1901 by a member of the British Committee 
[R.C.Dutt?] who described Wedderburn as "a firm believer 
in the sweet persuasiveness of reason" while Hume, he said 
"has within him the blood of revolutionists". "Indian
Politics in England: A Peep behind the Scenes".
Kayastha Samachar, Vol>, III, No.5* (May 1901), p.395*
2. A~Call to Arms, pp.2-3.
3. TBTctT p".5.-----
4. Ibid. pp.3-4.
his associates had urged him to end so that no one would 
interpret it as indicating a loss of sympathy with or faith 
in the Congress. He advised Indians not to anticipate much 
help from the Liberals. Nor should Indians think that their 
position was comparable to that of the Irish who had some 
90 M.P. 's and who had been "fighting tooth and nail...for 
nearly a century." The Indians, he said, had no M.P.'s,
"and you are, most of you, alas! it seems to me, never more 
than half in earnest in your fight! You meet in Congresses; 
you glow with a momentary enthusiasm;"and then few people 
devoted earnest thought or work to India's cause. He placed 
the blame for India's unhappy political position on the 
Indians themselves who showed neither self-sacrifice nor 
mutual trust, "You have indeed ^ ever eagerly clamoured for 
and vainly clutched at the Crown, but how many of you will 
touch the Cross with even your finger-tips?"^
Thus, with the preceding pages as background, it may 
be possible to understand why the authority of the older 
Congress leaders was challenged and to appreciate the revo­
lutionary effects of Lord Curzon's policies in 1904 and 1905 
on the course of Indian political life, which had exhibited 
so little vitality in the earlier years of his Viceroyalty.
1. Ibid,p.9. Eardley Norton similarly told an audience of
Indian friends in Bombay in 1892 that Indians lacked "grip" 
or "moral courage". When a European friend of the nation­
alists was faced with danger or difficulty, he said, "The 
invariable rule was that his native friend deserted him at 
a vital moment, and pushed him to the front to bear what 
blame and odium there was,"
Statesman, 30 April 1892.
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CHAPTER VI
THE PARTITION OF BENGAL AND THE 
POLITICAL REVIVAL
On 16 October 1905, the partition of Bengal came into 
effect. A new province, called Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
was created by transferring three Divisions from Bengal to 
Assam. The effect of the partition was to place the Bengali­
speaking Hindus in a minority in both Bengal and the new 
province and to set off an agitation that was unexpected and 
different in character from earlier agitations. The agita­
tion will be discussed in detail because of its uniqueness 
and also because it reveals something of the social condit­
ions of Bengal at the beginning of this century.
There is little reason to doubt that the reasons for 
partitioning Bengal, when it was first considered, were 
almost entirely administrative and economic. As they were 
not related to nationalism, there is no need for detailed 
notice here.'*" Briefly, Bengal, with a population of 78^ 
million, was held to be too large for efficient administra­
tion by a single government; Mthe spread of English educa-
1. See, for instance, Lovat Eraser, India under Curzon and 
After, p.19, Sufia Ahmed, Some Aspects of the History of 
the MuslimCommunity in Bengal (lo#4-1912) (London Ph.D. 
Thesis, I960) pp.334-42; and P.P..r H. of C. Cd. 2658 
of 1905, East India (Reconstruction of the Provinces of 
Bengal and Assam).
H.HoRisley, Sec., G-ovt. of India, to Sec., Govt, of 
Bengal, 3 Dec. 1903*
tion and the wider diffusion of the native press tend to 
increase litigation, to give greater publicity to the con­
duct of officials, and in every way to place a heavier 
strain upon the head of Government and upon all ranks of 
his subordinates;n ^ and Calcutta and the surrounding areas 
tended to absorb the attention and the revenues of Bengal
while the eastern districts were rife with crime, under-
2
educated, under-staffed, and under-developed,
Lord Curzon's original scheme for reducing the size 
of Bengal would have resulted in a much smaller transfer of 
territory to Assam than the scheme eventually adopted. It 
was published in the Gazette of India on 12 December 1903.
It proposed that Bengal should lose Chittagong Division, 
Dacca and Mymensingh Districts, and Hill Tippera to Assam, 
lose Chota Nagpur to the Central Provinces, and gain certain 
Uriya-speaking areas from Madras and the Central Provinces. 
These transfers, had they been carried out, would have 
relieved the Bengal Government of the administrative 
burden of almost eleven million people and they would have 
united the Uriya-speaking people under a single administra­
tion. It was also hoped that the transfers to Assam would 
promote the economic development of Assam by giving it an
1. Risley, 3 Dec. 1903, op.cit., para.2. 
2* Ibid. paras. 3, 19-25.
outlet on the sea (Chittagong). The Bengal-Assam railway 
was nearing completion and could be expected to provide the 
undeveloped resources of Assam with an easy access to the 
sea, Furthermore, the new province of east Bengal and Assam 
would be large enough, it was hoped* to recruit its own 
civil servants instead of borrowing from the Bengal Civil 
Service on a short-term basis. This would lead to more 
efficient administration,
No one has yet produced any evidence to show that the 
purpose of Lord Curzon’s original partition proposals were 
other than administrative and economic although J, Chaudhuri 
denounced the proposals at the 1903 Congress as "an attempt 
to break up our presidencies and to break up our nationali­
ties, to divide us and rule.1 There seems to be no ground 
whatsoever for the charge that Curzon, in 1903, hoped to 
divide the Bengal speaking people in order to reduce their 
political strength. If the purpose of these changes had been 
political, if the Government of India had intended to sepa­
rate Hindus from Muslims or eastern Bengalis from western 
Bengalis, then it would not have achieved its purpose by 
splitting off from eastern Bengal an area containing only 
about. 11,000,000 people while leaving the bulk of the
1* H.H.Risley, Sec., Govt, of India, to Ch.Sec. of Madras 
and Ch.Corns., of Assam and the Central Provinces,
3 Dec. 1903, Enclosure No.2, to H.H,Risley to Sec, of 
State, 3 Pec. 1903, op.cit.
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Bengalis, Hindu and Muslim, under the administration of 
Calcutta* In the official comments on the original plans, 
political considerations were not mentioned nor was it 
suggested that the Muslim community in particular would 
benefit from partition. Moreover, almost five months after 
the partition plan was announced, the Chief Commissioner of 
Assam, Bampfylde Puller, informed Curzon confidentially 
that he thought Bengal could be better relieved by taking
i
away Bihar than by taking away Dacca and Mymensingh. It 
is not likely that Puller would have been unaware of a poli­
tical design behind the partition proposals had one existed, 
The early protests to the partition scheme took the 
form of public meetings and the sending of memorials and 
telegrams to the newspapers and the Government, Although the 
meetings, which began in December 1903 and were mostly in 
eastern Bengal, were free of incident, they were -unprece­
dented in number, A list prepared by Prithwis Chandra Ray
contains the locations of more than 300 protest meetings
2held in January 1904 alone. Although the agitation subsided 
after January, the Bengalee was probably correct in saying 
that the initial response to the partition scheme was an 
explosion of public feeling for which there was nothing
1. Puller’s Confidential Note, enclosure to Puller to
J.O.Miller, Private Sec. to Curzon, 5 April 1904, No.135, 
C.W.P.I*, 1904, Vol.I, Curzon Papers.
2, Prithwischandra Ray, The Case Against the Break-up of 
Bengal, (Calcutta, 19t>5), p.90,
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comparable in recent Indian history.'*" The Englishman
reported that in Dacca and Mymensingh districts, there was
"a storm of passionate protest which has surprised those
who have led it," and that the partition proposals were
supported by no one* To the casual observer it would appear,
according to the Englishman, that the Government had
searched for the quickest means of "setting the province
2
in a ferment" and had chosen partition. The Englishman 
also found a "startling" change in the atmosphere at the 
Calcutta Town Hall protest meeting of 18 March 1904. "There 
was none of that honeyed euphemism which we are accustomed 
to hear from Bengali orators, no matter how greatly their 
feelings may be stirred." The grimness of the proceedings 
was relieved only by the Maharaja of Natore who quoted the 
verse:
"The toad beneath the harrow knows 
Exactly where each tooth point goes.
The butterfly upon the road 
Preaches contentment to the toad"^
The early months of the partition agitation witnessed 
a common front between the professional classes and the big 
landowners. The divisions of the preceding years were 
ignored as many important zamindars joined the agitation.
Bengalee, 5 Jan. 1904.
2. Englishman (Y/eekly Summary), 28 Jan, 1904.
3. Ibid, 24 March 1904.
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Among the many petitions received by the Government of 
Bengal in the early months of the agitation, there was one 
from the British Indian Association,but the Indian Associa­
tion which usually was more extreme, apparently did not 
feel it necessary to submit one of its own.^
The Bengalee gave the agitation added impetus on 26 
January 1904 by publishing a note written by Sir Henry 
Cotton in 1897, while he was Chief Commissioner of Assam, 
which revealed that he and the High Court Judges had opposed 
the proposal to transfer Chittagong Division to Assam at 
that time*
A variety of objections were made against the parti­
tion plan announced in December 1903* Protests were made 
against the incorporation of a part of Bengal into Assam 
which was governed by a Chief Commissioner without the 
assistance of a Legislative Council, a Board of Revenue, or 
a High Court. Without a Legislative Council, public opinion 
would have no formal means other than petitions, of comment­
ing on either new administrative regulations or on the 
behaviour of civil servants, as the representatives had 
in the Bengal Legislative Council through interpellation 
and debates. The San.jibani and other newspapers warned the
1. See enclosures to W.C.MacPherson, Offg. Ch.Sec., Govt, 
of Bengal, to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept.,
6 April 1904, Peb. Prog. No.157, I.H.P.Pub., Vol.7046.
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zamindars that the Permanent Settlement, in the new non- 
regulation Province, "could he abolished by a mere Gazette
i
notification." Without a Board of Revenue, there would 
be no court of appeal before which revenue petitioners 
could appear* And without the High Court, there would be no 
judicial tribunal independent of the executive. In other 
words, the inhabitants of the transferred districts would
2
lose what was called the '^apparatus of civilized government'.'
It was also alleged that, with the loss of the 
University of Calcutta, the educational opportunities of 
the people in the transferred districts would suffer. Simi­
larly, the number of available posts, government and 
private, would be reduced. Calcutta firms would not hire 
people from the transferred area and the people from the 
Dacca District, who held 1/10 of the posts in the Subordin­
ate, Judicial, and Executive Services in the 48 districts 
of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, would be limited to Govern­
ment service in the transferred districts only. This
1. Report on the Agitation Against the Partition of Bengal, 
para.6. Enclosure to R.W.Carlyle, Offg. Ch.Sec., Govt, 
of Bengal, to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept., 25 Jan. 
1906, June Prog. No.175, I.H.P.,Pub,, Vol.7312.
2. These and the following objections were discussed in 
W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 1904, op.cit. paras, 20-22, 41- 
49* The objections themselves were made many times, and 
were succinctly stated in Sita Nath Roy, Hon.Sec,,
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, to Ch.Sec., Govt.
of Bengal, 3 Feb. 1904, enclosure No.4 to W.C.MacPherson, 
6 April 1904, op.cit. ; and in Ananda Chandra Roy, Pres., 
Peoples' Assn., Dacca, and Sec., Landholders' Assn.,
Dacca, 4 March 1904, enclosure No.8. to W.C.MacPherson,
6 April 1904, op.cit.
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anticipated loss of opportunity for Government employment 
was especially resented because it was alleged that limit­
ations had recently been placed upon the employment of
1
-Bengalis in Assam and the United Provinces.
The revenues of Dacca and Mymensingh, it was feared, 
would be used to develop Assam and the port of Chittagong, 
Many east Bengal zamindars and merchants had property, 
agents, and other interests in Calcutta or other parts of 
Bengal outside the districts to be transferred. Partition 
would cause inconvenience, and in some instances, financial 
loss, to these persons. Others feared that the trade in 
jute and rice would be diverted from Calcutta to Chittagong. 
Furthermore, it was said that people in the affected
2
districts looked to Calcutta "for inspiration and guidance*.
They were said to "stand together on social and political .
questions", to "follow the same leaders,” and to be "repre-
3
sented by the same press" as the people of western Bengal.
Cultural, racial, and linguistic considerations also 
played an important role in the agitation against the 
original partition plan. The Jyoti of Chittagong predicted 
that "association with the Assamese will have a deteriorat­
ing effect upon the Bengalis of Chittagong, just as the
1, Ananda Chandra Roy, 4 March 1904, op.cit.
2, Nawab Syed Ameer Hussain, Hon. Sec,, Central National 
Muhammadan Assn., Calcutta, to Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bengal, 
17 Feb. 1904, enclosure No,7 to W.C.MacPherson,
6 April 1904, op.cit.
3# W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 1904, op.cit, para.46.
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[Assamese] have deteriorated hy reason of their association 
with the Burmese. The Charu Mihir of Mymensingh said it 
made one "shudder" to think of the effect that the Assamese 
language would have on Bengali. "The half-educated Assamese", 
it went on, "will continue to he the lords of the administ­
ration of the country, and we shall he judged and tried hy 
them. What a misfortune!" The Dacca Prakas , too, feared
3
the effects of contact with "the naked harharians of Assam. " 
Critics of partition repeatedly asserted that the Bengali 
people were united hy a common history, language, and race, 
and that to divide Bengal would he to divide a nation. This
A
was what Lord Curzon termed the sentimental opposition.
The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and the People*s 
Association of Dacca provided a concrete example of how 
partition would affect the unity of the "nation11. They 
pointed out that the movement among the Brahmans and Kayas- 
thas in favour of marriages with caste-fellows who lived 
outside their own half of Bengal would he set hack, for as
the latter organization dimmed, contact with Assam would
5he socially degrading. Some of the arguments were distinct­
ly hysterical. Por instance the Sanjivani said "the partit­
ion of Bengal will undoubtedly bring about the ultimate
1. Jyoti, 11 Jan. 1904, Bengal Newspaper Report, 23 Jan.
18&4, para.58.
2. Charu Mihir, 22 Dec. 1903, Bengal Newspaper Report,
2 Jan. 1904, para.35.
3. Dacca Prakas, 27 Dec. 1903, ibid., para.50.
4. 'Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Vol.Ill, Address at 
Mymensingh, 20 Peb. 1904, p.3^9.
5. Sita Nath Roy, 3 Peb. 1904, op.cit. and Ananda Chandra 
Roy, 4 March 1904, op.cit.
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extinction of the race*"^
The official opinions elicited hy Lord Curzon's
Government in January and February 1904 on the proposal to
transfer Dacca and Mymensingh Districts, Chittagong Division^
and Hill Tippera to Assam revealed that educated Bengalis
were almost unanimously hostile to the partition plan and
2
that the masses were indifferent. None of the opinions 
distinguished between Hindu and Muslim feeling# None 
suggested that the public feeling was dangerous or so strong 
that the partition ought to be abandoned* Generally, 
official opinion was in favour of a reduction in the size 
of Bengal but few thought that Lord Curzon *s scheme Went 
far enough*^ The Government was urged to transfer a larger 
area of Bengal to Assam in order to give more substantial 
relief to the Bengal Government and, at the same time, 
create a new province that would be large enough to have 
its own Board of Revenue and Legislative Council* The Com­
missioner of Dacca Division, H* Savage, believed that 
"perhaps the most important reform which would follow" from 
a wider scheme of partition would be that the Muslims
1, Sanjivani (Calcutta), 10 Nov, 1904, Bengal Newspaper 
Report, 19 Nov. 1904, para.37#
2* These opinions are enclosed in W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 
1904, op.cit*
3 9 C.E.Buckland and the other members of the Board of Reven­
ue, K.C.De, Magistrate of Faridpur, and H*W.P.Scroppe, 
Collector of Tippera, were opposed to the partition of 
the Bengali-speaking districts. See enclosures 17, 18, 
19, and 2 0 ‘to W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 1904, op.cit.
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"would have education offered to them in their 
mother-tongue, Bengali, unhampered by the 
Sanskrit tendencies of the Hindus, who up to 
now have controlled and practically monopo­
lized education in Bengal, or by the few 
educated men of their own religion, who 
have shut their eyes to facts and persuaded 
or tried to persuade themselves and others 
that the vernacular of the Eastern Bengal 
Musalman is Urdu.nl
The idea of a wider scheme of partition commended itself 
to Lord Curzon and when he made his speaking tour through 
Chittagong, Dacca, and Mymensingh in February 1904, he 
attempted to dispel popular apprehensions by hinting 
broadly that a larger area than originally planned might be 
transferred from Bengal* He pointed out that such a scheme 
might enable the new province to be equipped with a Lieu- 
tenant-Governorship, a Legislative Council, and an indepen­
dent revenue authority. He also said at Dacca that that 
city might become the capital of a new province "which 
would invest the Mahomedans in Eastern Bengal with a unity
which they have not enjoyed since the days of the old
2
Musulman Viceroys and Kings."
1. Savage to Chief Sec., Govt, of Bengal, 15 Feb. 1904, 
enclosure No.19 to W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 1904, op.cit.
H.H.Risley, in the 1901 Census Report, regretted attempts 
by speakers of Bengali and Hindi to introduce Sanskrit 
words into their languages. He reported that literature 
had "been divorced from the great mass of the population, 
and to the literary classes this is a matter of small 
moment..."
General Report on the Census of India, 1901, para.508.
For a Bengali view of the disadvantages of "linguistic 
miscegenation" (the adoption of English or Persian words 
into Bengali), see Bijaychandra Mazumdar, The History 
of the Bengali Language (2nd ed. pp. 14-16.
2. Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Vol.Ill, Address 
at Dacca, 18 Feb. 1904, p.303.
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The first appreciable Muslim support for the partit­
ion dates from Lord Curzon*s visit to Dacca in February 1904 
and his open hints that a new province with a Muslim 
majority was -under consideration* The central figure in this 
shift in Muslim public opinion in east Bengal was Nawab 
Salimullah of Dacca, It has been pointed out that Nawab Sal- 
imullah was obliged to the G-overnment of Bengal for past 
financial help, that the value of his real estate would have 
been increased by the establishment of a capital at Dacca, 
and that after partition was effected, he was appointed to 
the Bengal and Indian Legislative Councils and lent a very 
. large sum of money by the Government of India."1’ But it would 
be entirely misleading to suggest that Nawab Salimullah*s 
personal interests resulted in the widespread support which 
the larger partition scheme received from the Bengali 
Muslims in 1905. The Bengali Muslims had few newspapers or 
political organizations and they fared badly in competition 
with the Hindus for education and government employment.
In Bengal, in 1901, only 22 out of every 10,000 Muslims
2
knew English compared to 114 out of every 10,000 Hindus. ^  
f They held only ffi) of the "high appointments" under the
* \ \ k \
'  Government while the Hindus, who were less than twice as 
numerous as the Muslims, held 1,235.^ After the partition
1. C.J.0 *Donnell (The Causes of Present Discontents in India, 
p. 69) said it was £26,000, Henry W. Nevis on (The New 
Spirit in India, p.192) put the figure at.£10(5,000.
2. General Repor~of the Census of India, 1901» p.175.
3. Ibid. p.217#
1
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was effected, the Government found that of the ministerial 
posts in divisional, district, and sub-divisional offices 
in Eastern Bengal, Muslims held less than one-sixth of the 
appointments although they made up two-thirds of the popula­
tion.^" In the Police Department in Eastern Bengal the 
Muslim position was even worse. In what was called the 
Eastern Bengal Range, where Muslims equalled 59$ of the 
population, they held 4 of the 54 Inspectorships, 60 of the
484 Sub-Inspectorships, 45 of the 450 head constableships,
2
and 1,027 of the 4,594 constableships. In view of this
striking imbalance it is hardly surprising that many Muslims 
should have welcomed hints of a larger share of state 
patronage.
1. The Hindus had gained their commending position in 
Government offices through a system of unpaid apprentice­
ships. After partition the Government of Eastern Bengal 
and Assam declared that it was advisable to fix a pro­
portion of Muslims and to make special efforts to notify 
and encourage Muslims to apply for vacancies*
P.C.Iyon, Ch.Sec., Govt, of Eastern Bengal and Assam,
to Corns* of Divs,, 25 May 1906, May Appointment Dept*
Prog* No.16, Eastern Bengal and Assam Judicial Prog.,
Vol.7215.
2. In December 1905, the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern \ J  
Bengal expressed his hopes that "strenuous and continued 
efforts" would be made "to raise the proportion of Mus- 
almans in the police". The existing situation, he 
believed, was "unfair to the Musalman community." It was 
"politically very unsound, and it must have the effect of 
depriving of police protection the great mass of the 
raiyats" from their Hindu zamindars.
Sec., Govt* of Eastern Bengal and Assam, to Inspector- 
General of Police, 12 Dec, 1905* Oct, Confid* Jud, Prog.
No.6*, E.B. and A. Jud* Prog., Vol*72l8,
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By 1911 the position of the Bengali Muslims had
improved through the opening of new jobs in Eastern Bengal
and Assam and the abolition of the competitive examination
for the provincial civil service. Whereas in 1901 they held
roughly one-eighth of the 1,235 higher appointments, in 1911
they occupied almost one-fifth of the 2,305 gazetted appoint-
1
ments held hy Indians, While recognition of Muslim inter­
ests was an important factor in the official support for a 
wider scheme of partition, this recognition was not the 
result of an intention to alienate Hindus from Muslims. Or 
if it was with certain individuals, evidence has yet to he 
produced to prove it.
The public was left in ignorance of the ultimate 
shape of the partition between the time of Curzon*s trip 
to east Bengal in February 1904 and the announcement of 
the final scheme on 19 July 1905. Curzon had made it clear 
that a wider scheme than that announced in December 1903 
was being considered . but its details were not known.
During this interval several events occurred which 
destroyed any chance that the partition of Bengal would be 
received passively by the Bengali Hindus. The passing of 
the Universities and Official Secrets Bills, Lord Curzon*s
1. Sufia Ahmed, op.cit, p.217.
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Convocation Address, and the Russo-Japanese War further 
aroused people already alarmed "by the partition proposals.
The Universities Bill was "based on certain recommend-
1
ations made by the Universities Commission of 1902. The 
Commission had recommended that the quality of teaching 
should he improved hy raising fees, supplying a larger 
degree of European control and Government supervision, 
tightening the rules for University affiliation, abolishing 
the second class colleges which failed to measure up to the 
rules for affiliation, and doing away with all private law 
classes. The Report of the Universities Commission was sub­
mitted in June 1902 and was so strongly criticised by Indian 
public opinion that the Government of India announced on 
24 October 1902, its intention to modify the proposals to
fix minimum rates of college fees and to abolish second
2class colleges. The Government also dropped the plan to 
concentrate all law classes in Government colleges. These 
modifications removed the more contentious features of 
Curzon*s educational reforms, Curzon*s opponents argued
1.This Commission was appointed after Lord Curzon*s closed 
Simla Conference of European education experts in Sept­
ember 1901. Its chairman was Sir Thomas Raleigh. When it 
was originally appointed, it contained only one Indian, 
Syed Hosain Bilgrami, an official in the service of the 
Nizam of Hyderabad for many years and a member of the 
Aligarh school. Following many nationalist protests, 
Justice Guru Das Banerjea was added. He dissented from 
the Commission's Report.
2. Summary of Lord Curzon*s Administration in the Home 
Department, p.32,
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that those reforms would have made education the privilege
of the rich and would have destroyed the independence and
private initiative of Indian educators* They gave the
impression that the Government of India regarded educated
Indians as a nuisance, and hy narrowing the opportunities
1for education that nuisance might he removed.
While Lord Curzon1s Government compromised on the
questions of rates, second class colleges, and law classes,
it did not abandon its plans to hring higher education
u n d e r  closer Government surveillance and direction. Hamilton
and Curzon were convinced that without careful European
supervision the Universities would produce semi-educated,
2discontented,and seditious, graduates. The Universities 
Bill provided for tighter control hy reducing the number of 
Bellows on the University Senates, which meant, in effect, 
increasing the proportion of European Fellows, and hy con­
verting the term of the Fellowship from life to five years. 
Previous to the passing of the Bill, most Fellows were 
appointed hy the Government for life and did not possess 
special knowledge or experience of education. The Bill was 
supposed to enable the Government to fill the Senates with
1. See N.N.Ghose, MThe Report of the Indian Universities 
Commission", Kayastha Samachar* Vol.VI, Nos. 3 and 4 
(Sept.-Oct. 1902), pp.217-27. Also, C .Y.Chintamanifs 
speech, Report of the 20th I.N.C., pp.90-95»
2. The political danger of the existing state of the 
Universities was mentioned in
Hamilton to Curzon, 18 May 1899, MSS.Eur.C.126/1, and in 
Curzon to Hamilton, 28 Aug. 1901, MSS.Eur. D.510/8.
persons specially interested and qualified in education.
It was evident from some of the comments on the 
existing state of the Universities that the reforms were 
directed principally against the University of Calcutta. 
Alexander Pedlar, Director of Public Instruction in Bengal, 
complained that while in 1880 the European Fellows on the 
Calcutta Senate outnumbered the Indians by 177, in 1902 the 
Indians had a majority of 47. In 1880, Western ideals of 
education and Western ideas of discipline1 were prominently 
kept in view ... and now, more or less, the majority of the 
members of the Senate represent Eastern, rather than Western 
education."^ After the Universities Bill became law, of the 
64 Fellows nominated by the Chancellor (the Viceroy) and the 
10 Fellows elected by the registered graduates, 39 were 
Europeans and 35 were Indians. Of the 35 Indian Fellows, 12 
were officials and a few others were on Government pensions. 
Thus Curzon gained in Calcutta what was popularly believed 
to be his object; the officialization and Europeanization
1. India Leg. Council Progs., 18 March 1904, Vol.XLIII, 
p. 167.
Lord Curzon also singled out conditions at the 
University of Calcutta as evidence of the need for ^  
reform. See his speeches in the Legislative Council 
debates of 18 Dec. 1903 and 18 and 21 March 1904.
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of the University1 s management* In Bombay, on the other 
hand, where an Indian majority was not regarded by the 
Government as incompatible with efficient and sound educa­
tion, the Indians outnumbered the Europeans, 57 to 43> on 
the reformed Senate
Although the Universities Act did not fix college fees 
or abolish second class colleges, it did allow the Govern­
ment, acting through the Senates, to set certain standards 
which, if they had been harshly applied, would have enabled 
the Government to restrict educational opportunities. Under 
the Act, Regulations were passed by the University Senates 
preventing secondary schools from sending up candidates for 
the matriculation examination unless the schools conformed
to certain rules relating to staff, management, purpose,
2
buildings, discipline, and fees. But these rules did not 
have a radical effect,so that the main change effected byt 
the Universities Act was the reduction of Indian control 
over the management of the Universities,
Pherozeshah Mehta and some other Bombay politicians 
perceived a fault in the drafting of the Universities Act 
and they seized upon it and opened legal proceedings 
against, in effect, the Government of Bombay, Legal pro­
ceedings against the Government or its officials were to
1* Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol,X, No*4 
(Oct, 1504), pp,410-15.
2* Summary of Lord Curzon^ Administration in the Home 
Department, p.155.
become an important tactic of the nationalists in the part­
ition agitation. On 24 January 1905 a suit was filed in the 
High Court of Bombay seeking an injunction against the 
University of Bombayfs provisional Syndicate* The Universi­
ties Act had not provided a full programme for the transi­
tion from the old to the reformed Senates and Syndicates,
In the absence of prescribed procedure, the Chancellor had 
appointed a provisional Syndicate to conduct the 
University's executive business until the Act came into 
full operation. Pherozeshah Mehta and the other plaintiffs 
claimed in their suit that the Chancellor had acted illeg­
ally, that he was obligated to follow the old procedure and
1
allow the Senate to elect the Syndicate. But before a 
ruling was given, the Government of India drafted and passed
a Validating Bill which legalized the provisional Bombay
„ 2 
Syndicate,
The other unpopular measure passed by Lord Curzon1s 
Government in 1904 was the Official Secrets Amendment Bill. 
The Indian and Anglo- Indian newspapers were almost unani­
mous in branding the Bill a gross violation of the 
freedom of the press.
1. Hindustan Review, Vol.XII, No.72.(Aug.1905), p.168. Also 
£ord Lamington, Gov, of Bombay, to Curzon, 24 Jan. 1905, 
No.68b, C.W.P.I., 1905, Vol.l, Curzon Papers.
2. The Bill was introduced on 3 Pebruary 1905 and passed 
seven days later .
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The decision to amend the Indian Official Secrets 
Act of 1889 grew out of a case in which a military fort in 
the Bombay Presidency was photographed by a Parsi. The 
Government of India considered prosecuting the man but 
realized that a conviction could not be obtained since the 
Official Secrets Act of 1889 placed the onus of proving 
criminal intention upon the prosecution.^* The Official 
Secrets Act Amendment Bill of 1904- shifted the onus of 
proving innocence onto the accused, It also made it an 
offence to publish information about non-military affairs
which "are of such a confidential nature that the public
2interest would suffer by their disclosure," The newspapers 
in India, including the Pioneer, the Englishman, and the 
Statesman, were of one voice in condemning the decision to 
place civil affairs on the same level with military matters. 
The Bill was denounced as an infringement of the liberty
3
of the press worthy of Machiavelli or the Tzar's Government.
Obviously pained at the reception given to the Uni­
versities and Official Secrets Bills, Lord Curzon gave one 
of his unfortunate sermons on the short-comings of Indians 
at the Convocation of the University of Calcutta on 11 Feb-
1. Govt, of India, Home Dept. Pub. to Sec. of State,
6 March 1902, No,12 of 1902, Pub. Letters from India,1902.
2. Speech by Sir Arundel Arundel. India Leg. Council Prog.f 
$  Feb. 1904, Vol.XLIII, p.20.
3. See Englishman, 28 Jan, 1904; Sir Thomas Raleigh's 
introduction to Lord Curzon in India, pp.l-li; and 
C.J.O'Bonne11, The Causes of Present Discontents in 
India, pp.50-51.
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ruary 1905* Among the many Indian vices he warned his
audience to avoid, were exaggeration of language, flattery,
vituperation, invective,arrogance, lack of independent
judgment, rhetoric, and "the tyranny of faction and the
poison of racial bitterness." In the same address he made
his famous remark: "I hope I am making no false or arrogant
claim when I say that the highest ideal of truth is to a
2large extent a Western conception."
The Sandhya of Calcutta, whose editor was convicted 
of sedition on 4 December 1905, for subsequent articles, 
replied to Curzon^ Convocation speech: "What a rash, foul- 
tongued man! ... A good thrashing is the cure of foolish­
ness. But when the Viceroy is foolish there is nothing to 
be done."*^ The Amrita Bazar Patrika retorted that "in 
degraded India, in spite of moral decadence on all sides, 
Indians have not fallen as low as to require the services 
of a Westerner, whose civilization is still in its infancy, 
to teach them what constitutes the highest forms of truth
A
and honour."
This Convocation speech revealed a blindness to Indian 
sensibilities. It was but one of several occasions during 
the last two years of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty on whicl;
!• Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston. Vol.IV, pp.73-84,
2. Ibid, pT75.
3- _§andhya, 16 Feb. 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 25 Feb. 
1905, para.30.
4. Amrita Bazar Patrika. 16 Feb. 1905, Bengal Newspaper 
Keport, Part II, 18 Feb. 1905, para.201,
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his public utterances exhibited pique and querulousness.
His judgment sometimes left him and he failed to see the 
reason or the sincerity behind the mounting criticism of 
his policies. In December 1903 in the Legislative Council, 
G.K.Gokhale criticized the Government's failure to appoint 
a representative of nationalist or Congress opinion to the 
Universities Commission and Curzon complained with some 
bitterness, "I suppose that I have taken more trouble than 
anybody else about Commissions. I have to represent prov­
inces, interests, classes, creeds, upon them, and I have 
spent many hours of time in the attempt to make these 
Commissions fair. But we never get any thanks for our 
efforts."^ Gokhale also complained that the Universities 
Bill would reduce the number of Indian Fellows on the 
Senates, That was a fact. It was one of the purposes of the 
Bill. Yet Curzon replied facetiously that Gokhale was mis­
taken, that the Bill was a "great step forward" because it
would give "statutory recognition" to the Fellows for the 
2
first time, Curzon was technically correct in saying that 
the Fellows owed their position to custom rather than to a 
written law but this was a disingenuous quibble since no 
one had challenged the legality of the existing system.
Although the reforms and speeches of Lord Curzon were
1. Speech in the India Leg. Council, 18 Dec. 1903, 
Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Vol.Ill, p.264.
2, '1 dicfj" p',"267”.----- -------------------
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resented, it was the Japanese victories over Russia which
made the most profound impression on educated Indians in
1904 and 1905/ The industrial progress of Japan had heen
attracting notice in India for some years* In 1903 the
first Bengali student to study in Japan returned to India
after five years of work in a mine and at the University
of Tokyo in mining engineering*"^ A member of the Japanese
2
Diet attended the Ahmedabad Congress of 1902 and in 1905 
Viscount Moriyoshi Nagaoka, F.R.G.S., became the first 
President of an Indo-Japanese Association in Tokyo estab­
lished to promote cultural, educational, and commercial 
exchange.^ A Shivaji meeting in Tokyo on 7 May 1905 was
attended by 80 persons, including twenty Indian students and
4
representatives of Nepal, China, Korea, the Philippines, 
Japan and Siam. Three cheers were given to Shivaji (MShivaji 
Maharaj ki ,1 aiI ») and three banzais were given to the 
Mikado. Bengali students predominated at the meeting. One 
Mr. Pottdar of Poona explained in a speech that such hero 
worship would enable them to reassert their own nationality 
and also to stimulate "the common Asiatic unity, or - as I
1* Bengalee, 9 Oct. 1903.
2. Ibid, 4 Aug. 1904.
3. Ibid, 3 Dec. 1904.
4. British treatment of India was occasionally contrasted 
with American policies towards the Philippines. The 
Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar [Vol.X, No.l.
(July 1904),p.92] observed that after six years of 
American rule the Philippines enjoyed more autonomy 
than India did after a century and a half of British 
rule.
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like to call it - a higher humanity."
The actual events of the Russo-Japanese War were
followed closely in India. A relief fund for Japanese
2
widows and orphans was opened in Bengal in 1904, and on 
many occasions in 1905, the Bengalee contained advertise­
ments for a "cinematograph” of the war.
A number of lessons were drawn from the Japanese 
successes. A contributor to the Hindustan Review thought 
that "whatever Japan may owe to Europe ... the genius of 
the race is distinctly Asiatic and absolutely different from 
that of any European nation. The influence that radiates 
from Japan is gentler, more subdued and more human than 
that which emanates from the arrogant nations of Europe,"  ^
Por many Indians, Japan’s "easy and brilliant ascendancy in 
the East has for ever exploded the fiction regarding the 
inherent superiority of the Western races. The Japanese 
successes were "the talk of the market place, the topic of 
conversation in the family circle, the one absorbing theme 
which interests and gratifies us all .... We feel that we 
are not the same people as we were,"^ The Punjabi of Lahore
g
predicted that Asia was "to get her innings at last,"
1. Ibid, 14 June 1905.
2. Ibid, 4 March 1904. The Bengalee of 17 April 1904 
reported that Rs.1,596 had been collected so far.
3. N. Gupta, "Jap the Giant Killer", Hindustan Review
and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.2, No.3l (Sept, 1^04), p.240.
4. Bengalee, 10 June 19^5.
5. Ibid, 14 June 1905.
6. Punjabi, 19 June 1905, Punjab Newspaper Report, 24 June 
1905, para.2.
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Lord Curzon was on leave in England from April to 
December 1904. During this time Lord Ampthill, Governor of 
Madras, acted as Governor-General. Ampthill and other off­
icials were concerned about the security measures to be 
adopted for Curzon1s return to Calcutta via Bombay. In 
September and November, the Kal of Poona had praised the 
assassination of M. de Plehve in Russia and had hinted that 
the tyranny of Curzon might be combatted as the socialists 
and nihilists fought the autocratic rule of the Tzar.^
Curzon himself had received threatening letters from India. 
Ampthill was taking "every conceivable police precaution" 
to guard Curzon because he feared the effect of the 
Russian terrorists on India although he believed that 
"happily the native of India has not got that moral courage
2
which induces the European anarchist to risk his own life*" 
Curzon returned, however, without any attempt on his 
life. Shortly after his return, Ambica Charan Mazumdar 
sent a letter to the Government of Bengal inquiring its 
intentions with regard to the partition Jand Sir Henry 
Cotton presided over a meeting at the Calcutta Town Hall 
which passed a resolution insisting upon the publicfs right 
to know of any changes the Government might be considering
1. The text of the Kal articles may be seen in the 
enclosures to P.TTIPercival, Under Sec., Govt, of Bombay, 
Jud. Dept, to C.G.H.Fawcett, Rembrancer of Legal Affairs, 
23 Sept. 1904, and Percival to Fawcett, 21 Oct 1904,
Jud. Dept. (Confid.) Prog., Sept. No.A-3 and Oct. No.A-3, 
Bombay Jud, and Home Prog,., Confid., Vol.6958.
2. Ampthill to St. John Brodrick, Sec. of State, 21 Sept, 
1904, No.60, MSS.Eur. E*233/37.
3. Bengalee, 17 Dec. 1904.
35G
before any final decision was made.
While the issue was -unsettled, alternative plans were 
put forward by the nationalists. It was suggested that the 
non-Bengali areas of the province, such as Orissa, Chota 
Nagpur, and Bihar might be removed instead^or perhaps Bengal
could be given a Governor with a Council in order to lighten
2
the burden of the administration. The first solution would
have been popular in Orissa and Bihar, although not in
J
Bengal. Bor some years there had been a movement in Orissa 
in favour of the establishment of a Uriya-speaking province. 
The movement was led by a Christian, Modu Sadan Das, and 
his Utkal Union Conference which, according to Bepin Chandra 
Pal’s New India,was one of the few public movements in India 
that had agents and organisation in the villages and was in
1, See Sir Henry Cotton’s Presidential Address, Report of 
the 20th I.N.C.(1904) p.46; Also, Cotton’s speech, Town 
Hall Conference, 10 Jan. 1905, All About Partition, p.78.
2. Prithwis Chandra Roy, The Case Against the Break-up of 
Bengal. p.P; also Memorial adopted by Town Hall Meeting, 
Id March 1904, ibid, appendix C.
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touch with the common people.^* While the main motive behind 
the Uriya movement was the desire for unification of the 
Uriyan people who were divided between Madras, Bengal, and 
the Central Provinces, the demand for a Bihari province 
grew out of the dominance of Bengalis in government and
p
public life* The movement in favour of a separate Bihar 
was said to date from the birth of the Behar Times in 1893* 
The editor of this newspaper, Mahesh Narain, argued in 1896 
that the Biharis were more akin to the people of Upper India
1. New India. 8 Oct. 1904, Bengal Newspaper Report, Part II 
1964, para. 8142. The final section of the weekly news­
paper reports for Bengal in 1904 and 1905, contains 
extracts from Orissa newspapers. The movement is men­
tioned almost weekly. The movement is discussed in 
P.P., H, of C. Cd. 2746 of 1905, East India (Reconstruc - 
tion of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam). Further 
Papers, Enclosure 3 to No.2 B. Robertson, Ch.Sec* to 
Ch.Com,, Central Provinces, to Sec. Govt, of India,
Home Dept., 16 March 1904* The Madras Congress of 1903 
showed little sympathy to Uriyan demands for unification 
under a single administration. V. Krishnaswami Iyer 
attempted unsuccessfully to omit from the Partition 
resolution the protest against the transfer of Ganjam 
District and Gan jam and Vizagaptam Agency Tracts to 
Bengal. Iyer knew that the Uriyas favoured the transfer 
although the Telegus objected.
Report of the 19th I.N.C. (1903) pp.131-33*
2. According to the Bihar News (14 Jan, 1905, Bengal News­
paper Report, Part II, 21 Jan. 1905, para. 87) the 
Biharis welcomed the abolition of the complete examina­
tion for the provincial civil service because it would 
enable Biharis to get more jobs. In Bankipur, known as 
,fa hot-bed of animosity between the Bengalis and the 
Biharis", a Bengali Defense Association was founded 
late in 1904. (Hitavarta, 25 Dec. 1904, Bengal Newspaper 
Report, 31 Dec, 1904, para.56).
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than to the Bengalis and that therefore the Biharis should
have a separate administration. The Lieutenant-Governor
of Bengal, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, discouraged the idea
and the Bihari separationists were quiet from 1896 to 1903.
Then the partition Resolution of 12 December reopened the
issue. On the other hand, even with the threatened division
of the Bengali-speaking area, many Bengalis remained hostile
to the idea of a separate Bihar . ^  Sir Henry Cotton
suggested the idea in his Presidential address at the 1904-
Congress and proposed a resolution embodying it in the
Subjects Committee. But according to Mehesh Narain, the
proposed resolution, which was supported by Sachchidananda
Sinha, the only Bihari present, was "simply laughed down"
2
by the Bengalis who dominated the proceedings. In its 
place, a resolution was passed rec.ording an "emphatic pro­
test against the proposals of the Government of India for 
the partition of Bengal in any manner whatsoever. "-'There 
seem not to have been any petitions or memorials from 
Bengalis previous to the summer of 1905 which recommended
A
the creation of a non-Bengali province including Bihar.
1. Mahesh Narain, The Partition of Bengal or the Separation 
of Behar? (Allahabad, 1906, reprinted from the Hindustan 
KeviewT; pp.1-20. -------
2. Ibid, p.9.
3. Resolution XIV. Emphasis added,
4. On the other hand, the separation of Orissa was suggested 
in memorials from the Bengal Landholders' Association,
1 March 1904, and the Central National Muhammadan Associ­
ation, 17 Eeb. 1904, Annexures 9 and 10, W.C.MacPherson 
to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept, 6 April 1904. 
Enclosure 5 in No,2. East India {Reconstitution of the 
Provinces of Bengal and Assam) Purther Papers.
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Nevertheless the separation of Bihar would have been far 
less objectionable to Bengali public opinion than either 
the scheme announced on 12 December 1903 or the plan 
ultimately adopted*
Why did not the Government of India leave the Bengali­
speaking areas intact and instead separate Bihar and perhaps 
Orissa and Chota Nagpur? This was the solution adopted in 
1911 when the partition was undone and it would have been 
the logical alternative to the plan carried through by Lord 
Curzon in 1905. The Government of India's letter of 3 
December 1903, in which the partition was proposed, recog­
nized the linguistic argument in favour of the unification 
of the Uriyass
"Where the population speaking a distinct 
language and the area over which it is spoken 
are too small to constitute a substantial 
portion of a province, the foreign unit is 
almost of necessity neglected Hence in
dealing with a question of this kind, it may 
be that the true criterion of territorial 
redistribution should be sought not in race 
but in language. "J-
If this argument applied to the Uriyas, why was it not v 
valid for the Bengalis as well?
The answer seems to be that the Bengalis were unlikely 
to suffer from neglect in a divided Bengal, that the
l.H.H.Risley to Ch. Sec., Govt, of Bengal,
3 Dec. 1903, op.cit., para. 13.
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(Bengalis were unlikely to suffer from neglect in a divided
Bengal that the position of the Uriyas, who were spread I
out in Madras, the Central Provinces, and Bengal, was not ^
similar. But even more important, the interests of the
Indian Civil Service were at stake. The Government of India
believed that if Bihar and Orissa were removed from Bengal,
"it would take from Bengal all of its best districts and
would make the province universally unpopular."^ However,
2the separation of Bihar was not seriously considered. Pew 
Bengalis favoured it before mid-1905 and even the Biharis 
pressed their demand for their own state with far less 
determination than the Uriyas.
Lord Curzon's enlarged scheme of partition received 
the assent of the Secretary of State, St. John Brodrick, 
on 9 June 1905. ^ Under the scheme as finally accepted, the
1. P.P.Cd. 2746 of 1906.
East India (Reconstitution of the Provinces of Bengal 
and Assam) Purther Papers., No.2.
Extract of Govt, of India to Sec. of State, 2 Peb. 1905.
2. Dr. P.C.Ghosh (op.cit., p,123) is not correct in saying 
categorically that the separation of Bihar and Orissa 
from Bengal was not considered by Lord Curzon.
3* East India (Reconstitution of the Provinces of Bengal 
and Assam) Purther Papers,.., No.2,
Extract of Sec. of State to Gov.-Gen. in C. 9 June 1905. 
The actual decision in favour of an enlarged scheme was 
made by H.H.Risley and Sir Andrew Praser while Curzon 
was in England although presumably Curzon could have 
vetoed it if he had wished. Ampthill to Curzon, 19 Sept. 
1904, No.59, MSS.Eur. E,233/37. Also, A.HL.Praser ,
Lt. Gov. of Bengal, to Curzon, 16 April 1904, No.146, 
C.W.P.I., 1904, Vol.l, Curzon Papers.
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new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam consisted of Assam, 
the Chittagong, Dacca, and Rajshahi Divisior£ the District 
of Malda, and the State of Hill Tippera. This entailed 
the transfer of 24.5 million or 3/5 of the Bengali speakers 
of Bengal to the new province. Bengal also lost the five 
Hindi States of Chota Nagpur and gained Sambalpur and five 
Uriya States. In the final division, Bengal was left with a 
population of ahout 54 million which included 42 million 
Hindus hut only 17 million Bengali-speakers. Eastern Bengal 
and Assam contained 18 million Muslims and 12 million 
Hindus. It was placed under the jurisdiction of the Calcutta 
High Court and was given a Legislative Council and an inde­
pendent revenue authority. In giving his approval to this 
arrangement Brodrick was grudging. He questioned the 
urgency of reform and suggested that Curzon under-valued
,fthe strength and substance of the sentiment1 behind the
1
agitation against the partition. However, when the final
partition plan was announced in July 1905, no mention was
2made of Brodrick*s lack of enthusiasm.
The only solid evidence that this enlarged partition 
plan was adopted in order to divide and rule is a paragraph
1. Sec. of State to G-ov. Gen. in Council, 9 June 1905,
Confid. Oct. Prog. No.163, I.H.P., Pub., Vol.7048.
2. East India (Reconstitution of the Provinces of Bengal
and Assam) No.2. Resolution of the G-ovt. of India,
Home Dept., 19 July 1905.
362
in the Government of India1 s letter to the Secretary of 
State on 2  February 1905# The latter asked for the Secretary 
of State*s approval for the final scheme and contained 
the passage:
ti
.,. it cannot be for the lasting good of any 
country or any people that public opinion or 
what passes for it should be manufactured by 
a comparatively small number of people at a 
single centre and should be disseminated 
thence for universal adoption, all other 
views being discouraged or suppressed. The 
present agitation furnishes a notable 
illustration of the system under which a 
particular set of opinions expressed 
practically in the same words is sent out 
with a mandate from Calcutta to be echoed 
in the form of telegraphic protests and 
formal memorials from a number of different 
places all over Bengal, , . .
From every point of view it appears to 
us desirable to encourage the growth of 
centres of independent opinion, local aspira­
tions, local ideals, and to preserve the 
growing intelligence and enterprise of 
Bengal from being cramped and stunted by the 
process of forcing it prematurely into, a 
mould of rigid and sterile uniformity/ In 
course of time, if the subtle tendencies 
which determine social expansion and 
intellectual advancement are only given 
a fair field, it may be expected that such 
centres will arise among the Muhammadans at 
Dacca,among the natives of BehafyAaftd among 
the Uriyas at Cuttack*111 ' *
G.K.Gokhale quoted this passage in his presidential 
address to the 1905 Congress and said that it .showed an
1. Govt, of India to Sec, of State, 2 Feb, 1905, op.cit.
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attempt to prevent the "growing solidarity" of the Bengalis, 
to "weaken their power of co-operating for national ends." 
"After this," he continued, "let no apologist of the late 
Viceroy pretend that the object of the partition was 
administrative convenience and not political repression.1 
It is not possible to say with certainty how much weight 
Curzon gave to the political argument for partition. But 
it may be said that the political argument had little 
influence (and it may not have even occurred to him) on his 
decision to partition Bengal in 1903, It was only during the 
protests against the original plan that officials first 
saw the possible political benefits of a divided Bengal,
The Government of Bengal in its letter of 6 April 1904, said 
that the predominance of Calcutta in Bengal's political life 
was "not wholly to the advantage of the people of Eastern 
Bengal." The Muslims were said generally to be unsympathetic 
to the political leadership of Calcutta and others felt the 
influence of Calcutta "to be of a somewhat tyrannical 
character." The agitation against the partition was illustra­
tive of the disadvantage "that may result from the subordin-
2
ation of Bengal to Calcutta." Lord Curzon, too, during his 
trip to east Bengal in February 1904, had remarked on the
1* Heport of the 21st I.N.C.t p.9.
2. W.C.MacPherson, 6 April 1904, op.cit. para.46.
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alleged role of Calcutta in manufacturing public opinion
1
in the mofussil, In one of Lord Curzon1s letters to St.
John Brodrick, the Secretary of State, Curzon gave five
reasons for partitioning Bengal and the fifth was that the
Calcutta politicians dominated public opinion in other parts
of Bengal and India and that Calcutta had an undesirable
influence on the High Court, the Government of Bengal, and
2
even the Government of India, But this was the only 
letter among the dozens written to people in India and 
England in which Curzon mentioned this argument. Even in 
this one letter, in giving this fifth reason to Brodrick, 
Curzon seemed to he less concerned with convincing him of 
the necessity for dividing Bengal than to explain why the 
Calcutta leaders objected. The reference to Calcutta 
politicians was one of the few times that Curzon mentioned 
Bengal politics. There is, then, little evidence that 
Curzon was concerned about the political power of the 
Bengalis. It is much more likely that it was Curzon*s lack 
of concern which led him into the gross miscalculation of
On
the possible effect which the partition would have^Bengali 
feeling.
The evidence suggests that "divide and rule" was not
1, Speech at Dacca, 18 Peb. 1904 and speech at Mymensingh, 
20 Peb, 1904* Speeches of Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
Vol.Ill, pp. 29'9 and' ITtf.
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 2 Peb. 1905, No.15* C.W.S.S., 1904- 
1905, Curzon Papers,
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one of the main reasons for the partition of Bengal, The 
Governments of India and Bengal, it is true, perceived and 
considered the political advantages to he derived from 
separating Calcutta from east Bengal, It was one of the 
reasons why the larger scheme of partition was favoured. 
However, neither the Government of India's letter of 2 
February 1905 not the Government of Bengal's letter of 6 
April 1904 - the two official letters which mention the 
political argument in favour of partition - give much prom­
inence to that argument, lord Curzon and his advisors 
decided that a wider plan of partition was preferable to 
Curzon's 1903 scheme because it would enable the new pro­
vince to have the judicial, executive, and legislative 
machinery of a province governed by a Lieutenant- Governor 
and it would make available to the Muslim community oppor­
tunities for employment and education formerly absent or not 
utilized. That the wider partition scheme would also under­
mine the formidable power of the Bengali Hindu politicians 
was a further advantage. But it was only an additional or 
incidental justification for the partition which would have 
been carried out regardless of the political consequences. 
However in politics it is often the appearance rather than 
the reality which counts most.
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Por some months before the announcement of the final,
enlarged partition plan on 19 July 1905, the agitation
against partition had been almost non-existent because it
was known that the Government of India was considering a new
scheme, the details of which were unknown to the public.
When the final plan was suddenly announced there was
indecision among the Bengali leaders about what should be
done. The fact that the final plan included a Legislative
Council, High Court jurisdiction, and a revenue authority
did not, as Lord Curzon had hoped, make it palatable to the
vast majority of politically conscious Hindus.
There was general agreement among the Bengali leaders
that traditional methods of protest had failed to influence
the Government and that new methods were needed. The method
of protest favoured by the two most extreme Bengal news-
1
papers - New India and Sandhya - was the renunciation of 
all posts held under the Government. In May 1904 Bepin 
Chandra Palfs New India warded those persons who were 
trying to revive the Congress movement that in the last
1. When Lord Curzon*s resignation became known in August 
1905, the Sandhya (25 Aug, 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report,
2 Sept. 1905, para,26) commented: "The source of our 
annoyance and mischief is removed - sing, therefore the 
name of Hari," Hari is sung in funeral processions 
while bearing the 'body to the funeral pyre.
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thirty years progressive ideals had altered* It was no
longer possible to serve on the Legislative Councils with
1
self-respect and patriotism. Bepin Chandra Pal delivered 
a speech on 3 August 1905 at a meeting at the Star Theatre, 
Calcutta, during which leaflets containing a boycott vow 
were distributed. The vow said that self-government was the 
only government ordained by God, that "I admit no other 
form of Government ... to be binding11, and that "although 
oppressed by poverty and misfortune, I shall never accept 
service under this [British] Government.11 Lai Mohan Ghose 
also suggested that all Indians serving on Legislative 
Councils, District Boards and Municipalities, and as Honor­
ary Magistrates, should resign. He made the suggestion at 
Dinajpur on 21 July 1905 at one of the first mofussil 
protest meetings held after the final partition plan was 
announced.
However, it was decided not to resign honorary 
appointments. These positions were recognized by the Bengali 
leaders as fla source of local influence which would be use­
ful in the coming struggle," And probably of greater 
importances it was doubtful if such action would receive 
wide support. As Surendra Nath Banerjea has said, a partial
New India. 25 May 1904, Bengal Newspaper Report, Part II,
11 June 1904, para. 3O06,
2, Daily Hitavadi, 4 Aug. 1905# Bengal Newspaper Report,
12 Aug. 1905, para.57.
3- Sandhya. 24 July 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 29 July 
1905, para,50,
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failure in the early stages might have led to the collapse
i
of the agitation. Another suggestion which received even 
less support and was also allowed to drop was that the 
Bengalis should boycott the approaching visit of the Prince 
of Wales.^
The plan of action finally adopted, following a 
series of conferences at the Indian Association and the 
houses of Maharaja Jotindra Mohan Tagore and Maharaja Surya 
Kanto Acharya of Mymensingh, was the boycott of British 
goods.
The boycott was a familiar idea to many nationalists. 
In 1894, when the counter-vailing duties on cotton goods 
were imposed, public meetings in Calcutta, Madras, Berar, 
Bombay, Poona, Satara, and Ahmedabad resolved to boycott 
Lancashire goods and to wear only Indian cloth. Pew people 
carried out this plan. The man responsible for
1, A Nation in Making, p.189.
2* This was the significance of the resolution passed at 
Ripon College on 17 July, that the students should 
promise not to participate in any public amusement or 
rejoicing for six months, and of similar suggestions 
made at the Town Hall meeting of 7 Aug, 1905.
Englishman, 9 Aug, 1905 and Report on the Agitation 
against the Partition of Bengal, para.27.
Enclosure to R.W.Carlyle, Offg. Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bengal, 
to Sec, Govt, of India, Home Dept,, 25 Jan. 1906, June 
Prog, No.175, I.H.P.,Pub., Vol.7312,
This Report which was written by the Inspector-General 
of Police in Bengal, will be cited frequently below and 
will be referred to as the Partition Report.
3. Englishman, 18 Sept. 1905. The Amrita Bazar Patrika,
10 Nov. T905, quoted the Nasik Sazetteer to the effect 
that in 1726 a Bengali ascetic named Gurupada Swami, who 
lived near Nasik, carried on a campaign against the use 
of foreign goods.
Partition Report, op.cit, para. 31,
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popularizing the boycott in Bengal in 1905 was a Punjabi 
named Tahal Ram Ganga Ram, In February and March he spoke 
to crowds of students every evening in College Square, 
Calcutta, urging them not to buy British goods. According 
to the Report of the Inspector-General of Police, these 
speeches made a deep impression on the students who 
discussed the boycott idea frequently in the months pre­
ceding the final announcement of partition*** The resolve
of the Chinese to boycott American goods also impressed
2
many Bengalis in 1905.
The Calcutta leaders, who probably included 
J. Chaudhuri, Ambica Charan Mazumdar, Surendra Nath 
Banerjea, Bhupendra Nath Basu, and some of the titled 
zamindars, decided to stage a gigantic demonstration at 
the Calcutta Town Hall to formally adopt the boycott plan. 
Originally the date was set for 1 August but then it was 
postponed until 7 August . J  The Inspector-General of Police 
thought the delay might have been decided upon in order to 
allow enough time for mofussil boycott meetings to be held. 
This would have given the boycott movement an appearance
1. Partition Report, op.cit..para. 29.
2. See Sanjivani, 22 June 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report,
1 July 1905, para. 50; Daily Hitavadi, 30 June 1905, 
Bengal Newspaper Report, 8 July 19^5, para.455 and the 
Statesman, 9 Aug. 1905. The Englishman (8 Aug,1905) 
reported that the Chinese boycott had directly inspired 
the Bengali boycott decision.
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of spontaneity and avoided the suggestion that the movement 
was heing directed from Calcutta.^ The boycott resolution 
passed at the Town Hall meeting in Calcutta on 7 August 
stated
"That this meeting sympathizes with 
the resolution adopted at many meetings held 
in the mufassal, to abstain from the purchase 
of British manufactures so long as the Partition 
Resolution is not withdrawn, as a protest against 
the indifference of the British public in regard 
to Indian affairs and the consequent disregard of 
Indian public opinion by the present Government.“
This resolution was worded so that Calcutta seemed
simply to be following the lead of the mofussil.
The meeting of 7 August was impressive, judged by
the standard of previous Indian demonstrations. In the early
afternoon Ambica Charan Mazumdar, Surendra Nath Banerjea,
and J. Roy organized the students of at least a dozen
colleges into a procession of “not less than twelve
thousand“, according to the Statesman. From about two
o'clock onwards the students marched two by two from College
Square to the Town Hall, carrying pennants with the words
“United Bengal”. In many parts of Calcutta all shops were
closed. Having gathered around the outside of the Town Hall
at about four o 1clock, “the students formed an army ...
that attempted to swarm up the stairs, but they were
1. Partition Report, op.cit. para.38.
2. 8 Aug. 1905.
I
I
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blocked with tables and they were commanded to go back to
' the Maidan where a meeting would be h e l d . S u r e n d r a  Nath
Banerjea announced that because of the number of people,
there would be three meetings: on the upper and lower
floors of the Town Hall and on the Maidan,
“The expected speakers and the leaders of the 
community began to arrive and the enthusiasm 
of the crowd burst forth, cheer succeeding 
cheer as the Maharaja o£  Mymensingh, the 
Maharaja of Cossimbazar- the Raja of Nasipur, 
and the Raja of Natore took their seats on 
the platform.“ 3
"As it was towards five o'clock tha hall was 
densely packed and late arrivals, who thought 
themselves qualified, had to fight for the 
honour of a chair. With discernment worthy 
men were recognized in the crowd by self- 
appointed ushers and cheerfully propelled to 
honourable positions; others not so desirable 
were with perfect good-nature thrust away." 4
Literature was circulated giving the names of places
where Indian goods could be bought, and a pamphlet was
distributed recounting cases of assaults by Europeans on 
5Indians. The Town Hall had been draped with a large black 
cloth as a sign of mourning. But when it was learned that 
the meetings' organizers had rented English cloth from the 
firm of Messrs, Hall and Anderson, there was an indignant 
protest and it was removed,^ The speeches delivered at the 
three meetings were earnest but restrained - so much so
1. Englishman, 8 Aug. 1905.
2. Statesman, 8 Aug. 1905.
3. statesman, 8 Aug. 1905.
4. Englishman, 8 Aug. 1905.
5. Tbfa. —
6. Partition Report, op.cit. para, 38.
that the Sandhya published an article entitled ’’Slavishness 
in Protest”, criticising the failure of the meeting to 
definitely resolve to boycott British goods and deprecating 
the repeated use of the word '’constitutional1 by the 
speakers,*** The Maharaja of Cossimbazar chaired the main 
meeting and expressed his great anxiety for the future of 
the Bengali race. He observed that the Bengalis of west 
Bengal would be in an even worse position than the Bengali 
Hindus if Eastern Bengal and Assam because, while the latter 
would be outnumbered by Muslims, the former would be ”in a 
hopeless minority” among non-Bengali speakers^ In the old 
province of Bengal, there had been six Divisions but in the 
new Bengal, there would be only one and a half Bengali­
speaking Divisions, ”We shall be strangers in our own land”, 
2
he said.
The meeting of 7 August was attended by a large 
number of Muslims and Marwaris, whose support was required 
for a successful boycott. The sympathies of the Marwaris 
were particularly appealed to and when a Marwari spoke, he 
was loudly applauded,-' The meeting passed off without any 
disorderly incidents. The Englishman was disturbed by the 
meeting. It thought the support offered to the boycott of 
British goods was sinister, and although the Bengalis had
1, Sandhya, 9 Aug. 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 12 Aug,
para. 51.
2, Statesman, 8 Aug, 1905,
3, Englishman, 8 Aug. 1905,
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"hitherto displayed no capacity for combination", it 
wondered if the Government had realized the gravity of the 
feeling aroused hy partition#^
In a population such as that of Bengal, where the vast 
majority had had no connection with nationalist politics 
and probably had no understanding whatsoever of what the 
re-arrangement of Bengal's administrative boundaries meant, 
a boycott movement required, if it was to succeed, great 
organization, education, and leadership# In August, 
September, and October 1905» the movement attained a large 
measure of success, because of the well organized campaign 
of picketing#
Swadeshi pickets and patrols, composed of schoolboys, 
college students, and clerks, paraded through the bazaars 
and main thoroughfares of Calcutta and the mofussil towns, 
encouraging and sometimes coercing purchasers not to buy, 
and shopkeepers not to sell, foreign goods# These patrols 
began soon after the meeting of 7 August at which the boy­
cott resolution was passed# It was at about this time, too, 
that the term "swadeshi" came into popular use# Up until 
3 October, the Commissioner of the Calcutta Police reported,
the patrols did little harm "beyond causing annoyance and
2
seriously affecting the sale of imported articles,"
1. Ibid, 9 Aug# 1905#
2. Partition Report, op.cit# para.57.
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Coercion was occasionally used but few people dared complain 
to the police. In August there was a scuffle between 
swadeshi pickets and people trying to buy Dawson's boots on 
Bentinck Street, Calcutta.^ The Englishman published ex­
aggerated accounts about the activities of the pickets and 
patrols and claimed that in early September North Calcutta 
was in the control of gangs of boys who prevented the sale 
of foreign goods. It said that "the worst of the matter is 
that the frenzy amongst Bengali children of the better 
classes have communicated itself to urchins of the lower 
orders and cases are reported of gutter-snipes mobbing and 
assaulting Europeans," Previously the Englishman had 
questioned the wisdom of partitioning Bengal but now it 
said that serious observers were beginning to think that any 
amendment of the partition scheme would be a major mistake,
that it would be attributed to the boycott and intimidation
2
by students.
The first important incident involving the swadeshi 
patrols was on 3 October in Harrison Road, Burra Bazaar, 
Police Inspector Carroll came across a man in tears who was 
surrounded by students trying to compel him to return some 
foreign cloth to the shop where he had purchased it.
1. Nevertheless, the Bengalee and the Amrita Bazar Patrika 
continued to carry Dawson's boots advertisements on 
their front pages. Ibid, para,39.
2. Englishman, 5 September 1905.
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Inspector Carroll interfered, the students left and the man 
proceeded on his way. But the man was again surrounded by 
the students, upon which Inspector Carroll returned and 
arrested one of the intimidators, The prisoner was turned 
over to a constable but on the way to the police station a 
crowd attempted to rescue the prisoner. More police arrived 
and in the ensuing struggle the prisoner escaped and 
Inspector Carroll was assaulted by a number of persons. The 
police made seventeen arrests on the spot.
Shortly after the prisoners were taken to jail, 
A.C.Banerji and A.K.Ghose visited the Commissioner^ of 
Police in his home and asked for the release of the prison­
ers on bail. The Commissioner agreed. The following day 
A.C.Banerji, A.K.Ghose, Surendra Nath Banerjea, and Bhupend- 
ra Nath Basu called upon the Commissioner at home again and 
guaranteed to ,fstop further picketing in the town and 
suberbs of Calcutta" if the proceedings against the seven­
teen accused were dropped. The Commissioner accepted the 
bargain, but insisted that Rs,100 be given to Inspector 
Carroll as compensation for the assault and warned the 
leaders that it might be necessary to swear them in as 
special constables to help the police to deal with future 
intimidation. ^
1. Partition Report, op.cit. para.57 f report by Commissioner 
of Police, Calcutta, Although the pcxlice reports and the 
Englishman stated that bands of "students" were responsi­
ble for the intimidation, out of the 17 persons arrested 
in Burra Bazaar, only 5 were students, the remainder 
being clerks.
The Indian Mirror and the Bengalee appealed to 
students to refrain from violence and intimidation^ hut 
some other newspapers took another line* New India said 
that constitutional agitation was not possible because the
p
people had no constitutional or popular rights* The
Amrita Bazar Patrika stated that the Government had showed
its contempt for constitutional agitation and therefore
Indians should imitate the indigo ryots1 actions of 1859-
60, i*e. that they should rise against their oppressors*^
The Charu Mihir of Mymensingh hinted at the use of force
and predicted that "Mother Bengal is about to wash away
4 ^your misfortunes today by her own blood*" Surendra Nath 
Banerjea and Bhupendra Nath Basu may have been willing to 
call off the pickets but they were in a minority,so picket­
ing continued.
On 7 October in Chitpur Road, Sobha Bazaar, a man 
purchased some foreign-made dhoties from a shop, departed, 
and then returned with a crowd of students* The man insisted 
that he had asked for swadeshi dhoties; the shopkeeper 
denied it. The crowd grew, people shouted "Bande Mataram", 
and the police, fearing that a riot might occur, dispersed
1. Indian Mirror, 6 Sept. 1905 and Bengalee, 8 Sept, 1905. 
Bengal Newspaper Report, Part II, lo Sept, 1905. paras. 
1196-97.
2 *  New India* 9 Sept. 1905, ibid, para.1207.
3. Imrife Bazar Patrika, 12 Sept. 1905, ibid, para,1208.
4. TTKaru Mihir, 12 Sept. 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report,
23 Sept. 1905, para,26,
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the crowd. The next morning a large crowd reassembled in 
front of the same shop and demanded, as punishment for 
allegedly selling "belati" as swadeshi cloth, a contribution
to the National Fund^and a quantity of foreign cloth for a 
2
bonfire. Both demands were met by the shopkeeperfs son, 
who proclaimed to the crowd that he would never sell foreign 
goods again. A bonfire consumed the European cloth in front 
of the police and the cheering crowd, and that night bands 
of students carrying sticks paraded through the streets, of 
North Calcutta shouting "Bande Mataram1 everytime they 
passed a European or a police station.^
The effectiveness of the students reached its height 
on the day partition took effect - 16 October. The night 
before determined efforts were made to persuade shopkeepers 
not to open on partition day, and as a result, early in the 
morning of the 16th, hardly any shops were open in the 
Indian quarters of Calcutta, although late in the morning
A
Muslim shops on the Chitpur Road began to do business.
A special effort was aimed at closing the New Market where 
the Europeans and their servants did their shopping. Pickets 
were posted on the approaches to New Market in the early
1. The National Fund was established to promote the growth 
of Indian industries.
2. Partition Report, op.cit. para.57, accounts by various 
police officers. The Indian Daily News and the Englishman 
gave highly sensational reports of the affair of 7 Oct- 
ober, the latter saying that "many men were seriously 
injured" in the "riot" which, according to the police 
reports, never took place.
3. Englishman, 9 Oct. 1905*
4. Keport by Com.of Police, Calcutta, quoted in Partition
Report, op.cit, para. 57*
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hours of the morning. At 3s00 A.M. news reached New Market 
that a string of carts carrying meat had been stopped in 
Wellington Square. Chaprassis were sent to fetch the police 
and the pickets fled. Thus the Europeans got their meat 
supplies. With the fruit and vegetable carts entering 
Calcutta from Garden Reach, the pickets were more successful. 
They were stopped on the Kidderpur Road, and by the time the 
police arrived, the carters had returned home. "Not a single 
pound of fresh fish" reached New Market‘d but in this case 
it was not the pickets, but rather the three major Indian
p
fish contractors, who were responsible. New Market itself 
was visited by bands of Swadeshi Volunteers who harangued 
the shopkeepers but the police and the chaprassis kept them 
moving and the shops remained open.
Swadeshi Volunteers were stationed in the principal 
tramway and railway termini, distributing rakhis (thread 
wristlets) to passengers. The rakhis were tied to the 
wrists of two or more people to symbolize the continued 
unity of the Bengali race. In Calcutta many Bengali clerks 
removed their shoes and socks - foreign and un-Hindu objects 
- and, according to the Englishman, "the streets presented 
the spectacle of hundreds of Babus hurrying to office bare­
footed and with shoes in their hands,
Englishman, 17 Oct. 1905.
2, Report by Com. of Police, Calcutta, quoted in Partition
Report , op.cit. para.57.
3. Englishman, 17 Oct. 1905*
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The other features of partition day were fasting, 
"bathing in the river, and a meeting on the Upper Circular 
Road for the laying of the cornerstone for a "Federation 
Hall." The Federation Hall meeting took place in the 
afternoon after huge crowds had wandered through the streets 
throughout the morning. Shortly before the meeting, the 
crowds began to break up, the Muslims going to Wellesley 
Square while the Hindus, accompanied by a small number of 
Muslims, marched two by two to Upper Circular Road behind 
an old man who chanted Sanskrit hymns and occasionally gave 
the sign for a "Bande Mataram" cry. At the Muslim meeting 
in Wellesley Square, there was not complete unanimity in 
favour of swadeshi and the boycott, but most Calcutta 
Muslims disapproved of the partition, if with much less 
• feeling than the Hindus. Two moulvies advised the Wellesley 
Square meeting to have no part in the agitation against 
partition.^
There were few incidents during the day. Hundreds of 
policemen were stationed throughout the city but in order 
to avoid provocation, they were not armed with batons. Many 
of the Pathan traders, who came to Calcutta at the start of 
the cold weather to sell goods and who were finding business 
slow, "were evidently spoiling for a row, for they would 
push into knots of Hindus, listening to an orator, and laugh
i.‘ Ibid. 4
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loudly and insolently," But no one lost M s  temper.^ A 
Jewish shopkeeper initiated a charge for "house-trespass"
against one K.M.Banerji who tried to force him to close his
2
shop. In the other intimidation case of the day, a Hindu 
shopkeeper -entered the shop of a Muslim who refused to close 
down and, in the words of the Amrita Bazar Patrika, "more 
in a friendly spirit than anger, shook him hy the neck and 
uttered the words *Bande Mataram1", The Magistrate dis­
missed the case against the Hindu shopkeeper after he had 
apologised and paid Rs,25 into the poor box.^ In Burra 
Bazaar a group which included students held up a tramcar by 
placing themselves in front of it. The passengers were urged 
not to ride in tramcars. The police arrived and the cars 
were allowed to proceed. Except for these incidents, the 
day*s proceedings were good-natured. The labourers at Ralli 
Brothers Jute works at Chitpur refused to work and there was 
an almost total strike among the carters of Calcutta but an 
attempt to persuade the coal depot coolies at Kidderpur to 
strike failed,^
The boycott of foreign goods could be successful only 
so long as effective picketing was maintained, or, as the 
Government of Bengal realized, students were allowed to
1. Ibid.
2. Report by Com. of Police, Calcutta , quoted in Partition 
Report, op.cit, para.57.
3. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 21 Oct. 1905, Bengal Newspaper 
Report, Part IT, 28 Oct. 1905, para.1380,
4# Report by Com, of Police, Calcutta, quoted in Partition 
Report, op.cit. para.57.
patrol and picket in the bazaars. The boycott movement in 
and around Calcutta was seriously checked by the issue of a 
Government circular, dated 10 October, calling upon Magis­
trates and Collectors to inform the heads of schools and 
colleges that if their students participated in any politi­
cal, boycott, or picketing activity, then the school in 
question would be liable to lose their grants-in-aid, the 
right to send students up for Government scholarships, and 
even the recognition of the University of Calcutta.^ The 
circular also asked the Magistrates and Collectors to warn 
those persons connected with the management of schools and
colleges that they might be called upon to serve as special
2
constables if a disturbance seemed likely. Students were 
further discouraged from boycott activities by several pros­
ecutions# After an assault on the police who were attempting 
to disperse picketing students in Bhowanipur bazaar, 
Calcutta, in November, three students were fined for 
obstructing public servants in the performance of their 
duties, and one of the students was sentenced to one
1. The Englishman, 7 Oct. 1905, had suggested to the Govern- 
meirt that it; had an effective weapon against the boycott 
movement. The Government could shut down the colleges 
involved "for ever" and it could bar any student from 
appearing in Government examinations or aided institu­
tions for 5 or 6 years.
2. P.P.Cd. 3242 of 1906. East India (Resignation of Sir.
J.B.Puller), No.l, Circular Letter from R.W.Carlyle,
Offg. Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bengal, to Mags, and Cols.
10 Oct. 1905.
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month7s rigorous imprisonment On 27 November, a group of
boycotters tried to persuade some and prevent other students
from attending two schools in Shampukhur, Calcutta, The
police dispersed the boycotters who returned in the evening
and were chased away once again. In the process, fifteen
persons were arrested and later fined small sums for ob-
2structing the police. In another case, a student was 
sentenced to receive fifteen stripes of the whip for shout­
ing "Bande Mataram1' in the street.^
In the village of Andul, Howrah District, where the 
boycott was carried on with great vigour, several persons
A
were appointed as special constables, ostensibly to help 
in the event of disturbances, but the actual reason was 
probably to coerce them into giving up the boycott movement. 
The Government of Bengal believed that the decline in the 
boycott movement in western Bengal in December 1905 could 
be attributed to the Carlyle circular barring the students
1, Englishman, 1 Feb. 1906; Partition Report, op.cit. 
par£. FOU).
2. Bengalee 29 Nov. 1905; Englishman, 29 Nov, 1905; 
Partition Report, op.c ±\. para.60(7)*
3. This boy was given the warmest reception at the meeting 
at Grand Theatre, Calcutta, on 14 Feb. 1906? at which 
twenty or so persons punished for anti-partition activi­
ties were garlanded and presented with silver medals,
A Calcutta Police Report, Annexure to R,W.Carlyle, 
Ch.Sec., Govt, of Bengal, to Sec,, Govt, of India 
Home Dept., 23 March 1906, June Prog# No,178,
I.H.P.,Pub., Volv7312.
4, Partition Report, op.cit. para.57*
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from political agitation, the prosecution of student
pickets, and the appointment of the special constables at
1
Andul, Howrah District.
Religion was used to support the boycott movement.
One of the devices often used to encourage the boycott of 
foreign sugar and salt was to say that they were purified
with parts of pigs and cows and that they were therefore
2
forbidden to both Hindus and Muslims. Leaders of the agi­
tation contacted religious leaders. A.C.Banerji, whom the 
Inspector-General of Police called 1 one of the most danger­
ous and seditious” agitators, went to his home in Santipur, 
Nadia District, and tried to enlist the aid of the local 
pandits who were revered in many parts of Bengal.^ A large
1. R.W.Carlyle to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept.,
25 Jan. 1905, op.cit. para.13.
2. See, for instance, Medini Bandhav (Midnapur), 13 Sept. 
1905. Bengal Newspaper Report, 23 Sept. 1905, para.39; 
Also summaries of agitation in Pabna , Birbhum, Burdwan, 
and Noakhali Districts. (Partition Report, op.cit. 
para.57). The Bangabasi published a letter from a cor­
respondent who claimed to have seen bits of beef and 
pork being removed from salt on a Liverpool ship.
(Partition Report, para.45) The Bangabasi, 2 Sept. 1905, 
appealed to the pandits of Nabadwip, Nadia Dist., and 
of Bhatpura, 24 Parganas, to persuade people not to lose 
caste by using foreign salt. {Enclosure E, Partition 
Report, op.cit.).
3. Partition Report, op.cit. para.45* According to the 
Sandhya (23 Novf 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 2 Dec. 
1 9 0 5 , para,3 ) and the Amrita Bazar Patrika (23 Nov.
1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, Part II, 25 Nov. 1905, 
para. 151o) Banerji's house was guarded by four police 
constables and he was followed wherever he went.
number of religious figures did support the boycott, and 
around Calcutta Brahmans refused to perform religious cere­
monies at which foreign articles were worn or used. The 
Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that one hundred itinerant 
sadhus met at Puri and vowed to preach swadeshi throughout 
India. However, Special Branch investigations failed to turn 
up any cases of these sadhus carrying out their vows.^
The religious character of the boycott movement was 
most evident on 28 September at the Kalighat temple 
ceremony near Calcutta. In previous years many high caste 
Hindus had avoided the Mahapuja ceremonies at Kalighat
p
because of the sacrifice of animals. But not in 1905# High 
and low castes alike - more than 50,000 people in all, 
according to the Bengalee - gathered at Kalighat on 28 
September and took the swadeshi vows administered by the 
Hindu p r i e s t s ,  ^ The Englishman declared that this attempt 
to bring the "lower orders" into the partition agitation 
was particularly sinister since the Government had the means 
of controlling "Babus" and clerks who had to earn a res­
pectable income, but not the masses who had nothing to lose 
from the collapse of law and order.^
The boycott movement in Calcutta achieved great 
successes in its early months. A report written by the
1.Partition Report, op.cit. paras. 47-48.
2. Englishman, 30 Sept. 1905.
3* Bengalee, 3 Oct. 1905.
4. Englishman, 30 Sept. 1905.
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Collector of Customs on 21 September 1905 showed that 
European firms dealing in wholesale trade were able to sell 
only a limited amount of the boots, soaps, perfumes, and 
piece goods imported for the Puja holidays when presents 
were traditionally purchased on a large scale, A distinction 
was made by Bengalis between Continental and English goods, 
and one firm was able to sell its English goods only by 
marking them "Made in Germany," Japanese goods sold espec­
ially well.**’ A senior partner in a Leicester hosiery firm 
wrote to the Secretary of State for India complaining that 
Ralli Brothers had suffered a decrease of Rs. 70,000 per 
day in their Indian sales and that the English might lose 
business to the Germans,^
The Collector of Customs was not able to appraise 
accurately the effect of the boycott on the retail sale of 
piece goods. The Marwari bazaar dealers had purchased their 
stocks from European firms early in 1905 so that most of 
the stocks were held in the bazaars rather than in the 
warehouses. During the boycott movement an agreement was 
reached between the Bengali boycott leaders and the Marwaris 
to the effect that the boycott would not be applied to the
1."Notes on the extent to which the "Boycott" has at 
present affected wholesale and retail trade in Calcutta," 
Enclosure F  to Partition Report, op.cit.
2, H.A.Thornton, Brtner of Thornton and Mawby, Sock
and Hosiery Manufacturers, to Sec, of State, 14 Sept. 
1905, and enclosed letter from the Calcutta representa­
tive, J. and P, No.2861, Judicial and Public Papers,
Vol.731.
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existing stocks if the Marwari dealers would not make any 
fresh purchases for four months. The situation was further 
complicated by a dispute between the Marwaris and the 
importing firms over the terms of their agreements. The 
Marwaris took advantage of the boycott movement to try to 
force the European firms to modify the system under which 
the Manchester manufacturer could fail to deliver the goods 
promised without the Marwari having any redress, while, on 
the other hand, he could compel the Marwari to accept 
delivery at any time of goods already ordered.1
Prom the beginning of the boycott movement some of the 
political leaders were aware that the boycott could be sus­
tained for only a limited period of time. Hand-woven cloth 
was more expensive than machine-made cloth and poor people 
could not be expected to pay the extra cost often. Even
the price of Bombay cloth began to rise as the supplies of
2
swadeshi material became scarce. That the boycott achieved 
a large measure of success for two months in Calcutta was 
due to the general climate of opinion which supported the 
swadeshi patrols and pickets. According to the Inspector- 
General of Police, "even when the agitation assumed its 
most reprehensible form the general mass of educated 
Bengalis, it must be admitted, fully sympathised with the
1, "Notes on ... the "boycott1 ... in Calcutta," op.cit.
2, See the letters to the editor, Bengalee, throughout 
August 1905. In particular, see letters from Satis 
Chandra Mukerji in Bengalee, 13 and 19 Aug, 1905#
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most extreme measures taken,1 and ’few men of position” 
publicly spoke against the excesses of the agitators.'*' The 
success of the boycott also depended, to some extent, upon 
a fear of intimidation and violence. In March 1905, students
in College Square burnt an effigy of K.G. Gupta, a Divisional
2
Commissioner who supported the partition. One of the
ugliest incidents involved Dr. Aghore Nath Mukerjee of
Kidderpur. It was his custom to purchase European-made
articles and he received a letter threatening him with
death if he persisted in buying foreign goods. He was
enticed into a garri, ostensibly to visit a sick patient,
but instead he was taken to a deserted spot where coal-tar
was poured on his head.^ The Englishman reported that other
people had received anonymous, threatening letters for not
4supporting the boycott. The tone of soma newspapers was 
menacing. The Charu Mihir, for* instance, said that ’those 
who will refrain from agitation at this terrible crisis are 
traitors to their f a t h e r l a n d . A  reporter of the Pratijna 
(Calcutta) saw several Indians taking notes on Bepin 
Chandra Pal’s speech at the Grand Theatre, probably to
1. Partition Report, op.cit, para.56.
2. Daily Hitavadi, 28 March 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report,
8 April 1905, para,114.
3. Bengalee, 30 Sept. 1905.
4* Englishman, 29 Sept, 1905.
5. Charu Mihir, 29 Nov. 1904. Bengal Newspaper Report,
lT13ecT'T9'04, para. 47.
determine if the speech was seditious* The Pratijna said 
these Indians ought to he thrashed, that a man who 
'•ridicules your national feeling"ought to he slapped,^*
A number of assaults were made upon Europeans, mostly 
hy students, hoth in Calcutta and in the mofussil during 
the 1905 agitation. The Inspector-General of Police attri­
buted them to the agitation against partition and "to the
p
turbulent anti-English spirit" which it had aroused. In 
August, W.D,R.Prentice, Joint Magistrate of Howrah, was 
driving along the Strand Road in Calcutta when he was sur­
rounded by a group of students marching in a swadeshi pro­
cession who struck him with their fists and sticks.^
On 22 September 1905 a crowd of 6 - 7,000 people, 
mostly students, attended a protest meeting on the Maidan 
in Calcutta, After the meeting, a group of students threw 
mud, stones, and insults at four European women passing
along the Maidan in a private conveyance. In consequence,
Nath
the Commissioner of Police informed Bhupendrsy'Basu that no
?*^ijna, 30 Aug. 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 9 Sept, 
1905, para.45•
2, Partition Report, op.cit. para.59. According to the 
Sandhya, the new assertiveness was expressed against 
Eurasians, also. On 24 November, the Bengali students 
of Sibpur Engineering College, 24 Parganas, occupied 
the seats at the front of a classroom, which were 
customarily reserved for Eurasians, The students involved 
were punished, Sandhya, 29 Nov. 1905, Bengal Newspaper 
Report, 2 Dec. 1905, para.10.
3* Partition Report, op.cit, para. 59(1).
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more meetings would be allowed on the Maidan and that if
any were convened, they would he dispersed by the police.^
F.Blewitt, Manager of the Ballyganj branch of the
Aligarh Dairy Farm,took a hackney carriage from Calcutta
on 28 September with the intention of returning to his
farm. Just outside Calcutta, the driver halted the carriage
and demanded an extra Rs.5 from his passenger♦ Blewitt
then stepped out of the carriage and the driver, with the
help of his syce, forced him into the drain next to the
2road. The driver and syce were sent up for trial. Early 
in October, Captain G.M.T.Symmers was beaten on the head 
with umbrellas by some "Babus" in Calcutta because he had 
dismissed an Indian from the British Indian Transport 
Department and replaced him with a European.^ On the night 
of 30 October, in Calcutta, 5 or 6 Indians induced an 
unidentified European into a dark lane and started to 
assault him. He drew a pistol and before escaping, critic­
ally wounded two of his assailants.^- In early November, 
Manning Fox of Ballyganj "was waylaid and assaulted in 
broad daylight in a well-populated European thoroughfare by
*5
a party led by a dismissed servant,"-^ The Englishman 
reported two other cases in which European "masters" were
1. F.L.Halliday, Com. of Police to B.N.Basu, 25 Sept. 1905, 
Englishman, 27 Sept, 1905.
2. Partition Report, op.cit. para. 59(5).
3 *  Englishman, 3 Oct. 1905.
4. TbiSfTTTJct. 1905.
5. Partition Report, op.cit. para.59(6).
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insulted on the streets with vile language and complained 
that servants and their friends boycotted Europeans who 
dismissed a s e r v a n t O n  12 November, crowds surrounded 
two parties of Europeans in Beadon Square, threw mud at
them, and shouted "Bande Mataram", Justice Stephen of the
2
Calcutta High Court was with one of the parties, A day or 
two later, Professor Russell of Presidency College, who had 
annoyed the students by writing a report criticising the 
condition of their hostels, was struck by one or more stu- 
dents while leaving his classroom* In another November 
incident, a missionary preaching in Beadon Square was 
stoned.^-
Some of the more serious collisions between Indians 
and Europeans took place in the mofussil. On 19 September, 
Mr, Cattell, the jute agent in Madaripur, Faridpur District, 
was moving through a crowd when he pushed the umbrella of a 
15 year old school boy who was in his path. The umbrella 
swung back and hit Cattell in the face* Cattell demanded to 
know the boy’s name and the boy refused to give it* saying 
that he was not afraid of him, Cattell then struck the boy 
with his fist, causing a nose bleed and swelling on the nose 
and over the eyebrows. Several hours later 100 school boys
1. Englishman, 22 Nov, 1905.
2. Partition Report, op.cit, para,59#(11).
3. Ibid, para.59(12), Also Daily Hitavadi, 14 Nov. 1905,
Bengal Newspaper Report, lo Nov. 19o5, para.25.
4. Partition Report, op.cit, para.59(10).
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gathered at the scene of the incident and intercepted
1Cattell1s durwan, assaulted him, and took away his lantern 
and Cattell1s private letters* The injured hoy charged 
Cattell with assault in the local court but the case was 
discharged when no witnesses appeared for the proceedings. 
Cattell, on the other hand, did not make a complaint to the 
court. The Inspector of Schools visited Madaripur and, as 
none of the boys involved in the attack on Cattell*s durwan 
could be identified, he ordered the Head Master of the 
School to collect a fine of Rs.50 from the older students:
Rs.25 for the charitable dispensary and Rs.25 as compensa-
2
tion for the durwan.
At Serajganj, Pabna District, Mr. Carberry, the local 
Agent of the Bank of Bengal was attacked with stones and 
sticks after he had rebuked some schoolboys for frightening 
his horse by shouting ,r Bands Mataram".^ At Brahmanbaria, 
Tippera District, stones were thrown through the windows of 
a mission. The ladies of the mission were stoned and taunted 
with cries of *Bande Mataram* and efforts were made to keep
4
students from attending the Mission*s school.
Bakarganj District was the scene of more trouble than 
any other area. Events there led to the ban on public 
processions, on student participation in the anti-partition
3-* A durwan is a doorman.
2. This account is given by the Superintendent of Police, 
Jaridpur and quoted in the Partition Report, op.cit. 
para.59(7)-
3« Partition Report, op.cit, para.59(16).
4. Ibid, para. 59(8).
agitation, and on the shouting of fBande Mataram1, and 
indirectly to the resignation of Sir Bampfylde Puller. The 
first anti-European incident occurred in August at the 
Zillah School, Barisal where the Assistant Superintendent 
of the Bakarganj Police ”was hustled and followed” by the 
students.^ Later in the town of Jhalakati a group of school­
boys picketing in the bazaar ”molested” the servants of a 
European merchant named Ziggler who were attempting to 
purchase some cloth. When Ziggler came to the aid of his
servants the boys shook their fists at him and used phrases
2
such as ”What is one European?”
In another incident, Mr, Landon* an employee of the 
Telegraph Department at Bakarganj had ”an altercation” with 
some schoolboys who ”mobbed him and forced him to return 
to his boat, throwing mud and stones at him.” Landon fired
i.
his gun into the air to frighten the boys away.
Another feature of the campaign against partition waa 
the large number of strikes in and around Calcutta. The 
Inspector-General of Police thought that most of them could 
be attributed to the general excitement created by the 
partition agitation,^ Although in each strike there was a
1. Ibid, para. 59(2),
2. Ibid, para, 59(3)«
3. P.O.Lyon, Ch.Sec., Govt, of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
to Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept., 21 Nov, 1905, 
June Prog. No.170, I.H.P., Pub,, Vol.7312,
4. Partition Report, op.cit. para,6l(l).
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specific, non-political grievance, previously industrial 
strikes had heen infrequent. Purthermore, in several 
instances the strikers shouted "Bande Mataram" - tho phrase 
adopted as a nationalist war cry by the educated classes 
at the Calcutta Town Hall meeting of 7 August 1905*“^ The 
leaders of a few of the strikes were reported to have con­
sulted with and received funds from Bengali Congress 
leaders.
The first strike was among the clerks at Messrs. Burn 
and Co. Calcutta, in September. The main grievance of the 
clerks was the introduction of a new clock machine for 
registering the time of workers* arrivals and departures. 
A.C.Banerji "took charge of the strikers" and the Bengalee 
and the Sanjivani raised a fund for them which was said to 
have reached Rs.6,000. However, Messrs. Burn and Co. broke 
the strike by dismissing all the strikers and hiring new 
clerks.^
Another strike in which A.C.Banerji, as well as
1. A few lines of "Bande Mataram" were included in Hemchan- 
dra*s Bengali poem, "Rakhi Bandhar" at the time of the 
Calcutta Congress of 1886 and Rabindra Nath ' Tagore sang 
"Bande Mataram" at the 1896 Congress at Calcutta, But 
the phrase "Bande Mataram" came into general use only
in August 1905.
Haridas and Uma Mukherjee, Bande Mataram and Indian 
Nationalism (1906-1908;, pp.11-13.
2. Partition Report, op.cit. para. 61(2); also Bengalee,
4 Oct. 1905. This strike was dramatized in a Caicui’ta 
theatre in October and November 1905. See the daily 
advertisements in the Bengalee for*Kerani Bibhrat"or 
"The Clerks* Troubles".
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A,K. Ghosh, were involved was that at the Government Print­
ing Offices, It began in late September, ostensibly as a 
protest against inadequate conditions and pay. The 
Englishman reported that soon after the employees at the 
Government of India and Goverhment of Bengal Presses struck, 
agitators began to visit other European presses in an 
attempt to bring other employees out.^ S.Rainy, Under Secre - 
tary to the Government of Bengal, was deputed to make an 
inquiry into the workers* grievances. He visited the Gov­
ernment Presses and refused to allow any l e ^ l  practitioner 
to appear on behalf of the strikers and he declined to 
receive the petitions of any workers who had not returned 
to work. About the time of Rainy1 s visit it was announced
that any striker not returning to work by 3 October would
2
be dismissed. On 3 October seven of the ringleaders of the
•3
strike lost their jobs J  and the 600 compositors at the 
Hastings Street Branch of the Government of India Press, 
who were still absent, were also dismissed, leaving a total 
of 600 compositors still at work. On the next day 150 of 
the remaining compositors stayed away from work in sympathy
4. the
with the 600 who had been dismissed. At/ same time, one of 
the strikers was arrested and charged with wrongful
1. Englishman, 28 Sept, 1905.
2. Englishman, 3 ‘Get. 1905.
3. Ibid’, 4" ’Oct. 1905.
4. Ibid, 5 Oct. 1905.
restraint and criminal intimidation of compositors who 
ignored the pickets,^" A.C.Banerji and A.K,Ghosh defended 
the accused. The case was eventually dismissed when the
witnesses, who were compositors, retracted their earlier
2
statements. The decision to dismiss the strikers was 
relaxed and many of the compositiors who applied were re­
instated,^ However the Government Presses refused to take 
hack the seven strike leaders. In consequence, on or about 
24 October, the compositors at the Hastings Street and 
Dhurrumtollah Street Branches of the Government of India 
Press walked out and a lock out was proclaimed. Then the 
Government of India Press compositors walked to the Bengal 
Secretariat Press, and persuaded most of the oompositors 
there to come out.^ While the lockout at the Government of 
India Press continued, all the Government of India's print­
ing was done elsewhere. The Bengal Secretariat Press, on the 
other hand, was not completely shut down and some men con­
tinued to work, living on the premises throughout the day
and night. The coolies who brought the food to these men
were harrassed by the pickets until they were given 
police escorts. The resolution of the strikers was 
strong. On 25 October, out of the 450 compositors
usually employed at the Bengal Secretariat Press, only 55
,j—' .... . . . .  . —  —
1. Bengalee, 5 Oct, 1905.
2. Englishman, 24 Oct. 1905*
3. Tbid",”lT)""0ct, 1905.
4. Ibid, 24 Oct. 1905.
5. Ibid, 27 Oct. 1905.
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were at work, and two weeks later the number had risen to 
only 101. ^  On 16 November, the Englishman reported that 
most of the serious grievances had been removed and that 
the Press strike was almost at an end. The Inspector- 
General of Police thought that A.C.Banerji and A.K.Ghosh 
had been "the leaders and guides in this strike, and there 
is no doubt that these two succeeded in keeping the strikers 
from returning to work long after they were willing to do
2so.,: and were unwilling to let them return when they did,1 
If this is correct, it shows that these two men possessed a 
high degree of organizing capacity*
On 5 October the conductors on the Calcutta Tramways 
went on strike against the existing system of payments, 
under which they were paid according to the number of trips 
they made, and not by the hours they worked. The result of 
this system, naturally, was that conductors working on long 
routes received little pay* Many conductors worked from 
5 p*m* until 12 o'clock noon with only a short and indefinr* 
ite period for rest. The strikers were demanding fixed hours 
of work at a specific hourly rate of pay. The strike was 
largely effective and services were drastically curtailed*
A number of conductors were reported to have been intimi­
dated by strikers,*^ In one case, two strikers were arrested
1. Englishman* 7 Nov. 1905*
2. Partition Report, op.cit. para, 61(6).
3. Englishman* 6 and 7 Oct. 1905*
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and charged with trespassing on a tram car and threatening 
to criminally assault the conductor. The accused were 
defended hy A.K.Ghosh and A.C.Banerji in this strike also, 
and the latter called upon the Director of the Calcutta 
Tramways Company to discuss the grievances.'*’ Concessions
were granted to the strikers and the whole affair was
2
ended after a relatively short time.
At the same time that the Tramway strike began, the
guards on the East Indian Railway struck work in protest
against the introduction of new rules governing the payment
of allowances. The Englishman reported that the strikers
were Eurasians and that the strike was connected with the
■3
boycott movement. Then it corrected itself and stated that 
the Eurasians had not struck but were "manfully standing 
by their employers" and that the strikers were from the 
English working class,^ The Inspector-General of Police 
believed the strike had "no possible connection with the 
agitation"
An effort was made to persuade the Calcutta police 
to strike. Por two years they had been asking for higher 
pay. With the parUtion troubles, the Police Commissioner^ 
became worried about the effect of the agitation on them 
and he went to Darjeeling on 5 October to plead for an
1. Englishman, 10 Oct, 1905*
2. Partition Report, op.cit, para,61 (4).
3# Englishman, 6 Oct. 1905.
4. ‘Ihiff, T'lTct. 1905.
immediate increase. His mission was successful and the
1effect on police morale was beneficial*
There was a brief strike at the General Post Office 
2in Calcutta. The Calcutta Post Commissioner averted a 
strike among the Bengali Tally clerks at the Kidderpur 
Bocks by engaging Christian orphan boys to substitute for 
strikers*^
There were other labour troubles in the districts 
near Calcutta* The workers at the Gouripur Jute Mill, 24 
Parganas, struck work when a European assistant wounded 
two coolies while firing his gun at a dog. The strike ended 
after the Magistrate had fined the European Rs,40 and 
awarded compensation to the injured men.^ At the Port 
Gloucester Jute Mill in Bauria, 24 Parganas, the workers 
went out on strike in October and, after returning, shouted 
"Bande Mataram11 and were impertinent to the European 
assistants, according to a report prepared by the Superin­
tendent of Police. The manager of the mill, Mr* Porester, 
had two of the workers who shouted 'Bande Mataram1 caught 
and he took them to his office to find out their names.
After they had given their names they were released. But the 
workers in the mill disapproved of this action and on the
1, Partition Report, para,57, report on the Calcutta 
agitation through 16 October by the Commissioner of 
Police, Calcutta.
2* Englishman, 11 Nov. 1905.
3* B om&ay ~Gaze11e (Overland Edition), 7 Oct. 1905.
4. TEeport, op.cit. para.61(3).
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next day, the 9,000 men started shouting "Bande Mataram" 
five minutes before closing time. Several assistants tried 
to stop tho shouting and were jostled by the workers. As. 
the workers left the factory, some of them provocatively 
shouted >Bande Mataram* in the faces of the European 
assistants. The assistants seized two of the workers but 
other workers charged, and in the fight which followed, the 
two escaped, Forester telephoned the District Magistrate 
after the workers had left the premises and asked for armed 
police protection,which he was given. Several days later the 
police arrested two of the workers who had been involved in 
the fight with the assistants. In protest, all 9*000 workers 
left the mill, refusing to return until the case against the 
arrested men was dropped. The Superintendent of Police 
believed that some of the "Babus" who worked in the mill 
had been in communication with people in Calcutta who had 
probably "engineered11 the strike."**
On 14 October, the spinners at the Lower Hooghly Jute 
Mill struck, alleging that the European assistants 
assaulted them and levied heavy fines. Armed police were
sent to the mill but the strike ended without disturbance
2
after two days. In November the Muslim weavers at the 
Wellington Jute Mill, Hughly District, went out in protest
1. Partition Report, op.cit, para.61(9)*
2. Ibid, para, 61(7)*
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against the short time allowed for breaking Ramadan (fast) 
before returning to work in the evening.^
In the town of Howrah, on 2 November, there was a 
riot between Europeans and Indians : Messrs* Kilburn and 
Company were laying an electric installation* One of their 
Muslim coolies refused to move when asked to by a European 
assistant named Robertson, who then pushed the coolie* The 
coolie responded by throwing a handful of stones at 
Robertson, and at Ryan, another assistant, who came to 
Robertson's aid* Ryan and Robertson attacked the coolie with 
fists and a cane* A crowd soon gathered and threw stones at 
Ryan and Robertson, but was dispersed by the "workmen11 who 
sided with the assistants against the coolies and the crowd* 
The police arrived and, upon finding that the crowd had 
left, went away again* The Muslims then returned to attack 
Robertson* Robertson tried to run away but was felled by a 
stone and was assaulted again. The police arrived and
2
arrested two "Babus", two railway labourers and a boy*
There was one occasion upon which anti-machine 
slogans were shouted* On 22 September on Chowringhee in 
Calcutta, a wealthy zamindar was distributing alms to a 
crowd of about one thousand aged, blind, and crippled 
persons when an elderly beggar woman was knocked down and
1* Ibid, para. 61(8)*
2* This account was given by the Superintendent of Police, 
Howrah, ibid, para,59(13;*
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killed by a tram car. An angry crowd gathered, threatening
to tear up the tram tracks and to pull down the tram poles,
1
However, the police intervened before the crowd could act. 
The anti-partition movement was as strong, if not 
stronger, in many Bengali-speaking districts of the mofussil 
as it was in and around Calcutta. In the years preceeding 
the partition many mofussil politicians participated in 
political demonstrations and movements, but in most cases 
they did so only when they were in Calcutta. In 19051 the 
agitation affected the whole of such districts as Bakarganj*
Mymensingh, Tippera, and Faridpur, and large areas of many
2other districts. The reports prepared by the Inspector- 
General of Police and the Eastern Bengal and Assam Govern­
ment emphasise the role played by the Calcutta leaders in 
arousing support for their campaign, Sita Nath Roy and his 
brother, zamindars of Bhagyakul, Dacca District, were said 
to be nthe most ardent workers in spreading the agitation 
from Calcutta," Sita Nath Roy was Secretary of the Bengal 
National Chamber of Commerce and he and his family owned
A
various jute and other trade concerns. Among the prominent
Englishman, 23 Sept. 1905*
2. The Inspector-General of Police summarized the progress 
of the agitation in each district in para. 57 of the 
Partition Report.
3, Partition Report, para.10; P.C.Iyon, Ch.Sec., Govt, of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam, to Sec., Govt, of India, Home 
Dept., 21 Feb. 1906,
June Prog. No.177* I*H.P.,Pub., Vol.7312,
4* Partition Report, para.11.
40£
Calcutta leaders who visited the districts were Surendra 
Nath Banerjea, Bepin Chandra Pal, J. Chaudhuri, who all 
made extensive tours, and Lai Mohun Ghosh, Abdul Gaznavi, 
Kali Prasanna Kavyabisharad, and Bhupendra Nath Basu. In at 
least two districts, Khulna and Mymensingh, the boycott 
movement gained momentum immediately after visits by Calcut­
ta politicians?- Several Bengali leaflets, which the police 
claimed were printed and distributed from Calcutta, were 
circulated in the districts* One of the leaflets - "Who is 
our King" - was sent from Calcutta by post to the Bar
Libraries at Mymensingh and Jamalpur and copies of it were
palso found in Rajshahi and Assam. It called upon "the
babus and zamindars" not to submit to the foreigners, "Has
none of them the force of lathials at their command? Well,
die we must one day, so why should we not die after teaching
3
the salas a lesson?" It went on to urge the Hindus and 
Muslims to unite and appoint their own panchayats and 
chaukidars. "We will burn the houses of those who accept 
appointments under Government as panchayats and chaukidars. 
We will never pay revenue if it is now enhanced. If the 
zamindars oppress us, we will give up our lives and take 
theirs." After stating that the Bengalis would govern
1. Ibid, para.57#
2. Ibid, para,24.
3. A lathial is a club-man, often retained by zamindars to 
fignt in disputes with other zamindars. Sala is a word 
of strong abuse.
themselves, it concluded:
"Hindu and Mussalman "brethren, this nation 
of cannibals coming over from across seven 
oceans and thirteen rivers has insulted 
our mother - our dear golden Bengal - and 
you look on in silence. You have yet, 
brothers, strength in your arms, even now 
you take credit by quarrelling and fighting 
among yourselves. Surely you can save the 
mother's honour at least with lathis. Come 
brothers, come, once again, and let us 
prove to be the worthy sons of our mother 
and protect her by fighting courageously 
and shedding our blood ungrudgingly. "1
A similar leaflet was also distributed in the mofussil. 
The Calcutta Police believed at the time that it was written 
by Bepin Chandra Pal, printed by the Sanjibani Press, and
issued by the Brata Samiti, a swadeshi organization with a
2
branch in Calcutta. It called upon Brahmans, Kayasthas, 
Sudras, Chandals, Muslims, and Christians to combine against 
the firinghis.^  "In our presence the feringhis have made 
our mother naked.
"Why does not blood gush out of our eyes?
They have been attempting to dishonour our 
mother, we are still standing silent. Bravo 
to us! Come, brother, let us all show to the 
world how we ungrudgingly sacrifice our lives 
to maintaining the honour of our mother. Let
1. Annexure B to P.C.Iyon, 21 Peb. 1906, op.cit..
The publication of a transaltion of this leaflet in 
the Pioneer created a stir among both the Indian and 
Anglo-Indian newspapers. Englishman. 16 Sept. 1905*
2. Partition Report, para.25* Subsequently it was ascribed 
to Upadhyaya Brahmabandhab, according to Haridas and 
Uma Mukherjee, Bipin Chandra Pal and India's Struggle 
for Swaraj, note 26? pp.27-28.
3. ffirTnghi is an abusive term for a European.
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the whole world see how we Bengalis, hated 
and down-trodden as we are, take pride in 
maintaining the honour of our mother ....
Death for the sake of the motherland, 
what is more pleasant than this? Such 
deaths lead to everlasting paradise."1
Although Calcutta may have stimulated the agitation in 
the mofussil, it is clear that social conditions in the 
mofussil itself enabled the boycott movement to spread as 
much as it did. In Calcutta there were many European* 
teachers in the schools who often acted as an effective 
break upon the boycott activities of the students,^but in 
the districts, the European element was small. The Educa­
tion Department of the transferred districts contained only 
four Europeans and three of these were affiliated to Dacca 
College. In many of the schools, the teachers either sym­
pathized with or actively organized the student pickets* 
Similarly, in the police and civil services, the Hindus in 
many instances gave the Government little assistance. In 
Bakarganj, where there were more assaults and cases of law­
lessness than anywhere else, 19 of the 23 police officers 
who had charge of police stations were Hindus, In Paridpur 
District throughout which the swadeshi movement spread, out 
of the 34- superior officers working for the Government, 3 
were Europeans, 2 were Muslims, and 29 were Hindus.
1* Enclosure Cto Partition Report. This extract is not in­
cluded in the extract quoted by Haridas and Uma Mukherjee 
(Bipin Chandra Pal, pp.25-27) but is similar in substance 
and style.
Altogether there were 92 Europeans to supervise Government 
work in the transferred districts containing 26 million 
people. The police resources of the transferred districts 
were also poor. They were below their recommended strength 
everywhere and frequently they tolerated, out of sympathy, 
the excesses of the boycotters. Apart from the under-staffed 
and unreliable civil police, there were only 50 military 
police in the transferred districts, representing the total 
"reserve of physical force available" to reinforce the 
ordinary civil police.^
The other factor aiding the agitation in the mofussil 
was the social structure of Bengal. Under the Permanent 
Settlement the Bengali zamindars enjoyed a measure of inde­
pendence from government officials not possessed by land­
holders in temporarily settled areas, and, in practice, the 
Bengali zamindars and their agents tended to have more 
absolute power over their tenants. One of the many except­
ional features of the early partition agitation was the use 
of this power by the zamindars. It helps explain why pro­
tests came from classes of the population not previously
2touched by politics. The amla of zamindars were especially 
successful in preventing tenants from buying foreign goods 
in Jessore, Khulna, Nadia, Hughly, Rajshahi, Mymensingh and
1, P.O.Lyon, 21 Feb. 1906, op.cit. para. 7«
2. The clerical servants of zamindars.
[j
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Patna Districts.^ Among the zamindars who were reported to
i
| have compelled their tenants to purchase only swadeshi
articles were the Maharaja Girija Nath Roy of Dina j pur and
the Maharaja of Cossimbazar - the latter on his estates in
2
Rangpur, Nadia, and Rajshahi Districts,
Since swadeshi cloth was more expensive than foreign 
cloth - and it became increasingly so as the supply ran low 
- it was a serious burden for the peasant who was forced to 
buy it. But it is probable that cloth purchases often were 
simply postponed until the boycott movement subsided. In 
many cases the difference between the price of swadeshi 
and foreign goods was paid by the zamindar or the school­
boys who prevented the poor people from buying non-Indian 
material. It was rumoured in Calcutta that the Maharajas 
of Cossimbazar and Mymensingh paid for the purchase of the 
foreign cloth and cigarettes which were lavishly fed to 
bonfires.
The zamindars also put pressure on the shop-keepers.
In Paridpur the Marwaris complained that the local zamindar
1» R.W.Carlyle, 25 Jan. 1906, op.cit. para.10.
2, Partition Report, op.cit. para.57.
Sir Andrew Praser thought the fact that the Maharaja 
of Cossimbazar was of the Teli caste - a depressed caste 
of oil producers - helped to explain his bad behaviour 
in opposing the partition, A.H>L.Praser to Curzon,
11 Aug. 1905, No.40, C.W.P.I., 1905, Vol.II, Curzon 
Papers.
3. Partition Report, op.cit. para.43*
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had threatened to expel them from the bazaar;^" the
durwan of Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji visited Dhaniakhali
and Uttarpara bazaars, Hughly District, and ordered the
shop-keepers not to buy foreign salt, sugar, or cigarettes;
and the Hindoo Patriot reported that a bania of Chandrabazar,
Hughly District, had been fined by a zamindar for purchasing
2
foreign sugar.
In some towns, whole castes or professions resolved 
to boycott persons who patronised foreign goods. In Dinajpur 
and other places, the doctors, pleaders, and mukhtears 
threatened to boycott the Marwaris, In Paridpur the Muchis 
(shoemakers) vowed not to mend European shoes and the 
dhobies not to wash European clothes while the confection­
ers of Bankura town decided upon a caste fine of Rs.100 for 
anyone who used foreign sugar. And at the Juggemath temple 
in Puri, it was decided not to admit people refusing to 
use swadeshi goods.
While the zamindars, and to a lesser extent, caste and 
professional groups, helped enforce the boycott, the 
students in the mofussil were, as in Calcutta, the most 
conspicuous agency of the campaign. Sir Bampfylde Fuller, 
Lieutenant-Governor of the new province, knew that since he 
could not rely upon the full co-operation of his police and
1. P.O.Lyon, 21 Feb. 1906, op.cit. para.4.
2. Partition Report, para,57,
3. Ibid.
officials, ,fa policy of general repression was impracticable
1
even if desirable.'1 He had instead to use indirect methods
He decided to tour the transferred ’districts to meet and
explain to local leaders the purpose and probable benefits
of the partition. On 30 October, he set out from Shillong
on a tour which took him to every Eastern Bengal district
2
except Bogra and Malda. Before beginning his trip, he 
issued a circular on 16 October to all the district officers 
in the transferred divisions expressing his sympathy with
the anti-partition feeling and offering "to let bygones be
\ /
bygones" except with regard to the seditious leaflets. He 
also stated that the students of schools and colleges who 
ignored Government warnings against participation in the 
boycott campaign would be formally barred from Government 
service and their schools would lose their grants. The 
tone of this circular was decidedly more conciliatory than 
the circular of 10 October which was issued by the Govern­
ment of Bengal. But it failed to disarm the public senti­
ment against the earlier circular and it may actually have 
increased it. When Puller reached Dacca he was informed that 
in some towns the students were getting out of hand so he
_  A
sent out two more circulars on 8 November. One repeated 
the warning of 10 October that Government aid would be
1. P.O.Lyon, 21 Peb. 1906, op.cit. para.8.
2. Ibid, para.9.
3- Demi-off. Circular from B.C.Lyon, Chief Sec., Govt, of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam, to Corns, and all district 
officers of all transferred districts, 16 Oct. 1905.
4. P.C.Lyon, 21 Peb. 1906, op.cit. para,10.
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withdrawn from schools whose management did not make every
effort to prevent student participation in politics,^" The
other circular of 8 November - the most unpopular one of all
- ordered the Commissioners of Dacca, Chittagong, and
Rajshahi Divisions to forbid political and quasi-political
meetings and processions, except on private property, and to
2
prevent the shouting of ffBande Mataram" in public places.
The effect of all these circulars was to intensify the 
agitation.
One of the towns on Pullerfs itinerary was Rangpur,
The District Magistrate, Thomas Emerson, wrote to W.C.Gupta, 
a municipal councillor of Rangpur and a leading member of 
the local Bar, informing him of the Lieutenant-Governor’s 
impending visit and asking him to consider a suitable 
welcome. A meeting of Rangpur1s zamindars and other first 
citizens rejected a resolution in favour of welcoming 
Puller; (other towns also refused to present the customary 
welcome) and the students of Rangpur Zillah School attended 
a meeting and procession at which MBande Mataram1' was 
shouted, patriotic songs were sung, and some rowdyism took 
place. The District Magistrate ordered that all 200 
students who participated in the meeting should be fined
1. P.C.Lyon to Inspectors of Schools, Rajshahi, Dacca, and 
Chittagong Divisions, 8 Nov. 1905, Annexure B to P.O. 
Iyon, 21 Peb, 1906, op.cit,
2. P.C.Iyon to Corns., Rajshahi, Dacca, and Chittagong Divi­
sions, 8 Nov. 1905, ‘Annexure B to P*C.Lyon, 21 Peb. 1906.
3. Englishman, 2 Dec, 1905.
Rs.5 before returning to the school and warned the boys
that if the incident was repeated the school would be
closed, In consequence, 400 students boycotted the school
1
while only 10 attended. W.C. Gupta and some other Rangpur 
men set up a new school for the boys - the "National 
Institution". After the District Magistrate tried in vain 
to get an undertaking from Gupta and his friends that the 
boys would not attend future political meetings, Gupta and 
22 other men were informed that they had been appointed 
special constables under Act V of 1861 by the District 
Superintendent of Police, A.Taffman, They were ordered to 
appear at the Police Lines for instructions and drill. Most 
of them refused, believing that their appointment as 
special constables had been made vindictively. Summonses 
were issued against fourteen of the men but W.C. Gupta 
appealed against their appointment. A High Court Judge 
ordered District Magistrate Emerson to show cause why the
prosecution of Gupta should not either be quashed or trans-
p
ferred to another magistrate, In February, 1906, upon the 
suggestion of the Chief Justice, the Advocate-General with­
drew the case against Gupta. ^  But 263 boys who refused to 
return to the Government or Government-aided schools in 
Rangpur had their names removed from the school lists, were 
disqualified from appearing at University examinations, and
1, Bengalee, 7 and 8 Nov, 1905.
2. Englishman, 2 Dec, 1905.
3* Englishman (Weekly Summary), 8 Peb. 1906,
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were refused transfer certificates.
Students were punished in other towns as well for 
their political activities* In Dacca, for instance, some 
students were fined for attending the Collegiate School 
barefooted. The Hindu students struck and an attempt was 
made to b u m  the school down but eventually all but 60 
students paid their fines and returned. Two other Dacca 
boys were caned for rescuing a prisoner from the police*
At Noakhali, one boy was caned, three were rusticated for 
one year, three others had their names removed from the 
rolls, and the Headmaster was dismissed after the students 
became involved in a minor political disorder* A student 
was caned at Jalpaiguri for picketing while five Hindu boys 
at Dinajpur were "whipped by the head master in the presence 
of the whole school" for having beaten up a Muslim boy who 
presented a petition to Lieutenant-Governor Duller. In 
three other instances boys were punished in Eastern Bengal 
through judicial action: in Madaripur a boy was fined and
sentenced to six weeks imprisonment for assaulting a 
European while in Mymensingh two students accused of an 
offence leading out of picketing were bound over to keep the 
peace. In several other cases, Government aid or recognition
1, Telegram from Ch.Sec., Govt, of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
to Govt, of India, Home Dept., 17 April 1906. June Prog. 
No.182, I.H.P. Pub., Vol.7312.
was withdrawn from schools and colleges. ^
The other means adopted by the Government of Eastern 
Bengal and Assam to prevent intimidation and lawlessness 
was to station extra police in the trouble spots, Mymensingh 
was one of the towns to which police reinforcements were 
sent. Throughout the month of November pickets had tried to 
prevent the purchase of foreign goods in Burrabazar, the 
main market of Mymensingh. The boy cotters claimed they used 
only verbal arguments to dissuade purchasers from using 
belati goods; the police and a small number of witnesses
2willing to testify maintained that intimidation was used.
A reporter of the Englishman went to Mymensingh to 
see the boycotters at work. He found that every afternoon 
at 4,30* the nearly empty Burrabazar would suddenly be 
filled with boys who rushed there as soon as school finished 
for the day. On the particular day the reporter visited, 
half a dozen police constables without lathis tried unsuc­
cessfully to move the crowd of pickets. Then a line of 20 
policemen with lathis advanced and the boys melted away 
down the street and into side alleys. Six constables were 
stationed at the far end of the bazaar from the police
1. P.C,Lyon, 21 Peb, 1906, op.cit, para,13. Also Telegram 
from Ch.Sec., Govt, of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 17 April 
1906, op.cit.
2. See the judgment delivered by R.R.Garlick, the Joint 
Magistrate of Mymensingh in the Mymensingh Swadeshi 
Case, Swadeshi Cases, pub. by the Swadeshi Club 
(Calcutta, i 906}> pp.56-66,
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station from where the reporter was watching. As it became 
dark, expectant crowds remained in the alleys and on the 
roof-tops. Suddenly there were cries of "Bande Mataram" 
as the six constables were "attacked by a shower of stones
1
and brick bats which came chiefly from the roofs of houses*"
Police reinforcements were sent and in the melee, several
2
constables were "seriously hurt". Five persons were 
arrested and taken to the police station where they stayed 
until some local pleaders appeared and put up security for 
them.^ All five were convicted subsequently for their part 
in the riot and the assault on the police. In passing 
sentence on them, the Joint Magistrate of Mymensingh took 
into account "the means they have evidently had at their 
command for their defense for which counsel from Calcutta 
was engaged as well as half the bar of Mymensingh," He 
sentenced each boy to 15 daysf rigorous imprisonment and a 
fine of Rs.300, Two other boys were fined Rs.100 each for
A
failing to disperse when ordered to.
Swadeshi speakers urged the people of Mymensingh to 
defy Government orders and to welcome the opportunity of 
going to jail because they would be able to teach the other 
prisoners to shout "Bande Mataram",
1, Englishman, 2 Dec, 1905.
2, P.C.Lyon, 21 Feb, 1906, op.cit, para,12(2),
3, Englishman, 2 Dec. 1905#
4# Swadeshi Cases, pp.65-66.
5, Partition ^eport, op.cit. para.57.
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Fifteen extra police constables were sent from Assam
to Serajganj, Pabna District, after the assault on Mr. Car-
berry of the Bank of Bengal. It was learned that the boycott
leaders planned to hire lathials to fight with the police
and, as a precaution, the police made special efforts to
keep firm control on the crowds in the town."*" On 4 December,
Sasadhar Neogy, a medical practitioner and an Honorary
Magistrate, complained to the Divisional Inspector of
Police that one of the constables from Assam had beaten him.
The next day Neogy filed a complaint with the Sub-divisional
Officer of Serajganj, A.Marr, claiming that after making
the complaint to the Divisional Inspector, he had been
stopped on the road by six constables of the Assam police
from
and struck with belts/front and behind* However the Sub- 
divisional Officer refused to take cognizance of Neogy*s 
complaint and he gave no reason for his action. Neogy1s 
pleader went before the Calcutta High Court to seek a 
ruling which would, in effect, require the Sub-divisional 
Officer to recognize the complaint against the police con­
stables. The ruling was obtained and the Sub-divisional 
Officer heard the case. He asked Neogy to accept an apology
from the accused constables and to drop the case. Neogy
2
reluctantly agreed. There seems to have been no doubt that 
the constables had behaved as Neogy had complained,^
1. P.C.byon, 21 Feb. 1906, op.cit. para.12(3).
2. Swadeshi Cases, pp.52-56.
3. See P.C.Iyon, 21 Feb. 1906, op.cit. para.12(3)*
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However, the use of police in Barisal caused far more 
controversy than the Seranganj incidents. Barisal was the
headquarters of Bakarganj District, the district in which 
foreign salt was forcibly taken from dealers and destroyed, 
boats carrying foreign goods were stoned and in two cases 
sunk, Lord Curzon's effigy was burnt at a mock sradh cere­
mony,’3* two Europeans were insulted and stoned, and in which, 
altogether 60 cases of lawlessness were reported. Lieutenant- 
Governor Puller decided that if further violence was to be 
prevented, a show of force was needed. He stationed a 
company of 100 Gurkhas from Assam in Bakarganj District and 
visited Barisal himself,2
While in Barisal, Puller called Aswini Kumar Dutt and 
four other boycott leaders to an interview on 15 November 
1905. These five men had previously issued a circular 
encouraging people to maintain the boycott of foreign goods 
in spite of Puller's circulars. Puller told the men that 
he thought the circular was likely to lead to disorders. 
According to their account as published in the 
Statesman and the Bengalee, Puller would not allow the men 
to explain and he bullied them into signing their names to 
a letter withdrawing the circular.^ The letter which the 
men signed was addressed to Puller's Private Secretary and
1, Offerings are given in honour of deceased ancestors at 
a sradh ceremony.
2, P.C. lyon, 21 Nov. 1905, op.cit* paras.3,4 and 8.
3, Bengalee, 3 Dec. 1905.
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[ it saidsi
f
f "We have the honour to state that as His
| Honour the Lieutenant-G-overnor is of the
opinion that our appeal *,, contains 
certain expressions that may tend to lead 
people to commit breaches of the peace, we 
withdraw the same and request the favour of 
your communicating it to his Honour«1,1
Fuller labelled as incorrect the many Indian newspaper
reports which said that his manner in the interview had been
rude and over-bearing, and that he had extracted the signa-
2tures against the will of the boycott leaders.
Two days after Fuller*s meeting with the Barisal 
leaders, the new District Magistrate,James Charles Jack, 
issued a notice in Bengali saying that the signatories of 
the Swadeshi circular had withdrawn their appeal, "having 
been convinced that there occur in it expressions of 
sedition [which tend] to excite the populace."^ This 
further annoyed the Barisal leaders, who, far from issuing 
a "seditious" appeal, had expressly written that in the 
boycott campaign, no laws should be broken, no force should 
be used, no false rumours disseminated, that nothing more 
extreme than "excommunication" could be used to persuade 
people to adopt the boycott*^
J.C.Jack also called a dozen of the boycott leaders to
1* Daily Hitavadi. 24 Nov. 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 
2  Dec, 1905, para.34.
2. P.C.Lyon, 21 Feb. 1906, op.cit. para.10.
Daily Hitavadi, 24 Nov, 1905, Bengal Newspaper Report, 
2 Dec, 1905, para.34*
4. Bengalee, 3 Dec. 1905.
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see him on 16 November# What he said to them was the subject 
of much discussion in the Bengal Press# Depositions were 
taken from each of the- men by A.J#Pugh, a Calcutta 
solicitor. These men included some of the leading Barisal 
pleaders, Municipal Councillors, including the Chairman, 
members of the District and Local Boards, the Principal of 
the Brojomohun College, a Brahmo missionary, and two medical 
practitioners. These men alleged that in interviews with one 
or two persons at a time, Jack asked them not to hold any 
meetings for a period of two weeks since there was a danger 
of a Muslim rising against the Hindus and public feeling was 
running high# Jack allegedly told some of the men that he 
would give their names to the Gurkha soldiers if there was 
any disturbance and he would be unable to protect them from 
the Gurkhas. He told six of the men that they ought to leave
Barisal for a fortnight, implying that otherwise they would
1
not be safe from the Gurkhas or the Muslims.
1, Swadeshi Cases, pp. 35-42# The 35 depositions recorded 
by A.J.Pugh also appear in the Bengalee, 10 Dec. 1905# 
According to Rajani Kanto Guha, principal of Brojomohun 
College, Jack asked "if you read Burke, ... what do you 
find there? If you address the lower class people you 
only inflame their passions. They do not understand 
reason.M
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Was there really as much danger of a Hindu-Muslim
explosion as J.C.Jack was said to have claimed? In the
report on the partition agitation sent by the Government of
Eastern Bengal and Assam, the supposed hostility of the
Muslims to the boycott movement is mentioned repeatedly. In
discussing the pressure applied by zamindars, castes, and
professional groups on users of foreign goods, Puller’s
report that "in all places, the members of the Muhammadan
community were more specially subjected to oppression of
this kind.1,1 Puller said that Muslim feeling had largely
influenced his decision to send police reinforcements to
2
Serajganj and to Bakarganj District. As soon as he 
arrived at Dacca on his tour of the transferred districts, 
a Muslim deputation called upon him to protect against the 
intimidation practiced by the boycotters.^ Yet the only 
specific evidence of Muslim feeling which Puller offered 
with regard to Serajganj and Barisal, where the tension was 
supposedly great, was a petition signed by some Muslims of 
Seraj^anj, dated 20 January 1906, two months after Jack’s 
interview and the dispatch of the extra police.^ The 
explanation that Hindu government officials prevented
1. P.C.Iyon, 21 Peb, 1906, op.cit. para.4.
2. Ibid, para.11.
3. Ibid, para.5
4. Annexure H to ibid.
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Muslims from filing complaints in court is not altogether 
convincing.^ The report of the Inspector-General of Police 
on the agitation in Bakarganj District gives less prominence 
to Hindu-Muslim antagonism. It mentioned a report of 
communal feeling in September against Hindu bullying but 
said that there had been no danger of violence. In one 
instance a zamindar1s peon was assaulted by six Muslims for 
trying to stop the sale of Liverpool salt but otherwise the 
Inspector-General seems not to have been worried about the
2
Muslim attitude towards the boycott in Bakarganj.
It would not be possible to decide without seeing 
the local reports whether Muslim hostility towards the boy­
cott tactics was such that drastic measures really were
necessary to prevent blood-shed or whether Sir Bampfylde
Puller and J.C.Jack greatly exaggerated the position in 
order to provide themselves with an excuse for frightening 
Aswini Kumar Dutt and the Barisal leaders into abandoning 
the boycott and for sending in the Gurkhas. The first possi­
bility is supported by the fact that generally the Muslim 
community was not opposed to the partition and that intimi­
dation was used by the boycotters on a large scale against
1. P.C.Iyon, 21 Peb. 1906, op.cit. para.5.
2# Partition Report, op.cit. para.57#
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both Hindus and Muslims. The second possibility is suggested 
by the absence of concrete evidence for Puller1s claim of 
Hindu-Muslim ill-feeling and by the general tone of Puller#s 
remarks on the agitation, which give the impression of ex­
aggeration, hostility to the Hindu political leaders, and a 
desire to suppress the agitation by harsh measures#
In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
when Puller’s Government stationed a total of 33 additional 
police in the villages of Madhabpasa, Banoripara, and 
Narotampur in Bakarganj District, the Muslims were exempted 
from payment of the costs which the villages had to bear 
for one year."*" But again, local records might reveal good 
reasons for this unusual manner of apportioning charges 
for punitive police.
If there really was a possibility that the Muslims 
were contemplating an attack on the boycott leaders, Jack’s 
alleged suggestion that the leaders should leave town was an 
unusual method of avoiding a communal outbreak.
Two law suits were initiated against J.C.Jack. One 
was by Aswini Kumar Dutt who claimed losses and damages 
amounting to Rs.10,000 because of the loss in public esteem 
and reputation caused by Jack’s vernacular notice which
1. Proclamations Nos. 1010J and 1011J, Jud. and Gen. Dept., 
16 Nov. 1905* Eastern Bengal and Assam Gazette,
18 Nov, 1905.
421
had said incorrectly that Dutt had admitted issuing a 
seditious leaflet* The other legal action was brought by 
Priya Nath Guha, editor of the Bikas newspaper, who claimed 
Rs.2,000 compensation for being humiliated in the public eye 
and for inconvenience and anxiety caused by Jack’s alleged 
warning that the Gurkhas would deal with him if he did not 
leave town*'*'
After Puller’s visit and Jack’s interviews the state 
of public feeling in Barisal remained tense. The behaviour 
of the Gurkha soldiers in particular, was resented. The 
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam claimed that the shop­
keepers of Barisal raised their prices against the Gurkhas 
so that it was necessary to impose a tariff on the whole 
bazaar. But 12 shop-keepers including 7 Muslims, signed
depositions alleging that Gurkhas had taken goods without
2
paying the full price.
On 23 November J.C.Jack called out the Gurkhas to 
prevent the holding of a political meeting which he believed 
was being planned. The Gurkhas dispersed the crowds in the 
streets with their lathis. A correspondent of the Bengalee
7
reported that they "beat people ... indiscriminatelyt
1. Englishman, 2 Dec. 1905#
2. ~Swade sni Case s * pp,46-47.
3* Bengalee^ 25 Nov, 1905. One telegram from Barisal to
*^ 19 Bengalee was stopped by the Director-General of
Telegrams "because it supposedly contained incorrect
information, Bengaleet 28 Nov. 1905*
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it is certain that they used their lathis freely. That the 
man who received the most severe injuries was a pleader 
named Syama Charan Dutt was almost certainly no coincidence. 
Syama Charan Dutt had filed a complaint against the Gurkhas 
on the previous day, alleging that 14 or 15 Gurkha soldiers 
had entered the shop of his client, a sweet-vendor, on 18 
November, assaulted him, and removed a sign board containing 
the words "/Bande Mataram” and "Brother, use indigenous 
goods”. When the sweet-vendor first went to the police stat­
ion to make his complaint, the officer in charge had refused 
to record his statement,^"
About a dozen cases were instituted against the
2
Gurkhas for assault and trespass. The Bengal newspapers 
reported that a reign of terror had been imposed upon 
Barisal,^ The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam 
declared that an unscrupulous campaign was being carried on 
against the Gurkhas but it gave only one set of evidence 
for this allegations a statement drawn up by some Barisal 
leaders alleging that a mehtar (sweeper) woman had been 
indecently assaulted by a Gurkha soldier in Barisal and 
two statements from the mehtar woman and her husband denying
A
the occurrence of the assault. The use of this evidenoe
1. Swadeshi Cases, pp. 44-45 and 49.
2. Bengalee, 3 Dec. 1905.
3. See Bengal Newspaper Report, 2 Dec. 1905, paras.38-50.
4. Annexure P to P.C.Byon, 21 Peb. 1906, op.cit.
to prove that popular charges against the Gurkhas were 
untrue suggests that Lieutenant-Governor Puller reported 
the facts of the agitation with a definite lack of candour. 
In fact, the treatment of the Barisal mehtar assault case 
by Puller was so peculiar that the facts may be stated. On 
the morning of 10 December 1905, a mehtar woman was knocked 
down in Barisal. Her screams attracted a number of people 
who gave statements to the municipal overseer* The woman 
herself was said to have claimed that a Gurkha attempted 
to outrage her but subsequently she and her husband denied 
that she gave such a statement,^ The Weekly Chronicle 
of Sylhet published an article on 13 December stating that 
a Gurkha soldier tried to rape a sweeper woman in Barisal. 
The Assistant Superintendent of Police was deputed to in­
vestigate the allegation and he reported that he believed
an assault was made but that it was by someone other than a 
2
Gurkha. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam then
1. Statements of Mangli Methrani and Gunput Methar, laid on 
the table of the Legislative Council of India on 21 March 
1906 by Sir Arundel Arundel*
Enclosure to Memorandum from J.M.MacPherson, Sec., Govt, 
of India, Leg, Dept., to H.H.Risley, Sec., Govt, of India, 
Home Dept. 22 March 1906. May Prog. No.293* I.H.P.,Pub., 
Vol.7312,
2. Dated 14 Dec. 1905, Annexure (to P.C.Iyon, Ch.Sec., Govt, 
of Eastern Bengal and Assam, to Sec., Govt, of India.
1 May 1906. May Prog. No.296, I.H.P.,Pub., Vol.7312.
declared that the Weekly Chronicle had made "a gross mis­
statement" and it withdrew all official advertisements from 
the newspaper and refused to supply it with any further 
official information and publications.
G.K.Gokhale, in the Legislative Council of India on 
21 March 1906, asked why the newspaper was not prosecuted 
or why, if the Weekly Chronicled  report had been incorrect, 
the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam did not make a poll 
statement. Gokhale asked a similar question on 28 March. On 
21 March Sir Arundel Arundel replied that the allegation of 
a Gurkha assault had been disproved; on 28 March he said 
that the Government of India was not aware of any statement 
alleged to have been made by the mehtar woman charging a 
Gurkha with attempted rape. Sir Arundel Arundel gave these 
answers after Puller had supplied the "facts" to the 
Government of India in letters of 21 February and 17 March. 
But in these letters, Puller deliberately suppressed the 
alleged statement of the mehtar woman, the report by the 
Superintendent of Police saying that an assault 
almost certainly had been committed, and the statements by 
"five apparently respectable witnesses" whose testimony 
indicated that the assailant must have been a Gurkha.
Puller knew of the report and the statements because he had 
visited Barisal on 19 December and seen the papers himself*
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Fuller also must have known that an admission of assault 
by the woman would have led to social ostracism or disgrace 
for her and her husband and that therefore her denial of 
the assault was not a solid piece of evidence. The Govern­
ment of India ordered Fuller to restore Government patronage 
and advertisements to the Sylhet Weekly Chronicle, com­
menting that the Eastern Bengal and Assam Governments 
action had not been "either justifiable or judicious."**"
Towards the end of 1905 the boycott movement in 
Bengal died down, partly because its participants had spent 
their energy, partly because Government measures against 
boycotters and students made it increasingly difficult to 
enforce. Many politicians also realized that with a new 
Liberal Government in England and a new Viceroy in India, 
the chances of Indian reform were improved.
The swadeshi and boycott movements were adopted by a 
limited number of people outside Bengal. The movement gained 
the most support in Bombay and in areas where Bengalis lived, 
especially in the Central Provinces. Bengali clerks in the 
Bengal-Nagpur Railway offices in Calcutta were reported to
1. H.H.Risley, Sec., Govt, of India, Home Dept., to P.C, 
Iyon, Ch.Sec., Govt, of Eastern Bengal and Assam,
31 May, 1906.
426
have obtained railway passes for the Puja holidays and then 
to have turned them over to swadeshi agitators who travelled 
to JubboLpur and Nagpur* The Arya Samaj and the Maratha 
Brahmans were also active in the Central Provinces, Among 
the Poona Brahmans who visited the Central Provinces were
B.G.Tilak, Mrs. M.V.Joshi, and the son of Sivaram Mahadeo 
Paranjpe * ^
In the United Provinces, the swadeshi movement was
reported from 23 districts. Here also the Bengalis and the
Arya Samaj were active. An unusually large number of
Bengalis visited Benares during the Durga Pujas» and Bengali
school boys staged "Bande Mataram" processions. One of the
prominent speakers at Benares swadeshi meetings was K.P,
Chatter ji, editor of the Lahore Tribune. Annie Besant, the
proprietress of the Central Hindu College at Benares, told
her students not to participate in politics and she
2
prevented them from entering school barefooted. Her effigy 
was subsequently burnt.
In the Punjab, too, the movement was led by the Arya 
Samaj and the Bengalis including K.P.Chatterji and the 
Tribune f s sub-editor, A.L.Roy, as well as'Sarala Devi
1. Confidential Report on the effect of the anti-partition 
agitation on Provinces other than Bengal, by P.C.Daly, 
Special Asst, to Inspr.-Genl, of Police and C .J,Stevenson- 
Moore, Inspector-General of Police, L.P.,26 Jan,1906., 
paras. 1-4 and 31-47, Enclosure to R.W.Carlyle,
25 Jan. 1906, op.cit.
2, Ibid, paras, 5-30.
j
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Grhosal, wife of Ham Bhuj Butt, daughter of J. Ghosal, and 
niece of Rabindranath Tagore.^"
The swadeshi movement in Madras appeared "to have
2
been remarkably feeble".
In Bombay Presidency the boycott movement was led by 
Tilak and S.M.Paranjpe who addressed meetings in many dif­
ferent towns. In Poona on Partition Bay - 16 October - the 
crowds shouted "Bande Mataram" and wore rakhis which were 
said to have been sent by Surendra Nath Banerjea and Sarala 
Bevi Ghosal, A number of boycott meetings were held in 
places of worship in Bombay Presidency and in three towns, 
school boys refused to write their examinations on belati 
paper. In Kolhapur State some students at the Rajaram High 
School tore up their examination papers and the principal, 
Mr, Lucy, made the boys submit to corporal punishment befor*:* 
being allowed to sit for the exams. The Sanskrit teacher 
at the school, who was believed to have encouraged the 
students, was dismissed by the Political Agent. The Super­
intendent of Police at Nasik found the words "the Europeans 
will soon be driven out of India" written in the sand on the 
local golf course.^
1. Ibid, paras. 75-86.
2. Ibid, para. 87.
3. Ibid, paras, 49-74.
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While the Bengali boycott leaders had encouraged the 
workers to demand and strike for better working conditions 
and higher wages, in Bombay the boycott leaders reacted 
differently to the labour movement, The Times of India 
and the Bombay Gazette had been supporting the factory 
workers1 campaign for shorter working hours. But this 
campaign came at an inopportune time for the European and 
Indian textile mill owners who had received, because of the 
swadeshi and boycott movements, far more orders than usual. 
By the end of September all the Bombay mills had sold their 
textile supplies for the next six months. The mills were 
working over-time with the assistance of electric lighting 
which had recently been installed. The workers who had been 
demanding shorter hours objected to the use of electric 
light and on Sunday, 8 October, when the lights were 
switched on at 6,15 p.m. at the Phoenix Mill, a crowd of 
workers gathered and tried to compel all the workers to 
strike. The crowd smashed the time-keeper*s office and 
destroyed the records and papers they found there. The next 
day a crowd estimated at 10,000 persons assembled and 
threatened to smash the machinery in the textile mills if 
the lights were turned on. As a precaution, several mills
1, Ibid, para.74.
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were shut down. Prompt police action and a number of prose- 
1
cutions restored order and the mills returned to normal* 
When Tilak and S.M.Paranjpe addressed a swadeshi meeting in 
Bombay City, they complained that the .workers had been mis­
led although Paranjpe also criticised the Bombay manufact-
2
urers for raising their prices. One Bombay mill was 
selling its cloth at 30 to 40$ more than the price of 
English cloth of the same quality.*^
Despite the attempts made to popularize the boycott, 
it was not adopted on any substantial scale outside of 
Bengal.
The partition of Bengal, viewed as an act of admini­
stration, was a gigantic blunder which stirred up feelings 
which, it may be said with hind-sight, would one day 
probably have been aroused in any case. But before the 
partition was attempted, the nationalist movement was 
suffering from lassitude and incompetent leadership. Lord 
Curzon, from the nationalist point of view, performed a 
"great service to India". As the Bengalee said, "there
1. Of the ten persons convicted for offences connected with 
the riot of 8 October, six were under 16 years of age.
2. Bombay Gazette (Overland Summary), 21 Oct. 1905*
3. Confidential Heport on the effect of the anti-partition 
agitation on Provinces other than Bengal, para.74.
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comes a period in the history of national evolution when 
repression does not destroy, hut rather helps the 
beginnings of national life. We have arrived at this 
momentous stage."1 Lord Curzon almost certainly was not 
thinking of "repression"when he divided Bengal, hut that 
did not make the partition any less objectionahle.
**-• Bengalee, 15 June 1905.
CONCLUSION
In the years 1897 to 1905 the Government of India 
did not pursue a comprehensive policy towards nationalism, 
Instead, it dealt with individual problems as they suggested 
themselves. When it suspected a conspiracy against British 
rule, it arrested two nationalist leaders who were believed 
to be capable of intrigue* When the newspapers published 
inflammatory articles, it prosecuted a number of editors 
and strengthened the law of sedition* When disaffection was 
discovered in the schools, it tightened European control 
and supervision over Indian education, In each case, the 
Government was reacting to a specific threat.
The Government also attempted to strengthen its 
position by assisting the upper and lower classes to 
maintain themselves in an uneven competition for land, 
education, and government employment. However, this policy 
grew as much out of British ideas of economic expediency 
and justice as it did out of an attempt to undermine the 
strength of nationalism.
Most of the main irritants between the Government and 
the Congress were policies which were not designed to 
counter nationalism. The Government not only maintained the 
existing European dominance in the Civil Service and the
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Legislative Councils, but Lord Curzon even announced in
t'irjcl VC
1904, twenty-twe-years after the last constitutional
changes, that the "intellectual and moral progressM of
India would "he imperilled and thrown hack if it is
associated with a perpetual clamour for constitutional
change." Curzon thereby informed the Congress that no
reform was heing contemplated.*1* He also turned down a
suggestion hy Wedderburn that the Government should give
"a friendly, though perhaps informal, recognition of the
purposes of the Congress as a constitutional means of
bringing before the Government a responsible expression of
2
the Indian view of Indian affairs." Wedderburn thought 
that without such recognition, "the constitutional 
movement may continue, but tinged with undesirable 
acerbity, or it may collapse, in which case there will be 
serious danger of underground machinations, to defeat 
which was a leading object of the original Congress 
promoters,"^ Curzon informed Wedderburn that he could not 
give any form of recognition to the Congress because there 
were "extreme men" associated with it. Parnell, he said,
1. Debate on Financial Statement, India Leg. Council, 
Prog., 30 March, 1904, p.560.
2. Wedderburn to Curzon, 10 July 1902, No. 121, 
C.P.E.A., 1901-1904, Curzon Papers.
3. Wedderburn to CuVzon, 11 Oct. 1900, No.188, 
C.P.E.A., 1899-19^1, Curzon Papers.
had tried to keep men with extreme objectives in his party 
and had "failed utterly#
One of the obvious means of dealing with nationalism 
is granting concessions gradually or at least holding out 
the prospect of future concessions. Yet Curzon saw no 
reason to raise the hopes of the nationalists. He believed 
that the English possessed special qualities which were 
not shared by the people of India and that these qualities, 
if accompanied by efficient government, would ensure the 
continuation of British rule indefinitely. Because of the 
deficiencies he perceived in the Indian character, Curzon 
thought that any devolution of responsibility would 
decrease efficiency and thereby place British rule in 
danger. And if England should ever lose India, it would 
mean that England would decline to a third-rate power. If 
there had been historical precedents of Asian or African 
national movements seriously challenging a colonial power, 
Curzon might have pursued a less provocative policy. Or if 
he had not been misled by the feebleness of the Congress 
and if he had made an attempt to understand the forces 
at work in Indian society, he. might have avoided the
1. Curzon to Wedderburn, 15 Aug, 1902, No.116, C.P.E.A., 
1901-1904, Curzon Papers.
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blunder he committed in partitioning Bengal,
In the years 1897 to 1904 Indian nationalism showed 
fewer outward signs of strength than in the 1870s and 
1880s, Nevertheless vital changes in the character of the 
movement were taking place. The small group of men who 
ran the Congress seemed to be as impressed by the fact of 
their leadership as they were by the urgency of their 
demands for political and economic reform. Pew of the 
older leaders had had personal experience of economic 
deprivation and most of them, having uncritically 
adopted their political ideas from England, failed to 
understand or refused to exploit the religious and 
racial passions which were the potential source of a truly 
popular movement in India. B.G-.Tilak and lajpat Rai 
insisted upon the necessity of bringing the lower classes 
into the nationalist movement and of adopting tougher 
tactics. However, as the Congress was not conducted 
according to democratic or constitutional procedures, i t —- 
was not possible to remove the older leadership which 
resisted extreme forms of agitation. There were experiments 
in this period with new methods - the no rent campaign, 
the resignation of municipality seats, the walk-out from a 
Legislative Council. The Chapekars even carried out a 
political assassination.
If there was anything which united moderates and 
extremists, and reformers and conservatives, it was the 
belief that Indian society lacked altruism and the 
willingness to make self-sacrifices. The newspapers, the 
Congress, and the Social Conferences returned to this 
theme again and again. It was evident that a .more 
dedicated commitment to nationalism might provide the 
sense of purpose that was needed. The Russo-Japanese War 
contributed to the feeling that Europeans were not 
invincible nor Asians inferior, and the partition of 
Bengal provoked the Bengalis to try and prove it.
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of C. 8511.
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Cd.1179. Famine and Relief Operations, 1900-02.
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249. Moral and Material Progress and Condition 
of India during 1901-02, and the nine 
preceding years (Decennial Report).
Cd,1713* Railways: Report on the Administration 
and Y/orking of, by Mr. Thomas Robertson, 
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Cd.2746. Reconstitution of the Provinces of
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1885)*
Speeches of Babu Surendra Nath 
BaneTr ,-jea, 1880-84* Vol. 1Y, (Calcutta 
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Vol.II, (Ludhiana i960?)
Chintamani, C . Indian Social Reform In Four Parts
Yajnesvara.(ed.) Being a Collection of Essays^
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(Calcutta 1936).
i
453
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Modern Religious Movements in India.
--------------- -------- n T e V T T o ? F T 9T 8T:----
The Indian Municipality and Some 
Practical Hints on its Everyday Work.
(Calcutta 1$09)•
Fraser, Andrew H.L.
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